Roman infantry tactics
Encyclopedia
Roman infantry tactics refers to the theoretical and historical deployment, formation and maneuvers of the Roman
infantry from the start of the Roman Republic
to the fall of the Western Roman Empire. The article first presents a short overview of Roman training. Roman performance against different types of enemies is then analyzed. Finally a summation of what made the Roman tactics and strategy militarily effective through their long history is given below, as is a discussion of how and why this effectiveness eventually disappeared.
The focus below is primarily on Roman tactics - the "how" of their approach to battle, and how it stacked up against a variety of opponents over time. It does not attempt detailed coverage of things like army structure or equipment. Various battles are summarized to illustrate Roman methods with links to detailed articles on individual encounters. For in depth background on the historical structure of the infantry
relevant to this article, see Structure of the Roman military. For a history of Rome's military campaigns see Campaign history of the Roman military. For detail on equipment, daily life and specific Legions see Roman Legion
and Roman military personal equipment.
and strategy
evolved from that typical of a small tribal host seeking local hegemony, to massive operations encompassing a world empire
. This advance was affected by changing trends in Roman political, social and economic life, and that of the larger Mediterranean world, but it was also undergirded by a distinctive "Roman way" of war. This approach included a tendency towards standardization and systematization, practical borrowing, copying and adapting from outsiders, flexibility in tactics and methods, a strong sense of discipline, a ruthless persistence that sought comprehensive victory, and a cohesion brought about by the ideal of Roman citizenship
under arms - embodied in the Legion
. These elements waxed and waned over time, but they form a distinct basis underlying Rome's rise.
Some key phases of this evolution
throughout Rome's military
history would include:
Combat training exercises consisted of thrusting with a wooden gladius
into a quintain (wooden dummy) while wearing full armor, and sparring with one another. Legionaries were trained to thrust with their gladii because they could defend themselves behind their large shields (scuta
) while stabbing the enemy. The Romans were well aware that a wound of only 3 cm or 4 cm could cause death, so they emphasized quick, stabbing techniques to vital areas or between gaps in armor. Contemporary artistic depictions of Roman soldiers fighting, including Trajan's Column
in Rome, depict them as standing with their left foot and shield forward with their right foot back and turned outwards ninety degrees. Some believe this indicates a boxing
-like style of fighting where the shield in the left is used to jab and harass the enemy while the sword in the right is used to deliver the final blow.
In all likelihood however it is probably designed to allow for attacking with a passing motion similar to later medieval European Martial Arts which use a similar stance for armoured combat.
The benefit of attacking on what would later be dubbed the half pass is that the unit could remain in formation with each motion, as breaking formation was a great risk this along with their stance suggests such footwork is more likely than the boxing style suggested by some.
Other training exercises taught the legionary to obey commands and assume battle formations. At the end of training the legionary had to swear an oath of loyalty to the SPQR
(Senatus Populusque Romanus, or the Senate and the Roman People) or later to the emperor
. The soldier was then given a diploma
and sent off to fight for his living and the glory and honor of Rome.
(one heavy, one light) and 15 days' food rations. There were also tools for digging and constructing a castra
, the legions' fortified base camp. One writer recreates the following as to Caesar's army in Gaul: Each soldier arranged his heavy pack on a T or Y-shaped rod, borne on his left shoulder. Shields were protected on the march with a hide cover. Each legionnaire carried about 5 days worth of wheat, pulses or chickpeas, a flask of oil and a mess kit with a dish, cup, and utensil. Personal items might include a dyed horsehair crest for the helmet, a semi-water resistant oiled woolen cloak, socks and breeches for cold weather and a blanket. Entrenchment equipment included a shallow wicker basket for moving earth, a spade and/or pick-axe like dolabra, or turf cutter, and two wooden staves to construct the next camp palisade. All these were arranged in the marching pack toted by each infantryman.
Fighters travelled in groups of 8, and each octet was sometimes assigned a mule. The mule carried a variety of equipment and supplies, including a mill for grinding grain, a small clay oven for baking bread, cooking pots, spare weapons, waterskins, and tents. A Roman century had a complement of 10 mules, each attended by two non-combatants who handled foraging and water supply. A century might be supported by wagons in the rear, each drawn by 6 mules, and carrying tools, nails, water barrels, extra food and the tent and possessions of the centurion- commanding officer of the unit.
, the basic mass fighting force. The legion was split into ten sub-units called cohorts
, roughly comparable to a modern infantry battalion. The cohorts were further sub-divided into three maniples
, which in turn were split into two centuries
of about 60-100 men each. The first cohort in a legion was usually the strongest, with the fullest personnel complement and with the most skilled, experienced men. Several legions grouped together made up a distinctive field force or "army". Fighting strength could vary but generally a legion was made up of 4,800 soldiers, 60 centurions, 300 artillerymen, and 100 engineers and artificers, and around 1,600 non-combatants. Each legion was supported by a unit of 300 cavalry, the equites.
Supreme command of either legion or army was by consul
or proconsul
or a praetor
, or in cases of emergency in the Republican era, a dictator
. A praetor
or a propraetor could only command a single legion and not a consular army, which normally consisted of two legions plus the allies. In the early Republican period it was customary for an army to have dual commands, with different consuls holding the office on alternate days. In later centuries this was phased out in favor of one overall army commander. The legati
were officers of senatorial rank who assisted the supreme commander. Tribunes were young men of aristocratic rank who often supervised administrative tasks like camp construction. Centurions
(roughly equivalent in rank to today's non-commissioned or junior officers, but functioning as modern captains in field operations) commanded cohorts, maniples and centuries. Specialist groups like engineers and artificers were also used.
and Roman Legion
for a detailed breakdown. Below is a very basic summary of the legion's structure and ranks.
were among some of the best in the ancient world over the centuries- from the deployment of purchasing agents to systematically buy provisions during a campaign, to the construction of roads and supply caches, to the rental of shipping if the troops had to move by water. Heavy equipment and material (tents, artillery
, extra weapons and equipment, millstones etc.) was moved by pack animal and cart, while troops carried weighty individual packs with them, including staves and shovels for constructing the fortified camps. Typical of all armies, local opportunities were also exploited by troops on the spot, and the fields of peasant farmers unlucky enough to be near the zone of conflict might be stripped to meet army needs. As with most armed forces, an assortment of traders, hucksters, prostitutes and other miscellaneous service providers trailed in the wake of the Roman fighting men.
Construction of fortified camps. Legions on a campaign typically established a strong field camp, complete with palisade
and a deep ditch, providing a basis for supply storage, troop marshaling and defense. Camps were recreated each time the army moved, and were constructed with a view to both military necessity and religious symbolism. There were always four gateways, connected by two main criss-crossing streets, with the intersection at a concentration of command tents in the center. Space was also made for an altar and religious gathering area. Everything was standardized, from the positioning of baggage, equipment and specific army units, to the duties of officers who were to set up sentries, pickets and orders for the next day's march. Construction could take between 2 to 5 hours with part of the army laboring, while the rest stood guard, depending on the tactical situation. The shape of the camp was generally rectangular, but could vary based on the terrain or tactical situation. A distance of about 60 meters was left clear between the entrenchments and the first row of troop tents. This gap provided space for marshaling the legionnaires for battle and kept the troop area out of enemy missile range. No other ancient army persisted over such a long period in systematic camp construction like the Romans, even if the army rested for only a single day.
Breaking camp and marching. After a regimented breakfast at the allocated time, trumpets were sounded and the camp's tents and huts were dismantled and preparations made for departure. The trumpet then sounded again with the signal for "stand by to march". Mule
s and wagons of the baggage train would be loaded and units formed up. The camp would then be burned to the ground to prevent its later occupation and use by the enemy. The trumpet
s would then be sounded for a final time and then the troops asked three times whether they were ready, to which they were expected to shout together "Ready!", before marching off.
Intelligence. Good Roman commanders did not hesitate to exploit useful intelligence
, particularly where a siege situation or impending clash in the field was developing. Information was gathered from spies, collaborators, diplomats and envoys, and allies. Intercepted messages during the Second Punic War
for example were an intelligence coup for the Romans, and enabled them to dispatch two armies to find and destroy Hasdrubal
's Carthaginian force, preventing his reinforcement of Hannibal. Commanders also kept an eye on the situation in Rome since political enemies and rivals could use an unsuccessful campaign to inflict painful career and personal damage. During this initial phase the usual field reconnaissance
was also conducted - patrols might be sent out, raids mounted to probe for weaknesses, prisoners snatched, and local inhabitants intimidated.
Morale. If the field of potential battle were near, movement became more careful and more tentative. Several days might be spent in a location studying the terrain and opposition, while the troops were prepared mentally and physically for battle. Pep talks, sacrifices to the gods and the announcements of good omen
s might be carried out. A number of practical demonstrations might also be undertaken to test enemy reaction as well as to build troop morale. Part of the army might be led out of the camp and drawn up in battle array towards the enemy. If the enemy refused to come out and at least make a demonstration, the commander could claim a morale advantage for his men, contrasting the timidity of the opposition with the resolution of his fighting forces.
Historian Adrian Goldsworthy notes that such tentative pre-battle maneuvering was typical of ancient armies as each side sought to gain maximum advantage before the encounter. During this period, some ancient writers paint a picture of meetings between opposing commanders for negotiation or general discussion, as with the famous pre-clash conversation between Hannibal and Scipio
at Zama
. But whatever the truth of these discussions, or the flowery speeches allegedly made, the only encounter that ultimately mattered was battle.
.
in the first rank (that nearest the enemy), the principes
in the second rank, and the veteran triarii
in the third and final rank as barrier troops
, or sometimes even further back as a strategic reserve. When in danger of imminent defeat, the first and second lines, the Hastati and Principes, ordinarily fell back on the Triarii to reform the line to allow for either a counter-attack or an orderly withdrawal. Because falling back on the Triarii was an act of desperation, to mention "falling on the Triarii" ("ad triarios rediisse") became a common Roman phrase indicating one to be in a desperate situation.
Within this triplex acies system, contemporary Roman writers talk of the maniples adopting a checkered formation called quincunx
when deployed for battle but not yet engaged. In the first line, the hastati left gaps equal in size to their cross-sectional area between each maniple. The second line consisting of principes followed in a similar manner, lining up behind the gaps left by the first line. This was also done by the third line, standing behind the gaps in the second line. The velites were deployed in front of this line in a continuous, loose-formation line.
The Roman maneuver was a complex one, filled with the dust of thousands of soldiers wheeling into place, and the shouting of officers moving to and fro as they attempted to maintain order. Several thousand men had to be positioned from column into line, with each unit taking its designated place, along with light troops and cavalry. The fortified camps were laid out and organized to facilitate deployment. It might take some time for the final array of the host, but when accomplished the army's grouping of legions represented a formidable fighting force, typically arranged in three lines with a frontage as long as one mile (1.6 km).
A general three line deployment was to remain over the centuries, although the Marian reforms
phased out most divisions based on age and class, standardized weapons and reorganized the legions into bigger maneuver units like cohorts. The overall size of the legion, and length of the soldier's service also increased on a more permanent basis.
in front would throw their javelins at the enemy and then retreat through the gaps in the lines. This was an important innovation since in other armies of the period skirmishers would have to either retreat through their own armies ranks, causing confusion, or else flee around either flank of their own army. After the velites had retreated through the hastati, the 'posterior' century would march to the left and then forward so that they presented a solid line, creating a solid line of soldiers. The same procedure would be employed as they passed through the second and third ranks or turned to the side to channel down the gap between the first and second rows on route to help guard the legion's flanks.
At this point, the legion then presented a solid line to the enemy and the legion was in the correct formation for engagement. When the enemy closed, the hastati would charge. If they were losing the fight, the 'posterior' century returned to its position creating gaps again. Then the maniples would fall back through the gaps in the principes, who followed the same procedure to form a battle line and charge. If the principes could not break the enemy, they would retreat behind the triarii and the whole army would leave the battlefield in good order. According to some writers, the triarii formed a continuous line when they deployed, and their forward movement allowed scattered or discomfited units to rest and reform, to later rejoin the struggle.
The manipular system allowed engaging every kind of enemy even in rough terrain, because the legion had both flexibility and toughness according to the deployment of its lines. Lack of a strong cavalry corps however, was a major flaw of the Roman forces.
In the later imperial army, the general deployment was very similar, with the cohorts deploying in quincunx pattern. In a reflection of the earlier placement of the veteran triarii in the rear, the less experienced cohorts - usually the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 8th - were in the front; the more experienced cohorts - 1st, 5th, 7th, 9th, and 10th - were placed behind.
, Scipio deployed his entire legion in a single line to envelop Hannibal's army just as Hannibal had done at Cannae
. A brief summary of alternative formations known to have been used is shown below:
, and the following ranks hurled theirs over the heads of the front-line fighters. If a cast pilum did not cause direct death or injury, they were designed to bend on contact, rendering the pila unusable by the enemy. After the pila were cast, the soldiers then drew their swords and engaged the enemy. Emphasis was on using the shield to provide maximum body coverage, while attacking that exposed by the enemy. In the combat that ensued, Roman discipline, heavy shield, armor and training were to give them important advantages.
The acute shock of combat. Some scholars of the Roman infantry maintain that the intense trauma
and stress of hand to hand combat meant that the contenders did not simply hack at one another continuously until one dropped. Instead there were short periods of intense, vicious fighting. If indecisive, the contenders might fall back a short distance to recuperate, and then surge forward to renew the struggle. Others behind them would be stepping up into the fray meanwhile, engaging new foes or covering their colleagues. The individual warrior could thus count on temporary relief, rather than endless fighting until death or crippling injury. As the battle progressed, the massive physical and mental stress intensified. The stamina and willpower demanded to make yet one more charge, to make yet one more surge grew even greater. Eventually one side began to break down, and it is then that the greatest slaughter began.
Use of war machines and covering fire. Many Roman battles, especially during the late empire, were fought with the preparatory fire from Ballista
s and Onagers
. These war machines, a form of ancient artillery
, fired arrows and large stones towards the enemy (although many historians question the battlefield effectiveness of such weapons). Following this barrage, the Roman infantry advanced, in four lines, until they came within 30 meters of the enemy, then they halted, hurled their pila and charged. If the first line was repelled by the enemy, another line would rapidly resume the attack. Often this rapid sequence of deadly attacks proved the key of victory. Another common tactic was to taunt the enemy with feigned charges and rapid arrow fire by the auxiliares equites (auxiliary cavalry), forcing the enemy into pursuing them, and then leading the enemy into an ambush where they would be counter attacked by Roman heavy infantry and cavalry.
seem to imply that the legions could fight with gaps in their lines. Yet, most sources seem to admit that more usually a line would form into a solid front. Various approaches have been taken to reconcile these possibilities with the ancient writings. The advantages of gaps are obvious when a formation is on the move- it can more easily flow around obstacles and maneuver and control are enhanced and, as the Romans did in the pre-Marius republic, place baggage between the lines meaning that the cargo cannot be easily captured and that the army can quickly get ready for a battle by using it as cover. After the approach marching was complete, it would be extremely difficult to deploy an unbroken army of men for combat across any but the flattest ground without some sort of intervals. Many ancient armies used gaps of some sort, even the Carthaginians, who typically withdrew their initial skirmishing troops between the spaces before the main event. Even more loosely organized enemies like the Germanic hosts typically charged in distinct groups with small gaps between them, rather than marching up in a neat line.
Fighting with gaps is thus feasible as writers like Polybius assert. According to those who support that the quincunx formation view, what made the Roman approach stand out is that their intervals were generally larger and more systematically organized than those of other ancient armies. Each gap was covered by maniples or cohorts from lines farther back. A penetration of any significance could not just slip in unmolested. It would not only be mauled as it fought past the gauntlet of the first line, but would also clash with aggressive units moving up to plug the space. From a larger standpoint, as the battle waxed and waned, fresh units might be deployed through the intervals to relieve the men of the first line, allowing continual pressure to be brought forward.
. Yet another is a closing phase maneuver, when a solid line is constructed to make a last, final push as in the battle of Zama
. During the maelstrom of battle it is also possible that as the units merged into line, the general checkerboard spacing became more compressed or even disappeared, and the fighting would see a more or less solid line engaged with the enemy. Thus gaps at the beginning of the struggle might tend to vanish in the closing phases.
Some historians view the intervals as primarily useful in maneuver. Before the legionnaires closed with the enemy each echelon would form a solid line to engage. If things went badly for the first line, it would retreat through the gaps and the second echelon moved up- again forming a continuous front. Should they be discomfited, there still remained the veterans of the triarii who let the survivors retreat through the preset gaps. The veterans then formed a continuous front to engage the enemy or provided cover for the retreat of the army as a whole. The same procedure was followed when the triarii was phased out - intervals for maneuver, reforming and recovery- solid line to engage. Some writers maintain that in Caesar's
armies the use of the quincunx and its gaps seems to have declined, and his legions generally deployed in three unbroken lines as shown above, with four cohorts in front, and three apiece in the echeloned order. Relief was provided by the second and third lines 'filtering' forward to relieve their comrades in small groups, while the exhausted and wounded eased back from the front. The Romans still remained flexible however, using gaps and deploying four or sometimes two lines based on the tactical situation.
-type forces. Phalanxes might deepen their ranks heavily to add both stamina and shock power, but their general approach still favored one massive line, as opposed to the deep three-layer Roman arrangement. The advantage of the Roman system is that it allowed the continual funneling or metering of combat power forward over a longer period—massive, steadily renewed pressure to the front—until the enemy broke. Deployment of the second and third lines required careful consideration by the Roman commander. Deployed too early, and they might get entangled in the frontal fighting and become exhausted. Deployed too late, and they might be swept away in a rout if the first line began to break. Tight control had to be maintained, hence the 3rd line triari were sometimes made to squat or kneel, effectively discouraging premature movement to the front. The Roman commander was thus generally mobile, constantly moving from spot to spot, and often riding back in person to fetch reserves, if there was no time for standard messenger service. The large number of officers in the typical Roman army, and the flexible breakdown into sub-units like cohorts or maniples greatly aided coordination of such moves.
Whatever the actual formation taken however, the ominous funneling or surge of combat power up to the front remained constant:
Field fortifications. While strong cities/forts and elaborate sieges to capture them were common throughout the ancient world, the Romans were unique among ancient armies in their extensive use of field fortifications. In campaign after campaign, enormous effort was expended to dig- a job done by the ordinary legionnaire. His field pack included a shovel, a dolabra
or pickaxe, and a wicker basket for hauling dirt. Some soldiers also carried a type of turf cutter. With these they dug trenches, built walls and palisades and constructed assault roads. The operations of Julius Caesar
at Alesia
are well known. The Gallic city was surrounded by massive double walls penning in defenders, and keeping out relieving attackers. A network of camps and forts were included in these works. The inner trench alone was 20 feet (6.1 m) deep, and Caesar diverted a river to fill it with water. The ground was also sown with caltrops of iron barbs at various places to discourage assault. Surprisingly for such an infantry centered battle, Caesar relied heavily on cavalry
forces to counter Gallic sorties. Ironically, many of these were from Germanic tribes who had come to terms earlier.
The power of Roman field camps has been noted earlier, but in other actions, the Romans sometimes used trenches to secure their flanks against envelopment when they were outnumbered, as Caesar did during operations in Belgaic Gaul
. In the Brittany
region of France, moles
and breakwaters were constructed at enormous effort to assault the estuarine strongholds of the Gauls. Internal Roman fighting between Caesar and Pompey also saw the frequent employment of trenches, counter-trenches, dug-in strong points, and other works as the contenders maneuvered against each other in field combat. In the latter stages of the empire, the extensive use of such field fortifications declined as the heavy infantry itself was phased down. Nevertheless they are an integral part of the relentless Roman rise to dominance over large parts of the ancient world.
The Romans understood this concept very well and realized that training soldiers could include paying for his rations [food], his salary, his armor, his armaments [weapons], and a soldier’s honorarium [which was paid to those who received honorable discharges]. With all this in perspective, the Romans realized each individual soldier was a far too valuable resource to waste. The Romans knew the costs they were incurring for each soldier had to be quite similar on their enemy’s side. So the Romans developed a tactic that could cause a significant setback or even defeat to their enemy; while only creating a limited risk to their own soldiers. This tactic was known as “Resource Tactics.” Just as one might concur, standing armies run on their stomachs and their equipment, and both require regular supplies. The idea of "Resource Tactics" could ultimately cut off their opponents from resources in one of three ways:
1. The first way the Romans conducted this tactic was to attack the resource location themselves. Once they conquered a territory they would secure as much resources as they could handle. This allowed the Romans to restock their own supply and prevent the available resources from falling into their opponents hands.
2. The second way the Romans conducted this tactic was to actually intercept the supplies while in transit. The Romans would identify main supply routes of their enemies and create a stopping point . Once the enemy was stopped, the Romans would ransack the supply, which would drastically reduce the amount of supplies that would reach the enemy.
3. The final approach, and quite possibly the most famous way the Romans conducted this tactic was a “siege” [siege - a military operation in which troops surround a place and cut off all outside access to force surrender]. While conducting the siege, the Romans would typically build a wall around the existing city to help control the enemy. This wall would be built out of reach of the archers and would prevent the enemy from escaping. Once the Romans completed the wall, they would use catapults, ballistas, onagers, and trebuchets to hurl rocks, spears, and other objects from safe distances. The ongoing siege would eventually cause the city/fort to run out of resources, thus causing the opponents to die off or surrender; giving the Romans an easy victory.
The basic principle behind this tactic was to disrupt their enemies resources while increase their own personal resources. Without a regular supply of food, water, and other supplies, armies will begin to starve or dehydrate, which lead to low morale or killing of fellow soldiers. This in turn would cause the opposing Army to fail its overarching goal and fall apart.
