Collectivization in the Ukrainian SSR
Encyclopedia
Collectivization in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was part of the policy of Collectivization in the USSR and dekulakization
that was pursued between 1928 and 1933 with the purpose to consolidate individual land and labour into collective farms called kolkhoz
and to eliminate enemies of the working class. The idea of collective farms was seen by peasants as a revival of serfdom
.
In Soviet Ukraine this policy had a dramatic effect on the Ukrainian ethnic population and its culture as 86% of the population lived in rural settings. The forceful introduction of the policy of collectivization was one of the main causes of the Holodomor
. In Ukraine collectivization had specific goals and outcomes. According to a Soviet official explaining the goals: A ruthless struggle is going on between the peasantry and our regime. It's a struggle to the death. This year was a test of our strength and their endurance. It took a famine to show them who is master here. It has cost millions of lives, but the collective farm system is here to stay. We have won the war.
The Soviet policies related to collectivisation have to be understood in the larger context of the social "revolution from above
" that took place in the Soviet Union
at the time.
The formation of Collective farms were based on the large village farms in collective ownership of village inhabitants. Estimated yields were expected to increase by 150%. The ultimate goal of collectivization was to resolve "grain problems" of late 1920-s.
In the early 1920s only 3% of the peasantry of the USSR were collectivised. Within the first five year plan 20% of peasant households were to be collectivised, although in Ukraine the number was set at 30%.
Approaches to changing from individual farming to a collective type of agricultural production had existed since 1917, but for various reasons (lack of agricultural equipment, agronomy resources, etc.) were not implemented widely until 1925, when there was a more intensive effort by the agricultural sector to increase the number of agricultural cooperatives and bolster the effectiveness of already existing sovkhoz
es. In late 1927, after the XV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
, then known as the All-Union Communist party (bolsheviks) or VKP(b), a significant impetus was given to the collectivization effort.
In 1927, a drought
shortened the harvest
in southern areas of the Ukrainian SSR and North Caucasus
. In 1927–28 the winter tillage area was badly affected due to low snow levels. Despite seed aid from the State, many affected areas were not re-sown. The 1928 harvest was affected by drought in most of the grain producing areas of the Ukrainian SSR. Shortages in the harvest and difficulties with the supply system invoked difficulties with the food supply in urban areas and destabilized the food supply situation in the USSR in general. In order to alleviate the situation, a system of food rationing
was implemented in the second quarter of 1928 initially in Odessa
, and later spread to Mariupol
, Kherson
, Kiev
, Dniprelstan (Dnipropetrovsk
), and Kharkiv
. At the beginning of 1929 a similar system was implemented throughout the USSR. Despite the aid from the Soviet Ukrainian and the Central governments, many southern rural areas registered occurrences of malnutrition and in some cases hunger and starvation (the affected areas and thus the amount of required food aid was under-accounted by authorities). Due to the shortage of forage livestock
, its numbers were also affected (see table below).
Most of Kolkhoz
es and recently refurnished sovkhoz
es went through these years with few losses, and some were even able to provide assistance to peasants in the more affected areas (seed and grain for food).
was “collectivized”. In the early of 1929, the methods employed by the specially empowered authority “UkrKolhozcenter” changed from a voluntary enrollment to an administrative one. By October 1, 1929, a plan for the creation of kolkhozes was “outperformed” by 239%. As a result, 8.8% of arable land was “collectivized”.http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1929.php
, in early November 1929.
While “summoned “ by November 10–November 17, 1929 meeting of VKP(b) Central Committee “Twenty-Five Thousanders" only trained at special short courses, the main driving force of collectivization and dekulakization
in Ukraine became a "poor peasants committee" (“komnezamy”) and local village councils (silrady) where komnezams members had a voting majority.
The USSR Kolhozcenter issued the December 10, 1929, decree on collectivisation of livestock within a 3-month period (draft animals 100%, cattle 100%, pigs 80%, sheep and goats 60%). This drove many peasants to slaughter their livestock. By January 1, 1930, the percentage of collectivized households almost doubled, to 16.4% of the total number of households.
Despite the infamous January 5, 1930 decree
, in which the deadline for the complete collectivization of the Ukrainian SSR was set for the period from the end of 1931 to the spring of 1932, the Ukrainian SSR authorities decided to accelerate the completion of the campaign by autumn of 1930. The high expectations of the plan were outperformed by local authorities even without the assistance of the 7500 “Twenty-Five Thousanders who had reached some areas only by mid-February http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1930.php – by March 70.9% of arable land and 62.8% of peasant households were suddenly collectivized. The “Dekulakization
” plan was also “over-performed”. Almost 200,000 households (3.8% of total peasant households) were affected by the requisition of property, land, and houses. Some of the peasants were arrested and deported “to the north”. Many arrested 'kulak
s' and "well-to-do" farmers resettled their families to the Urals and Central Asia
, where they were often exploited in others sectors of the economy, such as timber cutting. The term 'kulak' was ultimately applied to anybody resisting collectivization as many of the so-called 'kulaks' were no more well-off than other peasants.
s. Many "kulaks" along with families were deported from the Ukrainian SSR.
According to declassified data, around 300,000 peasants in Ukrainian SSR out of a population of about 30 million were subject to these policies in 1930–31. Ukrainians composed 15% of the total 1.8 million 'kulaks' relocated Soviet-wide. On July 20, 1931 – as a response to the numerous regional requests for additional numbers of kulak deportations Politburo of VKP (b) concluded that the “strategic task of the Party was almost accomplished. All further deportations were recommended to be administered only to individuals.”
This second forced "voluntary" collectivization campaign also invoked a delay in sowing. As a result, cereal crops were heavily affected by the 1931 drought. During winter and spring of 1930–31, the Ukrainian agricultural authority "Narkomzem" Ukrainian SRR issued several reports about the significant decline of livestock and especially drought power caused by poor treatment, absence of forage
, stables/farms and due the "kulak
s sabotage".
According to the First Five-Year Plan
, Ukrainian agriculture was to switch from an exclusive orientation of grain to a more diverse output. This included not only a rise in Sugar beet
crops, but also other types of agricultural production were expected to be utilised by industry (with even cotton plants being established in 1931). This plan anticipated a decrease in the area of grain cultivated, in contrast to an increase of yield and area for other crops. By July 1, 1931, 65.7% of Ukrainian SSR peasant households and 67.2% of arable land were reported as "collectivized". The main grain and sugar beet production areas, however, were collectivized to a greater extent — 80-90%.
As of the beginning of October 1931, the collectivization of 68.0% of peasant households, and 72.0% of arable land was complete.
s (8.4 Tg
). Drought, administrative distribution of the plan for kolkhozes, together with the lack of relevant management generally destabilized the situation. Significant amounts of grain remained unharvested. A significant percentage was lost during processing and transportation, or spoiled at elevators (wet grain). The total Winter sowing area shrunk by approximately 2 million hectares. Livestock in kolkhozes remained without forage, which was collected under grain procurement. A similar occurrence happened with respect to seeds and wages awarded in kind for kolhoz members. Nevertheless, grain collection continued till May 1932 but reached only 90% of expected plan figures. By the end of December 1931, the collection plan was accomplished by 79%. Many kolkhozes from December 1931 onwards suffered from lack of food, resulting in an increased number of deaths caused by malnutrition registered by OGPU in some areas (Moldavian SSR as a whole and several central rayons of Vinnytsia
, Kiev and North-East rayons of Odessa
oblasts http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1932.php) in winter-spring and the early summer months of 1932. By 1932 the sowing campaign of the Ukrainian SSR was obtained with minimal power as most of the remaining horses were incapable of working, while the number of available agricultural tractors was too small to fill the gap.
Speculative prices on food in the cooperative network (5–10 times more as compared with neighboring Soviet republics) invoked a significant movement of peasants in search for bread. Attempts were made to manage the problem with bread speculation by imposing a quota on all carried foods met with very limited success. On the request of Kosior
such provisions were lifted by Stalin at the end of May 1932. The July GPU reports for the first half of 1932, mentioned the “difficulties with food” in 127 rayons (out of 484), acknowledged the fact the they did not have information for all regions. The Decree of Sovnarkom on “Kolkhoz Trade” issued in May, fostered rumors amongst peasants that collectivization was once again rolled-back as it had been in the spring 1930. As a result the number of peasants who abandoned the kolkhozes significantly increased.
s of grain for food for Ukraine and reverted no less than 700 agricultural tractors intended for other regions of USSR. By July, the total amount of aid provided from Central Soviet Authorities for food, sowing and forage for “agricultural sector” was numbered more than 17 million poods.
Taking into account the situation in Ukraine, the central grain collection plan was lowered by 18.1%, in comparison to the 1931 plan. Kolkhozes were expected to harvest 4,751.2 thousand tons, with the peasants responsible for 1,080.1 thousand tons. Sovkhozes were to submit 475,034 tons. In addition Ukrainian kolkhozes and sovkhozes were to return 132,750 tons of grain which had been provided in spring 1932 as aid. The grain collection plan for July 1932 was adopted to collect 19.5 million pood
s.
The actual state of collection was disastrous however, and by 31 July only 3 million poods (compared to 21 million in 1931) were collected. As of July 20 the harvested area was half of that in 1931. The sovhozes had only sowed 16% of the defined area.
This disparity between agricultural goals, and actual production grew later in the year. An expected 190 thousand tons of grain were to be exported, but by August 27, 1932, only 20 thousand tons were ready. The Ukrainian SSR met with difficulty in supplying the planned amount of food and as a result a rationing system was implemented to supply urban areas with food. This system became the major source of food delivery to cities while the alternatives, cooperative trade and black market trading, became too expensive, and under-supplied, to provide long-range assistance. By October 25, the plan for grain collection was lowered once again, from the quantity called for in the plan of August 22, 1932. Nevertheless, collection reached only 39% of the annually planned total. A second lowering of goals deducted 70 million poods but still demanded plan completion, and 100% efficiency. Attempts to reach the new goals of production proved futile in late 1932. On November 29, in order to complete the plan, Ukraine was to collect 94 million poods, 4.8 of them from sovkhozes. As of January 2, targets were again lowered, to 62.5 million poods. Later that month, on January 14,the targets were lowered even further– by 29.4 million poods, to 33.1 million. Vinnytsya, Kiev oblasts and Moldavian SRR had accomplished the lowered 1932 plan for grain procurement, but not for sowing reserves. The total remains for Ukraine was 22.1 million poods. At same time, GPU of Ukraine reported hunger and starvation in the Kiev
and Vinnytsia
oblasts, and began implementing measures to remedy the situation. By January 29 Kharkiv Oblast
had also fulfilled the grain collection plan, and reached its production target. Despite these apparent successes in production, the total amount of grain collected by February 5 was only 255 million poods (compared to 440 million poods in 1931) while the numbers of “hunger and malnutrition cases” as registered by the GPU of Ukrainian SSR, increased every day, particularly in rural areas and small towns.
http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1932.php
By early 1932, 69% of households were collectivized. Even though several other regions in the USSR were collectivized to a greater extent, the effect of the collectivization on the Ukrainian agriculture was very substantial.
Whilst the long-lasting effect of overall collectivization had an adverse effect on agricultural output everywhere, Ukraine had long been the most agriculturally productive area, providing over 50% of exported grain and 25% of total production of grain in the Russian Empire
in 1913. Over 228,936 square kilometres (56.571 million acres), 207,203 km² (51.201 million acres) were used for grain production, or 90.5% of total arable land. This degree of dependency on agriculture meant that the effects of a bad harvest could be almost unlimited. This had been long recognised, and while projections for agricultural production were adjusted, the shock of limited production could not be easily managed. While collections by the state were in turn, limited, there were already clear stresses. The 1932 total Soviet harvest, was to be 29.5 million tons in state collections of grain out of 90.7 million tons in production. But the actual result was a disastrous 55-60 million tons in production. The state ended up collecting only 18.5 million tons in grain. The total Soviet collections by the state were virtually the same in 1930 and 1931 at about 22.8 million tons. For 1932, they had significantly been reduced to 18.5 million tons; with even lower figure in Ukraine. These were the total estimated outcomes of the grain harvests:
In 1932 a "1/4 of yield" procurement quota for "grain production areas" of the Ukrainian SSR were planned for implementation. On September 23, 1932, a telegram signed by Molotov and Stalin noted that the harvest of 1932 was "satisfactory", according to estimates provided by the agricultural planning authorities, and therefore requests for seed for winter crops were refused while total winter-tillage area demands were increased. Later, Stalin blamed the statistical and planning authorities for inaccurately estimating potential yields and thus a "Commissions for yield estimation" was created on December 17, 1932 by his order. Some modern historians also agree that the 1932 harvest figures provided at the time were largely overestimated and the actual difference between estimated and actual harvest was significant. Such unrealistic figures resulted in demand that was impossibly to fulfill and resulted in lesser reduction of grain procurement plan and greater grain procurement then were possible in late 1932 through the February 5, 1933
On August 7, 1932, the Soviet government passed a law "on the safekeeping of Socialist property" that imposed from a ten year prison sentence to the death penalty for any theft of socialist property. Stalin personally appended the stipulation: "People who encroach on socialist property should be considered enemies of the people
." Within five months after passage of the law, 54,645 individuals were sentenced under its provisions, of which, 2,110 were sentenced to death. The initial wording of the Decree "On fought with speculation” adopted August 22, 1932 lead to common situations where acts by minor such as bartering tobacco for bread were documented as punished by 5 years imprisonment .; After 1934,by NKVD demand, the penalty for minor offenses was limited to a fine of 500 ruble
s or 3 month of correctional labor. http://www.law.edu.ru/article/article.asp?articleID=1131644
The existed practice of administrative punishment known as “black board” (black list) by the November, 18 Decree of Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine was applied to a greater extent and with more harsh methods to selected villages and kolkhozes that were considered to be "underperforming" in the grain collection procurement: “Immediate cessation of delivery of goods, complete suspension of cooperative and state trade in the villages, and removal of all available goods from cooperative and state stores”. Full prohibition of collective farm trade for both collective farms and collective farmers, and for private farmers. Cessation of any sort of credit and demand for early repayment of credit and other financial obligations.” Initially such sanctions were applied to only six villages, but later they were applied to numerous rural settlements and districts. For peasants, who were not kolkhoz members and who were "underperforming" in the grain collection procurement, special “measures” were adopted. To “reach the grain procurement quota” amongst peasants 1,100 brigades were organized which consisted of activists (often from neighboring villages) which had accomplished their grain procurement quota or were close to accomplishing it. Since most of goods supplied to the rural areas was commercial (fabrics, matches, fuels) and was sometimes obtained by villagers from neighbored cities or railway stations, sanctioned villages remained for a long period – as an example mentioned in the December 6 Decree the village of Kamyani Potoky was removed from blacklist only October 17, 1933 when they completed their plan for grain collection early. Since January 1933 the black list regime was “softened” when 100% of plan execution was no longer demanded, mentioned in the December 6 Decree villages Liutenky and Havrylivka were removed from the black list after 88 and 70% of plan completion respectively. http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1933.php
Measures were undertaken to persecute those withholding or bargaining grain. This was done frequently by requisition detachments, which raided farms to collect grain, and was done regardless of whether the peasants retained enough grain to feed themselves, or whether they had enough seed left to plant the next harvest.
continued to export grain rather than retain its crop to feed the people, even though on a significantly lower level than in previous years. In 1930–31 there had been 5,832,000 tons of grains exported In 1931–32, grain exports declined to 4,786,000 tons. In 1932–33, grain exports were just 1,607,000 tons and in 1933–34, this further declined to 1,441,000 tons. Officially published data slightly differ
Cereals : 1930 - 4,846,024;
1931 - 5,182,835; 1932 - 1,819,114 (first half of 1932 - approx 750 000, from late April grain also imported - approx. 157,000 tonnes ); 1933 - 1,771,364 tonnes (first half of 1933 - 220 000, late March grain also imported).
From that wheat: 1930 - 2,530,953; 1931 - 2,498,958 ; 1932 - 550,917; 1933 - 748,248 tons. Via Ukrainian commercial ports in 1932 were exported (thousand tons): 988.3 -grains, 16,5 other types of cereals; in 1933 - 809.6,-grains 2.6 -cereals; 3.5 meat, 0.4- butter, 2.5 - fish.
Via Ukrainian commercial ports in 1932 were imported (thousand tons): 1932 - no more than 67.2 of grains and cereals 1933 - 8.6 of grains.
Received from other Soviet ports - 1932 (thousand tons): 164 - grains, 7.3 - other types of cereals, fish -31.5 and no more than 177 thousand tons of meat and butter 1933- 230 - grains, 15.3 other types of cereals 0.1 - meat, 0.9- butter, fish - 34.3.
Collectivization in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was part of the policy of Collectivization in the USSR and dekulakization
that was pursued between 1928 and 1933 with the purpose to consolidate individual land and labour into collective farms called kolkhoz
and to eliminate enemies of the working class. The idea of collective farms was seen by peasants as a revival of serfdom
.
In Soviet Ukraine this policy had a dramatic effect on the Ukrainian ethnic population and its culture as 86% of the population lived in rural settings. The forceful introduction of the policy of collectivization was one of the main causes of the Holodomor
. In Ukraine collectivization had specific goals and outcomes. According to a Soviet official explaining the goals: A ruthless struggle is going on between the peasantry and our regime. It's a struggle to the death. This year was a test of our strength and their endurance. It took a famine to show them who is master here. It has cost millions of lives, but the collective farm system is here to stay. We have won the war.
The Soviet policies related to collectivisation have to be understood in the larger context of the social "revolution from above
" that took place in the Soviet Union
at the time.
The formation of Collective farms were based on the large village farms in collective ownership of village inhabitants. Estimated yields were expected to increase by 150%. The ultimate goal of collectivization was to resolve "grain problems" of late 1920-s.
In the early 1920s only 3% of the peasantry of the USSR were collectivised. Within the first five year plan 20% of peasant households were to be collectivised, although in Ukraine the number was set at 30%.
Approaches to changing from individual farming to a collective type of agricultural production had existed since 1917, but for various reasons (lack of agricultural equipment, agronomy resources, etc.) were not implemented widely until 1925, when there was a more intensive effort by the agricultural sector to increase the number of agricultural cooperatives and bolster the effectiveness of already existing sovkhoz
es. In late 1927, after the XV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
, then known as the All-Union Communist party (bolsheviks) or VKP(b), a significant impetus was given to the collectivization effort.
