Truppenführung
Encyclopedia
was a German
Army
field manual
published in 2 parts as : Part 1, promulgated in 1933, and Part 2 in 1934.
The original German text, which is notable for its clarity, was prepared by a group led by Colonel General
Ludwig Beck
(1880–1944) who was later executed by the Nazi administration for his part in the 1944 plot against Hitler
. The original publication consisted of a two-part, soft cover, pocket-sized manual, which was issued to all commissioned officers and senior non-commissioned officer
s. It contained basic military doctrine
for the German land forces () from its first publication up to the end of World War II
. A modified form is still in use today by the Federal German Army
(). The approximate equivalent U.S. Army
field manual was FM 100-5, now re-issued as FM-3.0 (Operations) (with later revisions) and available for download at the U.S. Army website. The British Army equivalent manual is Field Service Regulations, also available for download at the British Army website.
n army although its traditions go back to the Scharnhorst
reforms of 1810-1812. The modern basis of this Field Manual can be seen in the von Moltke
reforms of the mid 19th century. It was in von Moltke’s ‘Instructions for Large Unit Commanders’ and his concept of separated armies that we begin to see the emergence of modern German doctrine. The system of moving units separately and concentrating as an army before a battle resulted in more efficient supply and lower vulnerability to modern firepower. To enable a successful flanking attack, he asserted that concentration could only take place after the commencement of a battle. This was a development of the Scharnhorst concept of 'March Divided, Fight United.’
A major consequence of this innovation was the commander's loss of overall control of his forces due to his available means of communication which, at that time were visual (line-of-sight) or couriers, either mounted or on foot. The traditional concept of the elimination of uncertainty by means of ‘total obedience’ was now obsolete and operational initiative had to be assigned to a point further down the chain of command. In this new concept, commanders of distant detachments were required to exercise initiative in their decision making and von Moltke emphasised the benefits of developing officers who could do this within the limits of the senior commander’s intention.
He accomplished this by means of directives stating his intentions, rather than detailed orders, and he was willing to accept deviations from a directive provided that it was within the general framework of the mission. Von Moltke held this view firmly and it later became a fundamental of all German military theory.
Although other theorists have criticised him, von Moltke’s insistence that local commanders be allowed freedom of action has been defended by many German writers together with the concept that large armies made a flexible system of command necessary. Prussian and German Field Service Regulations published after 1870 confirm this concept and it is listed, word for word, in of 1933:
At the beginning of the First World War, the German armed forces were using a set of Field Service Regulations which had been issued in 1905. Their doctrine drew heavily on Clausewitz and von Moltke the Elder but the main influence was that of General Alfred von Schlieffen, then Chief of the General Staff. Many in the German army of the period did not accept some of the Clauswitz concepts such as the importance of the Defense and the relationship between war and politics. Although the traditional image of stagnation and trench warfare is correct, this period also produced many of the tactical concepts which are associated with modern warfare. On the defense (1915–1917) they pioneered and mastered: Flexible Defense, Defense-in-Depth
and Reverse-Slope Defense
. On the Offense in 1918, they perfected Fluid Non-Linear Infiltration tactics supported by artillery.
After the end of WWI, the Reichswehr under the direction of General Hans von Seeckt
, very carefully, studied the conduct and developments of the war. The result of the v.Seeckt reforms was the new tactical doctrine manual H.DV.487, Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen, now generally known as das Fug, published as Part 1 in 1921 and Part 2 in 1923.
An important introduction in the post WWI reforms was the introduction of Auftragstaktik, which can be translated as ‘Mission Command’ (U.K. forces definition) or: ‘Mission-Type Orders, or Directive Control’ (United States forces) and Mission-type tactics
(Federal German Army). The principal is that the senior commander states his intention (the mission) to his subordinate commanders. He informs them of the mission, the available means and the timeframe within which the mission has to be accomplished. He then places mission planning and execution in the hands of his subordinates and holds himself available to offer helpful advice and suggestions, but only if requested.
In 1925, von Seeckt noted: ‘The principal thing now is to increase the responsibilities of the individual soldier, particularly his independence of action, with the profitable result of increasing the capability of the individual’.
, in this sense was not a set of rules but rather a set of intellectual tools which could be consulted at any time and which would provide intellectual stimulus in any given situation. The unpredictable and chaotic nature of warfare is specifically referred to in the following sections of the manual (quoted in full):
Section 4 Lessons in the art of war cannot be exhaustively compiled in the form of regulations. The principles enunciated must be applied in accordance with the situation. Simple actions, logically carried out will lead most surely to the objective.
