Cable 243
Encyclopedia
DEPTEL 243, also known as Telegram 243, the August 24 cable or most commonly Cable 243, was a high-profile message sent on August 24, 1963 by the United States Department of State
to Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
, the US ambassador to South Vietnam
. The cable came in the wake of the midnight raids on August 21
by the Catholic regime of Ngo Dinh Diem
against Buddhist pagodas across the country, in which hundreds were believed to have been killed. The raids were orchestrated by Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu
and precipitated a change in US policy. The cable declared that Washington would no longer tolerate Nhu remaining in a position of power and ordered Lodge to pressure Diem to remove his brother. It said that if Diem refused, the Americans would explore the possibility for alternative leadership in South Vietnam. In effect, the cable authorized Lodge to give the green light to Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN) officers to launch a coup against Diem if he did not willingly remove Nhu from power. The cable marked a turning point in US-Diem relations and was described in the Pentagon Papers
as "controversial". Historian John W. Newman described it as "the single most controversial cable of the Vietnam War
".
The cable also highlighted an internal split in the Kennedy administration, with anti-Diem officials in the State Department prevailing over generals and Department of Defense officials who remained optimistic that the Vietnam War was proceeding well under Diem. This was underlined by the manner in which the cable was prepared before being transmitted to Lodge.
had asked Diem to give them extra powers to fight the Vietcong but secretly wanted to maneuver for a coup. Diem agreed, so that Nhu's Special Forces could take advantage and attack the Buddhist pagoda while disguised as regular ARVN forces. The raids were instigated by Nhu's Special Forces and Secret Police.
At first, there was confusion as to what had occurred. Nhu had ordered the phone lines into the US embassy and the US Information Service to be cut. A curfew was imposed on the streets, and it was initially believed that the regular army had orchestrated the attacks. The Voice of America
initially broadcast Nhu's version of the events, which held that the army was responsible. This infuriated the ARVN generals, since many Vietnamese listened to the program as their only source of non-government, non-propaganda news. Through CIA agent Lucien Conein
, General Tran Van Don
communicated to the Americans that Nhu had created the impression that the ARVN were responsible in order to increase dissent among the lower ranks and to weaken support for and discredit the generals in case they were planning a coup.
and CIA director John McCone
on vacation, the message was drafted by a group of State Department officials who were the only ones on duty. These were Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman
and Michael Forrestal
.
President John F. Kennedy
was on vacation at Hyannis Port, his family retreat, when Forrestal telephoned seeking to expedite the process with the commander-in-chief’s verbal approval. Kennedy asked to them "wait until Monday" when all the key figures would be in Washington, but Forrestal said that Harriman and Hilsman wanted to get the cable "out right away". Kennedy thus told Forrestal to get another high-ranking official to “get it cleared".
Harriman and Hilsman then drove from their offices to a Maryland golf course where George Ball was playing with Alexis Johnson. Ball told the trio to meet him at his home after he and Johnson finished their round of golf. Having returned home, Ball read the message but— knowing that the telegram could raise the morale of the generals and prompt a coup—refused to authorize it until his three visitors had gained Rusk’s endorsement. Those present at Ball’s home then phoned and read the important passages of the message to Rusk. They asked Rusk what he thought of the message if Kennedy was comfortable too. Rusk replied, "Well, go ahead. If the president understood the implications, [I] would give a green light."
Ball then discussed the matter with the president, who asked "What do you think?" over the phone. Ball said that Harriman and Hilsman were in strong support, saying that his "watered down" version "would certainly be taken as encouragement by the generals to a coup." Ball said that his group regarded Diem as an embarrassment to Washington because of his "most unconscionable and cruel, uncivilized" actions. He further cited Nhu’s violence against the Buddhists and Madame Nhu’s verbal attacks as reasons for breaking with Diem. According to Ball, Kennedy appeared to be broadly supportive of the cable, although apprehensive as to whether a new leader would do a better job. As McNamara was away, Kennedy told Ball that the message was acceptable if Rusk and Roswell Gilpatric
endorsed it.