In 1927, a drought
shortened the harvest
in southern areas of the Ukrainian SSR and North Caucasus
. In 1927–28 the winter tillage area was badly affected due to low snow levels. Despite seed aid from the State, many affected areas were not re-sown. The 1928 harvest was affected by drought in most of the grain producing areas of the Ukrainian SSR. Shortages in the harvest and difficulties with the supply system invoked difficulties with the food supply in urban areas and destabilized the food supply situation in the USSR in general. In order to alleviate the situation, a system of food rationing
was implemented in the second quarter of 1928 initially in Odessa
, and later spread to Mariupol
, Kherson
, Kiev
, Dniprelstan (Dnipropetrovsk
), and Kharkiv
. At the beginning of 1929 a similar system was implemented throughout the USSR. Despite the aid from the Soviet Ukrainian and the Central governments, many southern rural areas registered occurrences of malnutrition and in some cases hunger and starvation (the affected areas and thus the amount of required food aid was under-accounted by authorities). Due to the shortage of forage livestock
, its numbers were also affected (see table below).
Most of Kolkhoz
es and recently refurnished sovkhoz
es went through these years with few losses, and some were even able to provide assistance to peasants in the more affected areas (seed and grain for food).
was “collectivized”. In the early of 1929, the methods employed by the specially empowered authority “UkrKolhozcenter” changed from a voluntary enrollment to an administrative one. By October 1, 1929, a plan for the creation of kolkhozes was “outperformed” by 239%. As a result, 8.8% of arable land was “collectivized”.http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1929.php
, in early November 1929.
While “summoned “ by November 10–November 17, 1929 meeting of VKP(b) Central Committee “Twenty-Five Thousanders" only trained at special short courses, the main driving force of collectivization and dekulakization
in Ukraine became a "poor peasants committee" (“komnezamy”) and local village councils (silrady) where komnezams members had a voting majority.
The USSR Kolhozcenter issued the December 10, 1929, decree on collectivisation of livestock within a 3-month period (draft animals 100%, cattle 100%, pigs 80%, sheep and goats 60%). This drove many peasants to slaughter their livestock. By January 1, 1930, the percentage of collectivized households almost doubled, to 16.4% of the total number of households.
Despite the infamous January 5, 1930 decree
, in which the deadline for the complete collectivization of the Ukrainian SSR was set for the period from the end of 1931 to the spring of 1932, the Ukrainian SSR authorities decided to accelerate the completion of the campaign by autumn of 1930. The high expectations of the plan were outperformed by local authorities even without the assistance of the 7500 “Twenty-Five Thousanders who had reached some areas only by mid-February http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1930.php – by March 70.9% of arable land and 62.8% of peasant households were suddenly collectivized. The “Dekulakization
” plan was also “over-performed”. Almost 200,000 households (3.8% of total peasant households) were affected by the requisition of property, land, and houses. Some of the peasants were arrested and deported “to the north”. Many arrested 'kulak
s' and "well-to-do" farmers resettled their families to the Urals and Central Asia
, where they were often exploited in others sectors of the economy, such as timber cutting. The term 'kulak' was ultimately applied to anybody resisting collectivization as many of the so-called 'kulaks' were no more well-off than other peasants.
s. Many "kulaks" along with families were deported from the Ukrainian SSR.
According to declassified data, around 300,000 peasants in Ukrainian SSR out of a population of about 30 million were subject to these policies in 1930–31. Ukrainians composed 15% of the total 1.8 million 'kulaks' relocated Soviet-wide. On July 20, 1931 – as a response to the numerous regional requests for additional numbers of kulak deportations Politburo of VKP (b) concluded that the “strategic task of the Party was almost accomplished. All further deportations were recommended to be administered only to individuals.”
This second forced "voluntary" collectivization campaign also invoked a delay in sowing. As a result, cereal crops were heavily affected by the 1931 drought. During winter and spring of 1930–31, the Ukrainian agricultural authority "Narkomzem" Ukrainian SRR issued several reports about the significant decline of livestock and especially drought power caused by poor treatment, absence of forage
, stables/farms and due the "kulak
s sabotage".
According to the First Five-Year Plan
, Ukrainian agriculture was to switch from an exclusive orientation of grain to a more diverse output. This included not only a rise in Sugar beet
crops, but also other types of agricultural production were expected to be utilised by industry (with even cotton plants being established in 1931). This plan anticipated a decrease in the area of grain cultivated, in contrast to an increase of yield and area for other crops. By July 1, 1931, 65.7% of Ukrainian SSR peasant households and 67.2% of arable land were reported as "collectivized". The main grain and sugar beet production areas, however, were collectivized to a greater extent — 80-90%.
As of the beginning of October 1931, the collectivization of 68.0% of peasant households, and 72.0% of arable land was complete.
s (8.4 Tg
). Drought, administrative distribution of the plan for kolkhozes, together with the lack of relevant management generally destabilized the situation. Significant amounts of grain remained unharvested. A significant percentage was lost during processing and transportation, or spoiled at elevators (wet grain). The total Winter sowing area shrunk by approximately 2 million hectares. Livestock in kolkhozes remained without forage, which was collected under grain procurement. A similar occurrence happened with respect to seeds and wages awarded in kind for kolhoz members. Nevertheless, grain collection continued till May 1932 but reached only 90% of expected plan figures. By the end of December 1931, the collection plan was accomplished by 79%. Many kolkhozes from December 1931 onwards suffered from lack of food, resulting in an increased number of deaths caused by malnutrition registered by OGPU in some areas (Moldavian SSR as a whole and several central rayons of Vinnytsia
, Kiev and North-East rayons of Odessa
oblasts http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1932.php) in winter-spring and the early summer months of 1932. By 1932 the sowing campaign of the Ukrainian SSR was obtained with minimal power as most of the remaining horses were incapable of working, while the number of available agricultural tractors was too small to fill the gap.
Speculative prices on food in the cooperative network (5–10 times more as compared with neighboring Soviet republics) invoked a significant movement of peasants in search for bread. Attempts were made to manage the problem with bread speculation by imposing a quota on all carried foods met with very limited success. On the request of Kosior
such provisions were lifted by Stalin at the end of May 1932. The July GPU reports for the first half of 1932, mentioned the “difficulties with food” in 127 rayons (out of 484), acknowledged the fact the they did not have information for all regions. The Decree of Sovnarkom on “Kolkhoz Trade” issued in May, fostered rumors amongst peasants that collectivization was once again rolled-back as it had been in the spring 1930. As a result the number of peasants who abandoned the kolkhozes significantly increased.
s of grain for food for Ukraine and reverted no less than 700 agricultural tractors intended for other regions of USSR. By July, the total amount of aid provided from Central Soviet Authorities for food, sowing and forage for “agricultural sector” was numbered more than 17 million poods.
Taking into account the situation in Ukraine, the central grain collection plan was lowered by 18.1%, in comparison to the 1931 plan. Kolkhozes were expected to harvest 4,751.2 thousand tons, with the peasants responsible for 1,080.1 thousand tons. Sovkhozes were to submit 475,034 tons. In addition Ukrainian kolkhozes and sovkhozes were to return 132,750 tons of grain which had been provided in spring 1932 as aid. The grain collection plan for July 1932 was adopted to collect 19.5 million pood
s.
The actual state of collection was disastrous however, and by 31 July only 3 million poods (compared to 21 million in 1931) were collected. As of July 20 the harvested area was half of that in 1931. The sovhozes had only sowed 16% of the defined area.
This disparity between agricultural goals, and actual production grew later in the year. An expected 190 thousand tons of grain were to be exported, but by August 27, 1932, only 20 thousand tons were ready. The Ukrainian SSR met with difficulty in supplying the planned amount of food and as a result a rationing system was implemented to supply urban areas with food. This system became the major source of food delivery to cities while the alternatives, cooperative trade and black market trading, became too expensive, and under-supplied, to provide long-range assistance. By October 25, the plan for grain collection was lowered once again, from the quantity called for in the plan of August 22, 1932. Nevertheless, collection reached only 39% of the annually planned total. A second lowering of goals deducted 70 million poods but still demanded plan completion, and 100% efficiency. Attempts to reach the new goals of production proved futile in late 1932. On November 29, in order to complete the plan, Ukraine was to collect 94 million poods, 4.8 of them from sovkhozes. As of January 2, targets were again lowered, to 62.5 million poods. Later that month, on January 14,the targets were lowered even further– by 29.4 million poods, to 33.1 million. Vinnytsya, Kiev oblasts and Moldavian SRR had accomplished the lowered 1932 plan for grain procurement, but not for sowing reserves. The total remains for Ukraine was 22.1 million poods. At same time, GPU of Ukraine reported hunger and starvation in the Kiev
and Vinnytsia
oblasts, and began implementing measures to remedy the situation. By January 29 Kharkiv Oblast
had also fulfilled the grain collection plan, and reached its production target. Despite these apparent successes in production, the total amount of grain collected by February 5 was only 255 million poods (compared to 440 million poods in 1931) while the numbers of “hunger and malnutrition cases” as registered by the GPU of Ukrainian SSR, increased every day, particularly in rural areas and small towns.
http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1932.php
By early 1932, 69% of households were collectivized. Even though several other regions in the USSR were collectivized to a greater extent, the effect of the collectivization on the Ukrainian agriculture was very substantial.
Whilst the long-lasting effect of overall collectivization had an adverse effect on agricultural output everywhere, Ukraine had long been the most agriculturally productive area, providing over 50% of exported grain and 25% of total production of grain in the Russian Empire
in 1913. Over 228,936 square kilometres (56.571 million acres), 207,203 km² (51.201 million acres) were used for grain production, or 90.5% of total arable land. This degree of dependency on agriculture meant that the effects of a bad harvest could be almost unlimited. This had been long recognised, and while projections for agricultural production were adjusted, the shock of limited production could not be easily managed. While collections by the state were in turn, limited, there were already clear stresses. The 1932 total Soviet harvest, was to be 29.5 million tons in state collections of grain out of 90.7 million tons in production. But the actual result was a disastrous 55-60 million tons in production. The state ended up collecting only 18.5 million tons in grain. The total Soviet collections by the state were virtually the same in 1930 and 1931 at about 22.8 million tons. For 1932, they had significantly been reduced to 18.5 million tons; with even lower figure in Ukraine. These were the total estimated outcomes of the grain harvests:
In 1932 a "1/4 of yield" procurement quota for "grain production areas" of the Ukrainian SSR were planned for implementation. On September 23, 1932, a telegram signed by Molotov and Stalin noted that the harvest of 1932 was "satisfactory", according to estimates provided by the agricultural planning authorities, and therefore requests for seed for winter crops were refused while total winter-tillage area demands were increased. Later, Stalin blamed the statistical and planning authorities for inaccurately estimating potential yields and thus a "Commissions for yield estimation" was created on December 17, 1932 by his order. Some modern historians also agree that the 1932 harvest figures provided at the time were largely overestimated and the actual difference between estimated and actual harvest was significant. Such unrealistic figures resulted in demand that was impossibly to fulfill and resulted in lesser reduction of grain procurement plan and greater grain procurement then were possible in late 1932 through the February 5, 1933
On August 7, 1932, the Soviet government passed a law "on the safekeeping of Socialist property" that imposed from a ten year prison sentence to the death penalty for any theft of socialist property. Stalin personally appended the stipulation: "People who encroach on socialist property should be considered enemies of the people
." Within five months after passage of the law, 54,645 individuals were sentenced under its provisions, of which, 2,110 were sentenced to death. The initial wording of the Decree "On fought with speculation” adopted August 22, 1932 lead to common situations where acts by minor such as bartering tobacco for bread were documented as punished by 5 years imprisonment .; After 1934,by NKVD demand, the penalty for minor offenses was limited to a fine of 500 ruble
s or 3 month of correctional labor. http://www.law.edu.ru/article/article.asp?articleID=1131644
The existed practice of administrative punishment known as “black board” (black list) by the November, 18 Decree of Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine was applied to a greater extent and with more harsh methods to selected villages and kolkhozes that were considered to be "underperforming" in the grain collection procurement: “Immediate cessation of delivery of goods, complete suspension of cooperative and state trade in the villages, and removal of all available goods from cooperative and state stores”. Full prohibition of collective farm trade for both collective farms and collective farmers, and for private farmers. Cessation of any sort of credit and demand for early repayment of credit and other financial obligations.” Initially such sanctions were applied to only six villages, but later they were applied to numerous rural settlements and districts. For peasants, who were not kolkhoz members and who were "underperforming" in the grain collection procurement, special “measures” were adopted. To “reach the grain procurement quota” amongst peasants 1,100 brigades were organized which consisted of activists (often from neighboring villages) which had accomplished their grain procurement quota or were close to accomplishing it. Since most of goods supplied to the rural areas was commercial (fabrics, matches, fuels) and was sometimes obtained by villagers from neighbored cities or railway stations, sanctioned villages remained for a long period – as an example mentioned in the December 6 Decree the village of Kamyani Potoky was removed from blacklist only October 17, 1933 when they completed their plan for grain collection early. Since January 1933 the black list regime was “softened” when 100% of plan execution was no longer demanded, mentioned in the December 6 Decree villages Liutenky and Havrylivka were removed from the black list after 88 and 70% of plan completion respectively. http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1933.php
Measures were undertaken to persecute those withholding or bargaining grain. This was done frequently by requisition detachments, which raided farms to collect grain, and was done regardless of whether the peasants retained enough grain to feed themselves, or whether they had enough seed left to plant the next harvest.
continued to export grain rather than retain its crop to feed the people, even though on a significantly lower level than in previous years. In 1930–31 there had been 5,832,000 tons of grains exported In 1931–32, grain exports declined to 4,786,000 tons. In 1932–33, grain exports were just 1,607,000 tons and in 1933–34, this further declined to 1,441,000 tons. Officially published data slightly differ
Cereals : 1930 - 4,846,024;
1931 - 5,182,835; 1932 - 1,819,114 (first half of 1932 - approx 750 000, from late April grain also imported - approx. 157,000 tonnes ); 1933 - 1,771,364 tonnes (first half of 1933 - 220 000, late March grain also imported).
From that wheat: 1930 - 2,530,953; 1931 - 2,498,958 ; 1932 - 550,917; 1933 - 748,248 tons. Via Ukrainian commercial ports in 1932 were exported (thousand tons): 988.3 -grains, 16,5 other types of cereals; in 1933 - 809.6,-grains 2.6 -cereals; 3.5 meat, 0.4- butter, 2.5 - fish.
Via Ukrainian commercial ports in 1932 were imported (thousand tons): 1932 - no more than 67.2 of grains and cereals 1933 - 8.6 of grains.
Received from other Soviet ports - 1932 (thousand tons): 164 - grains, 7.3 - other types of cereals, fish -31.5 and no more than 177 thousand tons of meat and butter 1933- 230 - grains, 15.3 other types of cereals 0.1 - meat, 0.9- butter, fish - 34.3.
Collectivization in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was part of the policy of Collectivization in the USSR and dekulakization
that was pursued between 1928 and 1933 with the purpose to consolidate individual land and labour into collective farms called kolkhoz
and to eliminate enemies of the working class. The idea of collective farms was seen by peasants as a revival of serfdom
.
In Soviet Ukraine this policy had a dramatic effect on the Ukrainian ethnic population and its culture as 86% of the population lived in rural settings. The forceful introduction of the policy of collectivization was one of the main causes of the Holodomor
. In Ukraine collectivization had specific goals and outcomes. According to a Soviet official explaining the goals: A ruthless struggle is going on between the peasantry and our regime. It's a struggle to the death. This year was a test of our strength and their endurance. It took a famine to show them who is master here. It has cost millions of lives, but the collective farm system is here to stay. We have won the war.
The Soviet policies related to collectivisation have to be understood in the larger context of the social "revolution from above
" that took place in the Soviet Union
at the time.
The formation of Collective farms were based on the large village farms in collective ownership of village inhabitants. Estimated yields were expected to increase by 150%. The ultimate goal of collectivization was to resolve "grain problems" of late 1920-s.
In the early 1920s only 3% of the peasantry of the USSR were collectivised. Within the first five year plan 20% of peasant households were to be collectivised, although in Ukraine the number was set at 30%.
Approaches to changing from individual farming to a collective type of agricultural production had existed since 1917, but for various reasons (lack of agricultural equipment, agronomy resources, etc.) were not implemented widely until 1925, when there was a more intensive effort by the agricultural sector to increase the number of agricultural cooperatives and bolster the effectiveness of already existing sovkhoz
es. In late 1927, after the XV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
, then known as the All-Union Communist party (bolsheviks) or VKP(b), a significant impetus was given to the collectivization effort.
In 1927, a drought
shortened the harvest
in southern areas of the Ukrainian SSR and North Caucasus
. In 1927–28 the winter tillage area was badly affected due to low snow levels. Despite seed aid from the State, many affected areas were not re-sown. The 1928 harvest was affected by drought in most of the grain producing areas of the Ukrainian SSR. Shortages in the harvest and difficulties with the supply system invoked difficulties with the food supply in urban areas and destabilized the food supply situation in the USSR in general. In order to alleviate the situation, a system of food rationing
was implemented in the second quarter of 1928 initially in Odessa
, and later spread to Mariupol
, Kherson
, Kiev
, Dniprelstan (Dnipropetrovsk
), and Kharkiv
. At the beginning of 1929 a similar system was implemented throughout the USSR. Despite the aid from the Soviet Ukrainian and the Central governments, many southern rural areas registered occurrences of malnutrition and in some cases hunger and starvation (the affected areas and thus the amount of required food aid was under-accounted by authorities). Due to the shortage of forage livestock
, its numbers were also affected (see table below).
Most of Kolkhoz
es and recently refurnished sovkhoz
es went through these years with few losses, and some were even able to provide assistance to peasants in the more affected areas (seed and grain for food).
was “collectivized”. In the early of 1929, the methods employed by the specially empowered authority “UkrKolhozcenter” changed from a voluntary enrollment to an administrative one. By October 1, 1929, a plan for the creation of kolkhozes was “outperformed” by 239%. As a result, 8.8% of arable land was “collectivized”.http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1929.php
, in early November 1929.