. Prior to the rise of Rome, the Hellenic phalanx was the premiere infantry force in the Western World. It had proven itself on the battlefields of southern Europe- from Sparta
to Macedon
ia, and had met and overcome several strong non-European armies beyond - from Persia to India. Packed into a dense armored mass, and equipped with massive pikes 12 to 21 feet (6.4 m) in length, the phalanx was a formidable force. While defensive configurations were sometimes used, the phalanx was most effective when it was moving forward in attack, either in a frontal charge or in "oblique" or echeloned order against an opposing flank, as the victories of Alexander the Great and Theban innovator Epaminondas
attest. When working with other formations—light infantry and cavalry—it was, at its height under Alexander, without peer.
Weaknesses of the phalanx. Nevertheless the phalanx had key weaknesses. It had some maneuverability, but once a clash was joined this decreased, particularly on rough ground. Its "dense pack" approach also made it rigid. Compressed in the heat of battle, its troops could only primarily fight facing forward. The diversity of troops gave the phalanx great flexibility, but this diversity was a double-edged sword- relying on a mix of units that was complicated to control and position. These included not only the usual heavy infantrymen, cavalry and light infantry- but also various elite units, medium armed groups, foreign contingents with their own styles and shock units of war-elephants. Such "mixed" forces presented additional command and control problems. If properly organized and fighting together a long time under capable leaders, they could be very proficient. The campaigns of Alexander, and Pyrrhus
(a Hellenic-style formation of mixed contingents) show this. Without such long term cohesion and leadership however, their performance was uneven. By the time the Romans were engaging against Hellenistic armies the Greeks had ceased to use strong flank guards and cavalry contingents, and their system had degenerated into a mere clash of phalanxes. This was the formation overcome by the Romans at Cynoscephalae.
Advantages of Roman infantry. The Romans themselves had retained some aspects of the phalanx in their early legions, most notably the final line of fighters in the classic "triple line", the spearmen of the triarii. The long pikes of the triarii were to eventually disappear, and all hands were uniformly equipped with short sword, shield and pilum, and deployed in the distinctive Roman tactical system, which provided more standardization and cohesion in the long run over the Hellenic type formations.
Phalanxes facing the legion were vulnerable to the more flexible Roman "checkerboard" deployment, which provided each fighting man a good chunk of personal space to engage in close order fighting. The manipular system also allowed entire Roman sub-units to maneuver more widely, freed from the need to always remain tightly packed in rigid formation. The deep three-line deployment of the Romans allowed combat pressure to be steadily applied forward. Most phalanxes favored one huge line several ranks deep. This might do well in the initial stages, but as the battle entangled more and more men, the stacked Roman formation allowed fresh pressure to be imposed over a more extended time. As combat lengthened and the battlefield compressed, the phalanx might thus become exhausted or rendered immobile, while the Romans still had enough left to not only maneuver but to make the final surges forward. Hannibal's deployment at Zama
appears to recognize this—hence the Carthaginian also used a deep three-layer approach, sacrificing his first two lower quality lines and holding back his combat-hardened veterans of Italy for the final encounter. Hannibal's arrangement had much to recommend it given his weakness in cavalry and infantry, but he made no provision for one line relieving the other as the Romans did. Each line fought its own lonely battle and the last ultimately perished when the Romans reorganized for a final surge.
The legions also drilled and trained together over a more extended time, and were more uniform and streamlined, (unlike Hannibal's final force and others) enabling even less than brilliant army commanders to maneuver and position their forces proficiently. These qualities, among others, made them more than a match for the phalanx, when they met in combat.
According to Polybius, in his comparison of the phalanx versus the Roman system:
The Greek king Pyrrhus' phalangical system was to prove a tough trial for the Romans. Despite several defeats the Romans inflicted such losses on the Epirote army that the phrase "Pyrrhic victory
" has become a byword for a victory won at a terrible cost. A skillful and experienced commander, Pyrrhus deployed a typically mixed phalanx system, including shock units of war-elephants, and formations of light infantry (peltasts), elite units, and cavalry to support his infantry. Using these he was able to defeat the Romans twice, with a third battle deemed inconclusive or a limited Roman tactical success by many scholars. The battles below (see individual articles for detailed accounts) illustrate the difficulties of fighting against phalanx forces. If well led and deployed (compare Pyrrhus to the fleeing Perseus
at Pydna below), they presented a credible infantry alternative to the heavy legion. The Romans however were to learn from their mistakes. In subsequent battles after the Pyrrhic wars, they showed themselves masters of the Hellenic phalanx.
(See more detailed article)
In this battle the Macedonian phalanx originally held the high ground but all of its units had not been properly positioned due to earlier skirmishing. Nevertheless, an advance by its left wing drove back the Romans, who counterattacked on the right flank and made some progress against a somewhat disorganized Macedonian left. However the issue was still in doubt, until an unknown tribune (officer) detached 20 maniples from the Roman line and made an encircling attack against the Macedonian rear. This caused the enemy phalanx to collapse, securing a rout for the Romans. The more flexible, streamlined legionary organization had exploited the weaknesses of the densely packed phalanx. Such triumphs secured Roman hegemony in Greece and adjoining lands.
Battle of Pydna
(See more detailed article)
At Pydna the contenders deployed on a relatively flat plain, and the Macedonians had augmented the infantry with a sizeable cavalry contingent. At the hour of decision, the enemy phalanx advanced in formidable array against the Roman line, and made some initial progress. However, the ground it had to advance over was rough, and the powerful phalangial formation lost its tight cohesion. The Romans absorbed the initial shock and came on into the fray, where their more spacious formation and continuously applied pressure proved decisive in hand to hand combat on the rough ground. Shield and sword at close quarters on such terrain neutralized the long pike
, and supplementary Macedonian weapons (lighter armor and a dagger-like short sword) made an indifferent showing against the skillful and aggressive assault of the heavy Roman infantrymen. The opposition also failed to deploy supporting forces effectively to help the phalanx at its time of dire need. Indeed the Macedonian commander, Perseus, seeing the situation deteriorating, seems to have fled without even bringing his cavalry into the engagement. The affair was decided in less than two hours, with a comprehensive defeat for the Macedonians.
" illustrates more of the Roman army's flexibility. When the Romans faced phalangite
armies, the legions often deployed the velites
in front of the enemy with the command to contendite vestra sponte, to cause confusion and panic into the solid blocks of the phalanxes. Meanwhile, auxilia archers
were deployed on the wings of the legion in front of the cavalry
, in order to defend their withdrawal. These archers were ordered to eiaculare flammas, fire incendiary arrow
s into the enemy. The cohorts then advanced in a wedge formation, supported by the velites' and auxiliaries' fire, and charged into the phalanx at a single point, breaking it, then flanking it with the cavalry to seal the victory. See the Battle of Beneventum for evidence of fire-arrows being used.
Hannibal's individual genius, the steadiness of his core troops (forged over several years of fighting together in Spain, and later in Italy) and his cavalry arm seem to be the decisive factors. Time after time Hannibal exploited the tendencies of the Romans, particularly their eagerness to close and achieve a decisive victory. The cold, tired, wet legionnaires that slogged out of the Trebia River to form up on the river bank are but one example of how Hannibal forced or manipulated the Romans into fighting on his terms, and on the ground of his own choosing. The later debacles at Lake Trasimene and Cannae
, forced the proud Romans to avoid battle, shadowing the Carthaginians from the high ground of the Apennines, unwilling to risk a significant engagement on the plains where the enemy cavalry held sway.
Growing Roman tactical sophistication and ability to adapt overcomes earlier disasters. But while the case of Hannibal underscored that the Romans were far from invincible, it also demonstrated their long-term strengths. They isolated and eventually bottled up the Carthaginians and hastened their withdrawal from Italy with constant maneuver. More importantly, they began a counterattack into Spain and Africa. They were willing to absorb the humiliation in Italy and remain on the strategic defensive, but with typical relentless persistence they struck elsewhere, to finally crush their foes.
They also learned from those enemies. The operations of Scipio
were an improvement on some of those who had previously faced Hannibal, showing a higher level of advance thinking, preparation and organization. (Compare with Sempronius at the Battle of the Trebia River
for example). Scipio's contribution was in part to implement more flexible maneuver of tactical units, instead of the straight-ahead, three-line grind favored by some contemporaries. He also made better use of cavalry, traditionally an arm in which the Romans were lacking. His operations also included pincer movements, a consolidated battle line, and "reverse Cannae" formations and cavalry movements. His victories in Spain and the African campaign demonstrated a new sophistication in Roman warfare and reaffirmed the Roman capacity to adapt, persist and overcome. See detailed battles:
for an example. The Gallic opposition was also composed of a large number of different peoples and tribes, geographically ranging from the mountains of Switzerland, to the lowlands of France, to the forests of the Rhineland, and thus are not easy to categorize. The term "Gaul" has also been used interchangeably to describe Celt
ic peoples farther afield in Britain and Scotland
, adding even more to the diversity of peoples lumped together under this name. From a military standpoint however, they seem to have shared certain general characteristics: tribal polities with a relatively small and lesser elaborated state structure, light weaponry, fairly unsophisticated tactics and organization, a high degree of mobility, and inability to sustain combat power in their field forces over a lengthy period. Roman sources reflect on the prejudices of their times, but nevertheless testify to the Gauls fierceness and bravery.
under Brennus
, and had won several other victories such as the Battle of Noreia
and the Battle of Arausio
. The foremost Gallic triumph in this early period was "The Day of Allia"- July 18- when Roman troops were routed and driven into the Allia River. Henceforth, July 18 was considered an unlucky date on the Roman Calendar.
Some writers suggest that as a result of such debacles, the expanding Roman power began to adjust to this vigorous, fast-moving new enemy. The Romans began to phase out the monolithic phalanx they formerly fought in, and adopted the more flexible manipular formation. The circular hoplite shield was also enlarged and eventually replaced with the rectangular scutum for better protection. The heavy phalanx spear was replaced by the pila, suitable for throwing. Only the veterans of the triarrii retained the long spear- vestige of the former phalanx. Such early reforms also aided the Romans in their conquest of the rest of Italy over such foes as the Samnites, Latins and Greeks. As time went on Roman arms saw increasing triumph over the Gallics, particularly in the campaigns of Caesar. In the early imperial period however, Germanic warbands inflicted one of Rome's greatest military defeats, (the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest
) which saw the liquidation of three imperial legions, and was to spark a limit on Roman expansion in the West. And it was these Germanic tribes in part (most having some familiarity with Rome and its culture, and becoming more Romanized themselves) that were to eventually bring about the Roman military's final demise in the West. Ironically, in the final days, the bulk of the fighting was between forces composed mostly of barbarians on either side.
Whatever their particular culture, the Gallic and Germanic tribes generally proved themselves to be tough opponents, racking up several victories over their enemies. Some historians show that they sometimes used massed fighting in tightly packed phalanx-type formations with overlapping shields, and employed shield coverage during sieges. In open battle, they sometimes used a triangular "wedge" style formation in attack. Their greatest hope of success lay in 4 factors: (a) numerical superiority, (b) surprising the Romans (via an ambush for example) or in (c) advancing quickly to the fight, or (d) engaging the Romans over heavily covered or difficult terrain where units of the fighting horde could shelter within striking distance until the hour of decision, or if possible, withdraw and regroup between successive charges.
Most significant Gallic and Germanic victories show two or more of these characteristics. The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest
contains all four: surprise, a treacherous defection by Arminius
and his contingent, numerical superiority, quick charges to close rapidly, and favorable terrain and environmental conditions (thick forest and pounding rainstorms) that hindered Roman movement and gave the warriors enough cover to conceal their movements and mount successive attacks against the Roman line.
Weaknesses in organization and equipment. Against the fighting men from the legion however, the Gauls, Iberians and Germanic forces faced a daunting task. Individually, in single combat, the fierce barbarian warrior could more than hold his own against a Roman. In massed fighting however, the barbarians' rudimentary organization and tactics fared poorly against the well oiled machinery that was the Legion. The fierceness of the Gallic and Germanic charges is often commented upon by some writers, and in certain circumstances they could overwhelm Roman lines. Nevertheless the in-depth Roman formation allowed adjustments to be made, and the continual application of forward pressure made long-term combat a hazardous proposition for the Gauls.
Flank attacks were always possible, but the legion was flexible enough to pivot to meet this, either through sub-unit maneuver or through deployment of lines farther back. The cavalry screen on the flanks also added another layer of security, as did nightly regrouping in fortified camps. The Gauls and Germans also fought with little or no armor and with weaker shields, putting them at a disadvantage against the legion. Other items of Roman equipment from studded sandals, to body armor, to metal helmets added to Roman advantages. Generally speaking, the Gauls and Germans needed to get into good initial position against the Romans and to overwhelm them in the early phases of the battle. An extended set-piece slogging match between the lightly armed tribesmen and the well organized heavy legionaries usually spelled doom for the tribal fighters. Caesar's slaughter of the Helvetti near the Saône River is just one example of tribal disadvantage against the well-organized Romans, as is the victory of Germanicus at the Weser River and Agricola against the Celtic tribesmen of Caledonia (Scotland) circa 84 A.D.
Weaknesses in logistics. Roman logistics also provided a trump card against Germanic foes as it had against so many previous foes. Tacitus in his Annals reports that the Roman commander Germanicus recognized that continued operations in Gaul would require long trains of men and material to come overland, where they would be subject to attack as they traversed the forests and swamps. He therefore opened sea and river routes, moving large quantities of supplies and reinforcements relatively close to the zone of battle, bypassing the dangerous land routes. In addition, the Roman fortified camps provided secure staging areas for offensive, defensive and logistical operations, once their troops were deployed. Assault roads and causeways were constructed on marshy ground to facilitate maneuver, sometimes under direct Gallic attack. These Roman techniques repeatedly defeated their Germanic adversaries. While Germanic leaders and fighters influenced by Roman methods sometimes adapted them, most tribes did not have the strong organization of the Romans. As German scholar Hans Delbruck notes in his "History of the Art of War":
The Gallics also demonstrated a high level of tactical prowess in some areas. Gallic chariot
warfare for example, showed a high degree of integration and coordination with infantry, and Gallic horse and chariot assaults sometimes threatened Roman forces in the field with annihilation. At the Battle of Sentinum
for example, c. 295 BC, the Roman and Campanian cavalry encountered Gallic war-chariots and were routed in confusion- driven back from the Roman infantry by the unexpected appearance of the fast-moving Gallic assault. The discipline of the Roman infantry restored the line however, and a counterattack eventually defeated the Gallic forces and their allies.
The accounts of Polybius
leading up to the Battle of Telamon
, c. 225 BC mention chariot warfare, but it was ultimately unsuccessful. The Gauls met comprehensive defeat by the Roman legions under Papus and Regulus
. Chariot forces also attacked the legions as they were disembarking from ships during Caesar's invasion of Britain, but the Roman commander drove off the fast-moving assailants using covering fire (slings, arrows and engines of war) from his ships, and reinforcing his shore party of infantry to charge and drive off the attack. In the open field against Caesar, the Gallic/Celtics apparently deployed chariots with a driver and an infantry fighter armed with javelins. During the clash, the chariots would drop off their warriors to attack the enemy and retire a short distance away, massed in reserve. From this position they could retrieve the assault troops if the engagement was going badly, or apparently pick them up and deploy elsewhere. Caesar's troops were discomfited by one such attack, and he met it by withdrawing into his fortified redoubt. A later Gallic attack against the Roman camp was routed.
It should be noted also that superb as the Gallic fighters were, chariots were already declining as an effective weapon of war in the ancient world with the rise of mounted cavalry. At the battle of Mons Grapius in Caledonia (circa 84AD), Celtic chariots made an appearance. However they were no longer used in an offensive role but primarily for pre-battle show - riding back and forth and hurling insults. The main encounter was decided by infantry and mounted cavalry.
Superior Gallic mobility and numbers often troubled Roman arms, whether deployed in decades-long mobile or guerrilla warfare or in a decisive field engagement. The near defeat of Caesar in his Gallic campaign confirms this latter pattern, but also shows the strengths of Roman tactical organization and discipline. At the Battle of the Sabis
river, (see more detailed article) contingents of the Nervii
, Atrebates, Veromandui and Aduatuci tribes massed secretly in the surrounding forests as the main Roman force was busy making camp on the opposite side of the river. Some distance away behind them, slogged two slow moving legions with the baggage train. Engaged in foraging and camp construction the Roman forces were somewhat scattered. As camp building commenced, the barbarian forces launched a ferocious attack, streaming across the shallow water and quickly assaulting the distracted Romans. This incident is discussed in Caesar's Gallic War Commentaries.
So far the situation looked promising for the warrior host. The 4 conditions above were in their favor: (a) numerical superiority, (b) the element of surprise, (c) a quick advance/assault, and (d) favorable terrain that masked their movements until the last minute. Early progress was spectacular as the initial Roman dispositions were driven back. A rout looked possible. Caesar himself rallied sections of his endangered army, impressing resolve upon the troops. With their customary discipline and cohesion, the Romans then began to drive back the barbarian
assault. A charge by the Nervi tribe through a gap between the legions however almost turned the tide again, as the onrushing warriors seized the Roman camp and tried to outflank the other army units engaged with the rest of the tribal host. The initial phase of the clash had passed however and a slogging match ensued. The arrival of the two rear legions that had been guarding the baggage reinforced the Roman lines. Led by the 10th Legion, a counterattack was mounted with these reinforcements that broke the back of the barbarian effort and sent the tribesmen reeling in retreat. It was a close run thing, illustrating both the fighting prowess of the tribal forces, and the steady, disciplined cohesion of the Romans. Ultimately, the latter was to prove decisive in Rome's long fought conquest of Gaul.
As noted above, the fierce charge of the Germanics and their individual prowess is frequently acknowledged by several ancient Roman writers. The Battle of Gergovia
however demonstrates that the Gallic/Germanics were capable of a level of strategic insight and operation beyond merely mustering warriors for an open field clash. Under their war leader Vercingetorix, the Gallics pursued what some modern historians have termed a "persisting" or "logistics strategy" - a mobile approach relying not on direct open field clashes, but avoidance of major battle, "scorched earth" denial of resources, and the isolation and piecemeal destruction of Roman detachments and smaller unit groupings. When implemented consistently, this strategy saw some success against Roman operations. According to Caesar himself, during the siege of the town of Bourges, the lurking warbands of Germans were:
Caesar countered with a strategy of enticing the Germanic forces out into open battle, or of blockading them into submission.
At the town of Gergovia, resource denial was combined with concentration of superior force, and multiple threats from more than one direction. This caused the opposing Roman forces to divide, and ultimately fail. Gergovia was situated on the high ground of a tall hill, and Vercingetorix carefully drew up the bulk of his force on the slope, positioning allied tribes in designated places. He drilled his men and skirmished daily with the Romans, who had overrun a hilltop position, and had created a small camp some distance from Caesar's larger main camp. A rallying of about 10,000 disenchanted Aeudan tribesmen (engineered by Vercingetorix's agents) created a threat in Caesar's rear, including a threat to a supply convoy promised by the allied Aeudans, and he diverted four legions to meet this danger. This however gave Vercingetorix's forces the chance to concentrate in superior strength against the smaller two-legion force left behind at Gergovia, and desperate fighting ensued. Caesar dealt with the rear threat, turned around and by ruthless forced marching once again consolidated his forces at town. A feint using bogus cavalry by the Romans drew off part of the Gallic assault, and the Romans advanced to capture three more enemy outposts on the slope, and proceeded towards the walls of the stronghold. The diverted Gallic forces returned however and in frantic fighting outside the town walls, the Romans lost 700 men, including 46 centurions.
Caesar commenced a retreat from the town with the victorious Gallic warriors in pursuit. The Roman commander however mobilized his 10th Legion as a blocking force to cover his withdrawal and after some fighting, the tribesmen themselves withdrew back to Gergovia, taking several captured legion standards. The vicious fighting around Gergovia was the first time Caesar had suffered a military reverse, demonstrating the Germanic martial valor noted by the ancient chroniclers. The hard battle is referenced by the Roman historian Plutarch, who writes of the Averni people showing visitors a sword in one of their temples, a weapon that reputedly belonged to Caesar himself. According to Plutarch, the Roman general was shown the sword in the temple at Gergovia some years after the battle, but he refused to reclaim it, saying that it was consecrated, and to leave it where it was.
The Germanics were unable to sustain their strategy however, and Vercingetorix was to become trapped in Alesia, facing not divided sections or detachments of the Roman Army but Caesar's full force of approximately 70,000 men (50,000 legionnaires plus numerous additional auxiliary cavalry and infantry). This massive concentration of Romans was able to besiege the fortress in detail and repulse Gallic relief forces, and it fell in little more than a month. Vercingetorix overall persisting logistics policy however, demonstrates a significant level of strategic thinking. As historian A. Goldsworthy (2006) notes: "His [Vercingetorix's] strategy was considerably more sophisticated than that employed by Caesar's earlier opponents.." At Alesia this mobile approach became overly static. The Gauls gave battle at a place where they were inadequately provisioned for an extended siege, and where Caesar could bring his entire field force to bear on a single point without them being dissipated, and where his lines of supply were not effectively interdicted. At Gergovia by contrast, Caesar's strength was divided by the appearance of another Germanic force in his rear (the Aeudans)- threatening his sources and lines of supply. Together with a strong defensive anvil, (the town) supported by an offensive hammer (the open field forces), and coupled with previous resource denial pressure over time, the Romans were forced to retreat, and the Germanics secured a victory. As one historian notes about the persisting strategy:
The systematic wastage and destruction of enemy economic and human resources was called vastatio by the Romans. Crops and animals were destroyed or carried off, and local populaces were massacred or enslaved. Sometimes these tactics were also used to conduct punitive raids on barbarian tribes which had performed raids across the border. In the campaigns of Germanicus, Roman troops in the combat area carried out a "scorched earth" approach against their Germanic foes, devastating the land they depended on for supplies. "The country was wasted by fire and sword fifty miles round; nor sex nor age found mercy; places sacred and profane had the equal lot of destruction, all razed to the ground.." (Tacitus, Annals). The Roman "grind down" approach is also seen in the Bar Kokba Jewish revolt against the Romans. The Roman commander Severus, avoided meeting the hard-fighting Jewish rebels in the open field. Instead he relied on attacking their fortified strongpoints and devastating the zone of conflict in a methodical campaign. This "attritional" aspect of the Roman approach to combat contrasts with the notion of brilliant generalship or tactics sometimes seen in popular depictions of the Roman infantry.