Rusk then approved the message. In the 1980s, Rusk said "If Ball, Harriman, and President Kennedy were going to send it out, I wasn't going to raise any questions." Forrestal then phoned Gilpatric’s farm in the evening and told him that both Kennedy and Rusk had already approved. Gilpatric later recalled that "If Rusk went along with it and the President went along with it, I wasn't going to oppose it." He washed his hands of the matter, saying that it was between Kennedy and the state department, saying that "In McNamara's absence I felt I should not hold it up, so I went along with it just like you countersign a voucher." Marine General Victor Krulak also signed off without showing his superior, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor. Richard Helms
of the CIA also endorsed the message without notifying the director John McCone
; he later said that he believed that Forrestal was only advising of a resolution that had already been made. Forrestal then told Kennedy that he had gained the support of Kennedy’s inner circle, so the president told him to send the message. Cable 243 was thus sent to Lodge at 21:36.
The cable went on to instruct Lodge to inform Diem that the US could not accept the raids and to call for strong action to address the Buddhist crisis. Lodge was told to tell the South Vietnamese military officers that:
The cable also informed Lodge of the need to exonerate the ARVN from responsibility of the pagoda raids. It asked Lodge to approve a broadcast by the Voice of America
placing the responsibility on Nhu. Lodge was further requested to examine and search for alternative leadership to replace Diem.
on August 26. Kennedy was met with angry comments by Rusk, McNamara, McCone and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor, all of whom denied authorising the cable. Kennedy was reported to have said "My God! My government's coming apart." Taylor felt insulted by the final line of the cable which asserted that only the "minimum essential people" had seen its contents. During an acrimonius exchange at a midday meeting, he condemned the cable as an "egregious end run" by an anti-Diem faction. Hilsman
rebutted Taylor by asserting that Kennedy and representatives of departments and agencies had approved the message. Years afterward, Taylor declared
Taylor claimed that the message was reflective of Forrestal
and Hilsman's "well-known compulsion" to remove Diem. He accused them of pulling "a fast one".
Kennedy could no longer stand the arguing among his officials and shouted "This shit has got to stop!" Kennedy was angry at Forrestal and Hilsman; the former for what he deemed to be incompetence and Harriman for indiscretion. When Kennedy angrily criticised Forrestal for proceeding without gaining the explicit approval of McCone, Forrestal offered to resign. Kennedy acerbicly replied "You're not worth firing. You owe me something, so you stick around."
In the end, despite the bitter disagreement, the cable was not retracted. Ball refused to back down, maintaining that "the evil influence of the Nhus" overrode all other factors. Ball later described Diem as "an offense to America" and said that his government should not tolerate "such brutality and crass disregard of world sensitivities”. However, he also admitted that he did not know much about the leading figures in South Vietnam. McCone did not advocate a reversal of policy despite disagreeing with the process in which the telegram left Washington. Taylor also agreed to stand by the original decision despite his disagreement. He said that "You can't change American policy in twenty-four hours and expect anyone to ever believe you again." Kennedy walked around the meeting table and asked each of his advisers whether they wanted to change course. None were willing to tell him to retract his telegram.
Colby recalled that "It is difficult indeed to tell a President to his face that something he has approved is wrong and to do so without anything positive to offer in its place."
As a result, Kennedy chose not to revoke Cable 243, thereby enabling Lodge to proceed in encouraging a coup. The historian Howard Jones called it "a momentous decision".
According to Hilsman, Kennedy "didn't say anything" with regards to reservations about the coup. Kennedy had unanimous but uneasy and unhappy support from his advisers, although in reality only the decision had been made by a vocal anti-Diem minority who had sidestepped their colleagues and avoided getting a consensus to put in place a policy without thorough deliberation. The president was angry with himself and his advisers; him for being pressured into a hasty decision and his advisers for their dishonesty.