While “summoned “ by November 10–November 17, 1929 meeting of VKP(b) Central Committee “Twenty-Five Thousanders" only trained at special short courses, the main driving force of collectivization and dekulakization
in Ukraine became a "poor peasants committee" (“komnezamy”) and local village councils (silrady) where komnezams members had a voting majority.
The USSR Kolhozcenter issued the December 10, 1929, decree on collectivisation of livestock within a 3-month period (draft animals 100%, cattle 100%, pigs 80%, sheep and goats 60%). This drove many peasants to slaughter their livestock. By January 1, 1930, the percentage of collectivized households almost doubled, to 16.4% of the total number of households.
Despite the infamous January 5, 1930 decree
, in which the deadline for the complete collectivization of the Ukrainian SSR was set for the period from the end of 1931 to the spring of 1932, the Ukrainian SSR authorities decided to accelerate the completion of the campaign by autumn of 1930. The high expectations of the plan were outperformed by local authorities even without the assistance of the 7500 “Twenty-Five Thousanders who had reached some areas only by mid-February http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1930.php – by March 70.9% of arable land and 62.8% of peasant households were suddenly collectivized. The “Dekulakization
” plan was also “over-performed”. Almost 200,000 households (3.8% of total peasant households) were affected by the requisition of property, land, and houses. Some of the peasants were arrested and deported “to the north”. Many arrested 'kulak
s' and "well-to-do" farmers resettled their families to the Urals and Central Asia
, where they were often exploited in others sectors of the economy, such as timber cutting. The term 'kulak' was ultimately applied to anybody resisting collectivization as many of the so-called 'kulaks' were no more well-off than other peasants.
s. Many "kulaks" along with families were deported from the Ukrainian SSR.
According to declassified data, around 300,000 peasants in Ukrainian SSR out of a population of about 30 million were subject to these policies in 1930–31. Ukrainians composed 15% of the total 1.8 million 'kulaks' relocated Soviet-wide. On July 20, 1931 – as a response to the numerous regional requests for additional numbers of kulak deportations Politburo of VKP (b) concluded that the “strategic task of the Party was almost accomplished. All further deportations were recommended to be administered only to individuals.”
This second forced "voluntary" collectivization campaign also invoked a delay in sowing. As a result, cereal crops were heavily affected by the 1931 drought. During winter and spring of 1930–31, the Ukrainian agricultural authority "Narkomzem" Ukrainian SRR issued several reports about the significant decline of livestock and especially drought power caused by poor treatment, absence of forage
, stables/farms and due the "kulak
s sabotage".
According to the First Five-Year Plan
, Ukrainian agriculture was to switch from an exclusive orientation of grain to a more diverse output. This included not only a rise in Sugar beet
crops, but also other types of agricultural production were expected to be utilised by industry (with even cotton plants being established in 1931). This plan anticipated a decrease in the area of grain cultivated, in contrast to an increase of yield and area for other crops. By July 1, 1931, 65.7% of Ukrainian SSR peasant households and 67.2% of arable land were reported as "collectivized". The main grain and sugar beet production areas, however, were collectivized to a greater extent — 80-90%.
As of the beginning of October 1931, the collectivization of 68.0% of peasant households, and 72.0% of arable land was complete.
s (8.4 Tg
). Drought, administrative distribution of the plan for kolkhozes, together with the lack of relevant management generally destabilized the situation. Significant amounts of grain remained unharvested. A significant percentage was lost during processing and transportation, or spoiled at elevators (wet grain). The total Winter sowing area shrunk by approximately 2 million hectares. Livestock in kolkhozes remained without forage, which was collected under grain procurement. A similar occurrence happened with respect to seeds and wages awarded in kind for kolhoz members. Nevertheless, grain collection continued till May 1932 but reached only 90% of expected plan figures. By the end of December 1931, the collection plan was accomplished by 79%. Many kolkhozes from December 1931 onwards suffered from lack of food, resulting in an increased number of deaths caused by malnutrition registered by OGPU in some areas (Moldavian SSR as a whole and several central rayons of Vinnytsia
, Kiev and North-East rayons of Odessa
oblasts http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1932.php) in winter-spring and the early summer months of 1932. By 1932 the sowing campaign of the Ukrainian SSR was obtained with minimal power as most of the remaining horses were incapable of working, while the number of available agricultural tractors was too small to fill the gap.
Speculative prices on food in the cooperative network (5–10 times more as compared with neighboring Soviet republics) invoked a significant movement of peasants in search for bread. Attempts were made to manage the problem with bread speculation by imposing a quota on all carried foods met with very limited success. On the request of Kosior
such provisions were lifted by Stalin at the end of May 1932. The July GPU reports for the first half of 1932, mentioned the “difficulties with food” in 127 rayons (out of 484), acknowledged the fact the they did not have information for all regions. The Decree of Sovnarkom on “Kolkhoz Trade” issued in May, fostered rumors amongst peasants that collectivization was once again rolled-back as it had been in the spring 1930. As a result the number of peasants who abandoned the kolkhozes significantly increased.
s of grain for food for Ukraine and reverted no less than 700 agricultural tractors intended for other regions of USSR. By July, the total amount of aid provided from Central Soviet Authorities for food, sowing and forage for “agricultural sector” was numbered more than 17 million poods.
Taking into account the situation in Ukraine, the central grain collection plan was lowered by 18.1%, in comparison to the 1931 plan. Kolkhozes were expected to harvest 4,751.2 thousand tons, with the peasants responsible for 1,080.1 thousand tons. Sovkhozes were to submit 475,034 tons. In addition Ukrainian kolkhozes and sovkhozes were to return 132,750 tons of grain which had been provided in spring 1932 as aid. The grain collection plan for July 1932 was adopted to collect 19.5 million pood
s.
The actual state of collection was disastrous however, and by 31 July only 3 million poods (compared to 21 million in 1931) were collected. As of July 20 the harvested area was half of that in 1931. The sovhozes had only sowed 16% of the defined area.
This disparity between agricultural goals, and actual production grew later in the year. An expected 190 thousand tons of grain were to be exported, but by August 27, 1932, only 20 thousand tons were ready. The Ukrainian SSR met with difficulty in supplying the planned amount of food and as a result a rationing system was implemented to supply urban areas with food. This system became the major source of food delivery to cities while the alternatives, cooperative trade and black market trading, became too expensive, and under-supplied, to provide long-range assistance. By October 25, the plan for grain collection was lowered once again, from the quantity called for in the plan of August 22, 1932. Nevertheless, collection reached only 39% of the annually planned total. A second lowering of goals deducted 70 million poods but still demanded plan completion, and 100% efficiency. Attempts to reach the new goals of production proved futile in late 1932. On November 29, in order to complete the plan, Ukraine was to collect 94 million poods, 4.8 of them from sovkhozes. As of January 2, targets were again lowered, to 62.5 million poods. Later that month, on January 14,the targets were lowered even further– by 29.4 million poods, to 33.1 million. Vinnytsya, Kiev oblasts and Moldavian SRR had accomplished the lowered 1932 plan for grain procurement, but not for sowing reserves. The total remains for Ukraine was 22.1 million poods. At same time, GPU of Ukraine reported hunger and starvation in the Kiev
and Vinnytsia
oblasts, and began implementing measures to remedy the situation. By January 29 Kharkiv Oblast
had also fulfilled the grain collection plan, and reached its production target. Despite these apparent successes in production, the total amount of grain collected by February 5 was only 255 million poods (compared to 440 million poods in 1931) while the numbers of “hunger and malnutrition cases” as registered by the GPU of Ukrainian SSR, increased every day, particularly in rural areas and small towns.
http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1932.php
By early 1932, 69% of households were collectivized. Even though several other regions in the USSR were collectivized to a greater extent, the effect of the collectivization on the Ukrainian agriculture was very substantial.
Whilst the long-lasting effect of overall collectivization had an adverse effect on agricultural output everywhere, Ukraine had long been the most agriculturally productive area, providing over 50% of exported grain and 25% of total production of grain in the Russian Empire
in 1913. Over 228,936 square kilometres (56.571 million acres), 207,203 km² (51.201 million acres) were used for grain production, or 90.5% of total arable land. This degree of dependency on agriculture meant that the effects of a bad harvest could be almost unlimited. This had been long recognised, and while projections for agricultural production were adjusted, the shock of limited production could not be easily managed. While collections by the state were in turn, limited, there were already clear stresses. The 1932 total Soviet harvest, was to be 29.5 million tons in state collections of grain out of 90.7 million tons in production. But the actual result was a disastrous 55-60 million tons in production. The state ended up collecting only 18.5 million tons in grain. The total Soviet collections by the state were virtually the same in 1930 and 1931 at about 22.8 million tons. For 1932, they had significantly been reduced to 18.5 million tons; with even lower figure in Ukraine. These were the total estimated outcomes of the grain harvests:
In 1932 a "1/4 of yield" procurement quota for "grain production areas" of the Ukrainian SSR were planned for implementation. On September 23, 1932, a telegram signed by Molotov and Stalin noted that the harvest of 1932 was "satisfactory", according to estimates provided by the agricultural planning authorities, and therefore requests for seed for winter crops were refused while total winter-tillage area demands were increased. Later, Stalin blamed the statistical and planning authorities for inaccurately estimating potential yields and thus a "Commissions for yield estimation" was created on December 17, 1932 by his order. Some modern historians also agree that the 1932 harvest figures provided at the time were largely overestimated and the actual difference between estimated and actual harvest was significant. Such unrealistic figures resulted in demand that was impossibly to fulfill and resulted in lesser reduction of grain procurement plan and greater grain procurement then were possible in late 1932 through the February 5, 1933
On August 7, 1932, the Soviet government passed a law "on the safekeeping of Socialist property" that imposed from a ten year prison sentence to the death penalty for any theft of socialist property. Stalin personally appended the stipulation: "People who encroach on socialist property should be considered enemies of the people
." Within five months after passage of the law, 54,645 individuals were sentenced under its provisions, of which, 2,110 were sentenced to death. The initial wording of the Decree "On fought with speculation” adopted August 22, 1932 lead to common situations where acts by minor such as bartering tobacco for bread were documented as punished by 5 years imprisonment .; After 1934,by NKVD demand, the penalty for minor offenses was limited to a fine of 500 ruble
s or 3 month of correctional labor. http://www.law.edu.ru/article/article.asp?articleID=1131644
The existed practice of administrative punishment known as “black board” (black list) by the November, 18 Decree of Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine was applied to a greater extent and with more harsh methods to selected villages and kolkhozes that were considered to be "underperforming" in the grain collection procurement: “Immediate cessation of delivery of goods, complete suspension of cooperative and state trade in the villages, and removal of all available goods from cooperative and state stores”. Full prohibition of collective farm trade for both collective farms and collective farmers, and for private farmers. Cessation of any sort of credit and demand for early repayment of credit and other financial obligations.” Initially such sanctions were applied to only six villages, but later they were applied to numerous rural settlements and districts. For peasants, who were not kolkhoz members and who were "underperforming" in the grain collection procurement, special “measures” were adopted. To “reach the grain procurement quota” amongst peasants 1,100 brigades were organized which consisted of activists (often from neighboring villages) which had accomplished their grain procurement quota or were close to accomplishing it. Since most of goods supplied to the rural areas was commercial (fabrics, matches, fuels) and was sometimes obtained by villagers from neighbored cities or railway stations, sanctioned villages remained for a long period – as an example mentioned in the December 6 Decree the village of Kamyani Potoky was removed from blacklist only October 17, 1933 when they completed their plan for grain collection early. Since January 1933 the black list regime was “softened” when 100% of plan execution was no longer demanded, mentioned in the December 6 Decree villages Liutenky and Havrylivka were removed from the black list after 88 and 70% of plan completion respectively. http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1933.php
Measures were undertaken to persecute those withholding or bargaining grain. This was done frequently by requisition detachments, which raided farms to collect grain, and was done regardless of whether the peasants retained enough grain to feed themselves, or whether they had enough seed left to plant the next harvest.
continued to export grain rather than retain its crop to feed the people, even though on a significantly lower level than in previous years. In 1930–31 there had been 5,832,000 tons of grains exported In 1931–32, grain exports declined to 4,786,000 tons. In 1932–33, grain exports were just 1,607,000 tons and in 1933–34, this further declined to 1,441,000 tons. Officially published data slightly differ
Cereals : 1930 - 4,846,024;
1931 - 5,182,835; 1932 - 1,819,114 (first half of 1932 - approx 750 000, from late April grain also imported - approx. 157,000 tonnes ); 1933 - 1,771,364 tonnes (first half of 1933 - 220 000, late March grain also imported).
From that wheat: 1930 - 2,530,953; 1931 - 2,498,958 ; 1932 - 550,917; 1933 - 748,248 tons. Via Ukrainian commercial ports in 1932 were exported (thousand tons): 988.3 -grains, 16,5 other types of cereals; in 1933 - 809.6,-grains 2.6 -cereals; 3.5 meat, 0.4- butter, 2.5 - fish.
Via Ukrainian commercial ports in 1932 were imported (thousand tons): 1932 - no more than 67.2 of grains and cereals 1933 - 8.6 of grains.
Received from other Soviet ports - 1932 (thousand tons): 164 - grains, 7.3 - other types of cereals, fish -31.5 and no more than 177 thousand tons of meat and butter 1933- 230 - grains, 15.3 other types of cereals 0.1 - meat, 0.9- butter, fish - 34.3.
Ukrainian Holocaust - http://www.UkrainainHolocaust.org Famine in Ukraine 1932–1933 at the Central State Archive of Ukraine (photos, links)
Dekulakization
Dekulakization was the Soviet campaign of political repressions, including arrests, deportations, and executions of millions of the better-off peasants and their families in 1929-1932. The richer peasants were labeled kulaks and considered class enemies...
that was pursued between 1928 and 1933 with the purpose to consolidate individual land and labour into collective farms called kolkhoz
Kolkhoz
A kolkhoz , plural kolkhozy, was a form of collective farming in the Soviet Union that existed along with state farms . The word is a contraction of коллекти́вное хозя́йство, or "collective farm", while sovkhoz is a contraction of советское хозяйство...
and to eliminate enemies of the working class. The idea of collective farms was seen by peasants as a revival of serfdom
Serfdom
Serfdom is the status of peasants under feudalism, specifically relating to Manorialism. It was a condition of bondage or modified slavery which developed primarily during the High Middle Ages in Europe and lasted to the mid-19th century...
.
In Soviet Ukraine this policy had a dramatic effect on the Ukrainian ethnic population and its culture as 86% of the population lived in rural settings. The forceful introduction of the policy of collectivization was one of the main causes of the Holodomor
Holodomor
The Holodomor was a man-made famine in the Ukrainian SSR between 1932 and 1933. During the famine, which is also known as the "terror-famine in Ukraine" and "famine-genocide in Ukraine", millions of Ukrainians died of starvation in a peacetime catastrophe unprecedented in the history of...
. In Ukraine collectivization had specific goals and outcomes. According to a Soviet official explaining the goals: A ruthless struggle is going on between the peasantry and our regime. It's a struggle to the death. This year was a test of our strength and their endurance. It took a famine to show them who is master here. It has cost millions of lives, but the collective farm system is here to stay. We have won the war.
The Soviet policies related to collectivisation have to be understood in the larger context of the social "revolution from above
Revolution from above
A revolution from above refers to major political and social changes that are imposed by an elite on the population it dominates. By contrast, the plain term revolution suggests that pressure from below is a major driving force in events, even if other social groups cooperate with — or ultimately...
" that took place in the Soviet Union
Soviet Union
The Soviet Union , officially the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics , was a constitutionally socialist state that existed in Eurasia between 1922 and 1991....
at the time.
The formation of Collective farms were based on the large village farms in collective ownership of village inhabitants. Estimated yields were expected to increase by 150%. The ultimate goal of collectivization was to resolve "grain problems" of late 1920-s.
In the early 1920s only 3% of the peasantry of the USSR were collectivised. Within the first five year plan 20% of peasant households were to be collectivised, although in Ukraine the number was set at 30%.
Policy of collectivization
Sovkhoz
A sovkhoz , typically translated as state farm, is a state-owned farm. The term originated in the Soviet Union, hence the name. The term is still in use in some post-Soviet states, e.g., Russia and Belarus. It is usually contrasted with kolkhoz, which is a collective-owned farm...
es. In late 1927, after the XV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the only legal, ruling political party in the Soviet Union and one of the largest communist organizations in the world...
, then known as the All-Union Communist party (bolsheviks) or VKP(b), a significant impetus was given to the collectivization effort.
In 1927, a drought
Drought
A drought is an extended period of months or years when a region notes a deficiency in its water supply. Generally, this occurs when a region receives consistently below average precipitation. It can have a substantial impact on the ecosystem and agriculture of the affected region...
shortened the harvest
Harvest
Harvest is the process of gathering mature crops from the fields. Reaping is the cutting of grain or pulse for harvest, typically using a scythe, sickle, or reaper...
in southern areas of the Ukrainian SSR and North Caucasus
North Caucasus
The North Caucasus is the northern part of the Caucasus region between the Black and Caspian Seas and within European Russia. The term is also used as a synonym for the North Caucasus economic region of Russia....
. In 1927–28 the winter tillage area was badly affected due to low snow levels. Despite seed aid from the State, many affected areas were not re-sown. The 1928 harvest was affected by drought in most of the grain producing areas of the Ukrainian SSR. Shortages in the harvest and difficulties with the supply system invoked difficulties with the food supply in urban areas and destabilized the food supply situation in the USSR in general. In order to alleviate the situation, a system of food rationing
Rationing
Rationing is the controlled distribution of scarce resources, goods, or services. Rationing controls the size of the ration, one's allotted portion of the resources being distributed on a particular day or at a particular time.- In economics :...
was implemented in the second quarter of 1928 initially in Odessa
Odessa
Odessa or Odesa is the administrative center of the Odessa Oblast located in southern Ukraine. The city is a major seaport located on the northwest shore of the Black Sea and the fourth largest city in Ukraine with a population of 1,029,000 .The predecessor of Odessa, a small Tatar settlement,...