Some historians note however that Rome often balanced brutal attrition with shrewd diplomacy, as demonstrated by Caesar's harsh treatment of Gallic tribes that opposed him, but his sometimes conciliatory handling of those that submitted. Rome also used a variety of incentives to encourage cooperation by the elites of conquered peoples, co-opting opposition and incorporating them into the structure of the empire. This carrot and stick approach forms an integral part of "the Roman way" of war.
An even more dramatic demonstration of Roman vulnerability is shown in the numerous wars against Parthian
heavy cavalry. The Parthians and their successors used large numbers of fast-moving light riders to harass and skirmish, and delivered the coup de grâce with heavily armored lancers called "cataphract
s". Both types of troops used powerful composite bows that shot arrows of sufficient strength to penetrate Roman armor. The cataphracts extended combat power by serving as shock troops, engaging opposing forces with their heavy lances in thundering charges after they had been "softened up" by swarms of arrows. The Parthians also conducted a "scorched earth" policy against the Romans, refusing major set-piece encounters, while luring them deeper on to unfavorable ground, where they would lack water supplies and a secure line of retreat. The debacle of the Battle of Carrhae
saw a devastating defeat of Roman arms by the Parthian cavalry. Against such foes the Romans faced a difficult task. How could they be defeated?
, particularly, was ultimately to rely mostly on cavalry forces.
Adjustments of Ventidius. The operations of the Roman commander Publius Ventidius Bassus
illustrate three general tactics used by the infantry to fight their mounted foes. These drew on Caesar's veteran legions, and made Ventidius the only Roman general to celebrate a triumph against the Parthians. In three separate battles, he not only managed to defeat the Parthian armies and drive them out of Roman territory, but also managed to kill Parthia's three top military commanders during the battles. The adjustments of Ventidius were as follows:
Combined arms and quick advance. In the later Roman empire, cavalry forces played a larger role, with the infantry in support. The campaign of the Emperor Julian II
against the Persians is instructive in this regard. On June 22, 363 a large-scale clash occurred near the town of Maranga. Facing an enemy that threatened to blanket his troops with a hail of arrows, and in danger of envelopment, Julian deployed his force in a crescent formation, and ordered an advance by both infantry and cavalry on the double, thwarting both dangers by closing quickly. The gambit was successful. After a long battle, the Persians withdrew- a tactical victory (albeit a costly one for the Romans according to some historians). The work of Roman historian Ammianus Marcellinus offers a detailed description of the Persian campaign, including the quick charge by the heavy Roman infantry under Julian.
Marcellinus's commentary also sharply contrasts the fighting spirit of the Persian infantrymen with those of Rome, stating that they had "aversion to pitched infantry battles." In an earlier engagement outside the walls of Ctesiphon, Marcellinus again notes the value of the quick advance by the infantry:
Mixed results against major cavalry enemies. Rome's overall record against the Parthians was mixed, as it was against the horsemen of Hannibal, and some Gallic opponents. Subsequent Roman leaders like Anthony invaded Parthian territory but had to withdraw after severe losses. Others like Severus and Trajan saw some success, but could never hold the Parthian area permanently, and also pulled out. Nevertheless, the battles of Ventidius and Julian show that the Roman infantry, when properly handled and maneuvered, and when working in conjunction with other supporting arms like slingers, could, at least partially, meet the challenge of the cavalryman.
The Romans were able to copy and adapt the weapons and methods of their opponents more effectively. Some weapons, such as the gladius
, were adopted outright by the legionaries. Publius asserts that the pilum was of Samnite origin, and the shield was based on Greek design. In other cases, especially formidable enemies units of their forces were invited to serve in the Roman army as auxiliaries after peace was made. In the naval sphere, the Romans followed some of the same methods they used with the infantry, dropping their ineffective designs and copying, adapting and improving on Punic warships, and introducing heavier marine contingents (infantry fighters) on to their ships.
Roman organization was more flexible than those of many opponents. Compared to the tightly packed spearmen of the phalanx, the Roman heavy infantry, through their training and discipline, and operating in conjunction with light foot and cavalry, could quickly adopt a number of methods and formations depending on the situation. These range from the Testudo formation
during siege warfare, to a hollow square against cavalry attack, to mixed units of heavy foot, horse and light infantry against guerrillas in Spain, to the classic "triple line" or checkerboard patterns. Against more sophisticated opponents the Romans also showed great flexibility at times, such as the brilliant adjustments Scipio made against Hannibal at Zama. These included leaving huge gaps in the ranks to trap the charging elephants, and the recall, reposition and consolidation of a single battle line that advanced to the final death struggle against the Carthaginian veterans of Italy.
Roman discipline, organization and logistical systemization sustained combat effectiveness over a longer period. Notably, the Roman system of castra
, or fortified camps, allowed the army to stay in the field on favorable ground and be rested and resupplied for battle. Well organized Roman logistics also sustained combat power, from routine resupply and storage, to the construction of military roads, to state run arsenal
s and weapons factories, to well organized naval convoys that helped stave off defeat by Carthage
. The death of a leader generally did not cause the legions to lose heart in battle. Others stepped to the fore and carried on. In the defeat by Hannibal at the River Trebia, 10,000 Romans cut their way through the debacle to safety, maintaining unit cohesion
when all around was rout, a testimony to their tactical organization and discipline.
The Romans were more persistent and more willing to absorb and replace losses over time than their opponents. Unlike other civilizations, the Romans kept going relentlessly until typically their enemies had been completely crushed or neutralized. The army acted to implement policy and were not allowed to stop unless they received a command from the emperor or a decree from the senate.
Against the tribal polities of Europe, particularly in Hispania
, Roman tenacity and material weight eventually wore down most opposition. The tribes of Europe did not have a state or economic structure able to support lengthy campaigns and therefore could often (but not always) be made to change their minds about opposing Roman hegemony. The defeat in the Teutoburg Forest might seem like an exception, but even here, the Romans were back on the warpath 5 years later with major forces against their Germanic opponents. That there is an obvious limit to endless persistence does not negate the general pattern.
Where the Romans faced another large state structure, such as the Parthian Empire, they found the military road rocky indeed and were sometimes forced to an impasse. Nevertheless the distinct pattern of Roman tenacity holds. Rome suffered its greatest defeats against sophisticated Carthage, notably at Cannae, and was forced to avoid battle for a lengthy period. Yet in time, it rebuilt its forces on land and at sea, and persisted in the struggle, astonishing the Punics who expected it to sue for peace. Against the Parthians, crushing defeats did not stop the Romans, for they invaded Parthia
n territory several times afterwards, and though Parthia proper was never totally conquered, Rome ultimately secured a rough hegemony in the area.
Roman leadership was mixed, but over time it was often effective in securing Roman military success. Leadership debacles are common in Roman military history, from the routs against Hannibal, to the demise of the unlucky Crassus against the Parthians. The Roman polity's structuring however produced a steady supply of men willing and able to lead troops in battle- men that were held accountable for defeat or malfeasance. It was not unusual for a losing general to be prosecuted by political enemies in Rome, with some having their property confiscated and barely escaping death. The senatorial oligarchy, for all its political maneuvering, interference and other faults, provided the functions of oversight and audit over military matters, that over the course of time, shaped final results. The record is a mixed one, but whether under boisterous Republic
or Imperial emperor, Rome produced enough competent leaders to secure its military dominance for over a millennium. Some of the best leaders come from both eras, including Marius, Sulla, Scipio, Caesar, Trajan and others.
Note should be taken here of the large number of junior officers the Romans typically used to assure coordination and guidance. The initiative of such men played a key part in Roman success. Effective leadership was also bound up with the famous Roman centurion
s, the backbone of the legionary organization. While not all such men could be considered models of perfection, they commanded substantial respect.
The influence of Roman military and civic culture, as embodied particularly in the heavy infantry legion, gave the Roman military consistent motivation and cohesion. Such culture included but was not limited to: (a) the valuing of Roman citizenship, (b) the broad-based muster of free males into mass infantry units (as opposed to widespread use of foreign contingents, slaves or mercenaries), and (c) loyalty to those fighting units (the Legion) which remained characteristically Roman in outlook and discipline. Citizenship conveyed certain valuable rights in Roman society, and was another element that helped to promote the standardization and integration of the infantry. The citizen under arms - the legion soldier - was supposed to reflect and practice the Roman ideal of virtus, pietas, fides, - self-discipline, respect and faithfulness to engagements. Implementation of such ideals could be mixed according to some writers, but it was "a trilogy [driving] every aspect of military, domestic, economic and social life." As such it was a strong force for cohesion among Rome's infantrymen.
This meant that the new subdivided infantry lost the awesome power that the earlier legions had, meaning that whilst they were more likely to see a battle they were less likely to win it. That legion size was at an all time low, was also a factor.
Roman horsemen, while fast, were actually much too weak to cope with the very cavalry based invasions of the Huns, Goths, Vandals and Sassanids. Their ineffectiveness was demonstrated at Cannae
and Adrianople; in both instances the cavalry was completely destroyed by a vastly more powerful enemy horse.
, Mommsen
, Delbrück
, et al.), and thus cannot be excluded from any analysis of its infantry forces. Essentially it is argued that the increasing barbarization of the heavy legions weakened weaponry, training, morale and military effectiveness in the long run. The weapons changes described above are but one example.
It could be argued that the use of barbarian personnel was nothing new. This is accurate, however such use was clearly governed by "the Roman way." It was the barbarian personnel who had to adapt to Roman standards and organization, not the other way around. In the twilight of the empire, this was not the case. Such practices as permitting the settlement of massive, armed barbarian populations on Roman territory, the watering down of the privilege of citizenship, increasing use of alien contingents, and relaxation or removal of traditionally thorough and severe Roman discipline, organization and control, contributed to the decline of the heavy infantry.
The settlement of the foederati
for example, saw large barbarian contingents ushered on to Roman territory, with their own organization, under their own leaders. Such groupings showed a tendency to neglect "the Roman way" in organization, training, logistics etc., in favor of their own ideas, practices and agendas. These settlements may have bought short term political peace for imperial elites, but their long term effect was negative, weakening the traditional strengths of the heavy infantry in discipline, training and deployment. They also seemed to have lessened the incentive for remaining "old Guard" troops to adhere to such strengths, since the barbarians received equal or more favor with less effort. Indeed such "allied" barbarian contingents were at times to turn on the Romans, devastating wide areas with sack and pillage and even attacking imperial army formations.
Advantages of the mobile reserve strategy
The "mobile reserve" strategy, traditionally identified with Constantine I
, saw reversal of the traditional "forward" policy of strong frontier fortifications backed by legions stationed near likely zones of conflict. Instead, it is argued that the best troops were pulled back into a type of "mobile reserve" closer to the center that could be deployed to trouble areas throughout the empire. Some scholars claim this was a positive development, (Luttwak, Delbruck
, et al.) given growing difficulties with governing the vast empire, where political turmoil and severe financial difficulties had made the old preclusive security system untenable. Some writers such as Luttwak condemn the old style "forward" policy as indicating a "Maginot Line
" mentality in the troubled latter centuries of the Empire.
Disadvantages of the mobile reserve strategy versus the "forward" policy
Ancient writers like Zosimus
in the 5th century AD condemned the "reserve" policy as a major weakening of the military force. Other modern scholars (Ferrill et al.) also see the pullback as a strategic mistake, arguing that it left lower quality "second string" limitanei forces to stop an enemy, until the distant mobile reserve arrived. While the drop in quality did not happen immediately, it is argued that over time, the limitanei declined into lightly armed, static watchman type troops that were of dubious value against increasing barbarian marauders on the frontiers. The pullback of the best infantry was based more on political reasons (shoring up the power bases of the emperors and various elites) rather than on military reality. In addition it is claimed, the "forward" policy was not at all a static "Maginot" approach, but that traditional heavy legions and supporting cavalry could still move to a trouble spot by redeploying them from fortifications elsewhere along a particular frontier.
, in one of the most influential Western military works, highlighted this decline as the key factor in military weakness, noting that the core legions always fought as part of an integrated team of cavalry and light foot. In the latter years, this formula that had brought so much success petered out. Caught between the growth of lighter armed/less organized foot soldiers, and the increasing cavalry formations of the mobile forces, the "heavies" as the dominant force, withered on the vine. This does not mean that heavy units disappeared entirely, but that their mass recruitment, formation, organization and deployment as the dominant part of the Roman military was greatly reduced. Ironically, in Rome's final battles (the Western half of the empire) the defeats suffered were substantially inflicted by infantry forces (many fighting dismounted).
Speaking of the decline of the heavy infantry, the Roman historian Vegetius
lauded the old fighting units, and lamented how the heavy armor of the early days had been discarded by the weaker, less disciplined, barbarized forces:
Historian Arther Ferrill notes that even towards the end, some of the old infantry formations were still in use. Such grouping was increasingly ineffective however, without the severe close order discipline, drill and organization of old times. At the Battle of Châlons
(circa 451 AD) Attila the Hun
rallied his troops by mocking the once vaunted Roman infantry, alleging that they merely huddled under a screen of protective shields in close formation. He ordered his troops to ignore them and to attack the powerful Alans
and Visigoths instead. It was a sad commentary on the force that had once dominated Europe, the Mediterranean and much of the Middle East. It is true that at Châlons, the Roman infantry contributed to the victory by seizing part of the battlefield's high ground. Nevertheless its day had already passed in favor of the mass levies of the barbarian federates.
Roman army
The Roman army is the generic term for the terrestrial armed forces deployed by the kingdom of Rome , the Roman Republic , the Roman Empire and its successor, the Byzantine empire...
infantry from the start of the Roman Republic
Roman Republic
The Roman Republic was the period of the ancient Roman civilization where the government operated as a republic. It began with the overthrow of the Roman monarchy, traditionally dated around 508 BC, and its replacement by a government headed by two consuls, elected annually by the citizens and...
to the fall of the Western Roman Empire. The article first presents a short overview of Roman training. Roman performance against different types of enemies is then analyzed. Finally a summation of what made the Roman tactics and strategy militarily effective through their long history is given below, as is a discussion of how and why this effectiveness eventually disappeared.
The focus below is primarily on Roman tactics - the "how" of their approach to battle, and how it stacked up against a variety of opponents over time. It does not attempt detailed coverage of things like army structure or equipment. Various battles are summarized to illustrate Roman methods with links to detailed articles on individual encounters. For in depth background on the historical structure of the infantry
Infantry
Infantrymen are soldiers who are specifically trained for the role of fighting on foot to engage the enemy face to face and have historically borne the brunt of the casualties of combat in wars. As the oldest branch of combat arms, they are the backbone of armies...
relevant to this article, see Structure of the Roman military. For a history of Rome's military campaigns see Campaign history of the Roman military. For detail on equipment, daily life and specific Legions see Roman Legion
Roman legion
A Roman legion normally indicates the basic ancient Roman army unit recruited specifically from Roman citizens. The organization of legions varied greatly over time but they were typically composed of perhaps 5,000 soldiers, divided into maniples and later into "cohorts"...
and Roman military personal equipment.
Evolution of Roman infantry tactics
Roman military tacticsMilitary tactics
Military tactics, the science and art of organizing an army or an air force, are the techniques for using weapons or military units in combination for engaging and defeating an enemy in battle. Changes in philosophy and technology over time have been reflected in changes to military tactics. In...
and strategy
Strategy
Strategy, a word of military origin, refers to a plan of action designed to achieve a particular goal. In military usage strategy is distinct from tactics, which are concerned with the conduct of an engagement, while strategy is concerned with how different engagements are linked...
evolved from that typical of a small tribal host seeking local hegemony, to massive operations encompassing a world empire
Empire
The term empire derives from the Latin imperium . Politically, an empire is a geographically extensive group of states and peoples united and ruled either by a monarch or an oligarchy....
. This advance was affected by changing trends in Roman political, social and economic life, and that of the larger Mediterranean world, but it was also undergirded by a distinctive "Roman way" of war. This approach included a tendency towards standardization and systematization, practical borrowing, copying and adapting from outsiders, flexibility in tactics and methods, a strong sense of discipline, a ruthless persistence that sought comprehensive victory, and a cohesion brought about by the ideal of Roman citizenship
Roman citizenship
Citizenship in ancient Rome was a privileged political and legal status afforded to certain free-born individuals with respect to laws, property, and governance....
under arms - embodied in the Legion
Roman legion
A Roman legion normally indicates the basic ancient Roman army unit recruited specifically from Roman citizens. The organization of legions varied greatly over time but they were typically composed of perhaps 5,000 soldiers, divided into maniples and later into "cohorts"...
. These elements waxed and waned over time, but they form a distinct basis underlying Rome's rise.
Some key phases of this evolution
Evolution
Evolution is any change across successive generations in the heritable characteristics of biological populations. Evolutionary processes give rise to diversity at every level of biological organisation, including species, individual organisms and molecules such as DNA and proteins.Life on Earth...
throughout Rome's military
Military
A military is an organization authorized by its greater society to use lethal force, usually including use of weapons, in defending its country by combating actual or perceived threats. The military may have additional functions of use to its greater society, such as advancing a political agenda e.g...
history would include:
- Military forces based primarily on heavy citizen infantry with tribal beginnings and early use of phalanx type elements (see Military establishment of the Roman kingdomMilitary establishment of the Roman kingdomThe city of Rome, founded in a strategic location among a war-like people , needed to concern itself with military activity from the start. As Rome grew, its military needs changed...
) - Growing sophistication as Roman hegemony expanded outside Italy into North Africa, Greece and the Middle East (see Military establishment of the Roman RepublicMilitary establishment of the Roman RepublicAs the Roman kingdom successfully overcame opposition from the Italic hill tribes, and became a larger state, the age of tyranny in the eastern Mediterranean began to subside. Inspired by the idea of new constitutions arising there, the Roman populace threw off the yoke of tyranny and established a...
) - Continued refinement, standardization and streamlining in the period associated with Gaius MariusGaius MariusGaius Marius was a Roman general and statesman. He was elected consul an unprecedented seven times during his career. He was also noted for his dramatic reforms of Roman armies, authorizing recruitment of landless citizens, eliminating the manipular military formations, and reorganizing the...
including a broader based incorporation of more citizenry into the armyArmyAn army An army An army (from Latin arma "arms, weapons" via Old French armée, "armed" (feminine), in the broadest sense, is the land-based military of a nation or state. It may also include other branches of the military such as the air force via means of aviation corps...
, and more professionalism and permanence in army service. - Continued expansion, flexibility and sophistication from the end of the RepublicRepublicA republic is a form of government in which the people, or some significant portion of them, have supreme control over the government and where offices of state are elected or chosen by elected people. In modern times, a common simplified definition of a republic is a government where the head of...
into the time of the CaesarsCaesar (title)Caesar is a title of imperial character. It derives from the cognomen of Julius Caesar, the Roman dictator...
(see Military establishment of the Roman empireMilitary establishment of the Roman empireThe principate of the Roman empire had no use for the republican army with its intense loyalties to competing generals. Beginning with the first emperor, Octavius Caesar, the principles totally replaced the citizen army with apparatus of professionals dedicated to carrying out the emperor's will in...
) - Growing barbarization, turmoil and weakening of the heavy infantry units in favor of cavalryCavalryCavalry or horsemen were soldiers or warriors who fought mounted on horseback. Cavalry were historically the third oldest and the most mobile of the combat arms...
and lighter troops (See FoederatiFoederatiFoederatus is a Latin term whose definition and usage drifted in the time between the early Roman Republic and the end of the Western Roman Empire...
) - Demise of the Western EmpireWestern Roman EmpireThe Western Roman Empire was the western half of the Roman Empire after its division by Diocletian in 285; the other half of the Roman Empire was the Eastern Roman Empire, commonly referred to today as the Byzantine Empire....
and fragmentation into smaller, weaker local forces. This included the reversal of status of cavalry and infantry in the Eastern EmpireByzantine EmpireThe Byzantine Empire was the Eastern Roman Empire during the periods of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, centred on the capital of Constantinople. Known simply as the Roman Empire or Romania to its inhabitants and neighbours, the Empire was the direct continuation of the Ancient Roman State...
. CataphractCataphractA cataphract was a form of armored heavy cavalry utilised in ancient warfare by a number of peoples in Western Eurasia and the Eurasian Steppe....
forces formed an elite, with infantry being reduced to auxiliaries
Equipment and training
See detailed articles for more information on equipment, individual Legions and structureTraining
Over time the military system changed its equipment and roles, but throughout the course of Roman history, it always remained a disciplined and professional war machine. Soldiers carried out training common to every army, from initial muster, arms and weapons drill, formation marching and tactical exercises. The typical training regime consisted of gymnastics and swimming, to build physical strength and fitness, fighting with armatura (which were wooden weapons), to learn and master combat techniques and long route marches with full battle gear and equipment to build stamina, endurance and to accustom them to the hardships of campaigns.Combat training exercises consisted of thrusting with a wooden gladius
Gladius
Gladius was the Latin word for sword, and is used to represent the primary sword of Ancient Roman soldiers. Early ancient Roman swords were similar to those used by the Greeks. From the 3rd century BC, the Romans adopted swords similar to those used by the Celtiberians and others during the early...
into a quintain (wooden dummy) while wearing full armor, and sparring with one another. Legionaries were trained to thrust with their gladii because they could defend themselves behind their large shields (scuta
Scutum (shield)
Scutum is the Latin word for "shield", although it has in modern times come to be specifically associated with the rectangular, semi-cylindrical body shield carried by Roman legionaries.-History:...