Robert Kennedy had discussed the matter of revoking the cable with McNamara and Taylor, but felt pressured into not backflipping on something that the administration had not "fully discussed, as every other major decision since the Bay of Pigs had been discussed".
Kennedy later described the cable as a "major mistake", feeling that most of the blame fell at Harriman’s feet. His brother said "The result is we started down a road that we never really recovered from".
Encouraged by the authorization for Lodge to interfere directly in South Vietnam’s governance process, the critics of Diem from the State Department tried to capitalize on the momentum that they had developed.
A midday meeting followed at the White House on the same Monday, August 26. Continuing on from Saturday’s activism, Hilsman recommended pressuring Diem to replace his brother Nhu with a combination of military figures and civilians. Encouraged by the administration's choice to proceed with the telegram, Hilsman said that if Diem retained his brother, Washington should move to remove Diem and start a military-led regime led by General Tran Thien Khiem
, the Army Chief of Staff and General Nguyen Khanh
, who commanded the II Corps
—one of four in South Vietnam—based in the central highlands
town of Pleiku
.
Kennedy asked Hilsman of the consequences of a failed coup; his adviser said that it would be bad for the US, as Nhu was anti-American. McNamara agreed with Hilsman, and they thought that only Tung's men and some marine battalions remained loyal to Nhu.
The advisors thought that the officer corps would mostly be anti-Diem after the pagoda raids, and said that they would no longer fight if the Ngos stayed in power. They thus concluded that if the coup failed, the communists would win, so the Americans had to either leave Vietnam pre-emptively or be forced out if the coup failed, or to overthrow Diem. Hilsman said that contingency plans for an American evacuation had been made.
Harriman then called for American moves for a coup, with which Kennedy agreed, The president also criticized the media coverage of The New York Times
Saigon correspondent David Halberstam
, who had debunked Nhu’s false claims that the army had launched the raids, and had been severely critical of the Ngo family.
Kennedy called for "assurances we were not giving him serious consideration in our decision. When we move to eliminate this government, it should not be the result of [The] New York Times pressure."
Taylor remained opposed to any moves towards the deposal of Diem. Years afterward, he said that Diem was "a terrible pain in the neck", but was a devoted servant of his country. Taylor called on Kennedy to support Diem until a better leader had been lined up, pointing out that the officers were divided and therefore could not be relied on to plot and stage a coup.
Hilsman then cited two phone calls on August 24 from Admiral Harry D. Felt
, the commander of US forces in the Pacific, calling for backing to the generals to remove Nhu. Felt said that the mid-level officers would not fight if Nhu was not removed. Taylor became angry that Felt had advised the State Department to move against Diem without first consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Taylor then told Kennedy that Americans would not tolerate their officers selecting the president, and thus they should not usurp the cabinet in doing the same in South Vietnam.
When pressed by McNamara as to which generals to support, Hilsman listed only Duong Van Minh
, Tran Thien Khiem
, and Nguyen Khanh
, and said that the trio had some colleagues that they refused to name. Kennedy expressed agreement with Lodge that the Ngo brothers would never part ways, as did officials in Vietnam, but Rusk disagreed, still hesitant to endorse a coup, although he said a decisive action would be necessary either way. Hilsman continued to say that the Vietnamese public blamed the Nhus for the situation and would welcome a coup, which in his opinion, would need support. Rusk said that if Nhu stayed, "we must actually decide whether to move our resources out or to move our troops in". Hilsman ended the meeting by saying to "It is imperative that we act".
According to Jones, the policy was "inherently contradictory: It offered Diem an opportunity to salvage his regime by making reforms at the same time that it undercut his regime by assuring assistance to the generals if they staged a coup."
United States Department of State
The United States Department of State , is the United States federal executive department responsible for international relations of the United States, equivalent to the foreign ministries of other countries...
to Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. was a Republican United States Senator from Massachusetts and a U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, South Vietnam, West Germany, and the Holy See . He was the Republican nominee for Vice President in the 1960 Presidential election.-Early life:Lodge was born in Nahant,...