, and later spread to Mariupol
Mariupol
Mariupol , formerly known as Zhdanov , is a port city in southeastern Ukraine. It is located on the coast of the Azov Sea, at the mouth of the Kalmius River. Mariupol is the largest city in Priazovye - a geographical region around Azov Sea, divided by Russia and Ukraine - and is also a popular sea...
, Kherson
Kherson
Kherson is a city in southern Ukraine. It is the administrative center of the Kherson Oblast , and is designated as its own separate raion within the oblast. Kherson is an important port on the Black Sea and Dnieper River, and the home of a major ship-building industry...
, Kiev
Kiev
Kiev or Kyiv is the capital and the largest city of Ukraine, located in the north central part of the country on the Dnieper River. The population as of the 2001 census was 2,611,300. However, higher numbers have been cited in the press....
, Dniprelstan (Dnipropetrovsk
Dnipropetrovsk
Dnipropetrovsk or Dnepropetrovsk formerly Yekaterinoslav is Ukraine's third largest city with one million inhabitants. It is located southeast of Ukraine's capital Kiev on the Dnieper River, in the south-central region of the country...
), and Kharkiv
Kharkiv
Kharkiv or Kharkov is the second-largest city in Ukraine.The city was founded in 1654 and was a major centre of Ukrainian culture in the Russian Empire. Kharkiv became the first city in Ukraine where the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed in December 1917 and Soviet government was...
. At the beginning of 1929 a similar system was implemented throughout the USSR. Despite the aid from the Soviet Ukrainian and the Central governments, many southern rural areas registered occurrences of malnutrition and in some cases hunger and starvation (the affected areas and thus the amount of required food aid was under-accounted by authorities). Due to the shortage of forage livestock
Livestock
Livestock refers to one or more domesticated animals raised in an agricultural setting to produce commodities such as food, fiber and labor. The term "livestock" as used in this article does not include poultry or farmed fish; however the inclusion of these, especially poultry, within the meaning...
, its numbers were also affected (see table below).
Most of Kolkhoz
Kolkhoz
A kolkhoz , plural kolkhozy, was a form of collective farming in the Soviet Union that existed along with state farms . The word is a contraction of коллекти́вное хозя́йство, or "collective farm", while sovkhoz is a contraction of советское хозяйство...
es and recently refurnished sovkhoz
Sovkhoz
A sovkhoz , typically translated as state farm, is a state-owned farm. The term originated in the Soviet Union, hence the name. The term is still in use in some post-Soviet states, e.g., Russia and Belarus. It is usually contrasted with kolkhoz, which is a collective-owned farm...
es went through these years with few losses, and some were even able to provide assistance to peasants in the more affected areas (seed and grain for food).
Early stages
Despite an intense state campaign, collectivization, which was initially voluntary, was not popular amongst peasants: as of early 1929, only 5.6% of Ukrainian peasant households and 3.8% of arable landArable land
In geography and agriculture, arable land is land that can be used for growing crops. It includes all land under temporary crops , temporary meadows for mowing or pasture, land under market and kitchen gardens and land temporarily fallow...
was “collectivized”. In the early of 1929, the methods employed by the specially empowered authority “UkrKolhozcenter” changed from a voluntary enrollment to an administrative one. By October 1, 1929, a plan for the creation of kolkhozes was “outperformed” by 239%. As a result, 8.8% of arable land was “collectivized”.http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1929.php
"Fast track collectivization"
The next major step toward "all-over collectivization" took place after an article was published by Stalin in PravdaPravda
Pravda was a leading newspaper of the Soviet Union and an official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party between 1912 and 1991....
, in early November 1929.
While “summoned “ by November 10–November 17, 1929 meeting of VKP(b) Central Committee “Twenty-Five Thousanders" only trained at special short courses, the main driving force of collectivization and dekulakization
Dekulakization
Dekulakization was the Soviet campaign of political repressions, including arrests, deportations, and executions of millions of the better-off peasants and their families in 1929-1932. The richer peasants were labeled kulaks and considered class enemies...
in Ukraine became a "poor peasants committee" (“komnezamy”) and local village councils (silrady) where komnezams members had a voting majority.
The USSR Kolhozcenter issued the December 10, 1929, decree on collectivisation of livestock within a 3-month period (draft animals 100%, cattle 100%, pigs 80%, sheep and goats 60%). This drove many peasants to slaughter their livestock. By January 1, 1930, the percentage of collectivized households almost doubled, to 16.4% of the total number of households.
| Year | Total Horses |
Horses |
and Goats |
|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1932 | ||||||||
Despite the infamous January 5, 1930 decree
Decree
A decree is a rule of law issued by a head of state , according to certain procedures . It has the force of law...
, in which the deadline for the complete collectivization of the Ukrainian SSR was set for the period from the end of 1931 to the spring of 1932, the Ukrainian SSR authorities decided to accelerate the completion of the campaign by autumn of 1930. The high expectations of the plan were outperformed by local authorities even without the assistance of the 7500 “Twenty-Five Thousanders who had reached some areas only by mid-February http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1930.php – by March 70.9% of arable land and 62.8% of peasant households were suddenly collectivized. The “Dekulakization
Dekulakization
Dekulakization was the Soviet campaign of political repressions, including arrests, deportations, and executions of millions of the better-off peasants and their families in 1929-1932. The richer peasants were labeled kulaks and considered class enemies...
” plan was also “over-performed”. Almost 200,000 households (3.8% of total peasant households) were affected by the requisition of property, land, and houses. Some of the peasants were arrested and deported “to the north”. Many arrested 'kulak
Kulak
Kulaks were a category of relatively affluent peasants in the later Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, and early Soviet Union...
s' and "well-to-do" farmers resettled their families to the Urals and Central Asia
Central Asia
Central Asia is a core region of the Asian continent from the Caspian Sea in the west, China in the east, Afghanistan in the south, and Russia in the north...
, where they were often exploited in others sectors of the economy, such as timber cutting. The term 'kulak' was ultimately applied to anybody resisting collectivization as many of the so-called 'kulaks' were no more well-off than other peasants.
"Dizzy with success"
The fast-track to collectivization incited numerous peasant revolts in Ukraine and in other parts of the USSR. In response to the situation, the Soviet regime stepped back: the March 2, 1930, issue of "Pravda" published the Stalin's article "Dizzy with success". Soon, numerous orders and decrees were issued banning the use of force and administrative methods. Some of “mistakenly dekulakized” received their property back, and even some mistakenly deported returned home but in insignificant amounts – most remained where they had been deported. The collectivization process was rolled back: by 1 May 1933 38.2% of Ukrainian SSR peasant households and 41.1% of arable land had been collectivized. By the end of August these numbers declined to 29.2% and 35.6% respectively.Second forced "voluntary" collectivization
A second forced "voluntary" collectivization campaign was initiated in the winter–summer of 1931 with significant assistance of the so-called "tug-brigades" composed from kolkhoz udarnikUdarnik
Udarnik is a Russian, Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian term for a superproductive worker in the Soviet Union and ex-Yugoslavia. The term is derived from the expression "udarny trud" for "superproductive, enthusiastic labour", which is often translated as strike labour , and udarnik as strike worker,...
s. Many "kulaks" along with families were deported from the Ukrainian SSR.
According to declassified data, around 300,000 peasants in Ukrainian SSR out of a population of about 30 million were subject to these policies in 1930–31. Ukrainians composed 15% of the total 1.8 million 'kulaks' relocated Soviet-wide. On July 20, 1931 – as a response to the numerous regional requests for additional numbers of kulak deportations Politburo of VKP (b) concluded that the “strategic task of the Party was almost accomplished. All further deportations were recommended to be administered only to individuals.”
This second forced "voluntary" collectivization campaign also invoked a delay in sowing. As a result, cereal crops were heavily affected by the 1931 drought. During winter and spring of 1930–31, the Ukrainian agricultural authority "Narkomzem" Ukrainian SRR issued several reports about the significant decline of livestock and especially drought power caused by poor treatment, absence of forage
Forage
Forage is plant material eaten by grazing livestock.Historically the term forage has meant only plants eaten by the animals directly as pasture, crop residue, or immature cereal crops, but it is also used more loosely to include similar plants cut for fodder and carried to the animals, especially...
, stables/farms and due the "kulak
Kulak
Kulaks were a category of relatively affluent peasants in the later Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, and early Soviet Union...
s sabotage".
According to the First Five-Year Plan
First Five-Year Plan
The First Five-Year Plan, or 1st Five-Year Plan, of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a list of economic goals that was designed to strengthen the country's economy between 1928 and 1932, making the nation both militarily and industrially self-sufficient. "We are fifty or a hundred...
, Ukrainian agriculture was to switch from an exclusive orientation of grain to a more diverse output. This included not only a rise in Sugar beet
Sugar beet
Sugar beet, a cultivated plant of Beta vulgaris, is a plant whose tuber contains a high concentration of sucrose. It is grown commercially for sugar production. Sugar beets and other B...
crops, but also other types of agricultural production were expected to be utilised by industry (with even cotton plants being established in 1931). This plan anticipated a decrease in the area of grain cultivated, in contrast to an increase of yield and area for other crops. By July 1, 1931, 65.7% of Ukrainian SSR peasant households and 67.2% of arable land were reported as "collectivized". The main grain and sugar beet production areas, however, were collectivized to a greater extent — 80-90%.
Clarified “All-over collectivization”
The Decree of Central Committee of VKP(b) from August 2, 1931 clarified the “all-over collectivization” term - in order to be considered complete the “all-over collectivization” does not have to reach “100%”, but not less than 68–70% of peasants households and not less than 75-80% of arable lands. According to the same decree “all-over collectivization” accomplished at Northern Caucasus (Kuban) - 88% of households and 92% of arable lands “collectivized”, Ukraine (South) – 85 and 94 percents respectively, Ukraine (Right Bank) – 69 and 80 percents respectively, and Moldavian ASRR (part of Ukrainian SRR) – 68 and 75 percent.As of the beginning of October 1931, the collectivization of 68.0% of peasant households, and 72.0% of arable land was complete.
1931 Plan
The plan for the state grain collection in the Ukrainian SSR adopted for 1931 was over-optimistic — 510 million poodPood
Pood , is a unit of mass equal to 40 funt . It is approximately 16.38 kilograms . It was used in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Pood was first mentioned in a number of documents of the 12th century....
s (8.4 Tg
Teragram
Teragram may refer to:* 1012 grams, equivalent to a megatonne. See Orders of magnitude * Teragram Corporation...
). Drought, administrative distribution of the plan for kolkhozes, together with the lack of relevant management generally destabilized the situation. Significant amounts of grain remained unharvested. A significant percentage was lost during processing and transportation, or spoiled at elevators (wet grain). The total Winter sowing area shrunk by approximately 2 million hectares. Livestock in kolkhozes remained without forage, which was collected under grain procurement. A similar occurrence happened with respect to seeds and wages awarded in kind for kolhoz members. Nevertheless, grain collection continued till May 1932 but reached only 90% of expected plan figures. By the end of December 1931, the collection plan was accomplished by 79%. Many kolkhozes from December 1931 onwards suffered from lack of food, resulting in an increased number of deaths caused by malnutrition registered by OGPU in some areas (Moldavian SSR as a whole and several central rayons of Vinnytsia
Vinnytsia
Vinnytsia is a city located on the banks of the Southern Bug, in central Ukraine. It is the administrative center of Vinnytsia Oblast.-Names:...
, Kiev and North-East rayons of Odessa
Odessa
Odessa or Odesa is the administrative center of the Odessa Oblast located in southern Ukraine. The city is a major seaport located on the northwest shore of the Black Sea and the fourth largest city in Ukraine with a population of 1,029,000 .The predecessor of Odessa, a small Tatar settlement,...
oblasts http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1932.php) in winter-spring and the early summer months of 1932. By 1932 the sowing campaign of the Ukrainian SSR was obtained with minimal power as most of the remaining horses were incapable of working, while the number of available agricultural tractors was too small to fill the gap.
Kosior
Kosior may refer to one of three brothers, Polish-born Soviet politicians :*Stanislav Kosior *Vladislav Kosior *Iosif Kosior...
such provisions were lifted by Stalin at the end of May 1932. The July GPU reports for the first half of 1932, mentioned the “difficulties with food” in 127 rayons (out of 484), acknowledged the fact the they did not have information for all regions. The Decree of Sovnarkom on “Kolkhoz Trade” issued in May, fostered rumors amongst peasants that collectivization was once again rolled-back as it had been in the spring 1930. As a result the number of peasants who abandoned the kolkhozes significantly increased.
1932 situation
The Government of the Ukrainian SSR tried to remedy the situation from March with recourse to internal resources, but had little success - withdrawal of food from other Ukrainian regions depleted their own limited supplies. Starting in February 1932, administrative and territorial reform (oblast creation) also added mismanagement cast, - even Moscow had more details about the seed situation than the Ukrainian authorities. In May, in a desperate effort to change the situation, the central Soviet Government provided 7.1 million poodPood
Pood , is a unit of mass equal to 40 funt . It is approximately 16.38 kilograms . It was used in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Pood was first mentioned in a number of documents of the 12th century....
s of grain for food for Ukraine and reverted no less than 700 agricultural tractors intended for other regions of USSR. By July, the total amount of aid provided from Central Soviet Authorities for food, sowing and forage for “agricultural sector” was numbered more than 17 million poods.
Taking into account the situation in Ukraine, the central grain collection plan was lowered by 18.1%, in comparison to the 1931 plan. Kolkhozes were expected to harvest 4,751.2 thousand tons, with the peasants responsible for 1,080.1 thousand tons. Sovkhozes were to submit 475,034 tons. In addition Ukrainian kolkhozes and sovkhozes were to return 132,750 tons of grain which had been provided in spring 1932 as aid. The grain collection plan for July 1932 was adopted to collect 19.5 million pood
Pood
Pood , is a unit of mass equal to 40 funt . It is approximately 16.38 kilograms . It was used in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Pood was first mentioned in a number of documents of the 12th century....
s.
The actual state of collection was disastrous however, and by 31 July only 3 million poods (compared to 21 million in 1931) were collected. As of July 20 the harvested area was half of that in 1931. The sovhozes had only sowed 16% of the defined area.
This disparity between agricultural goals, and actual production grew later in the year. An expected 190 thousand tons of grain were to be exported, but by August 27, 1932, only 20 thousand tons were ready. The Ukrainian SSR met with difficulty in supplying the planned amount of food and as a result a rationing system was implemented to supply urban areas with food. This system became the major source of food delivery to cities while the alternatives, cooperative trade and black market trading, became too expensive, and under-supplied, to provide long-range assistance. By October 25, the plan for grain collection was lowered once again, from the quantity called for in the plan of August 22, 1932. Nevertheless, collection reached only 39% of the annually planned total. A second lowering of goals deducted 70 million poods but still demanded plan completion, and 100% efficiency. Attempts to reach the new goals of production proved futile in late 1932. On November 29, in order to complete the plan, Ukraine was to collect 94 million poods, 4.8 of them from sovkhozes. As of January 2, targets were again lowered, to 62.5 million poods. Later that month, on January 14,the targets were lowered even further– by 29.4 million poods, to 33.1 million. Vinnytsya, Kiev oblasts and Moldavian SRR had accomplished the lowered 1932 plan for grain procurement, but not for sowing reserves. The total remains for Ukraine was 22.1 million poods. At same time, GPU of Ukraine reported hunger and starvation in the Kiev
Kiev Oblast
Kyiv Oblast, sometimes written as Kiev Oblast is an oblast in central Ukraine.The administrative center of the oblast is the city of Kyiv , also being the capital of Ukraine...
and Vinnytsia
Vinnytsia Oblast
Vinnytsia Oblast is an oblast of Ukraine. Its administrative center is Vinnytsia.-Geography:The area of the region is 26,500 km²; its population is 1.7 million....
oblasts, and began implementing measures to remedy the situation. By January 29 Kharkiv Oblast
Kharkiv Oblast
Kharkiv Oblast is an oblast in eastern Ukraine. The oblast borders Russia to the north, Luhansk Oblast to the east, Donetsk Oblast to the south-east, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to the south-west, Poltava Oblast to the west and Sumy Oblast to the north-west...
had also fulfilled the grain collection plan, and reached its production target. Despite these apparent successes in production, the total amount of grain collected by February 5 was only 255 million poods (compared to 440 million poods in 1931) while the numbers of “hunger and malnutrition cases” as registered by the GPU of Ukrainian SSR, increased every day, particularly in rural areas and small towns.
http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1932.php
By early 1932, 69% of households were collectivized. Even though several other regions in the USSR were collectivized to a greater extent, the effect of the collectivization on the Ukrainian agriculture was very substantial.
| Oblast Oblast Oblast is a type of administrative division in Slavic countries, including some countries of the former Soviet Union. The word "oblast" is a loanword in English, but it is nevertheless often translated as "area", "zone", "province", or "region"... (in late 1932 administrative borders) |
Number of kolhozes |
% of peasantry households collectivization |
|---|---|---|
| Kiev Oblast | 4,053 | 67.3 |
| Chernihiv Oblast | 2,332 | 47.3 |
| Vinnytsia Oblast | 3,347 | 58.9 |
| Kharkiv Oblast | 4,347 | 72.0 |
| Dnipropetrovsk Oblast | 3,399 | 85.1 |
| Odessa Oblast | 3,594 | 84.4 |
| Donetsk Oblast | 1,578 | 84.4 |
| Moldavian ASSR | 620 | 68.3 |
| Ukrainian SSR | 23,270 | 69.0 (77.1% of arable land) |
Whilst the long-lasting effect of overall collectivization had an adverse effect on agricultural output everywhere, Ukraine had long been the most agriculturally productive area, providing over 50% of exported grain and 25% of total production of grain in the Russian Empire
Russian Empire
The Russian Empire was a state that existed from 1721 until the Russian Revolution of 1917. It was the successor to the Tsardom of Russia and the predecessor of the Soviet Union...