) while stabbing the enemy. The Romans were well aware that a wound of only 3 cm or 4 cm could cause death, so they emphasized quick, stabbing techniques to vital areas or between gaps in armor. Contemporary artistic depictions of Roman soldiers fighting, including Trajan's Column
Trajan's Column
Trajan's Column is a Roman triumphal column in Rome, Italy, which commemorates Roman emperor Trajan's victory in the Dacian Wars. It was probably constructed under the supervision of the architect Apollodorus of Damascus at the order of the Roman Senate. It is located in Trajan's Forum, built near...
in Rome, depict them as standing with their left foot and shield forward with their right foot back and turned outwards ninety degrees. Some believe this indicates a boxing
Boxing
Boxing, also called pugilism, is a combat sport in which two people fight each other using their fists. Boxing is supervised by a referee over a series of between one to three minute intervals called rounds...
-like style of fighting where the shield in the left is used to jab and harass the enemy while the sword in the right is used to deliver the final blow.
In all likelihood however it is probably designed to allow for attacking with a passing motion similar to later medieval European Martial Arts which use a similar stance for armoured combat.
The benefit of attacking on what would later be dubbed the half pass is that the unit could remain in formation with each motion, as breaking formation was a great risk this along with their stance suggests such footwork is more likely than the boxing style suggested by some.
Other training exercises taught the legionary to obey commands and assume battle formations. At the end of training the legionary had to swear an oath of loyalty to the SPQR
SPQR
SPQR is an initialism from a Latin phrase, Senatus Populusque Romanus , referring to the government of the ancient Roman Republic, and used as an official emblem of the modern day comune of Rome...
(Senatus Populusque Romanus, or the Senate and the Roman People) or later to the emperor
Roman Emperor
The Roman emperor was the ruler of the Roman State during the imperial period . The Romans had no single term for the office although at any given time, a given title was associated with the emperor...
. The soldier was then given a diploma
Military diploma
A Roman military diploma was a document inscribed in bronze certifying that the holder was honourably discharged from the Roman armed forces and/or had received the grant of Roman citizenship from the emperor as reward for service....
and sent off to fight for his living and the glory and honor of Rome.
Individual weapons, personal equipment and haulage
A legionary typically carried around 27 kilograms (60 pounds) of armour, weapons, and equipment. This load consisted of armour, sword, shield, two pilaPilum
The pilum was a javelin commonly used by the Roman army in ancient times. It was generally about two metres long overall, consisting of an iron shank about 7 mm in diameter and 60 cm long with pyramidal head...
(one heavy, one light) and 15 days' food rations. There were also tools for digging and constructing a castra
Castra
The Latin word castra, with its singular castrum, was used by the ancient Romans to mean buildings or plots of land reserved to or constructed for use as a military defensive position. The word appears in both Oscan and Umbrian as well as in Latin. It may have descended from Indo-European to Italic...
, the legions' fortified base camp. One writer recreates the following as to Caesar's army in Gaul: Each soldier arranged his heavy pack on a T or Y-shaped rod, borne on his left shoulder. Shields were protected on the march with a hide cover. Each legionnaire carried about 5 days worth of wheat, pulses or chickpeas, a flask of oil and a mess kit with a dish, cup, and utensil. Personal items might include a dyed horsehair crest for the helmet, a semi-water resistant oiled woolen cloak, socks and breeches for cold weather and a blanket. Entrenchment equipment included a shallow wicker basket for moving earth, a spade and/or pick-axe like dolabra, or turf cutter, and two wooden staves to construct the next camp palisade. All these were arranged in the marching pack toted by each infantryman.
Fighters travelled in groups of 8, and each octet was sometimes assigned a mule. The mule carried a variety of equipment and supplies, including a mill for grinding grain, a small clay oven for baking bread, cooking pots, spare weapons, waterskins, and tents. A Roman century had a complement of 10 mules, each attended by two non-combatants who handled foraging and water supply. A century might be supported by wagons in the rear, each drawn by 6 mules, and carrying tools, nails, water barrels, extra food and the tent and possessions of the centurion- commanding officer of the unit.
Artillery package
The legion also carried an artillery detachment with 30 pieces of artillery. This firepower package consisted of 10 stone throwing catapults and 20 bolt-shooting ballista, together with supporting wagons to carry ammunition and spare parts. Bolts were used for targeted fire on human opponents, while stones were used against fortifications or as an area saturation weapon. The catapults were powered by rope and sinew, tightened by ratchet and released by the stored energy. Caesar was to mount these in boats on some operations in Britain, striking fear in the heart of the native opponents according to his writings. Catapults like the scorpion were mobile and could be deployed in defence of camps, field entrenchments and even in the open field.Command, control and structure
Once the soldier had finished his training he was typically assigned to a legionRoman legion
A Roman legion normally indicates the basic ancient Roman army unit recruited specifically from Roman citizens. The organization of legions varied greatly over time but they were typically composed of perhaps 5,000 soldiers, divided into maniples and later into "cohorts"...
, the basic mass fighting force. The legion was split into ten sub-units called cohorts
Cohort (military unit)
A cohort was the basic tactical unit of a Roman legion following the reforms of Gaius Marius in 107 BC.-Legionary cohort:...
, roughly comparable to a modern infantry battalion. The cohorts were further sub-divided into three maniples
Maniple (military unit)
Maniple was a tactical unit of the Roman legion adopted from the Samnites during the Samnite Wars . It was also the name of the military insignia carried by such unit....
, which in turn were split into two centuries
Centuria
Centuria is a Latin substantive from the stem centum , denoting units consisting of 100 men. It also denotes a Roman unit of land area: 1 centuria = 100 heredia...
of about 60-100 men each. The first cohort in a legion was usually the strongest, with the fullest personnel complement and with the most skilled, experienced men. Several legions grouped together made up a distinctive field force or "army". Fighting strength could vary but generally a legion was made up of 4,800 soldiers, 60 centurions, 300 artillerymen, and 100 engineers and artificers, and around 1,600 non-combatants. Each legion was supported by a unit of 300 cavalry, the equites.
Supreme command of either legion or army was by consul
Consul
Consul was the highest elected office of the Roman Republic and an appointive office under the Empire. The title was also used in other city states and also revived in modern states, notably in the First French Republic...
or proconsul
Proconsul
A proconsul was a governor of a province in the Roman Republic appointed for one year by the senate. In modern usage, the title has been used for a person from one country ruling another country or bluntly interfering in another country's internal affairs.-Ancient Rome:In the Roman Republic, a...
or a praetor
Praetor
Praetor was a title granted by the government of Ancient Rome to men acting in one of two official capacities: the commander of an army, usually in the field, or the named commander before mustering the army; and an elected magistratus assigned varied duties...
, or in cases of emergency in the Republican era, a dictator
Roman dictator
In the Roman Republic, the dictator , was an extraordinary magistrate with the absolute authority to perform tasks beyond the authority of the ordinary magistrate . The office of dictator was a legal innovation originally named Magister Populi , i.e...
. A praetor
Praetor
Praetor was a title granted by the government of Ancient Rome to men acting in one of two official capacities: the commander of an army, usually in the field, or the named commander before mustering the army; and an elected magistratus assigned varied duties...
or a propraetor could only command a single legion and not a consular army, which normally consisted of two legions plus the allies. In the early Republican period it was customary for an army to have dual commands, with different consuls holding the office on alternate days. In later centuries this was phased out in favor of one overall army commander. The legati
Legatus
A legatus was a general in the Roman army, equivalent to a modern general officer. Being of senatorial rank, his immediate superior was the dux, and he outranked all military tribunes...
were officers of senatorial rank who assisted the supreme commander. Tribunes were young men of aristocratic rank who often supervised administrative tasks like camp construction. Centurions
Centurion (Roman army)
A centurion , also hekatontarch in Greek sources, or, in Byzantine times, kentarch was a professional officer of the Roman army after the Marian reforms of 107 BC...
(roughly equivalent in rank to today's non-commissioned or junior officers, but functioning as modern captains in field operations) commanded cohorts, maniples and centuries. Specialist groups like engineers and artificers were also used.
Military structure and ranks
An in-depth analysis of ranks, types, and historical units including their evolution over time is beyond the scope of this article. See Structural history of the Roman militaryStructural history of the Roman military
The structural history of the Roman military concerns the major transformations in the organization and constitution of ancient Rome's armed forces, "the most effective and long-lived military institution known to history." From its origins around 800 BC to its final dissolution in AD 476...
and Roman Legion
Roman legion
A Roman legion normally indicates the basic ancient Roman army unit recruited specifically from Roman citizens. The organization of legions varied greatly over time but they were typically composed of perhaps 5,000 soldiers, divided into maniples and later into "cohorts"...
for a detailed breakdown. Below is a very basic summary of the legion's structure and ranks.
Force structure
- Contubernium: "tent unit" of 8 men
- Centuria: 80 men commanded by a centurion
- Cohort: 6 centuries or a total of 480 fighting men. added to these were officers. The first cohort was double strength in terms of manpower, and generally held the best fighting men
- Legion: made up of 10 cohorts
- Field army: a grouping of several legions
- Equites: Each legion was supported by 300 cavalry (equites) , sub-divided into ten turmae
- Auxilia and velites: allied contingents, often providing light infantry and specialist fighting services, like archers, slingers or javelin men. They were usually formed into the light infantry or velites. Auxilia in the Republican period also formed allied heavy legions to complement Roman citizen formations.
- Non-combatant support: generally the men who tended the mules, forage, watering and sundries of the baggage train
Rank summary
- Consul - elected official with military and/or civil duties, sometimes both
- Praetor - appointed military commander of a legion or grouping of legions
- Legatus legionis - the legateor overall legion commander, usually filled by a senator
- Tribune - young officers, second in command of the legion. Other lesser tribunes served as junior officers
- Prefect - third in command of the legion. There were various types. The Prefectus equitarius commanded a unit of cavalry
- Primus pilus - commanding centurion for the first cohort- the senior centurion of the entire legion
- Centurion - basic commander of the century. Prestige varied based on the cohort they supervised
- Decurio - commander of the cavalry unit or turma
- Decanus- equivalent to a sergeant, commanded 8-man tent party
- Aquilifer - standard bearer of each legion- a position of much prestige
- Signifier - one for each century, handled financial matters and decorations
- Optio- second on command for the centurion
- Cornicen- horn blower or signaler
- Imaginifer - carried standard bearing the emperor's image
- Munifex - basic legion fighter- the lowest of the trained rank and file
- Tirones- new recruit to the legions, a novice
Logistics
Roman logisticsLogistics
Logistics is the management of the flow of goods between the point of origin and the point of destination in order to meet the requirements of customers or corporations. Logistics involves the integration of information, transportation, inventory, warehousing, material handling, and packaging, and...
were among some of the best in the ancient world over the centuries- from the deployment of purchasing agents to systematically buy provisions during a campaign, to the construction of roads and supply caches, to the rental of shipping if the troops had to move by water. Heavy equipment and material (tents, artillery
Artillery
Originally applied to any group of infantry primarily armed with projectile weapons, artillery has over time become limited in meaning to refer only to those engines of war that operate by projection of munitions far beyond the range of effect of personal weapons...
, extra weapons and equipment, millstones etc.) was moved by pack animal and cart, while troops carried weighty individual packs with them, including staves and shovels for constructing the fortified camps. Typical of all armies, local opportunities were also exploited by troops on the spot, and the fields of peasant farmers unlucky enough to be near the zone of conflict might be stripped to meet army needs. As with most armed forces, an assortment of traders, hucksters, prostitutes and other miscellaneous service providers trailed in the wake of the Roman fighting men.
Initial preparations and movement for battle
The approach march. Once the legion was deployed on an operation, the marching began. The approach to the battlefield was made in several columns, enhancing maneuverability. Typically a strong vanguard preceded the main body, and included scouts, cavalry and light troops. A tribune or other officer often accompanied the vanguard to survey the terrain for possible camp locations. Flank and reconnaissance elements were also deployed to provide the usual covering security. Behind the vanguard came the main body of heavy infantry. Each legion marched as a distinct formation and was accompanied by its own baggage train. The last legion usually provided the rear force, although several recently raised units might occupy this final echelon.Construction of fortified camps. Legions on a campaign typically established a strong field camp, complete with palisade
Palisade
A palisade is a steel or wooden fence or wall of variable height, usually used as a defensive structure.- Typical construction :Typical construction consisted of small or mid sized tree trunks aligned vertically, with no spacing in between. The trunks were sharpened or pointed at the top, and were...
and a deep ditch, providing a basis for supply storage, troop marshaling and defense. Camps were recreated each time the army moved, and were constructed with a view to both military necessity and religious symbolism. There were always four gateways, connected by two main criss-crossing streets, with the intersection at a concentration of command tents in the center. Space was also made for an altar and religious gathering area. Everything was standardized, from the positioning of baggage, equipment and specific army units, to the duties of officers who were to set up sentries, pickets and orders for the next day's march. Construction could take between 2 to 5 hours with part of the army laboring, while the rest stood guard, depending on the tactical situation. The shape of the camp was generally rectangular, but could vary based on the terrain or tactical situation. A distance of about 60 meters was left clear between the entrenchments and the first row of troop tents. This gap provided space for marshaling the legionnaires for battle and kept the troop area out of enemy missile range. No other ancient army persisted over such a long period in systematic camp construction like the Romans, even if the army rested for only a single day.
Breaking camp and marching. After a regimented breakfast at the allocated time, trumpets were sounded and the camp's tents and huts were dismantled and preparations made for departure. The trumpet then sounded again with the signal for "stand by to march". Mule
Mule
A mule is the offspring of a male donkey and a female horse. Horses and donkeys are different species, with different numbers of chromosomes. Of the two F1 hybrids between these two species, a mule is easier to obtain than a hinny...
s and wagons of the baggage train would be loaded and units formed up. The camp would then be burned to the ground to prevent its later occupation and use by the enemy. The trumpet
Trumpet
The trumpet is the musical instrument with the highest register in the brass family. Trumpets are among the oldest musical instruments, dating back to at least 1500 BCE. They are played by blowing air through closed lips, producing a "buzzing" sound which starts a standing wave vibration in the air...
s would then be sounded for a final time and then the troops asked three times whether they were ready, to which they were expected to shout together "Ready!", before marching off.
Intelligence. Good Roman commanders did not hesitate to exploit useful intelligence
Intelligence
Intelligence has been defined in different ways, including the abilities for abstract thought, understanding, communication, reasoning, learning, planning, emotional intelligence and problem solving....
, particularly where a siege situation or impending clash in the field was developing. Information was gathered from spies, collaborators, diplomats and envoys, and allies. Intercepted messages during the Second Punic War
Second Punic War
The Second Punic War, also referred to as The Hannibalic War and The War Against Hannibal, lasted from 218 to 201 BC and involved combatants in the western and eastern Mediterranean. This was the second major war between Carthage and the Roman Republic, with the participation of the Berbers on...
for example were an intelligence coup for the Romans, and enabled them to dispatch two armies to find and destroy Hasdrubal
Hasdrubal
Hasdrubal was the name of several Carthaginian generals of the First and Second Punic Wars...
's Carthaginian force, preventing his reinforcement of Hannibal. Commanders also kept an eye on the situation in Rome since political enemies and rivals could use an unsuccessful campaign to inflict painful career and personal damage. During this initial phase the usual field reconnaissance
Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance is the military term for exploring beyond the area occupied by friendly forces to gain information about enemy forces or features of the environment....
was also conducted - patrols might be sent out, raids mounted to probe for weaknesses, prisoners snatched, and local inhabitants intimidated.
Morale. If the field of potential battle were near, movement became more careful and more tentative. Several days might be spent in a location studying the terrain and opposition, while the troops were prepared mentally and physically for battle. Pep talks, sacrifices to the gods and the announcements of good omen
Omen
An omen is a phenomenon that is believed to foretell the future, often signifying the advent of change...
s might be carried out. A number of practical demonstrations might also be undertaken to test enemy reaction as well as to build troop morale. Part of the army might be led out of the camp and drawn up in battle array towards the enemy. If the enemy refused to come out and at least make a demonstration, the commander could claim a morale advantage for his men, contrasting the timidity of the opposition with the resolution of his fighting forces.
Historian Adrian Goldsworthy notes that such tentative pre-battle maneuvering was typical of ancient armies as each side sought to gain maximum advantage before the encounter. During this period, some ancient writers paint a picture of meetings between opposing commanders for negotiation or general discussion, as with the famous pre-clash conversation between Hannibal and Scipio
Scipio Africanus
Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus , also known as Scipio Africanus and Scipio the Elder, was a general in the Second Punic War and statesman of the Roman Republic...
at Zama
Battle of Zama
The Battle of Zama, fought around October 19, 202 BC, marked the final and decisive end of the Second Punic War. A Roman army led by Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus defeated a Carthaginian force led by the legendary commander Hannibal...
. But whatever the truth of these discussions, or the flowery speeches allegedly made, the only encounter that ultimately mattered was battle.
Deployment for combat
Pre-battle maneuver gave the competing commanders a feel for the impending clash, but final outcomes could be unpredictable, even after the start of hostilities. Skirmishing could get out of hand, launching both main forces towards one another. Political considerations, exhaustion of supplies, or even rivalry between commanders for glory could also spark a forward launch, as at the Battle of the Trebia RiverBattle of the Trebia
The Battle of the Trebia was the first major battle of the Second Punic War, fought between the Carthaginian forces of Hannibal and the Roman Republic in December of 218 BC, on or around the winter solstice...
.
Layout of the triple line
Once the machinery was in motion however, the Roman infantry typically was deployed, as the main body, facing the enemy. During deployment in the Republican era, the maniples were commonly arranged in triplex acies (triple battle order): that is, in three ranks, with the hastatiHastati
Hastatii were a class of infantry in the armies of the early Roman Republic who originally fought as spearmen, and later as swordsmen. They were originally some of the poorest men in the legion, and could afford only modest equipment — light armour and a large shield, in their service as the...
in the first rank (that nearest the enemy), the principes
Principes
Principes were spearmen, and later swordsmen, in the armies of the early Roman Republic. They were men in the prime of their lives who were fairly wealthy, and could afford decent equipment. They were the heavier infantry of the legion who carried large shields and wore good quality armour. Their...
in the second rank, and the veteran triarii
Triarii
Triarii were one of the elements of the early Roman military Manipular legions of the early Roman Republic . They were the oldest and among the wealthiest men in the army, and could afford good quality equipment. They wore heavy metal armour and carried large shields, their usual position being...
in the third and final rank as barrier troops
Barrier troops
Barrier troops, blocking units, or anti-retreat forces are formations of soldiers normally placed behind regular troops on a battle line to prevent panic or unauthorized withdrawal or retreat...
, or sometimes even further back as a strategic reserve. When in danger of imminent defeat, the first and second lines, the Hastati and Principes, ordinarily fell back on the Triarii to reform the line to allow for either a counter-attack or an orderly withdrawal. Because falling back on the Triarii was an act of desperation, to mention "falling on the Triarii" ("ad triarios rediisse") became a common Roman phrase indicating one to be in a desperate situation.
Within this triplex acies system, contemporary Roman writers talk of the maniples adopting a checkered formation called quincunx
Quincunx
A quincunx is a geometric pattern consisting of five points arranged in a cross, that is five coplanar points, four of them forming a square or rectangle and a fifth at its center...
when deployed for battle but not yet engaged. In the first line, the hastati left gaps equal in size to their cross-sectional area between each maniple. The second line consisting of principes followed in a similar manner, lining up behind the gaps left by the first line. This was also done by the third line, standing behind the gaps in the second line. The velites were deployed in front of this line in a continuous, loose-formation line.
The Roman maneuver was a complex one, filled with the dust of thousands of soldiers wheeling into place, and the shouting of officers moving to and fro as they attempted to maintain order. Several thousand men had to be positioned from column into line, with each unit taking its designated place, along with light troops and cavalry. The fortified camps were laid out and organized to facilitate deployment. It might take some time for the final array of the host, but when accomplished the army's grouping of legions represented a formidable fighting force, typically arranged in three lines with a frontage as long as one mile (1.6 km).
A general three line deployment was to remain over the centuries, although the Marian reforms
Marian reforms
The Marian reforms of 107 BC were a group of military reforms initiated by Gaius Marius, a statesman and general of the Roman republic.- Roman army before the Marian reforms :...
phased out most divisions based on age and class, standardized weapons and reorganized the legions into bigger maneuver units like cohorts. The overall size of the legion, and length of the soldier's service also increased on a more permanent basis.
Maneuvering
As the army approached its enemy, the velitesVelites
Velites were a class of infantry in the Polybian legions of the early Roman republic. Velites were light infantry and skirmishers who were armed with a number of light javelins, or hastae velitares, to fling at the enemy, and also carried short thrusting swords, or gladii for use in melee...
in front would throw their javelins at the enemy and then retreat through the gaps in the lines. This was an important innovation since in other armies of the period skirmishers would have to either retreat through their own armies ranks, causing confusion, or else flee around either flank of their own army. After the velites had retreated through the hastati, the 'posterior' century would march to the left and then forward so that they presented a solid line, creating a solid line of soldiers. The same procedure would be employed as they passed through the second and third ranks or turned to the side to channel down the gap between the first and second rows on route to help guard the legion's flanks.
At this point, the legion then presented a solid line to the enemy and the legion was in the correct formation for engagement. When the enemy closed, the hastati would charge. If they were losing the fight, the 'posterior' century returned to its position creating gaps again. Then the maniples would fall back through the gaps in the principes, who followed the same procedure to form a battle line and charge. If the principes could not break the enemy, they would retreat behind the triarii and the whole army would leave the battlefield in good order. According to some writers, the triarii formed a continuous line when they deployed, and their forward movement allowed scattered or discomfited units to rest and reform, to later rejoin the struggle.