, the US ambassador to South Vietnam
South Vietnam
South Vietnam was a state which governed southern Vietnam until 1975. It received international recognition in 1950 as the "State of Vietnam" and later as the "Republic of Vietnam" . Its capital was Saigon...
. The cable came in the wake of the midnight raids on August 21
Xa Loi Pagoda raids
The Xa Loi Pagoda raids were a series of synchronized attacks on various Buddhist pagodas in the major cities of South Vietnam shortly after midnight on August 21, 1963...
by the Catholic regime of Ngo Dinh Diem
Ngo Dinh Diem
Ngô Đình Diệm was the first president of South Vietnam . In the wake of the French withdrawal from Indochina as a result of the 1954 Geneva Accords, Diệm led the effort to create the Republic of Vietnam. Accruing considerable U.S. support due to his staunch anti-Communism, he achieved victory in a...
against Buddhist pagodas across the country, in which hundreds were believed to have been killed. The raids were orchestrated by Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu
Ngo Dinh Nhu
Ngô Ðình Nhu was the younger brother and chief political advisor of South Vietnam's first president, Ngô Ðình Diệm. Nhu was widely regarded as the architect of the Ngô family's nepotistic and autocratic rule over South Vietnam from 1955 to 1963...
and precipitated a change in US policy. The cable declared that Washington would no longer tolerate Nhu remaining in a position of power and ordered Lodge to pressure Diem to remove his brother. It said that if Diem refused, the Americans would explore the possibility for alternative leadership in South Vietnam. In effect, the cable authorized Lodge to give the green light to Army of the Republic of Vietnam
Army of the Republic of Vietnam
The Army of the Republic of Viet Nam , sometimes parsimoniously referred to as the South Vietnamese Army , was the land-based military forces of the Republic of Vietnam , which existed from October 26, 1955 until the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975...
(ARVN) officers to launch a coup against Diem if he did not willingly remove Nhu from power. The cable marked a turning point in US-Diem relations and was described in the Pentagon Papers
Pentagon Papers
The Pentagon Papers, officially titled United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, is a United States Department of Defense history of the United States' political-military involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1967...
as "controversial". Historian John W. Newman described it as "the single most controversial cable of the Vietnam War
Vietnam War
The Vietnam War was a Cold War-era military conflict that occurred in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia from 1 November 1955 to the fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975. This war followed the First Indochina War and was fought between North Vietnam, supported by its communist allies, and the government of...
".
The cable also highlighted an internal split in the Kennedy administration, with anti-Diem officials in the State Department prevailing over generals and Department of Defense officials who remained optimistic that the Vietnam War was proceeding well under Diem. This was underlined by the manner in which the cable was prepared before being transmitted to Lodge.
Background
The cable came in the wake of the midnight raids of August 21 by the Catholic regime of Ngo Dinh Diem against Buddhist pagodas across the country in which hundreds were believed to have been killed and more than a thousand monks and nuns were arrested. The pagodas were also extensively vandalised. Initially, the raids coincided with the declaration of martial law on the day before. A group of generals of the Army of the Republic of VietnamArmy of the Republic of Vietnam
The Army of the Republic of Viet Nam , sometimes parsimoniously referred to as the South Vietnamese Army , was the land-based military forces of the Republic of Vietnam , which existed from October 26, 1955 until the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975...
had asked Diem to give them extra powers to fight the Vietcong but secretly wanted to maneuver for a coup. Diem agreed, so that Nhu's Special Forces could take advantage and attack the Buddhist pagoda while disguised as regular ARVN forces. The raids were instigated by Nhu's Special Forces and Secret Police.