in 1913. Over 228,936 square kilometres (56.571 million acres), 207,203 km² (51.201 million acres) were used for grain production, or 90.5% of total arable land. This degree of dependency on agriculture meant that the effects of a bad harvest could be almost unlimited. This had been long recognised, and while projections for agricultural production were adjusted, the shock of limited production could not be easily managed. While collections by the state were in turn, limited, there were already clear stresses. The 1932 total Soviet harvest, was to be 29.5 million tons in state collections of grain out of 90.7 million tons in production. But the actual result was a disastrous 55-60 million tons in production. The state ended up collecting only 18.5 million tons in grain. The total Soviet collections by the state were virtually the same in 1930 and 1931 at about 22.8 million tons. For 1932, they had significantly been reduced to 18.5 million tons; with even lower figure in Ukraine. These were the total estimated outcomes of the grain harvests:
| Year | Production | Collections | Remainder | Collections as % of production |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1930 | 73-77 | 22.1 | 51-55 | 30.2-28.7 |
| 1931 | 57-65 | 22.8 | 34-43 | 40-35.1 |
| 1932 | 55-60 | 18.5 | 36.5-41.5 | 33.6-30.8 |
| 1933 | 70-77 | 22.7 | 47.3-54.3 | 32.4-29.5 |
| Year | Production | Collections |
|---|---|---|
| 1927 | 18.67 | 0.83 centralized collection only |
| 1928 | 13.88 | 1.44 |
| 1929 | 18.7 | 4.56 |
| 1930 | 22.72 | 6.92 |
| 1931 | 18.34 | 7.39 |
| 1932 | 14.65 | 4.28 |
| 1933 | 22.29 (including sorgo) |
5.98 |
Procurement practice
In 1928, a "by contract" policy of procurement (contracts for the delivery of agricultural products) was implemented for kolkhozes and ordinary peasants alike ("kulaks" had a "firm" plan for procurement) . Accordingly, from 1928 through January 1933, "grain production areas" were required to submit 1/3–1/4 of their estimated yield, while areas designated as "grain" were required to submit no more than 1/8 of their estimated yield. However, between the Autumn of 1930 and the Spring of 1932, local authorities tended to collect products from kolkhozes in amounts greater than the minimum required in order to exceed the contracted target (in some cases by more than 200%). Especially harmful methods utilized in the "by contract" policy were "counterplan" actions, which were additional collection plans implemented in already fulfilled contracts. Such "counterplan" measures were strictly forbidden after the Spring of 1933 as "extremely harmful for kolkhoz development."In 1932 a "1/4 of yield" procurement quota for "grain production areas" of the Ukrainian SSR were planned for implementation. On September 23, 1932, a telegram signed by Molotov and Stalin noted that the harvest of 1932 was "satisfactory", according to estimates provided by the agricultural planning authorities, and therefore requests for seed for winter crops were refused while total winter-tillage area demands were increased. Later, Stalin blamed the statistical and planning authorities for inaccurately estimating potential yields and thus a "Commissions for yield estimation" was created on December 17, 1932 by his order. Some modern historians also agree that the 1932 harvest figures provided at the time were largely overestimated and the actual difference between estimated and actual harvest was significant. Such unrealistic figures resulted in demand that was impossibly to fulfill and resulted in lesser reduction of grain procurement plan and greater grain procurement then were possible in late 1932 through the February 5, 1933
Legislation provisions
Enemy of the people
The term enemy of the people is a fluid designation of political or class opponents of the group using the term. The term implies that the "enemies" in question are acting against society as a whole. It is similar to the notion of "enemy of the state". The term originated in Roman times as ,...
." Within five months after passage of the law, 54,645 individuals were sentenced under its provisions, of which, 2,110 were sentenced to death. The initial wording of the Decree "On fought with speculation” adopted August 22, 1932 lead to common situations where acts by minor such as bartering tobacco for bread were documented as punished by 5 years imprisonment .; After 1934,by NKVD demand, the penalty for minor offenses was limited to a fine of 500 ruble
Ruble
The ruble or rouble is a unit of currency. Currently, the currency units of Belarus, Russia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, and, in the past, the currency units of several other countries, notably countries influenced by Russia and the Soviet Union, are named rubles, though they all are...
s or 3 month of correctional labor. http://www.law.edu.ru/article/article.asp?articleID=1131644
The existed practice of administrative punishment known as “black board” (black list) by the November, 18 Decree of Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine was applied to a greater extent and with more harsh methods to selected villages and kolkhozes that were considered to be "underperforming" in the grain collection procurement: “Immediate cessation of delivery of goods, complete suspension of cooperative and state trade in the villages, and removal of all available goods from cooperative and state stores”. Full prohibition of collective farm trade for both collective farms and collective farmers, and for private farmers. Cessation of any sort of credit and demand for early repayment of credit and other financial obligations.” Initially such sanctions were applied to only six villages, but later they were applied to numerous rural settlements and districts. For peasants, who were not kolkhoz members and who were "underperforming" in the grain collection procurement, special “measures” were adopted. To “reach the grain procurement quota” amongst peasants 1,100 brigades were organized which consisted of activists (often from neighboring villages) which had accomplished their grain procurement quota or were close to accomplishing it. Since most of goods supplied to the rural areas was commercial (fabrics, matches, fuels) and was sometimes obtained by villagers from neighbored cities or railway stations, sanctioned villages remained for a long period – as an example mentioned in the December 6 Decree the village of Kamyani Potoky was removed from blacklist only October 17, 1933 when they completed their plan for grain collection early. Since January 1933 the black list regime was “softened” when 100% of plan execution was no longer demanded, mentioned in the December 6 Decree villages Liutenky and Havrylivka were removed from the black list after 88 and 70% of plan completion respectively. http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1933.php
Measures were undertaken to persecute those withholding or bargaining grain. This was done frequently by requisition detachments, which raided farms to collect grain, and was done regardless of whether the peasants retained enough grain to feed themselves, or whether they had enough seed left to plant the next harvest.
Export of grain
After recognition of the famine situation in Ukraine during the drought and poor harvests, the Soviet government in MoscowMoscow
Moscow is the capital, the most populous city, and the most populous federal subject of Russia. The city is a major political, economic, cultural, scientific, religious, financial, educational, and transportation centre of Russia and the continent...
continued to export grain rather than retain its crop to feed the people, even though on a significantly lower level than in previous years. In 1930–31 there had been 5,832,000 tons of grains exported In 1931–32, grain exports declined to 4,786,000 tons. In 1932–33, grain exports were just 1,607,000 tons and in 1933–34, this further declined to 1,441,000 tons. Officially published data slightly differ
Cereals : 1930 - 4,846,024;
1931 - 5,182,835; 1932 - 1,819,114 (first half of 1932 - approx 750 000, from late April grain also imported - approx. 157,000 tonnes ); 1933 - 1,771,364 tonnes (first half of 1933 - 220 000, late March grain also imported).
From that wheat: 1930 - 2,530,953; 1931 - 2,498,958 ; 1932 - 550,917; 1933 - 748,248 tons. Via Ukrainian commercial ports in 1932 were exported (thousand tons): 988.3 -grains, 16,5 other types of cereals; in 1933 - 809.6,-grains 2.6 -cereals; 3.5 meat, 0.4- butter, 2.5 - fish.
Via Ukrainian commercial ports in 1932 were imported (thousand tons): 1932 - no more than 67.2 of grains and cereals 1933 - 8.6 of grains.
Received from other Soviet ports - 1932 (thousand tons): 164 - grains, 7.3 - other types of cereals, fish -31.5 and no more than 177 thousand tons of meat and butter 1933- 230 - grains, 15.3 other types of cereals 0.1 - meat, 0.9- butter, fish - 34.3.
Collectivization in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was part of the policy of Collectivization in the USSR and dekulakization
Dekulakization
Dekulakization was the Soviet campaign of political repressions, including arrests, deportations, and executions of millions of the better-off peasants and their families in 1929-1932. The richer peasants were labeled kulaks and considered class enemies...
that was pursued between 1928 and 1933 with the purpose to consolidate individual land and labour into collective farms called kolkhoz
Kolkhoz
A kolkhoz , plural kolkhozy, was a form of collective farming in the Soviet Union that existed along with state farms . The word is a contraction of коллекти́вное хозя́йство, or "collective farm", while sovkhoz is a contraction of советское хозяйство...
and to eliminate enemies of the working class. The idea of collective farms was seen by peasants as a revival of serfdom
Serfdom
Serfdom is the status of peasants under feudalism, specifically relating to Manorialism. It was a condition of bondage or modified slavery which developed primarily during the High Middle Ages in Europe and lasted to the mid-19th century...
.
In Soviet Ukraine this policy had a dramatic effect on the Ukrainian ethnic population and its culture as 86% of the population lived in rural settings. The forceful introduction of the policy of collectivization was one of the main causes of the Holodomor
Holodomor
The Holodomor was a man-made famine in the Ukrainian SSR between 1932 and 1933. During the famine, which is also known as the "terror-famine in Ukraine" and "famine-genocide in Ukraine", millions of Ukrainians died of starvation in a peacetime catastrophe unprecedented in the history of...
. In Ukraine collectivization had specific goals and outcomes. According to a Soviet official explaining the goals: A ruthless struggle is going on between the peasantry and our regime. It's a struggle to the death. This year was a test of our strength and their endurance. It took a famine to show them who is master here. It has cost millions of lives, but the collective farm system is here to stay. We have won the war.
The Soviet policies related to collectivisation have to be understood in the larger context of the social "revolution from above
Revolution from above
A revolution from above refers to major political and social changes that are imposed by an elite on the population it dominates. By contrast, the plain term revolution suggests that pressure from below is a major driving force in events, even if other social groups cooperate with — or ultimately...
" that took place in the Soviet Union
Soviet Union
The Soviet Union , officially the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics , was a constitutionally socialist state that existed in Eurasia between 1922 and 1991....
at the time.
The formation of Collective farms were based on the large village farms in collective ownership of village inhabitants. Estimated yields were expected to increase by 150%. The ultimate goal of collectivization was to resolve "grain problems" of late 1920-s.
In the early 1920s only 3% of the peasantry of the USSR were collectivised. Within the first five year plan 20% of peasant households were to be collectivised, although in Ukraine the number was set at 30%.
Policy of collectivization
Sovkhoz
A sovkhoz , typically translated as state farm, is a state-owned farm. The term originated in the Soviet Union, hence the name. The term is still in use in some post-Soviet states, e.g., Russia and Belarus. It is usually contrasted with kolkhoz, which is a collective-owned farm...
es. In late 1927, after the XV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the only legal, ruling political party in the Soviet Union and one of the largest communist organizations in the world...
, then known as the All-Union Communist party (bolsheviks) or VKP(b), a significant impetus was given to the collectivization effort.
In 1927, a drought
Drought
A drought is an extended period of months or years when a region notes a deficiency in its water supply. Generally, this occurs when a region receives consistently below average precipitation. It can have a substantial impact on the ecosystem and agriculture of the affected region...
shortened the harvest
Harvest
Harvest is the process of gathering mature crops from the fields. Reaping is the cutting of grain or pulse for harvest, typically using a scythe, sickle, or reaper...
in southern areas of the Ukrainian SSR and North Caucasus
North Caucasus
The North Caucasus is the northern part of the Caucasus region between the Black and Caspian Seas and within European Russia. The term is also used as a synonym for the North Caucasus economic region of Russia....
. In 1927–28 the winter tillage area was badly affected due to low snow levels. Despite seed aid from the State, many affected areas were not re-sown. The 1928 harvest was affected by drought in most of the grain producing areas of the Ukrainian SSR. Shortages in the harvest and difficulties with the supply system invoked difficulties with the food supply in urban areas and destabilized the food supply situation in the USSR in general. In order to alleviate the situation, a system of food rationing
Rationing
Rationing is the controlled distribution of scarce resources, goods, or services. Rationing controls the size of the ration, one's allotted portion of the resources being distributed on a particular day or at a particular time.- In economics :...
was implemented in the second quarter of 1928 initially in Odessa
Odessa
Odessa or Odesa is the administrative center of the Odessa Oblast located in southern Ukraine. The city is a major seaport located on the northwest shore of the Black Sea and the fourth largest city in Ukraine with a population of 1,029,000 .The predecessor of Odessa, a small Tatar settlement,...
, and later spread to Mariupol
Mariupol
Mariupol , formerly known as Zhdanov , is a port city in southeastern Ukraine. It is located on the coast of the Azov Sea, at the mouth of the Kalmius River. Mariupol is the largest city in Priazovye - a geographical region around Azov Sea, divided by Russia and Ukraine - and is also a popular sea...
, Kherson
Kherson
Kherson is a city in southern Ukraine. It is the administrative center of the Kherson Oblast , and is designated as its own separate raion within the oblast. Kherson is an important port on the Black Sea and Dnieper River, and the home of a major ship-building industry...
, Kiev
Kiev
Kiev or Kyiv is the capital and the largest city of Ukraine, located in the north central part of the country on the Dnieper River. The population as of the 2001 census was 2,611,300. However, higher numbers have been cited in the press....
, Dniprelstan (Dnipropetrovsk
Dnipropetrovsk
Dnipropetrovsk or Dnepropetrovsk formerly Yekaterinoslav is Ukraine's third largest city with one million inhabitants. It is located southeast of Ukraine's capital Kiev on the Dnieper River, in the south-central region of the country...
), and Kharkiv
Kharkiv
Kharkiv or Kharkov is the second-largest city in Ukraine.The city was founded in 1654 and was a major centre of Ukrainian culture in the Russian Empire. Kharkiv became the first city in Ukraine where the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed in December 1917 and Soviet government was...
. At the beginning of 1929 a similar system was implemented throughout the USSR. Despite the aid from the Soviet Ukrainian and the Central governments, many southern rural areas registered occurrences of malnutrition and in some cases hunger and starvation (the affected areas and thus the amount of required food aid was under-accounted by authorities). Due to the shortage of forage livestock
Livestock
Livestock refers to one or more domesticated animals raised in an agricultural setting to produce commodities such as food, fiber and labor. The term "livestock" as used in this article does not include poultry or farmed fish; however the inclusion of these, especially poultry, within the meaning...
, its numbers were also affected (see table below).
Most of Kolkhoz
Kolkhoz
A kolkhoz , plural kolkhozy, was a form of collective farming in the Soviet Union that existed along with state farms . The word is a contraction of коллекти́вное хозя́йство, or "collective farm", while sovkhoz is a contraction of советское хозяйство...
es and recently refurnished sovkhoz
Sovkhoz
A sovkhoz , typically translated as state farm, is a state-owned farm. The term originated in the Soviet Union, hence the name. The term is still in use in some post-Soviet states, e.g., Russia and Belarus. It is usually contrasted with kolkhoz, which is a collective-owned farm...
es went through these years with few losses, and some were even able to provide assistance to peasants in the more affected areas (seed and grain for food).
Early stages
Despite an intense state campaign, collectivization, which was initially voluntary, was not popular amongst peasants: as of early 1929, only 5.6% of Ukrainian peasant households and 3.8% of arable landArable land
In geography and agriculture, arable land is land that can be used for growing crops. It includes all land under temporary crops , temporary meadows for mowing or pasture, land under market and kitchen gardens and land temporarily fallow...
was “collectivized”. In the early of 1929, the methods employed by the specially empowered authority “UkrKolhozcenter” changed from a voluntary enrollment to an administrative one. By October 1, 1929, a plan for the creation of kolkhozes was “outperformed” by 239%. As a result, 8.8% of arable land was “collectivized”.http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1929.php
"Fast track collectivization"
The next major step toward "all-over collectivization" took place after an article was published by Stalin in PravdaPravda
Pravda was a leading newspaper of the Soviet Union and an official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party between 1912 and 1991....
, in early November 1929.
While “summoned “ by November 10–November 17, 1929 meeting of VKP(b) Central Committee “Twenty-Five Thousanders" only trained at special short courses, the main driving force of collectivization and dekulakization
Dekulakization
Dekulakization was the Soviet campaign of political repressions, including arrests, deportations, and executions of millions of the better-off peasants and their families in 1929-1932. The richer peasants were labeled kulaks and considered class enemies...
in Ukraine became a "poor peasants committee" (“komnezamy”) and local village councils (silrady) where komnezams members had a voting majority.
The USSR Kolhozcenter issued the December 10, 1929, decree on collectivisation of livestock within a 3-month period (draft animals 100%, cattle 100%, pigs 80%, sheep and goats 60%). This drove many peasants to slaughter their livestock. By January 1, 1930, the percentage of collectivized households almost doubled, to 16.4% of the total number of households.
| Year | Total Horses |
Horses |
and Goats |
|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1932 | ||||||||
Despite the infamous January 5, 1930 decree
Decree
A decree is a rule of law issued by a head of state , according to certain procedures . It has the force of law...
, in which the deadline for the complete collectivization of the Ukrainian SSR was set for the period from the end of 1931 to the spring of 1932, the Ukrainian SSR authorities decided to accelerate the completion of the campaign by autumn of 1930. The high expectations of the plan were outperformed by local authorities even without the assistance of the 7500 “Twenty-Five Thousanders who had reached some areas only by mid-February http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1930.php – by March 70.9% of arable land and 62.8% of peasant households were suddenly collectivized. The “Dekulakization
Dekulakization
Dekulakization was the Soviet campaign of political repressions, including arrests, deportations, and executions of millions of the better-off peasants and their families in 1929-1932. The richer peasants were labeled kulaks and considered class enemies...
” plan was also “over-performed”. Almost 200,000 households (3.8% of total peasant households) were affected by the requisition of property, land, and houses. Some of the peasants were arrested and deported “to the north”. Many arrested 'kulak
Kulak
Kulaks were a category of relatively affluent peasants in the later Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, and early Soviet Union...
s' and "well-to-do" farmers resettled their families to the Urals and Central Asia
Central Asia
Central Asia is a core region of the Asian continent from the Caspian Sea in the west, China in the east, Afghanistan in the south, and Russia in the north...
, where they were often exploited in others sectors of the economy, such as timber cutting. The term 'kulak' was ultimately applied to anybody resisting collectivization as many of the so-called 'kulaks' were no more well-off than other peasants.