The manipular system allowed engaging every kind of enemy even in rough terrain, because the legion had both flexibility and toughness according to the deployment of its lines. Lack of a strong cavalry corps however, was a major flaw of the Roman forces.
In the later imperial army, the general deployment was very similar, with the cohorts deploying in quincunx pattern. In a reflection of the earlier placement of the veteran triarii in the rear, the less experienced cohorts - usually the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 8th - were in the front; the more experienced cohorts - 1st, 5th, 7th, 9th, and 10th - were placed behind.
Formations
The above is only standard procedure and was often modified; for example, at ZamaBattle of Zama
The Battle of Zama, fought around October 19, 202 BC, marked the final and decisive end of the Second Punic War. A Roman army led by Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus defeated a Carthaginian force led by the legendary commander Hannibal...
, Scipio deployed his entire legion in a single line to envelop Hannibal's army just as Hannibal had done at Cannae
Battle of Cannae
The Battle of Cannae was a major battle of the Second Punic War, which took place on August 2, 216 BC near the town of Cannae in Apulia in southeast Italy. The army of Carthage under Hannibal decisively defeated a numerically superior army of the Roman Republic under command of the consuls Lucius...
. A brief summary of alternative formations known to have been used is shown below:
Combat
Hand-to-hand engagement after release of missile weapons. Once the deployment and initial skirmishing described above took place, the main body of heavy infantry closed the gap and attacked on the double. The front ranks usually cast their pilaPilum
The pilum was a javelin commonly used by the Roman army in ancient times. It was generally about two metres long overall, consisting of an iron shank about 7 mm in diameter and 60 cm long with pyramidal head...
, and the following ranks hurled theirs over the heads of the front-line fighters. If a cast pilum did not cause direct death or injury, they were designed to bend on contact, rendering the pila unusable by the enemy. After the pila were cast, the soldiers then drew their swords and engaged the enemy. Emphasis was on using the shield to provide maximum body coverage, while attacking that exposed by the enemy. In the combat that ensued, Roman discipline, heavy shield, armor and training were to give them important advantages.
The acute shock of combat. Some scholars of the Roman infantry maintain that the intense trauma
Physical trauma
Trauma refers to "a body wound or shock produced by sudden physical injury, as from violence or accident." It can also be described as "a physical wound or injury, such as a fracture or blow." Major trauma can result in secondary complications such as circulatory shock, respiratory failure and death...
and stress of hand to hand combat meant that the contenders did not simply hack at one another continuously until one dropped. Instead there were short periods of intense, vicious fighting. If indecisive, the contenders might fall back a short distance to recuperate, and then surge forward to renew the struggle. Others behind them would be stepping up into the fray meanwhile, engaging new foes or covering their colleagues. The individual warrior could thus count on temporary relief, rather than endless fighting until death or crippling injury. As the battle progressed, the massive physical and mental stress intensified. The stamina and willpower demanded to make yet one more charge, to make yet one more surge grew even greater. Eventually one side began to break down, and it is then that the greatest slaughter began.
Use of war machines and covering fire. Many Roman battles, especially during the late empire, were fought with the preparatory fire from Ballista
Ballista
The ballista , plural ballistae, was an ancient missile weapon which launched a large projectile at a distant target....
s and Onagers
Onager (siege weapon)
The onager was a Roman siege engine, which derived its name from the kicking action of the machine, similar to that of an onager , it was created as a simpler, cheaper version of the ballista. The Onager is a type of catapult that uses torsional pressure, generally from twisted rope, to store...
. These war machines, a form of ancient artillery
Artillery
Originally applied to any group of infantry primarily armed with projectile weapons, artillery has over time become limited in meaning to refer only to those engines of war that operate by projection of munitions far beyond the range of effect of personal weapons...
, fired arrows and large stones towards the enemy (although many historians question the battlefield effectiveness of such weapons). Following this barrage, the Roman infantry advanced, in four lines, until they came within 30 meters of the enemy, then they halted, hurled their pila and charged. If the first line was repelled by the enemy, another line would rapidly resume the attack. Often this rapid sequence of deadly attacks proved the key of victory. Another common tactic was to taunt the enemy with feigned charges and rapid arrow fire by the auxiliares equites (auxiliary cavalry), forcing the enemy into pursuing them, and then leading the enemy into an ambush where they would be counter attacked by Roman heavy infantry and cavalry.
Flexibility
Some ancient sources such as PolybiusPolybius
Polybius , Greek ) was a Greek historian of the Hellenistic Period noted for his work, The Histories, which covered the period of 220–146 BC in detail. The work describes in part the rise of the Roman Republic and its gradual domination over Greece...
seem to imply that the legions could fight with gaps in their lines. Yet, most sources seem to admit that more usually a line would form into a solid front. Various approaches have been taken to reconcile these possibilities with the ancient writings. The advantages of gaps are obvious when a formation is on the move- it can more easily flow around obstacles and maneuver and control are enhanced and, as the Romans did in the pre-Marius republic, place baggage between the lines meaning that the cargo cannot be easily captured and that the army can quickly get ready for a battle by using it as cover. After the approach marching was complete, it would be extremely difficult to deploy an unbroken army of men for combat across any but the flattest ground without some sort of intervals. Many ancient armies used gaps of some sort, even the Carthaginians, who typically withdrew their initial skirmishing troops between the spaces before the main event. Even more loosely organized enemies like the Germanic hosts typically charged in distinct groups with small gaps between them, rather than marching up in a neat line.
Fighting with gaps is thus feasible as writers like Polybius assert. According to those who support that the quincunx formation view, what made the Roman approach stand out is that their intervals were generally larger and more systematically organized than those of other ancient armies. Each gap was covered by maniples or cohorts from lines farther back. A penetration of any significance could not just slip in unmolested. It would not only be mauled as it fought past the gauntlet of the first line, but would also clash with aggressive units moving up to plug the space. From a larger standpoint, as the battle waxed and waned, fresh units might be deployed through the intervals to relieve the men of the first line, allowing continual pressure to be brought forward.
Mixing of a continuous front with interval fighting
One scenario for not using gaps is deployment in a limited space, such as the top of a hill or ravine, where extensive spreading out would not be feasible. Another is a particular attack formation, such as the wedge discussed above, or an encirclement as at the battle of IlipaBattle of Ilipa
The Battle of Ilipa in 206 BC was considered Scipio Africanus’s most brilliant victory in his military career during the Second Punic War. Though it may not seem to be as original as Hannibal’s tactic at Cannae, Scipio’s pre-battle maneuver and his Reverse Cannae formation was still a culmination...
. Yet another is a closing phase maneuver, when a solid line is constructed to make a last, final push as in the battle of Zama
Battle of Zama
The Battle of Zama, fought around October 19, 202 BC, marked the final and decisive end of the Second Punic War. A Roman army led by Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus defeated a Carthaginian force led by the legendary commander Hannibal...
. During the maelstrom of battle it is also possible that as the units merged into line, the general checkerboard spacing became more compressed or even disappeared, and the fighting would see a more or less solid line engaged with the enemy. Thus gaps at the beginning of the struggle might tend to vanish in the closing phases.
Some historians view the intervals as primarily useful in maneuver. Before the legionnaires closed with the enemy each echelon would form a solid line to engage. If things went badly for the first line, it would retreat through the gaps and the second echelon moved up- again forming a continuous front. Should they be discomfited, there still remained the veterans of the triarii who let the survivors retreat through the preset gaps. The veterans then formed a continuous front to engage the enemy or provided cover for the retreat of the army as a whole. The same procedure was followed when the triarii was phased out - intervals for maneuver, reforming and recovery- solid line to engage. Some writers maintain that in Caesar's
Julius Caesar
Gaius Julius Caesar was a Roman general and statesman and a distinguished writer of Latin prose. He played a critical role in the gradual transformation of the Roman Republic into the Roman Empire....
armies the use of the quincunx and its gaps seems to have declined, and his legions generally deployed in three unbroken lines as shown above, with four cohorts in front, and three apiece in the echeloned order. Relief was provided by the second and third lines 'filtering' forward to relieve their comrades in small groups, while the exhausted and wounded eased back from the front. The Romans still remained flexible however, using gaps and deploying four or sometimes two lines based on the tactical situation.
Line spacing and combat stamina
Another unique feature of the Roman infantry was the depth of its spacing. Most ancient armies deployed in shallower formations, particularly phalanxPhalanx formation
The phalanx is a rectangular mass military formation, usually composed entirely of heavy infantry armed with spears, pikes, sarissas, or similar weapons...
-type forces. Phalanxes might deepen their ranks heavily to add both stamina and shock power, but their general approach still favored one massive line, as opposed to the deep three-layer Roman arrangement. The advantage of the Roman system is that it allowed the continual funneling or metering of combat power forward over a longer period—massive, steadily renewed pressure to the front—until the enemy broke. Deployment of the second and third lines required careful consideration by the Roman commander. Deployed too early, and they might get entangled in the frontal fighting and become exhausted. Deployed too late, and they might be swept away in a rout if the first line began to break. Tight control had to be maintained, hence the 3rd line triari were sometimes made to squat or kneel, effectively discouraging premature movement to the front. The Roman commander was thus generally mobile, constantly moving from spot to spot, and often riding back in person to fetch reserves, if there was no time for standard messenger service. The large number of officers in the typical Roman army, and the flexible breakdown into sub-units like cohorts or maniples greatly aided coordination of such moves.
Whatever the actual formation taken however, the ominous funneling or surge of combat power up to the front remained constant:
- "When the first line as a whole had done its best and become weakened and exhausted by losses, it gave way to the relief of fresh men from the second line who, passing through it gradually, pressed forward one by one, or in single file, and worked their way into the fight in the same way. Meanwhile the tired men of the original first line, when sufficiently rested, reformed and re-entered the fight. This continued until all men of the first and second lines had been engaged. This does not presuppose an actual withdrawal of the first line, but rather a merging, a blending or a coalescing of both lines. Thus the enemy was given no rest and was continually opposed by fresh troops until, exhausted and demoralized, he yielded to repeated attacks."
Post-deployment commands
Whatever the deployment, the Roman army was marked both by flexibility and strong discipline and cohesion. Different formations were assumed according to different tactical situations.- Repellere equites ("repel horsemen/knights") was the formation used to resist cavalry. The legionaries would assume a squareInfantry squareAn infantry square is a combat formation an infantry unit forms in close order when threatened with cavalry attack.-Very early history:The formation was described by Plutarch and used by the Romans, and was developed from an earlier circular formation...
formation, holding their pila as spears in the space between their shields and strung together shoulder to shoulder. - At the command iacere pila, the legionaries hurled their pila at the enemy.
- At the command cuneum formate, the infantry formed a wedgeFlying wedgeA flying wedge is a configuration created from a body moving forward in a triangular formation. This V-shaped arrangement began as a successful military strategy in ancient times when infantry units would move forward in wedge formations to smash through an enemy's lines...
to charge and break enemy lines. This formation was used as a shockShock troopsShock troops or assault troops are formations created to lead an attack. "Shock troop" is a loose translation of the German word Stoßtrupp...
tactic. - At the command contendite vestra sponte, the legionaries assumed an aggressive stance and attacked every opponent they faced.
- At the command orbem formate, the legionaries assumed a circle-like formation with the archers placed in the midst of and behind the legionaries providing missile fire support. This tactic was used mainly when a small number of legionaries had to hold a position and were surrounded by enemies.
- At the command ciringite frontem, the legionaries held their position.
- At the command frontem allargate, a scattered formation was adopted.
- At the command testudinem formate, the legionaries assumed the testudo (tortoise) formationTestudo formationIn Ancient Roman warfare, the testudo or tortoise formation was a formation used commonly by the Roman Legions during battles, particularly sieges. Testudo is the Latin word for "tortoise"...
. This was slow moving but almost impenetrable to enemy fire, and thus very effective during sieges and/or when facing off against enemy archers. However in hand to hand fighting then the testudo was a weak formation and therefore it was only adopted when the enemy were far enough away so as the legionaries could get into another formation before being attacked. - At the command Agmen formate, the legionaries assumed a square formationInfantry squareAn infantry square is a combat formation an infantry unit forms in close order when threatened with cavalry attack.-Very early history:The formation was described by Plutarch and used by the Romans, and was developed from an earlier circular formation...
, which was also the typical shape of a century in battle.
Siegecraft and fortifications
Besieging cities.- Oppidum expugnare was the Roman term for besieging cities. It was divided into three phases:
- In the first phase, engineers (the cohors fabrorum) built a fortified camp near the city with walls of circumvallation and at the command 'turres extruere' built watch towers to prevent the enemy from bringing in reinforcements. Siege towers were built, trenches were dug and traps set all around the city. Also second, exterior line of walls (contravallation) was built around the city facing the enemy , as Caesar did at the Battle of AlesiaBattle of AlesiaThe Battle of Alesia or Siege of Alesia took place in September, 52 BC around the Gallic oppidum of Alesia, a major town centre and hill fort of the Mandubii tribe...
. Sometimes the Romans would mine the enemy's walls. - The second phase began with onagerOnager (siege weapon)The onager was a Roman siege engine, which derived its name from the kicking action of the machine, similar to that of an onager , it was created as a simpler, cheaper version of the ballista. The Onager is a type of catapult that uses torsional pressure, generally from twisted rope, to store...
and ballistaBallistaThe ballista , plural ballistae, was an ancient missile weapon which launched a large projectile at a distant target....
fire to cover the approach of the siege towers, which were full of legionaries ready to assault the wall's defenders. Meanwhile, other cohorts approached the city's wall in testudo formationTestudo formationIn Ancient Roman warfare, the testudo or tortoise formation was a formation used commonly by the Roman Legions during battles, particularly sieges. Testudo is the Latin word for "tortoise"...
, bringing up battering rams and ladders to breach the gates and scale the walls. - The third phase included opening of the city's main gate by the cohorts which had managed to break through or scale the walls, provided the rams had not knocked the gate open. Once the main gate was opened or the walls breached, the cavalry and other cohorts entered the city to finish off the remaining defenders.
Field fortifications. While strong cities/forts and elaborate sieges to capture them were common throughout the ancient world, the Romans were unique among ancient armies in their extensive use of field fortifications. In campaign after campaign, enormous effort was expended to dig- a job done by the ordinary legionnaire. His field pack included a shovel, a dolabra
Dolabra
The dolabra is a versatile tool used by the people in Italy since ancient times. The dolabra could serve as a pickaxe used by miners and excavators, a priest's implement for ritual religious slaughtering of animals and as an entrenching tool used in Roman infantry tactics....
or pickaxe, and a wicker basket for hauling dirt. Some soldiers also carried a type of turf cutter. With these they dug trenches, built walls and palisades and constructed assault roads. The operations of Julius Caesar
Julius Caesar
Gaius Julius Caesar was a Roman general and statesman and a distinguished writer of Latin prose. He played a critical role in the gradual transformation of the Roman Republic into the Roman Empire....
at Alesia
Battle of Alesia
The Battle of Alesia or Siege of Alesia took place in September, 52 BC around the Gallic oppidum of Alesia, a major town centre and hill fort of the Mandubii tribe...
are well known. The Gallic city was surrounded by massive double walls penning in defenders, and keeping out relieving attackers. A network of camps and forts were included in these works. The inner trench alone was 20 feet (6.1 m) deep, and Caesar diverted a river to fill it with water. The ground was also sown with caltrops of iron barbs at various places to discourage assault. Surprisingly for such an infantry centered battle, Caesar relied heavily on cavalry
Cavalry
Cavalry or horsemen were soldiers or warriors who fought mounted on horseback. Cavalry were historically the third oldest and the most mobile of the combat arms...
forces to counter Gallic sorties. Ironically, many of these were from Germanic tribes who had come to terms earlier.
The power of Roman field camps has been noted earlier, but in other actions, the Romans sometimes used trenches to secure their flanks against envelopment when they were outnumbered, as Caesar did during operations in Belgaic Gaul
Gaul
Gaul was a region of Western Europe during the Iron Age and Roman era, encompassing present day France, Luxembourg and Belgium, most of Switzerland, the western part of Northern Italy, as well as the parts of the Netherlands and Germany on the left bank of the Rhine. The Gauls were the speakers of...
. In the Brittany
Brittany
Brittany is a cultural and administrative region in the north-west of France. Previously a kingdom and then a duchy, Brittany was united to the Kingdom of France in 1532 as a province. Brittany has also been referred to as Less, Lesser or Little Britain...
region of France, moles
Mole (architecture)
A mole is a massive structure, usually of stone, used as a pier, breakwater, or a causeway between places separated by water. The word comes from Middle French mole and ultimately Latin mōlēs meaning a large mass, especially of rock and has the same root as molecule.Historically, the term "mole"...
and breakwaters were constructed at enormous effort to assault the estuarine strongholds of the Gauls. Internal Roman fighting between Caesar and Pompey also saw the frequent employment of trenches, counter-trenches, dug-in strong points, and other works as the contenders maneuvered against each other in field combat. In the latter stages of the empire, the extensive use of such field fortifications declined as the heavy infantry itself was phased down. Nevertheless they are an integral part of the relentless Roman rise to dominance over large parts of the ancient world.
Resource Tactics
As with any military organization, training soldiers/armies require a number of things and could prove to be quite costly in the long run.The Romans understood this concept very well and realized that training soldiers could include paying for his rations [food], his salary, his armor, his armaments [weapons], and a soldier’s honorarium [which was paid to those who received honorable discharges]. With all this in perspective, the Romans realized each individual soldier was a far too valuable resource to waste. The Romans knew the costs they were incurring for each soldier had to be quite similar on their enemy’s side. So the Romans developed a tactic that could cause a significant setback or even defeat to their enemy; while only creating a limited risk to their own soldiers. This tactic was known as “Resource Tactics.” Just as one might concur, standing armies run on their stomachs and their equipment, and both require regular supplies. The idea of "Resource Tactics" could ultimately cut off their opponents from resources in one of three ways:
1. The first way the Romans conducted this tactic was to attack the resource location themselves. Once they conquered a territory they would secure as much resources as they could handle. This allowed the Romans to restock their own supply and prevent the available resources from falling into their opponents hands.
2. The second way the Romans conducted this tactic was to actually intercept the supplies while in transit. The Romans would identify main supply routes of their enemies and create a stopping point . Once the enemy was stopped, the Romans would ransack the supply, which would drastically reduce the amount of supplies that would reach the enemy.
3. The final approach, and quite possibly the most famous way the Romans conducted this tactic was a “siege” [siege - a military operation in which troops surround a place and cut off all outside access to force surrender]. While conducting the siege, the Romans would typically build a wall around the existing city to help control the enemy. This wall would be built out of reach of the archers and would prevent the enemy from escaping. Once the Romans completed the wall, they would use catapults, ballistas, onagers, and trebuchets to hurl rocks, spears, and other objects from safe distances. The ongoing siege would eventually cause the city/fort to run out of resources, thus causing the opponents to die off or surrender; giving the Romans an easy victory.
The basic principle behind this tactic was to disrupt their enemies resources while increase their own personal resources. Without a regular supply of food, water, and other supplies, armies will begin to starve or dehydrate, which lead to low morale or killing of fellow soldiers. This in turn would cause the opposing Army to fail its overarching goal and fall apart.
Roman infantry versus Hellenic phalanx
Strengths of the phalanxPhalanx formation
The phalanx is a rectangular mass military formation, usually composed entirely of heavy infantry armed with spears, pikes, sarissas, or similar weapons...
. Prior to the rise of Rome, the Hellenic phalanx was the premiere infantry force in the Western World. It had proven itself on the battlefields of southern Europe- from Sparta
Sparta
Sparta or Lacedaemon, was a prominent city-state in ancient Greece, situated on the banks of the River Eurotas in Laconia, in south-eastern Peloponnese. It emerged as a political entity around the 10th century BC, when the invading Dorians subjugated the local, non-Dorian population. From c...
to Macedon
Macedon
Macedonia or Macedon was an ancient kingdom, centered in the northeastern part of the Greek peninsula, bordered by Epirus to the west, Paeonia to the north, the region of Thrace to the east and Thessaly to the south....
ia, and had met and overcome several strong non-European armies beyond - from Persia to India. Packed into a dense armored mass, and equipped with massive pikes 12 to 21 feet (6.4 m) in length, the phalanx was a formidable force. While defensive configurations were sometimes used, the phalanx was most effective when it was moving forward in attack, either in a frontal charge or in "oblique" or echeloned order against an opposing flank, as the victories of Alexander the Great and Theban innovator Epaminondas
Epaminondas
Epaminondas , or Epameinondas, was a Theban general and statesman of the 4th century BC who transformed the Ancient Greek city-state of Thebes, leading it out of Spartan subjugation into a preeminent position in Greek politics...
attest. When working with other formations—light infantry and cavalry—it was, at its height under Alexander, without peer.
Weaknesses of the phalanx. Nevertheless the phalanx had key weaknesses. It had some maneuverability, but once a clash was joined this decreased, particularly on rough ground. Its "dense pack" approach also made it rigid. Compressed in the heat of battle, its troops could only primarily fight facing forward. The diversity of troops gave the phalanx great flexibility, but this diversity was a double-edged sword- relying on a mix of units that was complicated to control and position. These included not only the usual heavy infantrymen, cavalry and light infantry- but also various elite units, medium armed groups, foreign contingents with their own styles and shock units of war-elephants. Such "mixed" forces presented additional command and control problems. If properly organized and fighting together a long time under capable leaders, they could be very proficient. The campaigns of Alexander, and Pyrrhus
Pyrrhus
Pyrrhus or Pyrrhos or Pyrros may refer to the following figures from Greek history and mythology:* Pyrrhus or Neoptolemus, son of Achilles* Pyrrhus of Epirus , famous king, to whom the term Pyrrhic victory alludes...