At first, there was confusion as to what had occurred. Nhu had ordered the phone lines into the US embassy and the US Information Service to be cut. A curfew was imposed on the streets, and it was initially believed that the regular army had orchestrated the attacks. The Voice of America
Voice of America
Voice of America is the official external broadcast institution of the United States federal government. It is one of five civilian U.S. international broadcasters working under the umbrella of the Broadcasting Board of Governors . VOA provides a wide range of programming for broadcast on radio...
initially broadcast Nhu's version of the events, which held that the army was responsible. This infuriated the ARVN generals, since many Vietnamese listened to the program as their only source of non-government, non-propaganda news. Through CIA agent Lucien Conein
Lucien Conein
Lt. Col. Lucien Emile Conein was a noted U.S. Army officer and Office of Strategic Services / Central Intelligence Agency operative...
, General Tran Van Don
Tran Van Don
Trần Văn Đôn was a general in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, and one of the principal figures in the coup d'état which deposed Ngô Đình Diệm from the presidency of South Vietnam.-Family:...
communicated to the Americans that Nhu had created the impression that the ARVN were responsible in order to increase dissent among the lower ranks and to weaken support for and discredit the generals in case they were planning a coup.
Preparation of the cable
On a Saturday afternoon, with Defense Secretary Robert McNamaraRobert McNamara
Robert Strange McNamara was an American business executive and the eighth Secretary of Defense, serving under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson from 1961 to 1968, during which time he played a large role in escalating the United States involvement in the Vietnam War...
and CIA director John McCone
John McCone
John Alexander McCone was an American businessman and politician who served as Director of Central Intelligence during the height of the Cold War.- Background :...
on vacation, the message was drafted by a group of State Department officials who were the only ones on duty. These were Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman
Roger Hilsman
Roger Hilsman is an author and political scientist. He served as an American soldier in Merrill's Marauders and then the Office of Strategic Services in China-Burma-India Theater of World War II during World War II and as an aide and adviser to President John F. Kennedy...
and Michael Forrestal
Michael Forrestal
Michael V. Forrestal was one of the leading aides to McGeorge Bundy, the national security adviser of President John F. Kennedy during the mid and latter stages of the Vietnam War . He was seen as a pivotal figure in the changing of U.S...
.
President John F. Kennedy
John F. Kennedy
John Fitzgerald "Jack" Kennedy , often referred to by his initials JFK, was the 35th President of the United States, serving from 1961 until his assassination in 1963....
was on vacation at Hyannis Port, his family retreat, when Forrestal telephoned seeking to expedite the process with the commander-in-chief’s verbal approval. Kennedy asked to them "wait until Monday" when all the key figures would be in Washington, but Forrestal said that Harriman and Hilsman wanted to get the cable "out right away". Kennedy thus told Forrestal to get another high-ranking official to “get it cleared".
Harriman and Hilsman then drove from their offices to a Maryland golf course where George Ball was playing with Alexis Johnson. Ball told the trio to meet him at his home after he and Johnson finished their round of golf. Having returned home, Ball read the message but— knowing that the telegram could raise the morale of the generals and prompt a coup—refused to authorize it until his three visitors had gained Rusk’s endorsement. Those present at Ball’s home then phoned and read the important passages of the message to Rusk. They asked Rusk what he thought of the message if Kennedy was comfortable too. Rusk replied, "Well, go ahead. If the president understood the implications, [I] would give a green light."
Ball then discussed the matter with the president, who asked "What do you think?" over the phone. Ball said that Harriman and Hilsman were in strong support, saying that his "watered down" version "would certainly be taken as encouragement by the generals to a coup." Ball said that his group regarded Diem as an embarrassment to Washington because of his "most unconscionable and cruel, uncivilized" actions. He further cited Nhu’s violence against the Buddhists and Madame Nhu’s verbal attacks as reasons for breaking with Diem. According to Ball, Kennedy appeared to be broadly supportive of the cable, although apprehensive as to whether a new leader would do a better job. As McNamara was away, Kennedy told Ball that the message was acceptable if Rusk and Roswell Gilpatric
Roswell Gilpatric
Roswell Leavitt Gilpatric was a prominent New York City corporate attorney and government official who served as Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1961–64, when he played a pivotal role in the high-stake strategies of the Cuban Missile Crisis, advising President John F...
endorsed it.