"Dizzy with success"
The fast-track to collectivization incited numerous peasant revolts in Ukraine and in other parts of the USSR. In response to the situation, the Soviet regime stepped back: the March 2, 1930, issue of "Pravda" published the Stalin's article "Dizzy with success". Soon, numerous orders and decrees were issued banning the use of force and administrative methods. Some of “mistakenly dekulakized” received their property back, and even some mistakenly deported returned home but in insignificant amounts – most remained where they had been deported. The collectivization process was rolled back: by 1 May 1933 38.2% of Ukrainian SSR peasant households and 41.1% of arable land had been collectivized. By the end of August these numbers declined to 29.2% and 35.6% respectively.Second forced "voluntary" collectivization
A second forced "voluntary" collectivization campaign was initiated in the winter–summer of 1931 with significant assistance of the so-called "tug-brigades" composed from kolkhoz udarnikUdarnik
Udarnik is a Russian, Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian term for a superproductive worker in the Soviet Union and ex-Yugoslavia. The term is derived from the expression "udarny trud" for "superproductive, enthusiastic labour", which is often translated as strike labour , and udarnik as strike worker,...
s. Many "kulaks" along with families were deported from the Ukrainian SSR.
According to declassified data, around 300,000 peasants in Ukrainian SSR out of a population of about 30 million were subject to these policies in 1930–31. Ukrainians composed 15% of the total 1.8 million 'kulaks' relocated Soviet-wide. On July 20, 1931 – as a response to the numerous regional requests for additional numbers of kulak deportations Politburo of VKP (b) concluded that the “strategic task of the Party was almost accomplished. All further deportations were recommended to be administered only to individuals.”
This second forced "voluntary" collectivization campaign also invoked a delay in sowing. As a result, cereal crops were heavily affected by the 1931 drought. During winter and spring of 1930–31, the Ukrainian agricultural authority "Narkomzem" Ukrainian SRR issued several reports about the significant decline of livestock and especially drought power caused by poor treatment, absence of forage
Forage
Forage is plant material eaten by grazing livestock.Historically the term forage has meant only plants eaten by the animals directly as pasture, crop residue, or immature cereal crops, but it is also used more loosely to include similar plants cut for fodder and carried to the animals, especially...
, stables/farms and due the "kulak
Kulak
Kulaks were a category of relatively affluent peasants in the later Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, and early Soviet Union...
s sabotage".
According to the First Five-Year Plan
First Five-Year Plan
The First Five-Year Plan, or 1st Five-Year Plan, of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a list of economic goals that was designed to strengthen the country's economy between 1928 and 1932, making the nation both militarily and industrially self-sufficient. "We are fifty or a hundred...
, Ukrainian agriculture was to switch from an exclusive orientation of grain to a more diverse output. This included not only a rise in Sugar beet
Sugar beet
Sugar beet, a cultivated plant of Beta vulgaris, is a plant whose tuber contains a high concentration of sucrose. It is grown commercially for sugar production. Sugar beets and other B...
crops, but also other types of agricultural production were expected to be utilised by industry (with even cotton plants being established in 1931). This plan anticipated a decrease in the area of grain cultivated, in contrast to an increase of yield and area for other crops. By July 1, 1931, 65.7% of Ukrainian SSR peasant households and 67.2% of arable land were reported as "collectivized". The main grain and sugar beet production areas, however, were collectivized to a greater extent — 80-90%.
Clarified “All-over collectivization”
The Decree of Central Committee of VKP(b) from August 2, 1931 clarified the “all-over collectivization” term - in order to be considered complete the “all-over collectivization” does not have to reach “100%”, but not less than 68–70% of peasants households and not less than 75-80% of arable lands. According to the same decree “all-over collectivization” accomplished at Northern Caucasus (Kuban) - 88% of households and 92% of arable lands “collectivized”, Ukraine (South) – 85 and 94 percents respectively, Ukraine (Right Bank) – 69 and 80 percents respectively, and Moldavian ASRR (part of Ukrainian SRR) – 68 and 75 percent.As of the beginning of October 1931, the collectivization of 68.0% of peasant households, and 72.0% of arable land was complete.
1931 Plan
The plan for the state grain collection in the Ukrainian SSR adopted for 1931 was over-optimistic — 510 million poodPood
Pood , is a unit of mass equal to 40 funt . It is approximately 16.38 kilograms . It was used in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Pood was first mentioned in a number of documents of the 12th century....
s (8.4 Tg
Teragram
Teragram may refer to:* 1012 grams, equivalent to a megatonne. See Orders of magnitude * Teragram Corporation...
). Drought, administrative distribution of the plan for kolkhozes, together with the lack of relevant management generally destabilized the situation. Significant amounts of grain remained unharvested. A significant percentage was lost during processing and transportation, or spoiled at elevators (wet grain). The total Winter sowing area shrunk by approximately 2 million hectares. Livestock in kolkhozes remained without forage, which was collected under grain procurement. A similar occurrence happened with respect to seeds and wages awarded in kind for kolhoz members. Nevertheless, grain collection continued till May 1932 but reached only 90% of expected plan figures. By the end of December 1931, the collection plan was accomplished by 79%. Many kolkhozes from December 1931 onwards suffered from lack of food, resulting in an increased number of deaths caused by malnutrition registered by OGPU in some areas (Moldavian SSR as a whole and several central rayons of Vinnytsia
Vinnytsia
Vinnytsia is a city located on the banks of the Southern Bug, in central Ukraine. It is the administrative center of Vinnytsia Oblast.-Names:...
, Kiev and North-East rayons of Odessa
Odessa
Odessa or Odesa is the administrative center of the Odessa Oblast located in southern Ukraine. The city is a major seaport located on the northwest shore of the Black Sea and the fourth largest city in Ukraine with a population of 1,029,000 .The predecessor of Odessa, a small Tatar settlement,...
oblasts http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1932.php) in winter-spring and the early summer months of 1932. By 1932 the sowing campaign of the Ukrainian SSR was obtained with minimal power as most of the remaining horses were incapable of working, while the number of available agricultural tractors was too small to fill the gap.
Kosior
Kosior may refer to one of three brothers, Polish-born Soviet politicians :*Stanislav Kosior *Vladislav Kosior *Iosif Kosior...
such provisions were lifted by Stalin at the end of May 1932. The July GPU reports for the first half of 1932, mentioned the “difficulties with food” in 127 rayons (out of 484), acknowledged the fact the they did not have information for all regions. The Decree of Sovnarkom on “Kolkhoz Trade” issued in May, fostered rumors amongst peasants that collectivization was once again rolled-back as it had been in the spring 1930. As a result the number of peasants who abandoned the kolkhozes significantly increased.
1932 situation
The Government of the Ukrainian SSR tried to remedy the situation from March with recourse to internal resources, but had little success - withdrawal of food from other Ukrainian regions depleted their own limited supplies. Starting in February 1932, administrative and territorial reform (oblast creation) also added mismanagement cast, - even Moscow had more details about the seed situation than the Ukrainian authorities. In May, in a desperate effort to change the situation, the central Soviet Government provided 7.1 million poodPood
Pood , is a unit of mass equal to 40 funt . It is approximately 16.38 kilograms . It was used in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Pood was first mentioned in a number of documents of the 12th century....
s of grain for food for Ukraine and reverted no less than 700 agricultural tractors intended for other regions of USSR. By July, the total amount of aid provided from Central Soviet Authorities for food, sowing and forage for “agricultural sector” was numbered more than 17 million poods.
Taking into account the situation in Ukraine, the central grain collection plan was lowered by 18.1%, in comparison to the 1931 plan. Kolkhozes were expected to harvest 4,751.2 thousand tons, with the peasants responsible for 1,080.1 thousand tons. Sovkhozes were to submit 475,034 tons. In addition Ukrainian kolkhozes and sovkhozes were to return 132,750 tons of grain which had been provided in spring 1932 as aid. The grain collection plan for July 1932 was adopted to collect 19.5 million pood
Pood
Pood , is a unit of mass equal to 40 funt . It is approximately 16.38 kilograms . It was used in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Pood was first mentioned in a number of documents of the 12th century....
s.
The actual state of collection was disastrous however, and by 31 July only 3 million poods (compared to 21 million in 1931) were collected. As of July 20 the harvested area was half of that in 1931. The sovhozes had only sowed 16% of the defined area.
This disparity between agricultural goals, and actual production grew later in the year. An expected 190 thousand tons of grain were to be exported, but by August 27, 1932, only 20 thousand tons were ready. The Ukrainian SSR met with difficulty in supplying the planned amount of food and as a result a rationing system was implemented to supply urban areas with food. This system became the major source of food delivery to cities while the alternatives, cooperative trade and black market trading, became too expensive, and under-supplied, to provide long-range assistance. By October 25, the plan for grain collection was lowered once again, from the quantity called for in the plan of August 22, 1932. Nevertheless, collection reached only 39% of the annually planned total. A second lowering of goals deducted 70 million poods but still demanded plan completion, and 100% efficiency. Attempts to reach the new goals of production proved futile in late 1932. On November 29, in order to complete the plan, Ukraine was to collect 94 million poods, 4.8 of them from sovkhozes. As of January 2, targets were again lowered, to 62.5 million poods. Later that month, on January 14,the targets were lowered even further– by 29.4 million poods, to 33.1 million. Vinnytsya, Kiev oblasts and Moldavian SRR had accomplished the lowered 1932 plan for grain procurement, but not for sowing reserves. The total remains for Ukraine was 22.1 million poods. At same time, GPU of Ukraine reported hunger and starvation in the Kiev
Kiev Oblast
Kyiv Oblast, sometimes written as Kiev Oblast is an oblast in central Ukraine.The administrative center of the oblast is the city of Kyiv , also being the capital of Ukraine...
and Vinnytsia
Vinnytsia Oblast
Vinnytsia Oblast is an oblast of Ukraine. Its administrative center is Vinnytsia.-Geography:The area of the region is 26,500 km²; its population is 1.7 million....
oblasts, and began implementing measures to remedy the situation. By January 29 Kharkiv Oblast
Kharkiv Oblast
Kharkiv Oblast is an oblast in eastern Ukraine. The oblast borders Russia to the north, Luhansk Oblast to the east, Donetsk Oblast to the south-east, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to the south-west, Poltava Oblast to the west and Sumy Oblast to the north-west...
had also fulfilled the grain collection plan, and reached its production target. Despite these apparent successes in production, the total amount of grain collected by February 5 was only 255 million poods (compared to 440 million poods in 1931) while the numbers of “hunger and malnutrition cases” as registered by the GPU of Ukrainian SSR, increased every day, particularly in rural areas and small towns.
http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1932.php
By early 1932, 69% of households were collectivized. Even though several other regions in the USSR were collectivized to a greater extent, the effect of the collectivization on the Ukrainian agriculture was very substantial.
| Oblast Oblast Oblast is a type of administrative division in Slavic countries, including some countries of the former Soviet Union. The word "oblast" is a loanword in English, but it is nevertheless often translated as "area", "zone", "province", or "region"... (in late 1932 administrative borders) |
Number of kolhozes |
% of peasantry households collectivization |
|---|---|---|
| Kiev Oblast | 4,053 | 67.3 |
| Chernihiv Oblast | 2,332 | 47.3 |
| Vinnytsia Oblast | 3,347 | 58.9 |
| Kharkiv Oblast | 4,347 | 72.0 |
| Dnipropetrovsk Oblast | 3,399 | 85.1 |
| Odessa Oblast | 3,594 | 84.4 |
| Donetsk Oblast | 1,578 | 84.4 |
| Moldavian ASSR | 620 | 68.3 |
| Ukrainian SSR | 23,270 | 69.0 (77.1% of arable land) |
Whilst the long-lasting effect of overall collectivization had an adverse effect on agricultural output everywhere, Ukraine had long been the most agriculturally productive area, providing over 50% of exported grain and 25% of total production of grain in the Russian Empire
Russian Empire
The Russian Empire was a state that existed from 1721 until the Russian Revolution of 1917. It was the successor to the Tsardom of Russia and the predecessor of the Soviet Union...
in 1913. Over 228,936 square kilometres (56.571 million acres), 207,203 km² (51.201 million acres) were used for grain production, or 90.5% of total arable land. This degree of dependency on agriculture meant that the effects of a bad harvest could be almost unlimited. This had been long recognised, and while projections for agricultural production were adjusted, the shock of limited production could not be easily managed. While collections by the state were in turn, limited, there were already clear stresses. The 1932 total Soviet harvest, was to be 29.5 million tons in state collections of grain out of 90.7 million tons in production. But the actual result was a disastrous 55-60 million tons in production. The state ended up collecting only 18.5 million tons in grain. The total Soviet collections by the state were virtually the same in 1930 and 1931 at about 22.8 million tons. For 1932, they had significantly been reduced to 18.5 million tons; with even lower figure in Ukraine. These were the total estimated outcomes of the grain harvests:
| Year | Production | Collections | Remainder | Collections as % of production |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1930 | 73-77 | 22.1 | 51-55 | 30.2-28.7 |
| 1931 | 57-65 | 22.8 | 34-43 | 40-35.1 |
| 1932 | 55-60 | 18.5 | 36.5-41.5 | 33.6-30.8 |
| 1933 | 70-77 | 22.7 | 47.3-54.3 | 32.4-29.5 |
| Year | Production | Collections |
|---|---|---|
| 1927 | 18.67 | 0.83 centralized collection only |
| 1928 | 13.88 | 1.44 |
| 1929 | 18.7 | 4.56 |
| 1930 | 22.72 | 6.92 |
| 1931 | 18.34 | 7.39 |
| 1932 | 14.65 | 4.28 |
| 1933 | 22.29 (including sorgo) |
5.98 |
Procurement practice
In 1928, a "by contract" policy of procurement (contracts for the delivery of agricultural products) was implemented for kolkhozes and ordinary peasants alike ("kulaks" had a "firm" plan for procurement) . Accordingly, from 1928 through January 1933, "grain production areas" were required to submit 1/3–1/4 of their estimated yield, while areas designated as "grain" were required to submit no more than 1/8 of their estimated yield. However, between the Autumn of 1930 and the Spring of 1932, local authorities tended to collect products from kolkhozes in amounts greater than the minimum required in order to exceed the contracted target (in some cases by more than 200%). Especially harmful methods utilized in the "by contract" policy were "counterplan" actions, which were additional collection plans implemented in already fulfilled contracts. Such "counterplan" measures were strictly forbidden after the Spring of 1933 as "extremely harmful for kolkhoz development."In 1932 a "1/4 of yield" procurement quota for "grain production areas" of the Ukrainian SSR were planned for implementation. On September 23, 1932, a telegram signed by Molotov and Stalin noted that the harvest of 1932 was "satisfactory", according to estimates provided by the agricultural planning authorities, and therefore requests for seed for winter crops were refused while total winter-tillage area demands were increased. Later, Stalin blamed the statistical and planning authorities for inaccurately estimating potential yields and thus a "Commissions for yield estimation" was created on December 17, 1932 by his order. Some modern historians also agree that the 1932 harvest figures provided at the time were largely overestimated and the actual difference between estimated and actual harvest was significant. Such unrealistic figures resulted in demand that was impossibly to fulfill and resulted in lesser reduction of grain procurement plan and greater grain procurement then were possible in late 1932 through the February 5, 1933
Legislation provisions
Enemy of the people
The term enemy of the people is a fluid designation of political or class opponents of the group using the term. The term implies that the "enemies" in question are acting against society as a whole. It is similar to the notion of "enemy of the state". The term originated in Roman times as ,...
." Within five months after passage of the law, 54,645 individuals were sentenced under its provisions, of which, 2,110 were sentenced to death. The initial wording of the Decree "On fought with speculation” adopted August 22, 1932 lead to common situations where acts by minor such as bartering tobacco for bread were documented as punished by 5 years imprisonment .; After 1934,by NKVD demand, the penalty for minor offenses was limited to a fine of 500 ruble
Ruble
The ruble or rouble is a unit of currency. Currently, the currency units of Belarus, Russia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, and, in the past, the currency units of several other countries, notably countries influenced by Russia and the Soviet Union, are named rubles, though they all are...
s or 3 month of correctional labor. http://www.law.edu.ru/article/article.asp?articleID=1131644
The existed practice of administrative punishment known as “black board” (black list) by the November, 18 Decree of Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine was applied to a greater extent and with more harsh methods to selected villages and kolkhozes that were considered to be "underperforming" in the grain collection procurement: “Immediate cessation of delivery of goods, complete suspension of cooperative and state trade in the villages, and removal of all available goods from cooperative and state stores”. Full prohibition of collective farm trade for both collective farms and collective farmers, and for private farmers. Cessation of any sort of credit and demand for early repayment of credit and other financial obligations.” Initially such sanctions were applied to only six villages, but later they were applied to numerous rural settlements and districts. For peasants, who were not kolkhoz members and who were "underperforming" in the grain collection procurement, special “measures” were adopted. To “reach the grain procurement quota” amongst peasants 1,100 brigades were organized which consisted of activists (often from neighboring villages) which had accomplished their grain procurement quota or were close to accomplishing it. Since most of goods supplied to the rural areas was commercial (fabrics, matches, fuels) and was sometimes obtained by villagers from neighbored cities or railway stations, sanctioned villages remained for a long period – as an example mentioned in the December 6 Decree the village of Kamyani Potoky was removed from blacklist only October 17, 1933 when they completed their plan for grain collection early. Since January 1933 the black list regime was “softened” when 100% of plan execution was no longer demanded, mentioned in the December 6 Decree villages Liutenky and Havrylivka were removed from the black list after 88 and 70% of plan completion respectively. http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1933.php
Measures were undertaken to persecute those withholding or bargaining grain. This was done frequently by requisition detachments, which raided farms to collect grain, and was done regardless of whether the peasants retained enough grain to feed themselves, or whether they had enough seed left to plant the next harvest.
Export of grain
After recognition of the famine situation in Ukraine during the drought and poor harvests, the Soviet government in MoscowMoscow
Moscow is the capital, the most populous city, and the most populous federal subject of Russia. The city is a major political, economic, cultural, scientific, religious, financial, educational, and transportation centre of Russia and the continent...
continued to export grain rather than retain its crop to feed the people, even though on a significantly lower level than in previous years. In 1930–31 there had been 5,832,000 tons of grains exported In 1931–32, grain exports declined to 4,786,000 tons. In 1932–33, grain exports were just 1,607,000 tons and in 1933–34, this further declined to 1,441,000 tons. Officially published data slightly differ
Cereals : 1930 - 4,846,024;
1931 - 5,182,835; 1932 - 1,819,114 (first half of 1932 - approx 750 000, from late April grain also imported - approx. 157,000 tonnes ); 1933 - 1,771,364 tonnes (first half of 1933 - 220 000, late March grain also imported).