Section 6 The command of an army and its subordinate units requires leaders capable of judgement, with clear vision and foresight, and the ability to make independent and decisive decisions and carry them out unwaveringly and positively. Such leaders must be impervious to the changes in the fortunes of war and possess full awareness of the high degree of responsibility placed on their shoulders.
Section 8 The example and personal bearing of officers and other soldiers who are responsible for leadership has a decisive effect on the troops. The officer, who in the face of the enemy displays coolness, decisiveness and courage, carries his troops with him. He also must win their affection and earn their trust through his understanding of their feelings, their way of thinking, and through his selfless care for them. Mutual trust is the surest foundation for discipline in times of need and danger.
The emptiness of the battlefield (die Leere des Schlachtfelds) requires soldiers who can think and act independently, who can make calculated, decisive and daring use of every situation and who understand that victory depends on each individual.
Training, physical fitness, selflessness, determination, self-confidence and daring equip a man to master the most difficult situations..
Section 12 Leaders must live with their troops and share in their dangers and deprivations, their joys and sorrows. Only thus can they acquire a first-hand knowledge of the combat capabilities and needs of their soldiers.
The individual is a part of the whole and is not only responsible for himself alone but also for his comrades. He who is capable of more than the others, who can achieve more, must guide and lead the inexperienced and the weak. Out of such a foundation grows genuine comradeship, which is as important between the leaders and the men as it is among the men themselves.
As Matthew Cooper states in his book The German Army 1933-45,
today is still widely considered to be one of the most influential military manuals ever produced. Surprisingly, until 2001 very little of its text was available in English except for some roughly translated excerpts and hand written notes in U.S. military archives and the Wedermeyer report. Equally surprisingly, the manual was classified by the United States military authorities until 2001 when the first full English translation was completed.
Germany
Germany , officially the Federal Republic of Germany , is a federal parliamentary republic in Europe. The country consists of 16 states while the capital and largest city is Berlin. Germany covers an area of 357,021 km2 and has a largely temperate seasonal climate...
Army
Army
An army An army An army (from Latin arma "arms, weapons" via Old French armée, "armed" (feminine), in the broadest sense, is the land-based military of a nation or state. It may also include other branches of the military such as the air force via means of aviation corps...
field manual
Field Manual
__FORCETOC__Field Manual is the second solo album by Death Cab for Cutie guitarist Chris Walla, released on January 29, 2008 on Barsuk Records. The album is Walla's first under his own name...
published in 2 parts as : Part 1, promulgated in 1933, and Part 2 in 1934.
The original German text, which is notable for its clarity, was prepared by a group led by Colonel General
Colonel General
Colonel General is a senior rank of General. North Korea and Russia are two countries which have used the rank extensively throughout their histories...
Ludwig Beck
Ludwig Beck
Generaloberst Ludwig August Theodor Beck was a German general and Chief of the German General Staff during the early years of the Nazi regime in Germany before World War II....
(1880–1944) who was later executed by the Nazi administration for his part in the 1944 plot against Hitler
Adolf Hitler
Adolf Hitler was an Austrian-born German politician and the leader of the National Socialist German Workers Party , commonly referred to as the Nazi Party). He was Chancellor of Germany from 1933 to 1945, and head of state from 1934 to 1945...
. The original publication consisted of a two-part, soft cover, pocket-sized manual, which was issued to all commissioned officers and senior non-commissioned officer
Non-commissioned officer
A non-commissioned officer , called a sub-officer in some countries, is a military officer who has not been given a commission...
s. It contained basic military doctrine
Military doctrine
Military doctrine is the concise expression of how military forces contribute to campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements.It is a guide to action, not hard and fast rules. Doctrine provides a common frame of reference across the military...
for the German land forces () from its first publication up to the end of World War II
World War II
World War II, or the Second World War , was a global conflict lasting from 1939 to 1945, involving most of the world's nations—including all of the great powers—eventually forming two opposing military alliances: the Allies and the Axis...
. A modified form is still in use today by the Federal German Army
German Army
The German Army is the land component of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany. Following the disbanding of the Wehrmacht after World War II, it was re-established in 1955 as the Bundesheer, part of the newly formed West German Bundeswehr along with the Navy and the Air Force...
(). The approximate equivalent U.S. Army
United States Army
The United States Army is the main branch of the United States Armed Forces responsible for land-based military operations. It is the largest and oldest established branch of the U.S. military, and is one of seven U.S. uniformed services...
field manual was FM 100-5, now re-issued as FM-3.0 (Operations) (with later revisions) and available for download at the U.S. Army website. The British Army equivalent manual is Field Service Regulations, also available for download at the British Army website.