Rusk then approved the message. In the 1980s, Rusk said "If Ball, Harriman, and President Kennedy were going to send it out, I wasn't going to raise any questions." Forrestal then phoned Gilpatric’s farm in the evening and told him that both Kennedy and Rusk had already approved. Gilpatric later recalled that "If Rusk went along with it and the President went along with it, I wasn't going to oppose it." He washed his hands of the matter, saying that it was between Kennedy and the state department, saying that "In McNamara's absence I felt I should not hold it up, so I went along with it just like you countersign a voucher." Marine General Victor Krulak also signed off without showing his superior, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor. Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Richard McGarrah Helms was the Director of Central Intelligence from 1966 to 1973. He was the only director to have been convicted of lying to the United States Congress over Central Intelligence Agency undercover activities. In 1977, he was sentenced to the maximum fine and received a suspended...
of the CIA also endorsed the message without notifying the director John McCone
John McCone
John Alexander McCone was an American businessman and politician who served as Director of Central Intelligence during the height of the Cold War.- Background :...
; he later said that he believed that Forrestal was only advising of a resolution that had already been made. Forrestal then told Kennedy that he had gained the support of Kennedy’s inner circle, so the president told him to send the message. Cable 243 was thus sent to Lodge at 21:36.
Cable
The opening paragraphs of the cable stated:The cable went on to instruct Lodge to inform Diem that the US could not accept the raids and to call for strong action to address the Buddhist crisis. Lodge was told to tell the South Vietnamese military officers that:
The cable also informed Lodge of the need to exonerate the ARVN from responsibility of the pagoda raids. It asked Lodge to approve a broadcast by the Voice of America
Voice of America
Voice of America is the official external broadcast institution of the United States federal government. It is one of five civilian U.S. international broadcasters working under the umbrella of the Broadcasting Board of Governors . VOA provides a wide range of programming for broadcast on radio...
placing the responsibility on Nhu. Lodge was further requested to examine and search for alternative leadership to replace Diem.
Lodge's response
Lodge replied the next day and endorsed the strong position but proposed to refrain from approaching Diem to suggest that Nhu be removed. Lodge advocated only stating the US position to the generals and in effect to encourage the ARVN to stage a coup. Lodge's cable stated:Infighting
The decision to authorise the cable prompted significant infighting in the Kennedy administration. This began on a Monday morning meeting at the White HouseWhite House
The White House is the official residence and principal workplace of the president of the United States. Located at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW in Washington, D.C., the house was designed by Irish-born James Hoban, and built between 1792 and 1800 of white-painted Aquia sandstone in the Neoclassical...
on August 26. Kennedy was met with angry comments by Rusk, McNamara, McCone and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor, all of whom denied authorising the cable. Kennedy was reported to have said "My God! My government's coming apart." Taylor felt insulted by the final line of the cable which asserted that only the "minimum essential people" had seen its contents. During an acrimonius exchange at a midday meeting, he condemned the cable as an "egregious end run" by an anti-Diem faction. Hilsman
Roger Hilsman
Roger Hilsman is an author and political scientist. He served as an American soldier in Merrill's Marauders and then the Office of Strategic Services in China-Burma-India Theater of World War II during World War II and as an aide and adviser to President John F. Kennedy...
rebutted Taylor by asserting that Kennedy and representatives of departments and agencies had approved the message. Years afterward, Taylor declared
Taylor claimed that the message was reflective of Forrestal
Michael Forrestal
Michael V. Forrestal was one of the leading aides to McGeorge Bundy, the national security adviser of President John F. Kennedy during the mid and latter stages of the Vietnam War . He was seen as a pivotal figure in the changing of U.S...
and Hilsman's "well-known compulsion" to remove Diem. He accused them of pulling "a fast one".