(a Hellenic-style formation of mixed contingents) show this. Without such long term cohesion and leadership however, their performance was uneven. By the time the Romans were engaging against Hellenistic armies the Greeks had ceased to use strong flank guards and cavalry contingents, and their system had degenerated into a mere clash of phalanxes. This was the formation overcome by the Romans at Cynoscephalae.
Advantages of Roman infantry. The Romans themselves had retained some aspects of the phalanx in their early legions, most notably the final line of fighters in the classic "triple line", the spearmen of the triarii. The long pikes of the triarii were to eventually disappear, and all hands were uniformly equipped with short sword, shield and pilum, and deployed in the distinctive Roman tactical system, which provided more standardization and cohesion in the long run over the Hellenic type formations.
Phalanxes facing the legion were vulnerable to the more flexible Roman "checkerboard" deployment, which provided each fighting man a good chunk of personal space to engage in close order fighting. The manipular system also allowed entire Roman sub-units to maneuver more widely, freed from the need to always remain tightly packed in rigid formation. The deep three-line deployment of the Romans allowed combat pressure to be steadily applied forward. Most phalanxes favored one huge line several ranks deep. This might do well in the initial stages, but as the battle entangled more and more men, the stacked Roman formation allowed fresh pressure to be imposed over a more extended time. As combat lengthened and the battlefield compressed, the phalanx might thus become exhausted or rendered immobile, while the Romans still had enough left to not only maneuver but to make the final surges forward. Hannibal's deployment at Zama
Battle of Zama
The Battle of Zama, fought around October 19, 202 BC, marked the final and decisive end of the Second Punic War. A Roman army led by Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus defeated a Carthaginian force led by the legendary commander Hannibal...
appears to recognize this—hence the Carthaginian also used a deep three-layer approach, sacrificing his first two lower quality lines and holding back his combat-hardened veterans of Italy for the final encounter. Hannibal's arrangement had much to recommend it given his weakness in cavalry and infantry, but he made no provision for one line relieving the other as the Romans did. Each line fought its own lonely battle and the last ultimately perished when the Romans reorganized for a final surge.
The legions also drilled and trained together over a more extended time, and were more uniform and streamlined, (unlike Hannibal's final force and others) enabling even less than brilliant army commanders to maneuver and position their forces proficiently. These qualities, among others, made them more than a match for the phalanx, when they met in combat.
According to Polybius, in his comparison of the phalanx versus the Roman system:
- ".. Whereas the phalanx requires one time and one type of ground.. Its use requires flat and level ground which is unencumbered by any obstacles.. If the enemy refuses to come down to [meet it on level ground].. what purpose can the phalanx serve? .. [Also] the phalanx soldier cannot operate in either smaller units or singly, whereas the Roman formation is highly flexible. Every Roman soldier.. can adapt himself equally well to any place of time and meet an attack from any quarter.. Accordingly since the effective use of parts of the Roman army is so much superior, their plans are much more likely to achieve success."
Versus Pyrrhus
See detailed article Pyrrhus of EpirusPyrrhus of Epirus
Pyrrhus or Pyrrhos was a Greek general and statesman of the Hellenistic era. He was king of the Greek tribe of Molossians, of the royal Aeacid house , and later he became king of Epirus and Macedon . He was one of the strongest opponents of early Rome...
The Greek king Pyrrhus' phalangical system was to prove a tough trial for the Romans. Despite several defeats the Romans inflicted such losses on the Epirote army that the phrase "Pyrrhic victory
Pyrrhic victory
A Pyrrhic victory is a victory with such a devastating cost to the victor that it carries the implication that another such victory will ultimately cause defeat.-Origin:...
" has become a byword for a victory won at a terrible cost. A skillful and experienced commander, Pyrrhus deployed a typically mixed phalanx system, including shock units of war-elephants, and formations of light infantry (peltasts), elite units, and cavalry to support his infantry. Using these he was able to defeat the Romans twice, with a third battle deemed inconclusive or a limited Roman tactical success by many scholars. The battles below (see individual articles for detailed accounts) illustrate the difficulties of fighting against phalanx forces. If well led and deployed (compare Pyrrhus to the fleeing Perseus
Perseus
Perseus ,Perseos and Perseas are not used in English. the legendary founder of Mycenae and of the Perseid dynasty of Danaans there, was the first of the mythic heroes of Greek mythology whose exploits in defeating various archaic monsters provided the founding myths of the Twelve Olympians...
at Pydna below), they presented a credible infantry alternative to the heavy legion. The Romans however were to learn from their mistakes. In subsequent battles after the Pyrrhic wars, they showed themselves masters of the Hellenic phalanx.
- Battle of HeracleaBattle of HeracleaThe Battle of Heraclea took place in 280 BC between the Romans under the command of Consul Publius Valerius Laevinus and the combined forces of Greeks from Epirus, Tarentum, Thurii, Metapontum, and Heraclea under the command of King Pyrrhus of Epirus....
- Battle of Asculum
- Battle of Beneventum
Notable triumphs
Battle of CynoscephalaeBattle of Cynoscephalae
The Battle of Cynoscephalae was an encounter battle fought in Thessaly in 197 BC between the Roman army, led by Titus Quinctius Flamininus, and the Antigonid dynasty of Macedon, led by Philip V.- Prelude :...
(See more detailed article)
In this battle the Macedonian phalanx originally held the high ground but all of its units had not been properly positioned due to earlier skirmishing. Nevertheless, an advance by its left wing drove back the Romans, who counterattacked on the right flank and made some progress against a somewhat disorganized Macedonian left. However the issue was still in doubt, until an unknown tribune (officer) detached 20 maniples from the Roman line and made an encircling attack against the Macedonian rear. This caused the enemy phalanx to collapse, securing a rout for the Romans. The more flexible, streamlined legionary organization had exploited the weaknesses of the densely packed phalanx. Such triumphs secured Roman hegemony in Greece and adjoining lands.
Battle of Pydna
Battle of Pydna
The Battle of Pydna in 168 BC between Rome and the Macedonian Antigonid dynasty saw the further ascendancy of Rome in the Hellenic/Hellenistic world and the end of the Antigonid line of kings, whose power traced back to Alexander the Great.Paul K...
(See more detailed article)
At Pydna the contenders deployed on a relatively flat plain, and the Macedonians had augmented the infantry with a sizeable cavalry contingent. At the hour of decision, the enemy phalanx advanced in formidable array against the Roman line, and made some initial progress. However, the ground it had to advance over was rough, and the powerful phalangial formation lost its tight cohesion. The Romans absorbed the initial shock and came on into the fray, where their more spacious formation and continuously applied pressure proved decisive in hand to hand combat on the rough ground. Shield and sword at close quarters on such terrain neutralized the long pike
Pike (weapon)
A pike is a pole weapon, a very long thrusting spear used extensively by infantry both for attacks on enemy foot soldiers and as a counter-measure against cavalry assaults. Unlike many similar weapons, the pike is not intended to be thrown. Pikes were used regularly in European warfare from the...
, and supplementary Macedonian weapons (lighter armor and a dagger-like short sword) made an indifferent showing against the skillful and aggressive assault of the heavy Roman infantrymen. The opposition also failed to deploy supporting forces effectively to help the phalanx at its time of dire need. Indeed the Macedonian commander, Perseus, seeing the situation deteriorating, seems to have fled without even bringing his cavalry into the engagement. The affair was decided in less than two hours, with a comprehensive defeat for the Macedonians.
Other anti-phalanx tactics
"Breaking phalanxesPhalanx formation
The phalanx is a rectangular mass military formation, usually composed entirely of heavy infantry armed with spears, pikes, sarissas, or similar weapons...
" illustrates more of the Roman army's flexibility. When the Romans faced phalangite
Phalangite
Phalangite is the Greek name for*an infantryman deployed in a phalanx of Classical and Hellenistic antiquity. The Macedonian so-called Sarissaphoros had a tactical advantage over other phalangites because of their extremely long pikes known as a sarissa...
armies, the legions often deployed the velites
Velites
Velites were a class of infantry in the Polybian legions of the early Roman republic. Velites were light infantry and skirmishers who were armed with a number of light javelins, or hastae velitares, to fling at the enemy, and also carried short thrusting swords, or gladii for use in melee...
in front of the enemy with the command to contendite vestra sponte, to cause confusion and panic into the solid blocks of the phalanxes. Meanwhile, auxilia archers
Archery
Archery is the art, practice, or skill of propelling arrows with the use of a bow, from Latin arcus. Archery has historically been used for hunting and combat; in modern times, however, its main use is that of a recreational activity...
were deployed on the wings of the legion in front of the cavalry
Cavalry
Cavalry or horsemen were soldiers or warriors who fought mounted on horseback. Cavalry were historically the third oldest and the most mobile of the combat arms...
, in order to defend their withdrawal. These archers were ordered to eiaculare flammas, fire incendiary arrow
Arrow
An arrow is a shafted projectile that is shot with a bow. It predates recorded history and is common to most cultures.An arrow usually consists of a shaft with an arrowhead attached to the front end, with fletchings and a nock at the other.- History:...
s into the enemy. The cohorts then advanced in a wedge formation, supported by the velites' and auxiliaries' fire, and charged into the phalanx at a single point, breaking it, then flanking it with the cavalry to seal the victory. See the Battle of Beneventum for evidence of fire-arrows being used.
Versus Hannibal's Carthage
Tactical superiority of Hannibal's forces. While not a classic phalanx force, Hannibal's army was composed of "mixed" contingents and elements common to Hellenic formations, and it is told that towards the end of his life, Hannibal reportedly named Pyrrhus as the commander of the past that he most admired Rome however had blunted Pyrrhus' hosts prior to the rise of Hannibal, and given their advantages in organization, discipline, and resource mobilization, why did they not make a better showing in the field against the Carthaginian, who throughout most of his campaign in Italy suffered from numerical inferiority and lack of support from his homeland?Hannibal's individual genius, the steadiness of his core troops (forged over several years of fighting together in Spain, and later in Italy) and his cavalry arm seem to be the decisive factors. Time after time Hannibal exploited the tendencies of the Romans, particularly their eagerness to close and achieve a decisive victory. The cold, tired, wet legionnaires that slogged out of the Trebia River to form up on the river bank are but one example of how Hannibal forced or manipulated the Romans into fighting on his terms, and on the ground of his own choosing. The later debacles at Lake Trasimene and Cannae
Battle of Cannae
The Battle of Cannae was a major battle of the Second Punic War, which took place on August 2, 216 BC near the town of Cannae in Apulia in southeast Italy. The army of Carthage under Hannibal decisively defeated a numerically superior army of the Roman Republic under command of the consuls Lucius...
, forced the proud Romans to avoid battle, shadowing the Carthaginians from the high ground of the Apennines, unwilling to risk a significant engagement on the plains where the enemy cavalry held sway.
Growing Roman tactical sophistication and ability to adapt overcomes earlier disasters. But while the case of Hannibal underscored that the Romans were far from invincible, it also demonstrated their long-term strengths. They isolated and eventually bottled up the Carthaginians and hastened their withdrawal from Italy with constant maneuver. More importantly, they began a counterattack into Spain and Africa. They were willing to absorb the humiliation in Italy and remain on the strategic defensive, but with typical relentless persistence they struck elsewhere, to finally crush their foes.
They also learned from those enemies. The operations of Scipio
Scipio Africanus
Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus , also known as Scipio Africanus and Scipio the Elder, was a general in the Second Punic War and statesman of the Roman Republic...
were an improvement on some of those who had previously faced Hannibal, showing a higher level of advance thinking, preparation and organization. (Compare with Sempronius at the Battle of the Trebia River
Battle of the Trebia
The Battle of the Trebia was the first major battle of the Second Punic War, fought between the Carthaginian forces of Hannibal and the Roman Republic in December of 218 BC, on or around the winter solstice...
for example). Scipio's contribution was in part to implement more flexible maneuver of tactical units, instead of the straight-ahead, three-line grind favored by some contemporaries. He also made better use of cavalry, traditionally an arm in which the Romans were lacking. His operations also included pincer movements, a consolidated battle line, and "reverse Cannae" formations and cavalry movements. His victories in Spain and the African campaign demonstrated a new sophistication in Roman warfare and reaffirmed the Roman capacity to adapt, persist and overcome. See detailed battles:
- Battle of BaeculaBattle of BaeculaThe Battle of Baecula was Scipio Africanus’s first major field battle after he had taken command of Roman interests in Iberia during the Second Punic War, in which he routed the Carthaginian army under the command of Hasdrubal Barca.-Prelude:...
- Battle of IlipaBattle of IlipaThe Battle of Ilipa in 206 BC was considered Scipio Africanus’s most brilliant victory in his military career during the Second Punic War. Though it may not seem to be as original as Hannibal’s tactic at Cannae, Scipio’s pre-battle maneuver and his Reverse Cannae formation was still a culmination...
- Battle of ZamaBattle of ZamaThe Battle of Zama, fought around October 19, 202 BC, marked the final and decisive end of the Second Punic War. A Roman army led by Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus defeated a Carthaginian force led by the legendary commander Hannibal...
Barbarian Armies
Views of the Gallic enemies of Rome have varied widely. Some older histories consider them to be backward savages, ruthlessly destroying the civilization and "grandeur that was Rome." Some modernist views see them in a proto-nationalist light, ancient freedom fighters resisting the iron boot of empire. Often their bravery is celebrated as worthy adversaries of Rome. See the Dying GaulDying Gaul
The Dying Gaul , formerly known as the Dying Gladiator, is an ancient Roman marble copy of a lost Hellenistic sculpture that is thought to have been executed in bronze, which was commissioned some time between 230 BC and 220 BC by Attalus I of Pergamon to celebrate his victory over the Celtic...
for an example. The Gallic opposition was also composed of a large number of different peoples and tribes, geographically ranging from the mountains of Switzerland, to the lowlands of France, to the forests of the Rhineland, and thus are not easy to categorize. The term "Gaul" has also been used interchangeably to describe Celt
Celt
The Celts were a diverse group of tribal societies in Iron Age and Roman-era Europe who spoke Celtic languages.The earliest archaeological culture commonly accepted as Celtic, or rather Proto-Celtic, was the central European Hallstatt culture , named for the rich grave finds in Hallstatt, Austria....
ic peoples farther afield in Britain and Scotland
Scotland
Scotland is a country that is part of the United Kingdom. Occupying the northern third of the island of Great Britain, it shares a border with England to the south and is bounded by the North Sea to the east, the Atlantic Ocean to the north and west, and the North Channel and Irish Sea to the...
, adding even more to the diversity of peoples lumped together under this name. From a military standpoint however, they seem to have shared certain general characteristics: tribal polities with a relatively small and lesser elaborated state structure, light weaponry, fairly unsophisticated tactics and organization, a high degree of mobility, and inability to sustain combat power in their field forces over a lengthy period. Roman sources reflect on the prejudices of their times, but nevertheless testify to the Gauls fierceness and bravery.
- "Their chief weapons were long, two-edged swords of soft iron.. For defense they carried small wicker shields. Their armies were undisciplined mobs, greedy for plunder.. Brave to the point of recklessness, they were formidable warriors, and the ferocity of their first assault inspired terror even in the ranks of veteran armies."
Early Gallic victories
Though popular accounts celebrate the legions and an assortment of charismatic commanders quickly vanquishing massive hosts of "wild barbarians", Rome suffered a number of early defeats against such tribal armies. As early as the Republican period (circa 390-387 B.C.), they had sacked RomeBattle of the Allia
The Battle of the Allia was a battle of the first Gallic invasion of Rome. The battle was fought near the Allia river: the defeat of the Roman army opened the route for the Gauls to sack Rome. It was fought in 390/387 BC.-Background:...
under Brennus
Brennus
Brennus is the name of two Gaulish chieftains famous in ancient history:* Brennus , chieftain of the Senones, a Gallic tribe originating from the modern areas of France known as Seine-et-Marne, Loiret, and Yonne; in 387 BC, in the Battle of the Allia, he led an army of Cisalpine Gauls in their...
, and had won several other victories such as the Battle of Noreia
Battle of Noreia
The Battle of Noreia in 112 BC, was the opening action of the Cimbrian War fought between the Roman Republic and the migrating Proto-Germanic tribes, the Cimbri and the Teutons . It ended in defeat, and near disaster, for the Romans.- Prelude :...
and the Battle of Arausio
Battle of Arausio
The Battle of Arausio took place on October 6, 105 BC, at a site between the town of Arausio and the Rhône River. Ranged against the migratory tribes of the Cimbri under Boiorix and the Teutoni were two Roman armies, commanded by the proconsul Quintus Servilius Caepio and consul Gnaeus Mallius...
. The foremost Gallic triumph in this early period was "The Day of Allia"- July 18- when Roman troops were routed and driven into the Allia River. Henceforth, July 18 was considered an unlucky date on the Roman Calendar.
Some writers suggest that as a result of such debacles, the expanding Roman power began to adjust to this vigorous, fast-moving new enemy. The Romans began to phase out the monolithic phalanx they formerly fought in, and adopted the more flexible manipular formation. The circular hoplite shield was also enlarged and eventually replaced with the rectangular scutum for better protection. The heavy phalanx spear was replaced by the pila, suitable for throwing. Only the veterans of the triarrii retained the long spear- vestige of the former phalanx. Such early reforms also aided the Romans in their conquest of the rest of Italy over such foes as the Samnites, Latins and Greeks. As time went on Roman arms saw increasing triumph over the Gallics, particularly in the campaigns of Caesar. In the early imperial period however, Germanic warbands inflicted one of Rome's greatest military defeats, (the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest
Battle of the Teutoburg Forest
The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest took place in 9 CE, when an alliance of Germanic tribes led by Arminius of the Cherusci ambushed and decisively destroyed three Roman legions, along with their auxiliaries, led by Publius Quinctilius Varus.Despite numerous successful campaigns and raids by the...
) which saw the liquidation of three imperial legions, and was to spark a limit on Roman expansion in the West. And it was these Germanic tribes in part (most having some familiarity with Rome and its culture, and becoming more Romanized themselves) that were to eventually bring about the Roman military's final demise in the West. Ironically, in the final days, the bulk of the fighting was between forces composed mostly of barbarians on either side.
Tribal strengths
Whatever their particular culture, the Gallic and Germanic tribes generally proved themselves to be tough opponents, racking up several victories over their enemies. Some historians show that they sometimes used massed fighting in tightly packed phalanx-type formations with overlapping shields, and employed shield coverage during sieges. In open battle, they sometimes used a triangular "wedge" style formation in attack. Their greatest hope of success lay in 4 factors: (a) numerical superiority, (b) surprising the Romans (via an ambush for example) or in (c) advancing quickly to the fight, or (d) engaging the Romans over heavily covered or difficult terrain where units of the fighting horde could shelter within striking distance until the hour of decision, or if possible, withdraw and regroup between successive charges.
Most significant Gallic and Germanic victories show two or more of these characteristics. The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest
Battle of the Teutoburg Forest
The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest took place in 9 CE, when an alliance of Germanic tribes led by Arminius of the Cherusci ambushed and decisively destroyed three Roman legions, along with their auxiliaries, led by Publius Quinctilius Varus.Despite numerous successful campaigns and raids by the...
contains all four: surprise, a treacherous defection by Arminius
Arminius
Arminius , also known as Armin or Hermann was a chieftain of the Germanic Cherusci who defeated a Roman army in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest...
and his contingent, numerical superiority, quick charges to close rapidly, and favorable terrain and environmental conditions (thick forest and pounding rainstorms) that hindered Roman movement and gave the warriors enough cover to conceal their movements and mount successive attacks against the Roman line.
Tribal weaknesses
Weaknesses in organization and equipment. Against the fighting men from the legion however, the Gauls, Iberians and Germanic forces faced a daunting task. Individually, in single combat, the fierce barbarian warrior could more than hold his own against a Roman. In massed fighting however, the barbarians' rudimentary organization and tactics fared poorly against the well oiled machinery that was the Legion. The fierceness of the Gallic and Germanic charges is often commented upon by some writers, and in certain circumstances they could overwhelm Roman lines. Nevertheless the in-depth Roman formation allowed adjustments to be made, and the continual application of forward pressure made long-term combat a hazardous proposition for the Gauls.
Flank attacks were always possible, but the legion was flexible enough to pivot to meet this, either through sub-unit maneuver or through deployment of lines farther back. The cavalry screen on the flanks also added another layer of security, as did nightly regrouping in fortified camps. The Gauls and Germans also fought with little or no armor and with weaker shields, putting them at a disadvantage against the legion. Other items of Roman equipment from studded sandals, to body armor, to metal helmets added to Roman advantages. Generally speaking, the Gauls and Germans needed to get into good initial position against the Romans and to overwhelm them in the early phases of the battle. An extended set-piece slogging match between the lightly armed tribesmen and the well organized heavy legionaries usually spelled doom for the tribal fighters. Caesar's slaughter of the Helvetti near the Saône River is just one example of tribal disadvantage against the well-organized Romans, as is the victory of Germanicus at the Weser River and Agricola against the Celtic tribesmen of Caledonia (Scotland) circa 84 A.D.
Weaknesses in logistics. Roman logistics also provided a trump card against Germanic foes as it had against so many previous foes. Tacitus in his Annals reports that the Roman commander Germanicus recognized that continued operations in Gaul would require long trains of men and material to come overland, where they would be subject to attack as they traversed the forests and swamps. He therefore opened sea and river routes, moving large quantities of supplies and reinforcements relatively close to the zone of battle, bypassing the dangerous land routes. In addition, the Roman fortified camps provided secure staging areas for offensive, defensive and logistical operations, once their troops were deployed. Assault roads and causeways were constructed on marshy ground to facilitate maneuver, sometimes under direct Gallic attack. These Roman techniques repeatedly defeated their Germanic adversaries. While Germanic leaders and fighters influenced by Roman methods sometimes adapted them, most tribes did not have the strong organization of the Romans. As German scholar Hans Delbruck notes in his "History of the Art of War":
- ".. the superiority of the Roman art of warfare was based on the army organization.. a system that permitted very large masses of men to be concentrated at a given point, to move in an orderly fashion, to be fed, to be kept together. The Gauls could do none of these things."