From that wheat: 1930 - 2,530,953; 1931 - 2,498,958 ; 1932 - 550,917; 1933 - 748,248 tons. Via Ukrainian commercial ports in 1932 were exported (thousand tons): 988.3 -grains, 16,5 other types of cereals; in 1933 - 809.6,-grains 2.6 -cereals; 3.5 meat, 0.4- butter, 2.5 - fish.
Via Ukrainian commercial ports in 1932 were imported (thousand tons): 1932 - no more than 67.2 of grains and cereals 1933 - 8.6 of grains.
Received from other Soviet ports - 1932 (thousand tons): 164 - grains, 7.3 - other types of cereals, fish -31.5 and no more than 177 thousand tons of meat and butter 1933- 230 - grains, 15.3 other types of cereals 0.1 - meat, 0.9- butter, fish - 34.3.
Collectivization in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was part of the policy of Collectivization in the USSR and dekulakization
Dekulakization
Dekulakization was the Soviet campaign of political repressions, including arrests, deportations, and executions of millions of the better-off peasants and their families in 1929-1932. The richer peasants were labeled kulaks and considered class enemies...
that was pursued between 1928 and 1933 with the purpose to consolidate individual land and labour into collective farms called kolkhoz
Kolkhoz
A kolkhoz , plural kolkhozy, was a form of collective farming in the Soviet Union that existed along with state farms . The word is a contraction of коллекти́вное хозя́йство, or "collective farm", while sovkhoz is a contraction of советское хозяйство...
and to eliminate enemies of the working class. The idea of collective farms was seen by peasants as a revival of serfdom
Serfdom
Serfdom is the status of peasants under feudalism, specifically relating to Manorialism. It was a condition of bondage or modified slavery which developed primarily during the High Middle Ages in Europe and lasted to the mid-19th century...
.
In Soviet Ukraine this policy had a dramatic effect on the Ukrainian ethnic population and its culture as 86% of the population lived in rural settings. The forceful introduction of the policy of collectivization was one of the main causes of the Holodomor
Holodomor
The Holodomor was a man-made famine in the Ukrainian SSR between 1932 and 1933. During the famine, which is also known as the "terror-famine in Ukraine" and "famine-genocide in Ukraine", millions of Ukrainians died of starvation in a peacetime catastrophe unprecedented in the history of...
. In Ukraine collectivization had specific goals and outcomes. According to a Soviet official explaining the goals: A ruthless struggle is going on between the peasantry and our regime. It's a struggle to the death. This year was a test of our strength and their endurance. It took a famine to show them who is master here. It has cost millions of lives, but the collective farm system is here to stay. We have won the war.
The Soviet policies related to collectivisation have to be understood in the larger context of the social "revolution from above
Revolution from above
A revolution from above refers to major political and social changes that are imposed by an elite on the population it dominates. By contrast, the plain term revolution suggests that pressure from below is a major driving force in events, even if other social groups cooperate with — or ultimately...
" that took place in the Soviet Union
Soviet Union
The Soviet Union , officially the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics , was a constitutionally socialist state that existed in Eurasia between 1922 and 1991....
at the time.
The formation of Collective farms were based on the large village farms in collective ownership of village inhabitants. Estimated yields were expected to increase by 150%. The ultimate goal of collectivization was to resolve "grain problems" of late 1920-s.
In the early 1920s only 3% of the peasantry of the USSR were collectivised. Within the first five year plan 20% of peasant households were to be collectivised, although in Ukraine the number was set at 30%.
Policy of collectivization
Sovkhoz
A sovkhoz , typically translated as state farm, is a state-owned farm. The term originated in the Soviet Union, hence the name. The term is still in use in some post-Soviet states, e.g., Russia and Belarus. It is usually contrasted with kolkhoz, which is a collective-owned farm...
es. In late 1927, after the XV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the only legal, ruling political party in the Soviet Union and one of the largest communist organizations in the world...
, then known as the All-Union Communist party (bolsheviks) or VKP(b), a significant impetus was given to the collectivization effort.
In 1927, a drought
Drought
A drought is an extended period of months or years when a region notes a deficiency in its water supply. Generally, this occurs when a region receives consistently below average precipitation. It can have a substantial impact on the ecosystem and agriculture of the affected region...
shortened the harvest
Harvest
Harvest is the process of gathering mature crops from the fields. Reaping is the cutting of grain or pulse for harvest, typically using a scythe, sickle, or reaper...
in southern areas of the Ukrainian SSR and North Caucasus
North Caucasus
The North Caucasus is the northern part of the Caucasus region between the Black and Caspian Seas and within European Russia. The term is also used as a synonym for the North Caucasus economic region of Russia....
. In 1927–28 the winter tillage area was badly affected due to low snow levels. Despite seed aid from the State, many affected areas were not re-sown. The 1928 harvest was affected by drought in most of the grain producing areas of the Ukrainian SSR. Shortages in the harvest and difficulties with the supply system invoked difficulties with the food supply in urban areas and destabilized the food supply situation in the USSR in general. In order to alleviate the situation, a system of food rationing
Rationing
Rationing is the controlled distribution of scarce resources, goods, or services. Rationing controls the size of the ration, one's allotted portion of the resources being distributed on a particular day or at a particular time.- In economics :...
was implemented in the second quarter of 1928 initially in Odessa
Odessa
Odessa or Odesa is the administrative center of the Odessa Oblast located in southern Ukraine. The city is a major seaport located on the northwest shore of the Black Sea and the fourth largest city in Ukraine with a population of 1,029,000 .The predecessor of Odessa, a small Tatar settlement,...
, and later spread to Mariupol
Mariupol
Mariupol , formerly known as Zhdanov , is a port city in southeastern Ukraine. It is located on the coast of the Azov Sea, at the mouth of the Kalmius River. Mariupol is the largest city in Priazovye - a geographical region around Azov Sea, divided by Russia and Ukraine - and is also a popular sea...
, Kherson
Kherson
Kherson is a city in southern Ukraine. It is the administrative center of the Kherson Oblast , and is designated as its own separate raion within the oblast. Kherson is an important port on the Black Sea and Dnieper River, and the home of a major ship-building industry...
, Kiev
Kiev
Kiev or Kyiv is the capital and the largest city of Ukraine, located in the north central part of the country on the Dnieper River. The population as of the 2001 census was 2,611,300. However, higher numbers have been cited in the press....
, Dniprelstan (Dnipropetrovsk
Dnipropetrovsk
Dnipropetrovsk or Dnepropetrovsk formerly Yekaterinoslav is Ukraine's third largest city with one million inhabitants. It is located southeast of Ukraine's capital Kiev on the Dnieper River, in the south-central region of the country...
), and Kharkiv
Kharkiv
Kharkiv or Kharkov is the second-largest city in Ukraine.The city was founded in 1654 and was a major centre of Ukrainian culture in the Russian Empire. Kharkiv became the first city in Ukraine where the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed in December 1917 and Soviet government was...
. At the beginning of 1929 a similar system was implemented throughout the USSR. Despite the aid from the Soviet Ukrainian and the Central governments, many southern rural areas registered occurrences of malnutrition and in some cases hunger and starvation (the affected areas and thus the amount of required food aid was under-accounted by authorities). Due to the shortage of forage livestock
Livestock
Livestock refers to one or more domesticated animals raised in an agricultural setting to produce commodities such as food, fiber and labor. The term "livestock" as used in this article does not include poultry or farmed fish; however the inclusion of these, especially poultry, within the meaning...
, its numbers were also affected (see table below).
Most of Kolkhoz
Kolkhoz
A kolkhoz , plural kolkhozy, was a form of collective farming in the Soviet Union that existed along with state farms . The word is a contraction of коллекти́вное хозя́йство, or "collective farm", while sovkhoz is a contraction of советское хозяйство...
es and recently refurnished sovkhoz
Sovkhoz
A sovkhoz , typically translated as state farm, is a state-owned farm. The term originated in the Soviet Union, hence the name. The term is still in use in some post-Soviet states, e.g., Russia and Belarus. It is usually contrasted with kolkhoz, which is a collective-owned farm...
es went through these years with few losses, and some were even able to provide assistance to peasants in the more affected areas (seed and grain for food).
Early stages
Despite an intense state campaign, collectivization, which was initially voluntary, was not popular amongst peasants: as of early 1929, only 5.6% of Ukrainian peasant households and 3.8% of arable landArable land
In geography and agriculture, arable land is land that can be used for growing crops. It includes all land under temporary crops , temporary meadows for mowing or pasture, land under market and kitchen gardens and land temporarily fallow...
was “collectivized”. In the early of 1929, the methods employed by the specially empowered authority “UkrKolhozcenter” changed from a voluntary enrollment to an administrative one. By October 1, 1929, a plan for the creation of kolkhozes was “outperformed” by 239%. As a result, 8.8% of arable land was “collectivized”.http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1929.php
"Fast track collectivization"
The next major step toward "all-over collectivization" took place after an article was published by Stalin in PravdaPravda
Pravda was a leading newspaper of the Soviet Union and an official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party between 1912 and 1991....
, in early November 1929.
While “summoned “ by November 10–November 17, 1929 meeting of VKP(b) Central Committee “Twenty-Five Thousanders" only trained at special short courses, the main driving force of collectivization and dekulakization
Dekulakization
Dekulakization was the Soviet campaign of political repressions, including arrests, deportations, and executions of millions of the better-off peasants and their families in 1929-1932. The richer peasants were labeled kulaks and considered class enemies...
in Ukraine became a "poor peasants committee" (“komnezamy”) and local village councils (silrady) where komnezams members had a voting majority.
The USSR Kolhozcenter issued the December 10, 1929, decree on collectivisation of livestock within a 3-month period (draft animals 100%, cattle 100%, pigs 80%, sheep and goats 60%). This drove many peasants to slaughter their livestock. By January 1, 1930, the percentage of collectivized households almost doubled, to 16.4% of the total number of households.
| Year | Total Horses |
Horses |
and Goats |
|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1932 | ||||||||
Despite the infamous January 5, 1930 decree
Decree
A decree is a rule of law issued by a head of state , according to certain procedures . It has the force of law...
, in which the deadline for the complete collectivization of the Ukrainian SSR was set for the period from the end of 1931 to the spring of 1932, the Ukrainian SSR authorities decided to accelerate the completion of the campaign by autumn of 1930. The high expectations of the plan were outperformed by local authorities even without the assistance of the 7500 “Twenty-Five Thousanders who had reached some areas only by mid-February http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1930.php – by March 70.9% of arable land and 62.8% of peasant households were suddenly collectivized. The “Dekulakization
Dekulakization
Dekulakization was the Soviet campaign of political repressions, including arrests, deportations, and executions of millions of the better-off peasants and their families in 1929-1932. The richer peasants were labeled kulaks and considered class enemies...
” plan was also “over-performed”. Almost 200,000 households (3.8% of total peasant households) were affected by the requisition of property, land, and houses. Some of the peasants were arrested and deported “to the north”. Many arrested 'kulak
Kulak
Kulaks were a category of relatively affluent peasants in the later Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, and early Soviet Union...
s' and "well-to-do" farmers resettled their families to the Urals and Central Asia
Central Asia
Central Asia is a core region of the Asian continent from the Caspian Sea in the west, China in the east, Afghanistan in the south, and Russia in the north...
, where they were often exploited in others sectors of the economy, such as timber cutting. The term 'kulak' was ultimately applied to anybody resisting collectivization as many of the so-called 'kulaks' were no more well-off than other peasants.
"Dizzy with success"
The fast-track to collectivization incited numerous peasant revolts in Ukraine and in other parts of the USSR. In response to the situation, the Soviet regime stepped back: the March 2, 1930, issue of "Pravda" published the Stalin's article "Dizzy with success". Soon, numerous orders and decrees were issued banning the use of force and administrative methods. Some of “mistakenly dekulakized” received their property back, and even some mistakenly deported returned home but in insignificant amounts – most remained where they had been deported. The collectivization process was rolled back: by 1 May 1933 38.2% of Ukrainian SSR peasant households and 41.1% of arable land had been collectivized. By the end of August these numbers declined to 29.2% and 35.6% respectively.Second forced "voluntary" collectivization
A second forced "voluntary" collectivization campaign was initiated in the winter–summer of 1931 with significant assistance of the so-called "tug-brigades" composed from kolkhoz udarnikUdarnik
Udarnik is a Russian, Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian term for a superproductive worker in the Soviet Union and ex-Yugoslavia. The term is derived from the expression "udarny trud" for "superproductive, enthusiastic labour", which is often translated as strike labour , and udarnik as strike worker,...
s. Many "kulaks" along with families were deported from the Ukrainian SSR.
According to declassified data, around 300,000 peasants in Ukrainian SSR out of a population of about 30 million were subject to these policies in 1930–31. Ukrainians composed 15% of the total 1.8 million 'kulaks' relocated Soviet-wide. On July 20, 1931 – as a response to the numerous regional requests for additional numbers of kulak deportations Politburo of VKP (b) concluded that the “strategic task of the Party was almost accomplished. All further deportations were recommended to be administered only to individuals.”
This second forced "voluntary" collectivization campaign also invoked a delay in sowing. As a result, cereal crops were heavily affected by the 1931 drought. During winter and spring of 1930–31, the Ukrainian agricultural authority "Narkomzem" Ukrainian SRR issued several reports about the significant decline of livestock and especially drought power caused by poor treatment, absence of forage
Forage
Forage is plant material eaten by grazing livestock.Historically the term forage has meant only plants eaten by the animals directly as pasture, crop residue, or immature cereal crops, but it is also used more loosely to include similar plants cut for fodder and carried to the animals, especially...
, stables/farms and due the "kulak
Kulak
Kulaks were a category of relatively affluent peasants in the later Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, and early Soviet Union...
s sabotage".
According to the First Five-Year Plan
First Five-Year Plan
The First Five-Year Plan, or 1st Five-Year Plan, of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a list of economic goals that was designed to strengthen the country's economy between 1928 and 1932, making the nation both militarily and industrially self-sufficient. "We are fifty or a hundred...
, Ukrainian agriculture was to switch from an exclusive orientation of grain to a more diverse output. This included not only a rise in Sugar beet
Sugar beet
Sugar beet, a cultivated plant of Beta vulgaris, is a plant whose tuber contains a high concentration of sucrose. It is grown commercially for sugar production. Sugar beets and other B...
crops, but also other types of agricultural production were expected to be utilised by industry (with even cotton plants being established in 1931). This plan anticipated a decrease in the area of grain cultivated, in contrast to an increase of yield and area for other crops. By July 1, 1931, 65.7% of Ukrainian SSR peasant households and 67.2% of arable land were reported as "collectivized". The main grain and sugar beet production areas, however, were collectivized to a greater extent — 80-90%.
Clarified “All-over collectivization”
The Decree of Central Committee of VKP(b) from August 2, 1931 clarified the “all-over collectivization” term - in order to be considered complete the “all-over collectivization” does not have to reach “100%”, but not less than 68–70% of peasants households and not less than 75-80% of arable lands. According to the same decree “all-over collectivization” accomplished at Northern Caucasus (Kuban) - 88% of households and 92% of arable lands “collectivized”, Ukraine (South) – 85 and 94 percents respectively, Ukraine (Right Bank) – 69 and 80 percents respectively, and Moldavian ASRR (part of Ukrainian SRR) – 68 and 75 percent.As of the beginning of October 1931, the collectivization of 68.0% of peasant households, and 72.0% of arable land was complete.
1931 Plan
The plan for the state grain collection in the Ukrainian SSR adopted for 1931 was over-optimistic — 510 million poodPood
Pood , is a unit of mass equal to 40 funt . It is approximately 16.38 kilograms . It was used in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Pood was first mentioned in a number of documents of the 12th century....
s (8.4 Tg
Teragram
Teragram may refer to:* 1012 grams, equivalent to a megatonne. See Orders of magnitude * Teragram Corporation...
). Drought, administrative distribution of the plan for kolkhozes, together with the lack of relevant management generally destabilized the situation. Significant amounts of grain remained unharvested. A significant percentage was lost during processing and transportation, or spoiled at elevators (wet grain). The total Winter sowing area shrunk by approximately 2 million hectares. Livestock in kolkhozes remained without forage, which was collected under grain procurement. A similar occurrence happened with respect to seeds and wages awarded in kind for kolhoz members. Nevertheless, grain collection continued till May 1932 but reached only 90% of expected plan figures. By the end of December 1931, the collection plan was accomplished by 79%. Many kolkhozes from December 1931 onwards suffered from lack of food, resulting in an increased number of deaths caused by malnutrition registered by OGPU in some areas (Moldavian SSR as a whole and several central rayons of Vinnytsia
Vinnytsia
Vinnytsia is a city located on the banks of the Southern Bug, in central Ukraine. It is the administrative center of Vinnytsia Oblast.-Names:...
, Kiev and North-East rayons of Odessa
Odessa
Odessa or Odesa is the administrative center of the Odessa Oblast located in southern Ukraine. The city is a major seaport located on the northwest shore of the Black Sea and the fourth largest city in Ukraine with a population of 1,029,000 .The predecessor of Odessa, a small Tatar settlement,...
oblasts http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1932.php) in winter-spring and the early summer months of 1932. By 1932 the sowing campaign of the Ukrainian SSR was obtained with minimal power as most of the remaining horses were incapable of working, while the number of available agricultural tractors was too small to fill the gap.
Kosior
Kosior may refer to one of three brothers, Polish-born Soviet politicians :*Stanislav Kosior *Vladislav Kosior *Iosif Kosior...
such provisions were lifted by Stalin at the end of May 1932. The July GPU reports for the first half of 1932, mentioned the “difficulties with food” in 127 rayons (out of 484), acknowledged the fact the they did not have information for all regions. The Decree of Sovnarkom on “Kolkhoz Trade” issued in May, fostered rumors amongst peasants that collectivization was once again rolled-back as it had been in the spring 1930. As a result the number of peasants who abandoned the kolkhozes significantly increased.