Kennedy could no longer stand the arguing among his officials and shouted "This shit has got to stop!" Kennedy was angry at Forrestal and Hilsman; the former for what he deemed to be incompetence and Harriman for indiscretion. When Kennedy angrily criticised Forrestal for proceeding without gaining the explicit approval of McCone, Forrestal offered to resign. Kennedy acerbicly replied "You're not worth firing. You owe me something, so you stick around."
In the end, despite the bitter disagreement, the cable was not retracted. Ball refused to back down, maintaining that "the evil influence of the Nhus" overrode all other factors. Ball later described Diem as "an offense to America" and said that his government should not tolerate "such brutality and crass disregard of world sensitivities”. However, he also admitted that he did not know much about the leading figures in South Vietnam. McCone did not advocate a reversal of policy despite disagreeing with the process in which the telegram left Washington. Taylor also agreed to stand by the original decision despite his disagreement. He said that "You can't change American policy in twenty-four hours and expect anyone to ever believe you again." Kennedy walked around the meeting table and asked each of his advisers whether they wanted to change course. None were willing to tell him to retract his telegram.
Colby recalled that "It is difficult indeed to tell a President to his face that something he has approved is wrong and to do so without anything positive to offer in its place."
As a result, Kennedy chose not to revoke Cable 243, thereby enabling Lodge to proceed in encouraging a coup. The historian Howard Jones called it "a momentous decision".
According to Hilsman, Kennedy "didn't say anything" with regards to reservations about the coup. Kennedy had unanimous but uneasy and unhappy support from his advisers, although in reality only the decision had been made by a vocal anti-Diem minority who had sidestepped their colleagues and avoided getting a consensus to put in place a policy without thorough deliberation. The president was angry with himself and his advisers; him for being pressured into a hasty decision and his advisers for their dishonesty.
Robert Kennedy had discussed the matter of revoking the cable with McNamara and Taylor, but felt pressured into not backflipping on something that the administration had not "fully discussed, as every other major decision since the Bay of Pigs had been discussed".
Kennedy later described the cable as a "major mistake", feeling that most of the blame fell at Harriman’s feet. His brother said "The result is we started down a road that we never really recovered from".
Encouraged by the authorization for Lodge to interfere directly in South Vietnam’s governance process, the critics of Diem from the State Department tried to capitalize on the momentum that they had developed.
A midday meeting followed at the White House on the same Monday, August 26. Continuing on from Saturday’s activism, Hilsman recommended pressuring Diem to replace his brother Nhu with a combination of military figures and civilians. Encouraged by the administration's choice to proceed with the telegram, Hilsman said that if Diem retained his brother, Washington should move to remove Diem and start a military-led regime led by General Tran Thien Khiem
Tran Thien Khiem
General Trần Thiện Khiêm was an officer in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam War. During the 1960s he was involved in several coups. He helped President Ngo Dinh Diem put down a November 1960 coup attempt and was rewarded with promotion...
, the Army Chief of Staff and General Nguyen Khanh
Nguyen Khanh
Nguyễn Khánh is a former general in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam who variously served as Head of State and Prime minister of South Vietnam while at the head of a military junta from January 1964 until February 1965. He was involved in or against many coup attempts, failed and successful,...
, who commanded the II Corps
II Corps (South Vietnam)
The II Corps was a corps of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam , the army of the nation state of South Vietnam that existed from 1955 to 1975. It was one of four corps in the ARVN, and it oversaw the region of the central highlands region, north of the capital Saigon...
—one of four in South Vietnam—based in the central highlands
Tây Nguyên
Tây Nguyên, translated as Western Highlands and sometimes also called Central Highlands, is one of the regions of Vietnam. It contains the provinces of Đắk Lắk, Đắk Nông, Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Lâm Đồng....
town of Pleiku
Pleiku
Pleiku is a town in central Vietnam, located in that nation's central highland region. It is the capital of the Gia Lai Province; it is inhabited primarily by the Bahnar and Jarai ethnic groups, sometimes known as the Montagnards or Degar....