Tribal chariots
The Gallics also demonstrated a high level of tactical prowess in some areas. Gallic chariot
Chariot
The chariot is a type of horse carriage used in both peace and war as the chief vehicle of many ancient peoples. Ox carts, proto-chariots, were built by the Proto-Indo-Europeans and also built in Mesopotamia as early as 3000 BC. The original horse chariot was a fast, light, open, two wheeled...
warfare for example, showed a high degree of integration and coordination with infantry, and Gallic horse and chariot assaults sometimes threatened Roman forces in the field with annihilation. At the Battle of Sentinum
Battle of Sentinum
The Battle of Sentinum was the decisive battle of the Third Samnite War, fought in 295 BC near Sentinum , in which the Romans were able to overcome a formidable coalition of Samnites, Etruscans, Umbrians, and their Gallic allies...
for example, c. 295 BC, the Roman and Campanian cavalry encountered Gallic war-chariots and were routed in confusion- driven back from the Roman infantry by the unexpected appearance of the fast-moving Gallic assault. The discipline of the Roman infantry restored the line however, and a counterattack eventually defeated the Gallic forces and their allies.
The accounts of Polybius
Polybius
Polybius , Greek ) was a Greek historian of the Hellenistic Period noted for his work, The Histories, which covered the period of 220–146 BC in detail. The work describes in part the rise of the Roman Republic and its gradual domination over Greece...
leading up to the Battle of Telamon
Battle of Telamon
The Battle of Telamon was fought between the Roman Republic and an alliance of Gauls in 225 BC. The Romans, led by the consuls Gaius Atilius Regulus and Lucius Aemilius Papus, defeated the Gauls, thus extending their influence over northern Italy....
, c. 225 BC mention chariot warfare, but it was ultimately unsuccessful. The Gauls met comprehensive defeat by the Roman legions under Papus and Regulus
Regulus
Regulus is the brightest star in the constellation Leo and one of the brightest stars in the night sky, lying approximately 77.5 light years from Earth. Regulus is a multiple star system composed of four stars which are organized into two pairs...
. Chariot forces also attacked the legions as they were disembarking from ships during Caesar's invasion of Britain, but the Roman commander drove off the fast-moving assailants using covering fire (slings, arrows and engines of war) from his ships, and reinforcing his shore party of infantry to charge and drive off the attack. In the open field against Caesar, the Gallic/Celtics apparently deployed chariots with a driver and an infantry fighter armed with javelins. During the clash, the chariots would drop off their warriors to attack the enemy and retire a short distance away, massed in reserve. From this position they could retrieve the assault troops if the engagement was going badly, or apparently pick them up and deploy elsewhere. Caesar's troops were discomfited by one such attack, and he met it by withdrawing into his fortified redoubt. A later Gallic attack against the Roman camp was routed.
It should be noted also that superb as the Gallic fighters were, chariots were already declining as an effective weapon of war in the ancient world with the rise of mounted cavalry. At the battle of Mons Grapius in Caledonia (circa 84AD), Celtic chariots made an appearance. However they were no longer used in an offensive role but primarily for pre-battle show - riding back and forth and hurling insults. The main encounter was decided by infantry and mounted cavalry.
Tribal guerrillas
- The Iberian zone of struggle. The Gallic-Celtic-Iberian peoples, like many other tribes falling under the general "Gallic" banner, put up an obstinate fight against Roman hegemony. Based in what is now modern day Spain and Portugal, they fought continuously, with varying levels of intensity, for almost two centuries, beginning around 218 B.C. The initial hegemons of Spain were the Carthaginians who struggled against various tribes to carve out colonies and a commercial empire, primarily in coastal enclaves. Carthaginian defeats by Rome brought struggle against a new, harsher imperium. Tribes such as the Celtiberi carried out a strong resistance, a struggle later continued by other groups such as the Lusitani, under ViriathusViriathusViriathus was the most important leader of the Lusitanian people that resisted Roman expansion into the regions of Western Hispania , where the Roman province of Lusitania would be established...
. The Lusitanian WarLusitanian WarThe Lusitanian War, called the Purinos Polemos , was a war of resistance fought between the advancing legions of the Roman Republic and the Lusitani tribes of Hispania Ulterior from 155 to 139 BC. The Lusitani revolted on two separate occasions and were pacified...
and the Numantine WarNumantine WarThe Numantine War was the last conflict of the Celtiberian Wars fought by the Romans to subdue those people along the Ebro. It was a twenty year long conflict between the Celtiberian tribes of Hispania Citerior and the Roman government. It began in 154 BC as a revolt of the Celtiberians of...
are but a few examples of the prolonged conflict, which cut across 20 decades of Roman history. Full conquest was not achieved until the time of AugustusAugustusAugustus ;23 September 63 BC – 19 August AD 14) is considered the first emperor of the Roman Empire, which he ruled alone from 27 BC until his death in 14 AD.The dates of his rule are contemporary dates; Augustus lived under two calendars, the Roman Republican until 45 BC, and the Julian...
. The vicious long-term fighting made HispaniaHispaniaAnother theory holds that the name derives from Ezpanna, the Basque word for "border" or "edge", thus meaning the farthest area or place. Isidore of Sevilla considered Hispania derived from Hispalis....
a place of dread for the Roman soldier. Historian Sir Edward Creasy, in his "The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the WorldThe Fifteen Decisive Battles of the WorldThe Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World: from Marathon to Waterloo is a book written by Sir Edward Shepherd Creasy and published in 1851. This book tells the story of the fifteen military engagements which, according to the author, had a significant impact on world history.-Chapters:Each...
" had this to say about the Iberian conflicts.
-
- "The war against the Spaniards, who, of all the nations subdued by the Romans, defended their liberty with the greatest obstinacy... the Romans in both provinces were so often beaten, that nothing was more dreaded by the soldiers at home than to be sent there...
- Roman tactics. Rome deployed its standard methods, with greater emphasis on blended units of light troops, cavalry and heavy infantry when confronting the guerrilla or mobile tactics used by the IberiansIberiansThe Iberians were a set of peoples that Greek and Roman sources identified with that name in the eastern and southern coasts of the Iberian peninsula at least from the 6th century BC...
. Roman fortified camps were also valuable in protecting the troops and providing bases of operation. While combat results were mixed in the open field, the Romans did comparatively well when besieging Iberian cities, systematically eliminating enemy leaders, supply bases and centers of resistance. Destruction of Iberian resources by burning grain fields or demolishing villages also put the native resistance under greater pressure. The operations of Scipio during the Numantine WarNumantine WarThe Numantine War was the last conflict of the Celtiberian Wars fought by the Romans to subdue those people along the Ebro. It was a twenty year long conflict between the Celtiberian tribes of Hispania Citerior and the Roman government. It began in 154 BC as a revolt of the Celtiberians of...
illustrate these methods, including a crackdown on lax practices and tightening of legionary discipline. Other Roman tactics touched on the political sphere such as the "pacification" treaties of Gracchus, and treachery and trickery, as in the massacres of tribal leaders by LucullusLucullusLucius Licinius Lucullus , was an optimate politician of the late Roman Republic, closely connected with Sulla Felix...
and GalbaGalbaGalba , was Roman Emperor for seven months from 68 to 69. Galba was the governor of Hispania Tarraconensis, and made a bid for the throne during the rebellion of Julius Vindex...
under guise of negotiation. Rome frequently capitalized on divisions among the tribes. A "divide and conquer" policy was in use, with competing (and sometimes insincere) treaties being negotiated to isolate targeted groups, and allied tribes being used to subdue others.
- Celtic-Iberian tactics. Fighting for their independence and survival, the Iberian tribes used fortified cities or strongpoints to defend against their enemies, and mixed this with mobile warfare in formations ranging from small guerrilla bands, to large units numbering thousands of men. The Celtic/Iberian horsemen in particular appear to be more than a match for those of Rome, a fact proved in earlier years by the key role such allied cavalry played in Hannibal's victories. Favorable mobility and knowledge of the local terrain were to help the tribes immensely. One of the most successful ambushes was pulled off by a chieftain named Carus, who liquidated around 6,000 Romans in a combined cavalry-infantry strike. Another was executed by one Caesarus, who took advantage of a disorderly Roman pursuit under Mummius, to lay a trap that resulted in Roman losses of around 9,000 men. A similar Iberian "turn and fight" gambit is also recorded as being successful against GalbaGalbaGalba , was Roman Emperor for seven months from 68 to 69. Galba was the governor of Hispania Tarraconensis, and made a bid for the throne during the rebellion of Julius Vindex...
. Roman arms however triumphed over two grinding centuries of conflict. See "AppianAppianAppian of Alexandria was a Roman historian of Greek ethnicity who flourished during the reigns of Trajan, Hadrian, and Antoninus Pius.He was born ca. 95 in Alexandria. He tells us that, after having filled the chief offices in the province of Egypt, he went to Rome ca. 120, where he practised as...
's History of Rome: The Spanish Wars" for a more detailed discussion of individual battles, leaders and engagements.
Superior tactical organization: victory of Caesar at the Sambre River
Superior Gallic mobility and numbers often troubled Roman arms, whether deployed in decades-long mobile or guerrilla warfare or in a decisive field engagement. The near defeat of Caesar in his Gallic campaign confirms this latter pattern, but also shows the strengths of Roman tactical organization and discipline. At the Battle of the Sabis
Battle of the Sabis
The Battle of the Sabis, also known as the Battle of the Sambre or the Battle against the Nervians , was fought in 57 BC in the area known today as Wallonia, between the legions of the Roman Republic and an association of Belgic tribes, principally the Nervii...
river, (see more detailed article) contingents of the Nervii
Nervii
The Nervii were an ancient Germanic tribe, and one of the most powerful Belgic tribes; living in the northeastern hinterlands of Gaul, they were known to trek long distances to engage in various wars and functions...
, Atrebates, Veromandui and Aduatuci tribes massed secretly in the surrounding forests as the main Roman force was busy making camp on the opposite side of the river. Some distance away behind them, slogged two slow moving legions with the baggage train. Engaged in foraging and camp construction the Roman forces were somewhat scattered. As camp building commenced, the barbarian forces launched a ferocious attack, streaming across the shallow water and quickly assaulting the distracted Romans. This incident is discussed in Caesar's Gallic War Commentaries.
So far the situation looked promising for the warrior host. The 4 conditions above were in their favor: (a) numerical superiority, (b) the element of surprise, (c) a quick advance/assault, and (d) favorable terrain that masked their movements until the last minute. Early progress was spectacular as the initial Roman dispositions were driven back. A rout looked possible. Caesar himself rallied sections of his endangered army, impressing resolve upon the troops. With their customary discipline and cohesion, the Romans then began to drive back the barbarian
Barbarian
Barbarian and savage are terms used to refer to a person who is perceived to be uncivilized. The word is often used either in a general reference to a member of a nation or ethnos, typically a tribal society as seen by an urban civilization either viewed as inferior, or admired as a noble savage...
assault. A charge by the Nervi tribe through a gap between the legions however almost turned the tide again, as the onrushing warriors seized the Roman camp and tried to outflank the other army units engaged with the rest of the tribal host. The initial phase of the clash had passed however and a slogging match ensued. The arrival of the two rear legions that had been guarding the baggage reinforced the Roman lines. Led by the 10th Legion, a counterattack was mounted with these reinforcements that broke the back of the barbarian effort and sent the tribesmen reeling in retreat. It was a close run thing, illustrating both the fighting prowess of the tribal forces, and the steady, disciplined cohesion of the Romans. Ultimately, the latter was to prove decisive in Rome's long fought conquest of Gaul.
Persisting logistics strategy: Gallic–Germanic victory at Gergovia
As noted above, the fierce charge of the Germanics and their individual prowess is frequently acknowledged by several ancient Roman writers. The Battle of Gergovia
Battle of Gergovia
The Battle of Gergovia took place in 52 BC in Gaul at Gergovia, the chief town of the Arverni. The battle was fought between a Roman Republic army, led by proconsul Julius Caesar, and Gallic forces led by Vercingetorix...
however demonstrates that the Gallic/Germanics were capable of a level of strategic insight and operation beyond merely mustering warriors for an open field clash. Under their war leader Vercingetorix, the Gallics pursued what some modern historians have termed a "persisting" or "logistics strategy" - a mobile approach relying not on direct open field clashes, but avoidance of major battle, "scorched earth" denial of resources, and the isolation and piecemeal destruction of Roman detachments and smaller unit groupings. When implemented consistently, this strategy saw some success against Roman operations. According to Caesar himself, during the siege of the town of Bourges, the lurking warbands of Germans were:
- "on the watch for our foraging and grain-gatherer parties, when necessarily scattered far afield he attacked them and inflicted serious losses... This imposed such scarcity opon the army that for several days they were without grain and staved off starvation only by driving cattle from remote villages."
Caesar countered with a strategy of enticing the Germanic forces out into open battle, or of blockading them into submission.
At the town of Gergovia, resource denial was combined with concentration of superior force, and multiple threats from more than one direction. This caused the opposing Roman forces to divide, and ultimately fail. Gergovia was situated on the high ground of a tall hill, and Vercingetorix carefully drew up the bulk of his force on the slope, positioning allied tribes in designated places. He drilled his men and skirmished daily with the Romans, who had overrun a hilltop position, and had created a small camp some distance from Caesar's larger main camp. A rallying of about 10,000 disenchanted Aeudan tribesmen (engineered by Vercingetorix's agents) created a threat in Caesar's rear, including a threat to a supply convoy promised by the allied Aeudans, and he diverted four legions to meet this danger. This however gave Vercingetorix's forces the chance to concentrate in superior strength against the smaller two-legion force left behind at Gergovia, and desperate fighting ensued. Caesar dealt with the rear threat, turned around and by ruthless forced marching once again consolidated his forces at town. A feint using bogus cavalry by the Romans drew off part of the Gallic assault, and the Romans advanced to capture three more enemy outposts on the slope, and proceeded towards the walls of the stronghold. The diverted Gallic forces returned however and in frantic fighting outside the town walls, the Romans lost 700 men, including 46 centurions.
Caesar commenced a retreat from the town with the victorious Gallic warriors in pursuit. The Roman commander however mobilized his 10th Legion as a blocking force to cover his withdrawal and after some fighting, the tribesmen themselves withdrew back to Gergovia, taking several captured legion standards. The vicious fighting around Gergovia was the first time Caesar had suffered a military reverse, demonstrating the Germanic martial valor noted by the ancient chroniclers. The hard battle is referenced by the Roman historian Plutarch, who writes of the Averni people showing visitors a sword in one of their temples, a weapon that reputedly belonged to Caesar himself. According to Plutarch, the Roman general was shown the sword in the temple at Gergovia some years after the battle, but he refused to reclaim it, saying that it was consecrated, and to leave it where it was.
The Germanics were unable to sustain their strategy however, and Vercingetorix was to become trapped in Alesia, facing not divided sections or detachments of the Roman Army but Caesar's full force of approximately 70,000 men (50,000 legionnaires plus numerous additional auxiliary cavalry and infantry). This massive concentration of Romans was able to besiege the fortress in detail and repulse Gallic relief forces, and it fell in little more than a month. Vercingetorix overall persisting logistics policy however, demonstrates a significant level of strategic thinking. As historian A. Goldsworthy (2006) notes: "His [Vercingetorix's] strategy was considerably more sophisticated than that employed by Caesar's earlier opponents.." At Alesia this mobile approach became overly static. The Gauls gave battle at a place where they were inadequately provisioned for an extended siege, and where Caesar could bring his entire field force to bear on a single point without them being dissipated, and where his lines of supply were not effectively interdicted. At Gergovia by contrast, Caesar's strength was divided by the appearance of another Germanic force in his rear (the Aeudans)- threatening his sources and lines of supply. Together with a strong defensive anvil, (the town) supported by an offensive hammer (the open field forces), and coupled with previous resource denial pressure over time, the Romans were forced to retreat, and the Germanics secured a victory. As one historian notes about the persisting strategy:
- "But before the defeat at Alesia, Vercingetorix's strategy had driven Cesar from central Gaul.. In finding and overwhelming Roman foragers as Fabius had done to Hannibal's men, the Gauls concentrated against weakness to win many small victories. Their strength in cavalry helped them concentrate rapidly, facilitating the application of the combat element in their strategy, though attacking foragers and grain gatherers was also intrinsic to the logistic aspect of their campaign."
Victory through attrition
In their battles against a wide variety of opponents, Rome's ruthless persistence, greater resources and stronger organization wore down their opponents over time. In Spain, resources were thrown at the problem until it yielded over 150 years later- a slow, harsh grind of endless marching, constant sieges and fighting, broken treaties, burning villages and enslaved captives. As long as the Roman Senate and its successors were willing to replace and expend more men and material decade after decade, victory could be bought through a strategy of exhaustion.The systematic wastage and destruction of enemy economic and human resources was called vastatio by the Romans. Crops and animals were destroyed or carried off, and local populaces were massacred or enslaved. Sometimes these tactics were also used to conduct punitive raids on barbarian tribes which had performed raids across the border. In the campaigns of Germanicus, Roman troops in the combat area carried out a "scorched earth" approach against their Germanic foes, devastating the land they depended on for supplies. "The country was wasted by fire and sword fifty miles round; nor sex nor age found mercy; places sacred and profane had the equal lot of destruction, all razed to the ground.." (Tacitus, Annals). The Roman "grind down" approach is also seen in the Bar Kokba Jewish revolt against the Romans. The Roman commander Severus, avoided meeting the hard-fighting Jewish rebels in the open field. Instead he relied on attacking their fortified strongpoints and devastating the zone of conflict in a methodical campaign. This "attritional" aspect of the Roman approach to combat contrasts with the notion of brilliant generalship or tactics sometimes seen in popular depictions of the Roman infantry.
Some historians note however that Rome often balanced brutal attrition with shrewd diplomacy, as demonstrated by Caesar's harsh treatment of Gallic tribes that opposed him, but his sometimes conciliatory handling of those that submitted. Rome also used a variety of incentives to encourage cooperation by the elites of conquered peoples, co-opting opposition and incorporating them into the structure of the empire. This carrot and stick approach forms an integral part of "the Roman way" of war.
Tactical problems of fighting cavalry
Cavalry opponents were one of if not the toughest challenges faced by the Roman infantry. Combining both missile and shock capability with extensive mobility, cavalry exploited the inherent weakness of the legion- its relatively slow movement and deployment. Defeat by strong cavalry forces is a recurring event in Roman military history. The campaigns of Hannibal illustrate this well, as Numidian and Spanish/Gallic horsemen repeatedly outflanked Roman formations, dealing devastating blows in the sides and rear. Hannibal's great victory at Cannae (considered one of the greatest Roman defeats ever) was primarily an infantry struggle, but the key role was played by his cavalry, as in his other victories.An even more dramatic demonstration of Roman vulnerability is shown in the numerous wars against Parthian
Parthian Empire
The Parthian Empire , also known as the Arsacid Empire , was a major Iranian political and cultural power in ancient Persia...
heavy cavalry. The Parthians and their successors used large numbers of fast-moving light riders to harass and skirmish, and delivered the coup de grâce with heavily armored lancers called "cataphract
Cataphract
A cataphract was a form of armored heavy cavalry utilised in ancient warfare by a number of peoples in Western Eurasia and the Eurasian Steppe....
s". Both types of troops used powerful composite bows that shot arrows of sufficient strength to penetrate Roman armor. The cataphracts extended combat power by serving as shock troops, engaging opposing forces with their heavy lances in thundering charges after they had been "softened up" by swarms of arrows. The Parthians also conducted a "scorched earth" policy against the Romans, refusing major set-piece encounters, while luring them deeper on to unfavorable ground, where they would lack water supplies and a secure line of retreat. The debacle of the Battle of Carrhae
Battle of Carrhae
The Battle of Carrhae, fought in 53 BC near the town of Carrhae, was a major battle between the Parthian Empire and the Roman Republic. The Parthian Spahbod Surena decisively defeated a Roman invasion force led by Marcus Licinius Crassus...
saw a devastating defeat of Roman arms by the Parthian cavalry. Against such foes the Romans faced a difficult task. How could they be defeated?
Successful tactics
Clues exist in the earlier campaigns of Alexander the Great against mounted Asiatic warriors—engaging the horsemen with strong detachments of light infantry and missile troops, and driving them off with charges by Alexander's heavy cavalry units. The Roman variant continued the same "combined arms" approach, with a larger role for cavalry as the empire went on. The Eastern half of the Roman EmpireRoman Empire
The Roman Empire was the post-Republican period of the ancient Roman civilization, characterised by an autocratic form of government and large territorial holdings in Europe and around the Mediterranean....
, particularly, was ultimately to rely mostly on cavalry forces.
Adjustments of Ventidius. The operations of the Roman commander Publius Ventidius Bassus
Publius Ventidius Bassus
Publius Ventidius Bassus, or in full, Publius Ventidius Publii filius Bassus, "Publius Ventidius, Publius's son, Bassus" was a Roman general and one of Julius Caesar's protégés...
illustrate three general tactics used by the infantry to fight their mounted foes. These drew on Caesar's veteran legions, and made Ventidius the only Roman general to celebrate a triumph against the Parthians. In three separate battles, he not only managed to defeat the Parthian armies and drive them out of Roman territory, but also managed to kill Parthia's three top military commanders during the battles. The adjustments of Ventidius were as follows:
- Increase in firepower. Ventidius sought to neutralize the Parthian advantage in firepower, by adding his own, and provided his legions with numerous slingers whose furious fire was instrumental in checking the Parthian horsemen during several battles. In subsequent engagements, other Roman commanders increased cavalry units and slingers, with the latter being supplied with leaden bullets which gave more range and killing power.