Background
has its doctrinal origins in the late 19th century PrussiaPrussia
Prussia was a German kingdom and historic state originating out of the Duchy of Prussia and the Margraviate of Brandenburg. For centuries, the House of Hohenzollern ruled Prussia, successfully expanding its size by way of an unusually well-organized and effective army. Prussia shaped the history...
n army although its traditions go back to the Scharnhorst
Gerhard von Scharnhorst
Gerhard Johann David Waitz von Scharnhorst was a general in Prussian service, Chief of the Prussian General Staff, noted for both his writings, his reforms of the Prussian army, and his leadership during the Napoleonic Wars....
reforms of 1810-1812. The modern basis of this Field Manual can be seen in the von Moltke
Helmuth von Moltke the Elder
Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke was a German Field Marshal. The chief of staff of the Prussian Army for thirty years, he is regarded as one of the great strategists of the latter 19th century, and the creator of a new, more modern method of directing armies in the field...
reforms of the mid 19th century. It was in von Moltke’s ‘Instructions for Large Unit Commanders’ and his concept of separated armies that we begin to see the emergence of modern German doctrine. The system of moving units separately and concentrating as an army before a battle resulted in more efficient supply and lower vulnerability to modern firepower. To enable a successful flanking attack, he asserted that concentration could only take place after the commencement of a battle. This was a development of the Scharnhorst concept of 'March Divided, Fight United.’
A major consequence of this innovation was the commander's loss of overall control of his forces due to his available means of communication which, at that time were visual (line-of-sight) or couriers, either mounted or on foot. The traditional concept of the elimination of uncertainty by means of ‘total obedience’ was now obsolete and operational initiative had to be assigned to a point further down the chain of command. In this new concept, commanders of distant detachments were required to exercise initiative in their decision making and von Moltke emphasised the benefits of developing officers who could do this within the limits of the senior commander’s intention.
He accomplished this by means of directives stating his intentions, rather than detailed orders, and he was willing to accept deviations from a directive provided that it was within the general framework of the mission. Von Moltke held this view firmly and it later became a fundamental of all German military theory.
Although other theorists have criticised him, von Moltke’s insistence that local commanders be allowed freedom of action has been defended by many German writers together with the concept that large armies made a flexible system of command necessary. Prussian and German Field Service Regulations published after 1870 confirm this concept and it is listed, word for word, in of 1933:
Details
Section 15
Every man, from the youngest soldier upward, must be required at all times and in all situations to commit his whole mental, spiritual and physical strength. Only in this way will the full force of a unit be brought to bear in decisive action. Only thus will men develop, who will in the hour of danger maintain their courage and decisiveness and carry their weaker comrades with them to achieve deeds of daring.
The first criterion in war remains decisive action. Everyone from the highest commander down to the youngest soldier, must be constantly aware that inaction and neglect incriminate him more severely than any error in the choice of means. (emphasis in the original text)
At the beginning of the First World War, the German armed forces were using a set of Field Service Regulations which had been issued in 1905. Their doctrine drew heavily on Clausewitz and von Moltke the Elder but the main influence was that of General Alfred von Schlieffen, then Chief of the General Staff. Many in the German army of the period did not accept some of the Clauswitz concepts such as the importance of the Defense and the relationship between war and politics. Although the traditional image of stagnation and trench warfare is correct, this period also produced many of the tactical concepts which are associated with modern warfare. On the defense (1915–1917) they pioneered and mastered: Flexible Defense, Defense-in-Depth
Defence in depth
Defence in depth is a military strategy; it seeks to delay rather than prevent the advance of an attacker, buying time and causing additional casualties by yielding space...
and Reverse-Slope Defense
Reverse slope defence
A reverse slope defence is a military tactic where a defending force is positioned on the slope of an elevated terrain feature such as a hill, ridge, or mountain, on the side opposite from the attacking force...
. On the Offense in 1918, they perfected Fluid Non-Linear Infiltration tactics supported by artillery.
After the end of WWI, the Reichswehr under the direction of General Hans von Seeckt
Hans von Seeckt
Johannes Friedrich "Hans" von Seeckt was a German military officer noted for his organization of the German Army during the Weimar Republic.-Early life:...
, very carefully, studied the conduct and developments of the war. The result of the v.Seeckt reforms was the new tactical doctrine manual H.DV.487, Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen, now generally known as das Fug, published as Part 1 in 1921 and Part 2 in 1923.