1932 situation
The Government of the Ukrainian SSR tried to remedy the situation from March with recourse to internal resources, but had little success - withdrawal of food from other Ukrainian regions depleted their own limited supplies. Starting in February 1932, administrative and territorial reform (oblast creation) also added mismanagement cast, - even Moscow had more details about the seed situation than the Ukrainian authorities. In May, in a desperate effort to change the situation, the central Soviet Government provided 7.1 million poodPood
Pood , is a unit of mass equal to 40 funt . It is approximately 16.38 kilograms . It was used in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Pood was first mentioned in a number of documents of the 12th century....
s of grain for food for Ukraine and reverted no less than 700 agricultural tractors intended for other regions of USSR. By July, the total amount of aid provided from Central Soviet Authorities for food, sowing and forage for “agricultural sector” was numbered more than 17 million poods.
Taking into account the situation in Ukraine, the central grain collection plan was lowered by 18.1%, in comparison to the 1931 plan. Kolkhozes were expected to harvest 4,751.2 thousand tons, with the peasants responsible for 1,080.1 thousand tons. Sovkhozes were to submit 475,034 tons. In addition Ukrainian kolkhozes and sovkhozes were to return 132,750 tons of grain which had been provided in spring 1932 as aid. The grain collection plan for July 1932 was adopted to collect 19.5 million pood
Pood
Pood , is a unit of mass equal to 40 funt . It is approximately 16.38 kilograms . It was used in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Pood was first mentioned in a number of documents of the 12th century....
s.
The actual state of collection was disastrous however, and by 31 July only 3 million poods (compared to 21 million in 1931) were collected. As of July 20 the harvested area was half of that in 1931. The sovhozes had only sowed 16% of the defined area.
This disparity between agricultural goals, and actual production grew later in the year. An expected 190 thousand tons of grain were to be exported, but by August 27, 1932, only 20 thousand tons were ready. The Ukrainian SSR met with difficulty in supplying the planned amount of food and as a result a rationing system was implemented to supply urban areas with food. This system became the major source of food delivery to cities while the alternatives, cooperative trade and black market trading, became too expensive, and under-supplied, to provide long-range assistance. By October 25, the plan for grain collection was lowered once again, from the quantity called for in the plan of August 22, 1932. Nevertheless, collection reached only 39% of the annually planned total. A second lowering of goals deducted 70 million poods but still demanded plan completion, and 100% efficiency. Attempts to reach the new goals of production proved futile in late 1932. On November 29, in order to complete the plan, Ukraine was to collect 94 million poods, 4.8 of them from sovkhozes. As of January 2, targets were again lowered, to 62.5 million poods. Later that month, on January 14,the targets were lowered even further– by 29.4 million poods, to 33.1 million. Vinnytsya, Kiev oblasts and Moldavian SRR had accomplished the lowered 1932 plan for grain procurement, but not for sowing reserves. The total remains for Ukraine was 22.1 million poods. At same time, GPU of Ukraine reported hunger and starvation in the Kiev
Kiev Oblast
Kyiv Oblast, sometimes written as Kiev Oblast is an oblast in central Ukraine.The administrative center of the oblast is the city of Kyiv , also being the capital of Ukraine...
and Vinnytsia
Vinnytsia Oblast
Vinnytsia Oblast is an oblast of Ukraine. Its administrative center is Vinnytsia.-Geography:The area of the region is 26,500 km²; its population is 1.7 million....
oblasts, and began implementing measures to remedy the situation. By January 29 Kharkiv Oblast
Kharkiv Oblast
Kharkiv Oblast is an oblast in eastern Ukraine. The oblast borders Russia to the north, Luhansk Oblast to the east, Donetsk Oblast to the south-east, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to the south-west, Poltava Oblast to the west and Sumy Oblast to the north-west...
had also fulfilled the grain collection plan, and reached its production target. Despite these apparent successes in production, the total amount of grain collected by February 5 was only 255 million poods (compared to 440 million poods in 1931) while the numbers of “hunger and malnutrition cases” as registered by the GPU of Ukrainian SSR, increased every day, particularly in rural areas and small towns.
http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1932.php
By early 1932, 69% of households were collectivized. Even though several other regions in the USSR were collectivized to a greater extent, the effect of the collectivization on the Ukrainian agriculture was very substantial.
| Oblast Oblast Oblast is a type of administrative division in Slavic countries, including some countries of the former Soviet Union. The word "oblast" is a loanword in English, but it is nevertheless often translated as "area", "zone", "province", or "region"... (in late 1932 administrative borders) |
Number of kolhozes |
% of peasantry households collectivization |
|---|---|---|
| Kiev Oblast | 4,053 | 67.3 |
| Chernihiv Oblast | 2,332 | 47.3 |
| Vinnytsia Oblast | 3,347 | 58.9 |
| Kharkiv Oblast | 4,347 | 72.0 |
| Dnipropetrovsk Oblast | 3,399 | 85.1 |
| Odessa Oblast | 3,594 | 84.4 |
| Donetsk Oblast | 1,578 | 84.4 |
| Moldavian ASSR | 620 | 68.3 |
| Ukrainian SSR | 23,270 | 69.0 (77.1% of arable land) |
Whilst the long-lasting effect of overall collectivization had an adverse effect on agricultural output everywhere, Ukraine had long been the most agriculturally productive area, providing over 50% of exported grain and 25% of total production of grain in the Russian Empire
Russian Empire
The Russian Empire was a state that existed from 1721 until the Russian Revolution of 1917. It was the successor to the Tsardom of Russia and the predecessor of the Soviet Union...
in 1913. Over 228,936 square kilometres (56.571 million acres), 207,203 km² (51.201 million acres) were used for grain production, or 90.5% of total arable land. This degree of dependency on agriculture meant that the effects of a bad harvest could be almost unlimited. This had been long recognised, and while projections for agricultural production were adjusted, the shock of limited production could not be easily managed. While collections by the state were in turn, limited, there were already clear stresses. The 1932 total Soviet harvest, was to be 29.5 million tons in state collections of grain out of 90.7 million tons in production. But the actual result was a disastrous 55-60 million tons in production. The state ended up collecting only 18.5 million tons in grain. The total Soviet collections by the state were virtually the same in 1930 and 1931 at about 22.8 million tons. For 1932, they had significantly been reduced to 18.5 million tons; with even lower figure in Ukraine. These were the total estimated outcomes of the grain harvests:
| Year | Production | Collections | Remainder | Collections as % of production |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1930 | 73-77 | 22.1 | 51-55 | 30.2-28.7 |
| 1931 | 57-65 | 22.8 | 34-43 | 40-35.1 |
| 1932 | 55-60 | 18.5 | 36.5-41.5 | 33.6-30.8 |
| 1933 | 70-77 | 22.7 | 47.3-54.3 | 32.4-29.5 |
| Year | Production | Collections |
|---|---|---|
| 1927 | 18.67 | 0.83 centralized collection only |
| 1928 | 13.88 | 1.44 |
| 1929 | 18.7 | 4.56 |
| 1930 | 22.72 | 6.92 |
| 1931 | 18.34 | 7.39 |
| 1932 | 14.65 | 4.28 |
| 1933 | 22.29 (including sorgo) |
5.98 |
Procurement practice
In 1928, a "by contract" policy of procurement (contracts for the delivery of agricultural products) was implemented for kolkhozes and ordinary peasants alike ("kulaks" had a "firm" plan for procurement) . Accordingly, from 1928 through January 1933, "grain production areas" were required to submit 1/3–1/4 of their estimated yield, while areas designated as "grain" were required to submit no more than 1/8 of their estimated yield. However, between the Autumn of 1930 and the Spring of 1932, local authorities tended to collect products from kolkhozes in amounts greater than the minimum required in order to exceed the contracted target (in some cases by more than 200%). Especially harmful methods utilized in the "by contract" policy were "counterplan" actions, which were additional collection plans implemented in already fulfilled contracts. Such "counterplan" measures were strictly forbidden after the Spring of 1933 as "extremely harmful for kolkhoz development."In 1932 a "1/4 of yield" procurement quota for "grain production areas" of the Ukrainian SSR were planned for implementation. On September 23, 1932, a telegram signed by Molotov and Stalin noted that the harvest of 1932 was "satisfactory", according to estimates provided by the agricultural planning authorities, and therefore requests for seed for winter crops were refused while total winter-tillage area demands were increased. Later, Stalin blamed the statistical and planning authorities for inaccurately estimating potential yields and thus a "Commissions for yield estimation" was created on December 17, 1932 by his order. Some modern historians also agree that the 1932 harvest figures provided at the time were largely overestimated and the actual difference between estimated and actual harvest was significant. Such unrealistic figures resulted in demand that was impossibly to fulfill and resulted in lesser reduction of grain procurement plan and greater grain procurement then were possible in late 1932 through the February 5, 1933
Legislation provisions
Enemy of the people
The term enemy of the people is a fluid designation of political or class opponents of the group using the term. The term implies that the "enemies" in question are acting against society as a whole. It is similar to the notion of "enemy of the state". The term originated in Roman times as ,...
." Within five months after passage of the law, 54,645 individuals were sentenced under its provisions, of which, 2,110 were sentenced to death. The initial wording of the Decree "On fought with speculation” adopted August 22, 1932 lead to common situations where acts by minor such as bartering tobacco for bread were documented as punished by 5 years imprisonment .; After 1934,by NKVD demand, the penalty for minor offenses was limited to a fine of 500 ruble
Ruble
The ruble or rouble is a unit of currency. Currently, the currency units of Belarus, Russia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, and, in the past, the currency units of several other countries, notably countries influenced by Russia and the Soviet Union, are named rubles, though they all are...
s or 3 month of correctional labor. http://www.law.edu.ru/article/article.asp?articleID=1131644
The existed practice of administrative punishment known as “black board” (black list) by the November, 18 Decree of Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine was applied to a greater extent and with more harsh methods to selected villages and kolkhozes that were considered to be "underperforming" in the grain collection procurement: “Immediate cessation of delivery of goods, complete suspension of cooperative and state trade in the villages, and removal of all available goods from cooperative and state stores”. Full prohibition of collective farm trade for both collective farms and collective farmers, and for private farmers. Cessation of any sort of credit and demand for early repayment of credit and other financial obligations.” Initially such sanctions were applied to only six villages, but later they were applied to numerous rural settlements and districts. For peasants, who were not kolkhoz members and who were "underperforming" in the grain collection procurement, special “measures” were adopted. To “reach the grain procurement quota” amongst peasants 1,100 brigades were organized which consisted of activists (often from neighboring villages) which had accomplished their grain procurement quota or were close to accomplishing it. Since most of goods supplied to the rural areas was commercial (fabrics, matches, fuels) and was sometimes obtained by villagers from neighbored cities or railway stations, sanctioned villages remained for a long period – as an example mentioned in the December 6 Decree the village of Kamyani Potoky was removed from blacklist only October 17, 1933 when they completed their plan for grain collection early. Since January 1933 the black list regime was “softened” when 100% of plan execution was no longer demanded, mentioned in the December 6 Decree villages Liutenky and Havrylivka were removed from the black list after 88 and 70% of plan completion respectively. http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1933.php
Measures were undertaken to persecute those withholding or bargaining grain. This was done frequently by requisition detachments, which raided farms to collect grain, and was done regardless of whether the peasants retained enough grain to feed themselves, or whether they had enough seed left to plant the next harvest.
Export of grain
After recognition of the famine situation in Ukraine during the drought and poor harvests, the Soviet government in MoscowMoscow
Moscow is the capital, the most populous city, and the most populous federal subject of Russia. The city is a major political, economic, cultural, scientific, religious, financial, educational, and transportation centre of Russia and the continent...
continued to export grain rather than retain its crop to feed the people, even though on a significantly lower level than in previous years. In 1930–31 there had been 5,832,000 tons of grains exported In 1931–32, grain exports declined to 4,786,000 tons. In 1932–33, grain exports were just 1,607,000 tons and in 1933–34, this further declined to 1,441,000 tons. Officially published data slightly differ
Cereals : 1930 - 4,846,024;
1931 - 5,182,835; 1932 - 1,819,114 (first half of 1932 - approx 750 000, from late April grain also imported - approx. 157,000 tonnes ); 1933 - 1,771,364 tonnes (first half of 1933 - 220 000, late March grain also imported).
From that wheat: 1930 - 2,530,953; 1931 - 2,498,958 ; 1932 - 550,917; 1933 - 748,248 tons. Via Ukrainian commercial ports in 1932 were exported (thousand tons): 988.3 -grains, 16,5 other types of cereals; in 1933 - 809.6,-grains 2.6 -cereals; 3.5 meat, 0.4- butter, 2.5 - fish.
Via Ukrainian commercial ports in 1932 were imported (thousand tons): 1932 - no more than 67.2 of grains and cereals 1933 - 8.6 of grains.
Received from other Soviet ports - 1932 (thousand tons): 164 - grains, 7.3 - other types of cereals, fish -31.5 and no more than 177 thousand tons of meat and butter 1933- 230 - grains, 15.3 other types of cereals 0.1 - meat, 0.9- butter, fish - 34.3.
| Year | Tractors | H.P. |
|---|---|---|
| 1929–30 | 15,112 | 160,500 |
| 1931 | 26,051 | 321,097 |
| 1932 | 39,089 | 514,259 |
| 1933 | 51,320 | 720,094 |
| 1934 | 64,516 | 933,300 |
Books and articles
- Yar Slavutyth, survivor - actual accounts- Alberta Report feature-http://www.ukrainianholocaust.org
- Marco Carynnyk, Lubomyr Luciuk and Bohdan S Kordan, eds, The Foreign Office and the Famine: British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932-1933, foreword by Michael Marrus (Kingston: Limestone Press, 1988)
- Robert ConquestRobert ConquestGeorge Robert Ackworth Conquest CMG is a British historian who became a well-known writer and researcher on the Soviet Union with the publication in 1968 of The Great Terror, an account of Stalin's purges of the 1930s...
, Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine Oxford University PressOxford University PressOxford University Press is the largest university press in the world. It is a department of the University of Oxford and is governed by a group of 15 academics appointed by the Vice-Chancellor known as the Delegates of the Press. They are headed by the Secretary to the Delegates, who serves as...
New York (1987) ISBN 0195051807 - Robert W. Davies; Wheatcroft, Stephen G., The Years of Hunger. Soviet Agriculture 1931-1933, Houndmills 2004 ISBN 3-412-10105-2, also ISBN 0-333-31107-8
- Robert W. Davies; Wheatcroft, Stephen G., Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33 - A Reply to Ellman, in: Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 58 (2006), 4, pp. 625–633.
- Miron Dolot, EXECUTION BY HUNGER: THE HIDDEN HOLOCAUST, New York: W.W Norton & Company, 1985, xvi + 231 pp. ISBN 0-393-01886-5.
- Barbara Falk, Sowjetische Städte in der Hungersnot 1932/33. Staatliche Ernährungspolitik und städtisches Alltagsleben (= Beiträge zur Geschichte Osteuropas 38), Köln: Böhlau Verlag 2005 ISBN 3-412-10105-2
- Wasyl Hryshko, The Ukrainian Holocaust of 1933, (Toronto: 1983, Bahriany Foundation)
- Stanislav Kulchytsky, Hennadiy Yefimenko. Демографічні наслідки голодомору 1933 р. в Україні. Всесоюзний перепис 1937 р. в Україні: документи та матеріали (Demographic consequence of Holodomor of 1933 in Ukraine. The all-Union census of 1937 in Ukraine), Kiev, Institute of History, 2003.
- R. Kusnierz, - Ukraina w latach kolektywizacji i Wielkiego Glodu (1929-1933), Torun, 2005
- Leonard Leshuk, ed, Days of Famine, Nights of Terror: Firsthand Accounts of Soviet Collectivization, 1928-1934 (Kingston: Kashtan Press, 1995)
- Lubomyr Luciuk, ed, Not Worthy: Walter Duranty's Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times (Kingston: Kashtan Press, 2004)
- Stephen G. Wheatcroft: Towards Explaining the Soviet Famine of 1931-1933: Political and Natural Factors in Perspective, in: Food and Foodways Vol. 12 (2004), No. 2-3, pp. 104–136.
External links
Ukrainian Holocaust - http://www.UkrainainHolocaust.org Famine in Ukraine 1932–1933 at the Central State Archive of Ukraine (photos, links)
- Yaroslav Bilinsky, Was the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 Genocide?, Journal of Genocide Research , 1(2), pages= 147–156 (June 1999), available at external site
- Stanislav Kulchytsky, Italian Research on the Holodomor, October 2005. Stanislav Kulchytsky, "Why did Stalin exterminate the Ukrainians? Comprehending the Holodomor. The position of Soviet historians" - Six part series from DenDen (newspaper)Den is a Kiev-based, centrist daily boardsheet newspaper. Founded in 1996, the paper has a circulation of about 60,000. It is linked to former prime minister Yevhen Marchuk - his wife Larysa Ivshyna is the paper's editor-in-chief...
: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6; Kulchytsky on Holodomor 1-6/ Valeriy Soldatenko, "A starved 1933: subjectove thoughts on objective processes", Zerkalo NedeliZerkalo NedeliZerkalo Nedeli , usually referred to in English as the Mirror Weekly, is one of Ukraine’s most influential analytical newspapers published weekly in Kiev, the nation's capital. It was founded in 1994, and as of 2006 its print circulation was 57,000. It offers political analysis, original...
, June 28 - July 4, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian./ Stanislav Kulchytsky's articles in Zerkalo NedeliZerkalo NedeliZerkalo Nedeli , usually referred to in English as the Mirror Weekly, is one of Ukraine’s most influential analytical newspapers published weekly in Kiev, the nation's capital. It was founded in 1994, and as of 2006 its print circulation was 57,000. It offers political analysis, original...
, Kiev, Ukraine"- "How many of us perish in Holodomor on 1933", November 23-November 29, 2002. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
- "Reasons of the 1933 famine in Ukraine. Through the pages of one almost forgotten book" August 16–22, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
- "Reasons of the 1933 famine in Ukraine-2", October 4-October 10, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
- "Demographic losses in Ukraine in the twentieth century", October 2-October 8, 2004. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
- "Holodomor-33: Why and how?" November 25 - December 1. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
- UKRAINIAN FAMINE Revelations from the Russian Archives at the Library of CongressLibrary of CongressThe Library of Congress is the research library of the United States Congress, de facto national library of the United States, and the oldest federal cultural institution in the United States. Located in three buildings in Washington, D.C., it is the largest library in the world by shelf space and...