- Securing the high ground and other terrain features. In his three victories over the horsemen, Ventidius had his infantry secure the high ground, bolstering defensive positions and maneuvers with withering covering fire by the slingers. Seizure of key terrain features also obstructed avenues of attack and provided anchor points that allowed maneuvering detachments to counterattack, or to fall back if unfavorable conditions developed. Against the horsemen, heavy infantry units had to work closely with cavalry and light troops, and be mutually supporting, or they could be quickly isolated and destroyed.
- Controlled charges from a compact formation. A tight formation was maintained on the march, and special care had to be taken when crossing a mountain, ravine or bridge. In such cases, sub-sections of the legion had to be redeployed to provide covering and blocking forces until the army had safely navigated the route. Once encamped in the zone of battle and controlling the high ground, Ventidius did not prematurely venture on to flat terrain or allow his forces to lose cohesion as at Careahae. The legions deployed in three lines, forming a compact defensive front to beat off any heavy cavalry charge, and let the enemy come to them. As the slingers and light troops mauled the approaching Parthian horsemen, Ventidius ordered a series of controlled charges when the enemy was within range, being careful not to have his troops advance too far forward where they could be cut off. In the meantime, the toops were continuously covered by the deadly sling-fire. This tactic inflicted substantial casualties on the Parthian forces and weakened them to the extent that the Romans could order a general counter-offensive against the enemy that led to their defeat or scattering.
Combined arms and quick advance. In the later Roman empire, cavalry forces played a larger role, with the infantry in support. The campaign of the Emperor Julian II
Julian the Apostate
Julian "the Apostate" , commonly known as Julian, or also Julian the Philosopher, was Roman Emperor from 361 to 363 and a noted philosopher and Greek writer....
against the Persians is instructive in this regard. On June 22, 363 a large-scale clash occurred near the town of Maranga. Facing an enemy that threatened to blanket his troops with a hail of arrows, and in danger of envelopment, Julian deployed his force in a crescent formation, and ordered an advance by both infantry and cavalry on the double, thwarting both dangers by closing quickly. The gambit was successful. After a long battle, the Persians withdrew- a tactical victory (albeit a costly one for the Romans according to some historians). The work of Roman historian Ammianus Marcellinus offers a detailed description of the Persian campaign, including the quick charge by the heavy Roman infantry under Julian.
- "To prevent the preliminary volleys of the archers from disrupting our ranks he (Julian) advanced at the double and so ruined the effect of their fire ... Roman foot in close order made a mighty push and drove the serried ranks of the enemy before them ..."
Marcellinus's commentary also sharply contrasts the fighting spirit of the Persian infantrymen with those of Rome, stating that they had "aversion to pitched infantry battles." In an earlier engagement outside the walls of Ctesiphon, Marcellinus again notes the value of the quick advance by the infantry:
- "both sides fought hand-to-hand with spears and drawn swords; the quicker our men forced themselves into the enemy's line the less they were exposed to danger from arrows."
Mixed results against major cavalry enemies. Rome's overall record against the Parthians was mixed, as it was against the horsemen of Hannibal, and some Gallic opponents. Subsequent Roman leaders like Anthony invaded Parthian territory but had to withdraw after severe losses. Others like Severus and Trajan saw some success, but could never hold the Parthian area permanently, and also pulled out. Nevertheless, the battles of Ventidius and Julian show that the Roman infantry, when properly handled and maneuvered, and when working in conjunction with other supporting arms like slingers, could, at least partially, meet the challenge of the cavalryman.
Effectiveness
Despite the undoubted success of the Roman army from early republic to late empire, over the course of history there were also some major defeats involving great loss of life. And yet, over time, the Romans not only bounced back from great loss but eventually crushed or neutralized the vast majority of their enemies. How then did they do it against a variety of enemies that were, at various times and places more numerous, more skilled or better led?Central factors in Roman success
Some elements that made the Romans an effective military force, both tactically and at higher levels, were:The Romans were able to copy and adapt the weapons and methods of their opponents more effectively. Some weapons, such as the gladius
Gladius
Gladius was the Latin word for sword, and is used to represent the primary sword of Ancient Roman soldiers. Early ancient Roman swords were similar to those used by the Greeks. From the 3rd century BC, the Romans adopted swords similar to those used by the Celtiberians and others during the early...
, were adopted outright by the legionaries. Publius asserts that the pilum was of Samnite origin, and the shield was based on Greek design. In other cases, especially formidable enemies units of their forces were invited to serve in the Roman army as auxiliaries after peace was made. In the naval sphere, the Romans followed some of the same methods they used with the infantry, dropping their ineffective designs and copying, adapting and improving on Punic warships, and introducing heavier marine contingents (infantry fighters) on to their ships.
Roman organization was more flexible than those of many opponents. Compared to the tightly packed spearmen of the phalanx, the Roman heavy infantry, through their training and discipline, and operating in conjunction with light foot and cavalry, could quickly adopt a number of methods and formations depending on the situation. These range from the Testudo formation
Testudo formation
In Ancient Roman warfare, the testudo or tortoise formation was a formation used commonly by the Roman Legions during battles, particularly sieges. Testudo is the Latin word for "tortoise"...
during siege warfare, to a hollow square against cavalry attack, to mixed units of heavy foot, horse and light infantry against guerrillas in Spain, to the classic "triple line" or checkerboard patterns. Against more sophisticated opponents the Romans also showed great flexibility at times, such as the brilliant adjustments Scipio made against Hannibal at Zama. These included leaving huge gaps in the ranks to trap the charging elephants, and the recall, reposition and consolidation of a single battle line that advanced to the final death struggle against the Carthaginian veterans of Italy.
Roman discipline, organization and logistical systemization sustained combat effectiveness over a longer period. Notably, the Roman system of castra
Castra
The Latin word castra, with its singular castrum, was used by the ancient Romans to mean buildings or plots of land reserved to or constructed for use as a military defensive position. The word appears in both Oscan and Umbrian as well as in Latin. It may have descended from Indo-European to Italic...
, or fortified camps, allowed the army to stay in the field on favorable ground and be rested and resupplied for battle. Well organized Roman logistics also sustained combat power, from routine resupply and storage, to the construction of military roads, to state run arsenal
Arsenal
An arsenal is a place where arms and ammunition are made, maintained and repaired, stored, issued to authorized users, or any combination of those...
s and weapons factories, to well organized naval convoys that helped stave off defeat by Carthage
Carthage
Carthage , implying it was a 'new Tyre') is a major urban centre that has existed for nearly 3,000 years on the Gulf of Tunis, developing from a Phoenician colony of the 1st millennium BC...
. The death of a leader generally did not cause the legions to lose heart in battle. Others stepped to the fore and carried on. In the defeat by Hannibal at the River Trebia, 10,000 Romans cut their way through the debacle to safety, maintaining unit cohesion
Unit cohesion
Unit cohesion is a military concept, defined by one former United States Chief of staff in the early 1980s as "the bonding together of soldiers in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, the unit, and mission accomplishment, despite combat or mission stress"...
when all around was rout, a testimony to their tactical organization and discipline.
The Romans were more persistent and more willing to absorb and replace losses over time than their opponents. Unlike other civilizations, the Romans kept going relentlessly until typically their enemies had been completely crushed or neutralized. The army acted to implement policy and were not allowed to stop unless they received a command from the emperor or a decree from the senate.
Against the tribal polities of Europe, particularly in Hispania
Hispania
Another theory holds that the name derives from Ezpanna, the Basque word for "border" or "edge", thus meaning the farthest area or place. Isidore of Sevilla considered Hispania derived from Hispalis....
, Roman tenacity and material weight eventually wore down most opposition. The tribes of Europe did not have a state or economic structure able to support lengthy campaigns and therefore could often (but not always) be made to change their minds about opposing Roman hegemony. The defeat in the Teutoburg Forest might seem like an exception, but even here, the Romans were back on the warpath 5 years later with major forces against their Germanic opponents. That there is an obvious limit to endless persistence does not negate the general pattern.
Where the Romans faced another large state structure, such as the Parthian Empire, they found the military road rocky indeed and were sometimes forced to an impasse. Nevertheless the distinct pattern of Roman tenacity holds. Rome suffered its greatest defeats against sophisticated Carthage, notably at Cannae, and was forced to avoid battle for a lengthy period. Yet in time, it rebuilt its forces on land and at sea, and persisted in the struggle, astonishing the Punics who expected it to sue for peace. Against the Parthians, crushing defeats did not stop the Romans, for they invaded Parthia
Parthia
Parthia is a region of north-eastern Iran, best known for having been the political and cultural base of the Arsacid dynasty, rulers of the Parthian Empire....
n territory several times afterwards, and though Parthia proper was never totally conquered, Rome ultimately secured a rough hegemony in the area.
Roman leadership was mixed, but over time it was often effective in securing Roman military success. Leadership debacles are common in Roman military history, from the routs against Hannibal, to the demise of the unlucky Crassus against the Parthians. The Roman polity's structuring however produced a steady supply of men willing and able to lead troops in battle- men that were held accountable for defeat or malfeasance. It was not unusual for a losing general to be prosecuted by political enemies in Rome, with some having their property confiscated and barely escaping death. The senatorial oligarchy, for all its political maneuvering, interference and other faults, provided the functions of oversight and audit over military matters, that over the course of time, shaped final results. The record is a mixed one, but whether under boisterous Republic
Republic
A republic is a form of government in which the people, or some significant portion of them, have supreme control over the government and where offices of state are elected or chosen by elected people. In modern times, a common simplified definition of a republic is a government where the head of...
or Imperial emperor, Rome produced enough competent leaders to secure its military dominance for over a millennium. Some of the best leaders come from both eras, including Marius, Sulla, Scipio, Caesar, Trajan and others.
Note should be taken here of the large number of junior officers the Romans typically used to assure coordination and guidance. The initiative of such men played a key part in Roman success. Effective leadership was also bound up with the famous Roman centurion
Centurion
A centurion was a professional officer of the Roman army .Centurion may also refer to:-Military:* Centurion tank, British battle tank* HMS Centurion, name of several ships and a shore base of the British Royal Navy...
s, the backbone of the legionary organization. While not all such men could be considered models of perfection, they commanded substantial respect.
The influence of Roman military and civic culture, as embodied particularly in the heavy infantry legion, gave the Roman military consistent motivation and cohesion. Such culture included but was not limited to: (a) the valuing of Roman citizenship, (b) the broad-based muster of free males into mass infantry units (as opposed to widespread use of foreign contingents, slaves or mercenaries), and (c) loyalty to those fighting units (the Legion) which remained characteristically Roman in outlook and discipline. Citizenship conveyed certain valuable rights in Roman society, and was another element that helped to promote the standardization and integration of the infantry. The citizen under arms - the legion soldier - was supposed to reflect and practice the Roman ideal of virtus, pietas, fides, - self-discipline, respect and faithfulness to engagements. Implementation of such ideals could be mixed according to some writers, but it was "a trilogy [driving] every aspect of military, domestic, economic and social life." As such it was a strong force for cohesion among Rome's infantrymen.
Decline of the Roman infantry
Any history of the Roman infantry must grapple with the factors that led to the decline of the heavy legions that once dominated the Western world. Such decline of course is closely linked with the decay of other facets of Rome's economy, society and political scene. Nevertheless some historians emphasize that the final demise of Rome was due to military defeat, however plausible (or implausible) the plethora of theories advanced by some scholars, ranging from declining tax bases, to class struggle, to lead poisoning. Two of the major factors that have occupied scholars of the military will be discussed here: barbarization and the adaptation of a "mobile reserve" strategy. There are a number of controversies in this area with dueling scholars advancing competing theories.Changes in the legions
To combat the more frequent raids and advances of their hostile neighbors the legions were changed from slow and heavy to much lighter troops, and cavalry was introduced as a serious concept.This meant that the new subdivided infantry lost the awesome power that the earlier legions had, meaning that whilst they were more likely to see a battle they were less likely to win it. That legion size was at an all time low, was also a factor.
Roman horsemen, while fast, were actually much too weak to cope with the very cavalry based invasions of the Huns, Goths, Vandals and Sassanids. Their ineffectiveness was demonstrated at Cannae
Cannae
Cannae is an ancient village of the Apulia region of south east Italy. It is a frazione of the comune of Barletta.-Geography:It is situated near the river Aufidus , on a hill on the right Cannae (mod. Canne della Battaglia) is an ancient village of the Apulia region of south east Italy. It is a...
and Adrianople; in both instances the cavalry was completely destroyed by a vastly more powerful enemy horse.
"Barbarization" of the heavy infantry
"Barbarization" is a common theme in many works on Rome (See GibbonEdward Gibbon
Edward Gibbon was an English historian and Member of Parliament...
, Mommsen
Mommsen
Mommsen is a surname, and may refer to one of a family of German historians, see Mommsen family:* Theodor Mommsen , great classical scholar, and winner of the Nobel Prize in Literature* Tycho Mommsen...
, Delbrück
Hans Delbrück
Hans Delbrück was a German historian. Delbrück was one of the first modern military historians, basing his method of research on the critical examination of ancient sources, the use of auxiliary disciplines, like demography and economics, to complete the analysis and the comparison between...
, et al.), and thus cannot be excluded from any analysis of its infantry forces. Essentially it is argued that the increasing barbarization of the heavy legions weakened weaponry, training, morale and military effectiveness in the long run. The weapons changes described above are but one example.
It could be argued that the use of barbarian personnel was nothing new. This is accurate, however such use was clearly governed by "the Roman way." It was the barbarian personnel who had to adapt to Roman standards and organization, not the other way around. In the twilight of the empire, this was not the case. Such practices as permitting the settlement of massive, armed barbarian populations on Roman territory, the watering down of the privilege of citizenship, increasing use of alien contingents, and relaxation or removal of traditionally thorough and severe Roman discipline, organization and control, contributed to the decline of the heavy infantry.
The settlement of the foederati
Foederati
Foederatus is a Latin term whose definition and usage drifted in the time between the early Roman Republic and the end of the Western Roman Empire...
for example, saw large barbarian contingents ushered on to Roman territory, with their own organization, under their own leaders. Such groupings showed a tendency to neglect "the Roman way" in organization, training, logistics etc., in favor of their own ideas, practices and agendas. These settlements may have bought short term political peace for imperial elites, but their long term effect was negative, weakening the traditional strengths of the heavy infantry in discipline, training and deployment. They also seemed to have lessened the incentive for remaining "old Guard" troops to adhere to such strengths, since the barbarians received equal or more favor with less effort. Indeed such "allied" barbarian contingents were at times to turn on the Romans, devastating wide areas with sack and pillage and even attacking imperial army formations.
Growth of the mobile forces approach
Some scholars challenge the notion that a "mobile reserve" in the modern military sense existed in the Roman Empire, and instead argue that the shifts in organization represent a series of field armies deployed in various areas as needed, particularly in the East. Others point to the heavy fiscal difficulties and political turmoil of the later Empire that made it difficult to continue traditional policy. Controversy on the topic is lively.Advantages of the mobile reserve strategy
The "mobile reserve" strategy, traditionally identified with Constantine I
Constantine I
Constantine the Great , also known as Constantine I or Saint Constantine, was Roman Emperor from 306 to 337. Well known for being the first Roman emperor to convert to Christianity, Constantine and co-Emperor Licinius issued the Edict of Milan in 313, which proclaimed religious tolerance of all...
, saw reversal of the traditional "forward" policy of strong frontier fortifications backed by legions stationed near likely zones of conflict. Instead, it is argued that the best troops were pulled back into a type of "mobile reserve" closer to the center that could be deployed to trouble areas throughout the empire. Some scholars claim this was a positive development, (Luttwak, Delbruck
Delbrück
Delbrück is a town in the east of North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany, located in the district Paderborn. As of 2002 it has a population of 29,846.-History:...
, et al.) given growing difficulties with governing the vast empire, where political turmoil and severe financial difficulties had made the old preclusive security system untenable. Some writers such as Luttwak condemn the old style "forward" policy as indicating a "Maginot Line
Maginot Line
The Maginot Line , named after the French Minister of War André Maginot, was a line of concrete fortifications, tank obstacles, artillery casemates, machine gun posts, and other defences, which France constructed along its borders with Germany and Italy, in light of its experience in World War I,...
" mentality in the troubled latter centuries of the Empire.
Disadvantages of the mobile reserve strategy versus the "forward" policy
Ancient writers like Zosimus
Zosimus
Zosimus was a Byzantine historian, who lived in Constantinople during the reign of the Byzantine Emperor Anastasius I . According to Photius, he was a comes, and held the office of "advocate" of the imperial treasury.- Historia Nova :...
in the 5th century AD condemned the "reserve" policy as a major weakening of the military force. Other modern scholars (Ferrill et al.) also see the pullback as a strategic mistake, arguing that it left lower quality "second string" limitanei forces to stop an enemy, until the distant mobile reserve arrived. While the drop in quality did not happen immediately, it is argued that over time, the limitanei declined into lightly armed, static watchman type troops that were of dubious value against increasing barbarian marauders on the frontiers. The pullback of the best infantry was based more on political reasons (shoring up the power bases of the emperors and various elites) rather than on military reality. In addition it is claimed, the "forward" policy was not at all a static "Maginot" approach, but that traditional heavy legions and supporting cavalry could still move to a trouble spot by redeploying them from fortifications elsewhere along a particular frontier.
Twilight of the hard-core infantry
There are numerous other facets to the controversy, but whatever the school of thought, all agree that the traditional strengths and weaponry of the heavy infantry legion declined from the standards of earlier eras. The 4th century writer VegetiusVegetius
Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, commonly referred to simply as Vegetius, was a writer of the Later Roman Empire. Nothing is known of his life or station beyond what he tells us in his two surviving works: Epitoma rei militaris , and the lesser-known Digesta Artis Mulomedicinae, a guide to...
, in one of the most influential Western military works, highlighted this decline as the key factor in military weakness, noting that the core legions always fought as part of an integrated team of cavalry and light foot. In the latter years, this formula that had brought so much success petered out. Caught between the growth of lighter armed/less organized foot soldiers, and the increasing cavalry formations of the mobile forces, the "heavies" as the dominant force, withered on the vine. This does not mean that heavy units disappeared entirely, but that their mass recruitment, formation, organization and deployment as the dominant part of the Roman military was greatly reduced. Ironically, in Rome's final battles (the Western half of the empire) the defeats suffered were substantially inflicted by infantry forces (many fighting dismounted).
Speaking of the decline of the heavy infantry, the Roman historian Vegetius
Vegetius
Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, commonly referred to simply as Vegetius, was a writer of the Later Roman Empire. Nothing is known of his life or station beyond what he tells us in his two surviving works: Epitoma rei militaris , and the lesser-known Digesta Artis Mulomedicinae, a guide to...
lauded the old fighting units, and lamented how the heavy armor of the early days had been discarded by the weaker, less disciplined, barbarized forces:
- "Those who find the old arms so burdensome, must either receive wounds upon their naked bodies and die, or what is worse still, run the risk of being made prisoners, or of betraying the country by their flight. Thus, to avoid fatigue, they allow themselves to be butchered shamefully, like cattle."
Historian Arther Ferrill notes that even towards the end, some of the old infantry formations were still in use. Such grouping was increasingly ineffective however, without the severe close order discipline, drill and organization of old times. At the Battle of Châlons
Battle of Chalons
The Battle of the Catalaunian Plains , also called the Battle of Châlons sur Marne, took place in AD 451 between a coalition led by the Visigothic king Theodoric I and the Roman general Flavius Aëtius, against the Huns and their allies commanded by their leader Attila...
(circa 451 AD) Attila the Hun
Attila the Hun
Attila , more frequently referred to as Attila the Hun, was the ruler of the Huns from 434 until his death in 453. He was leader of the Hunnic Empire, which stretched from the Ural River to the Rhine River and from the Danube River to the Baltic Sea. During his reign he was one of the most feared...
rallied his troops by mocking the once vaunted Roman infantry, alleging that they merely huddled under a screen of protective shields in close formation. He ordered his troops to ignore them and to attack the powerful Alans
Alans
The Alans, or the Alani, occasionally termed Alauni or Halani, were a group of Sarmatian tribes, nomadic pastoralists of the 1st millennium AD who spoke an Eastern Iranian language which derived from Scytho-Sarmatian and which in turn evolved into modern Ossetian.-Name:The various forms of Alan —...
and Visigoths instead. It was a sad commentary on the force that had once dominated Europe, the Mediterranean and much of the Middle East. It is true that at Châlons, the Roman infantry contributed to the victory by seizing part of the battlefield's high ground. Nevertheless its day had already passed in favor of the mass levies of the barbarian federates.
See also
- List of Ancient Rome-related topics
- Roman legionRoman legionA Roman legion normally indicates the basic ancient Roman army unit recruited specifically from Roman citizens. The organization of legions varied greatly over time but they were typically composed of perhaps 5,000 soldiers, divided into maniples and later into "cohorts"...
- Military history of ancient RomeMilitary history of ancient RomeFrom its origin as a city-state in Italy in the 8th century BC, to its rise as an empire covering much of Southern Europe, Western Europe, Near East and North Africa and fall in the 5th century AD, the political history of Ancient Rome was typically closely entwined with its military history...
- CastraCastraThe Latin word castra, with its singular castrum, was used by the ancient Romans to mean buildings or plots of land reserved to or constructed for use as a military defensive position. The word appears in both Oscan and Umbrian as well as in Latin. It may have descended from Indo-European to Italic...
Sources and references
- Caesar's De Bello Gallico
- Vegetius's De Re MilitariDe Re MilitariDe Re Militari , also Epitoma Rei Militaris, is a treatise by the late Latin writer Vegetius about Roman warfare and military principles as a presentation of methods and practices in use during the height of Rome's power, and responsible for that power...
- Notitia DignitatumNotitia DignitatumThe Notitia Dignitatum is a unique document of the Roman imperial chanceries. One of the very few surviving documents of Roman government, it details the administrative organisation of the eastern and western empires, listing several thousand offices from the imperial court down to the provincial...