An important introduction in the post WWI reforms was the introduction of Auftragstaktik, which can be translated as ‘Mission Command’ (U.K. forces definition) or: ‘Mission-Type Orders, or Directive Control’ (United States forces) and Mission-type tactics
Mission-type tactics
Mission-type tactics , have been a central component of the tactics of German armed forces since the 19th century. The term Auftragstaktik was coined by opponents of the development of mission-type tactics...
(Federal German Army). The principal is that the senior commander states his intention (the mission) to his subordinate commanders. He informs them of the mission, the available means and the timeframe within which the mission has to be accomplished. He then places mission planning and execution in the hands of his subordinates and holds himself available to offer helpful advice and suggestions, but only if requested.
‘'For to work, it is necessary that a subordinate leader, or even a common soldier, has to fully understand the commander’s intent, also to the next higher level of command, and the purpose of the mission. If he does not understand, then he has the obligation to ask.’'
In 1925, von Seeckt noted: ‘The principal thing now is to increase the responsibilities of the individual soldier, particularly his independence of action, with the profitable result of increasing the capability of the individual’.
Impact
The impact of das Fug and on the Reichswehr and, later the Heer, was wide.- The delegation of command responsibility throughout the army, as necessary for the accomplishment of a mission and, if required, down to the individual soldier.
- The removal of social barriers between officers and men where the command relationship is based upon mutual respect, trust and confidence, as described in sections 7 and 12.
- The preparation for the introduction of aircraft, armored units and combined-arms units some years before the first armored division was formed in the Heer.
- The concept that the conduct of operations cannot be defined or laid down in field manuals, or other regulations which inhibit a commanders’ flexibility.
, in this sense was not a set of rules but rather a set of intellectual tools which could be consulted at any time and which would provide intellectual stimulus in any given situation. The unpredictable and chaotic nature of warfare is specifically referred to in the following sections of the manual (quoted in full):
Lynne-Rienner Edition 2001
Section 2 The conduct of war is subject to continual development. New weapons dictate ever-changing forms. Their appearance must be anticipated and their influence evaluated. They must be placed in service quickly.Section 4 Lessons in the art of war cannot be exhaustively compiled in the form of regulations. The principles enunciated must be applied in accordance with the situation. Simple actions, logically carried out will lead most surely to the objective.
Section 6 The command of an army and its subordinate units requires leaders capable of judgement, with clear vision and foresight, and the ability to make independent and decisive decisions and carry them out unwaveringly and positively. Such leaders must be impervious to the changes in the fortunes of war and possess full awareness of the high degree of responsibility placed on their shoulders.
On Leadership and the qualities of Officers
Section 7 An officer is in every sense a teacher and a leader. In addition to his knowledge of men and his sense of justice, he must be distinguished by superior knowledge and experience, by moral excellence, by self-discipline and by high courage.Section 8 The example and personal bearing of officers and other soldiers who are responsible for leadership has a decisive effect on the troops. The officer, who in the face of the enemy displays coolness, decisiveness and courage, carries his troops with him. He also must win their affection and earn their trust through his understanding of their feelings, their way of thinking, and through his selfless care for them. Mutual trust is the surest foundation for discipline in times of need and danger.
On the value of the individual soldier
Section 10 The decisive factor, despite technology and weaponry, is the value of the individual soldier. The wider his experience in combat, the greater his importance.The emptiness of the battlefield (die Leere des Schlachtfelds) requires soldiers who can think and act independently, who can make calculated, decisive and daring use of every situation and who understand that victory depends on each individual.
Training, physical fitness, selflessness, determination, self-confidence and daring equip a man to master the most difficult situations..
Section 12 Leaders must live with their troops and share in their dangers and deprivations, their joys and sorrows. Only thus can they acquire a first-hand knowledge of the combat capabilities and needs of their soldiers.
The individual is a part of the whole and is not only responsible for himself alone but also for his comrades. He who is capable of more than the others, who can achieve more, must guide and lead the inexperienced and the weak. Out of such a foundation grows genuine comradeship, which is as important between the leaders and the men as it is among the men themselves.
As Matthew Cooper states in his book The German Army 1933-45,
"On the question of tactics, die was a brilliant exposition of modern principles and drew sound lessons from Germany’s terrible experience in the 1914-1918 war. Initiative, decisive manoeuvre and envelopment were the keynotes of the German tactical doctrine. Its success in the war years was to prove immeasurably superior to the methods of its enemies"
today is still widely considered to be one of the most influential military manuals ever produced. Surprisingly, until 2001 very little of its text was available in English except for some roughly translated excerpts and hand written notes in U.S. military archives and the Wedermeyer report. Equally surprisingly, the manual was classified by the United States military authorities until 2001 when the first full English translation was completed.