.
Kennedy asked Hilsman of the consequences of a failed coup; his adviser said that it would be bad for the US, as Nhu was anti-American. McNamara agreed with Hilsman, and they thought that only Tung's men and some marine battalions remained loyal to Nhu.
The advisors thought that the officer corps would mostly be anti-Diem after the pagoda raids, and said that they would no longer fight if the Ngos stayed in power. They thus concluded that if the coup failed, the communists would win, so the Americans had to either leave Vietnam pre-emptively or be forced out if the coup failed, or to overthrow Diem. Hilsman said that contingency plans for an American evacuation had been made.
Harriman then called for American moves for a coup, with which Kennedy agreed, The president also criticized the media coverage of The New York Times
The New York Times
The New York Times is an American daily newspaper founded and continuously published in New York City since 1851. The New York Times has won 106 Pulitzer Prizes, the most of any news organization...
Saigon correspondent David Halberstam
David Halberstam
David Halberstam was an American Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, author and historian, known for his early work on the Vietnam War, his work on politics, history, the Civil Rights Movement, business, media, American culture, and his later sports journalism.-Early life and education:Halberstam...
, who had debunked Nhu’s false claims that the army had launched the raids, and had been severely critical of the Ngo family.
Kennedy called for "assurances we were not giving him serious consideration in our decision. When we move to eliminate this government, it should not be the result of [The] New York Times pressure."
Taylor remained opposed to any moves towards the deposal of Diem. Years afterward, he said that Diem was "a terrible pain in the neck", but was a devoted servant of his country. Taylor called on Kennedy to support Diem until a better leader had been lined up, pointing out that the officers were divided and therefore could not be relied on to plot and stage a coup.
Hilsman then cited two phone calls on August 24 from Admiral Harry D. Felt
Harry D. Felt
Admiral Harry Donald Felt was an aviator in the United States Navy who led U.S. carrier strikes during World War II and later served as commander in chief of Pacific Command from 1958 to 1964.-Early career:...
, the commander of US forces in the Pacific, calling for backing to the generals to remove Nhu. Felt said that the mid-level officers would not fight if Nhu was not removed. Taylor became angry that Felt had advised the State Department to move against Diem without first consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Taylor then told Kennedy that Americans would not tolerate their officers selecting the president, and thus they should not usurp the cabinet in doing the same in South Vietnam.
When pressed by McNamara as to which generals to support, Hilsman listed only Duong Van Minh
Duong Van Minh
Minh was born on 16 February 1916 in Mỹ Tho Province in the Mekong Delta, the son of a wealthy landowner who served in a prominent position in the Finance Ministry of the French colonial administration...
, Tran Thien Khiem
Tran Thien Khiem
General Trần Thiện Khiêm was an officer in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam War. During the 1960s he was involved in several coups. He helped President Ngo Dinh Diem put down a November 1960 coup attempt and was rewarded with promotion...
, and Nguyen Khanh
Nguyen Khanh
Nguyễn Khánh is a former general in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam who variously served as Head of State and Prime minister of South Vietnam while at the head of a military junta from January 1964 until February 1965. He was involved in or against many coup attempts, failed and successful,...
, and said that the trio had some colleagues that they refused to name. Kennedy expressed agreement with Lodge that the Ngo brothers would never part ways, as did officials in Vietnam, but Rusk disagreed, still hesitant to endorse a coup, although he said a decisive action would be necessary either way. Hilsman continued to say that the Vietnamese public blamed the Nhus for the situation and would welcome a coup, which in his opinion, would need support. Rusk said that if Nhu stayed, "we must actually decide whether to move our resources out or to move our troops in". Hilsman ended the meeting by saying to "It is imperative that we act".
According to Jones, the policy was "inherently contradictory: It offered Diem an opportunity to salvage his regime by making reforms at the same time that it undercut his regime by assuring assistance to the generals if they staged a coup."