Swampman
Encyclopedia
Swampman is the subject of a philosophical
thought experiment
introduced by Donald Davidson
, in his 1987 paper "Knowing One's Own Mind". The experiment runs as follows:
Davidson holds that there would nevertheless be a difference, though no one would notice it. Swampman will appear to recognize Davidson's friends, but it is impossible for him to actually recognize them, as he has never seen them before. As Davidson puts it, "it can't recognize anything, because it never cognized anything in the first place."
These considerations lead Davidson to deny that the Swampman's utterances can be construed as referring to anything in particular. To take a fairly specific example: suppose that at some point the previous day Davidson had looked at a glass marble on a shelf; unbeknownst to him there was another, visually identical glass marble hidden right behind it. When he makes an assertion about 'the marble I saw yesterday' we take him to be referring to the one that he did in fact see, even if he could not supply enough descriptive information to identify it later. Had the marbles been arranged in the other order, therefore, we would take him to be referring to the other marble, yet his internal state would be identical.
The Swampman has no causal history. He is in the same state as the actual Davidson and the counter-factual Davidson considered above, whose utterances refer to different marbles. As a result his utterance could refer to either marble. In principle, Davidson tells us, the above indeterminacies can be extended to any degree we like: the fact that the Swampman happens to be identical to Davidson does not change the fact that he could have arrived at that state by any one of countless histories, each of which would demand we interpret him differently. Until the Swampman has begun interacting with and using language among the objects of the real world, we can have no grounds to attributing any meanings or thoughts to him at all.
Amongst those who accept the force of this argument, there are two distinct ways of viewing its consequences. On the one hand, many philosophers have taken it to affect merely how we should evaluate Swampman. The argument is believed to demonstrate that Swampman's utterances and thoughts do not mean anything, and do not refer to anything in particular. On this view, Swampman's subjectivity
and consciousness
are considered to be unchanged. Others have argued that this lack of a causal history renders incoherent the notion that Swampman could have a mind
at all, which in turn raises the question of whether he is, in fact, a person
. (Note that Davidson calls Swampman 'it' rather than 'he'. This is obviously not a result of anatomical considerations.)
This argument depends upon the acceptance of semantic externalism
- the claim that what one's words mean is determined not merely by some internal state, but also by the causal history of the speaker.
This concept has been said to have implications for mind uploading or mind transferance, as it indirectly addresses the question of whether an exact replica of one's brain patterns created within an alternate brain, an android brain, or a virtual universe is the same being as the person it was copied from, or another being entirely.
Philosophy
Philosophy is the study of general and fundamental problems, such as those connected with existence, knowledge, values, reason, mind, and language. Philosophy is distinguished from other ways of addressing such problems by its critical, generally systematic approach and its reliance on rational...
thought experiment
Thought experiment
A thought experiment or Gedankenexperiment considers some hypothesis, theory, or principle for the purpose of thinking through its consequences...
introduced by Donald Davidson
Donald Davidson (philosopher)
Donald Herbert Davidson was an American philosopher born in Springfield, Massachusetts, who served as Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley from 1981 to 2003 after having also held teaching appointments at Stanford University, Rockefeller University, Princeton...
, in his 1987 paper "Knowing One's Own Mind". The experiment runs as follows:
Davidson holds that there would nevertheless be a difference, though no one would notice it. Swampman will appear to recognize Davidson's friends, but it is impossible for him to actually recognize them, as he has never seen them before. As Davidson puts it, "it can't recognize anything, because it never cognized anything in the first place."
These considerations lead Davidson to deny that the Swampman's utterances can be construed as referring to anything in particular. To take a fairly specific example: suppose that at some point the previous day Davidson had looked at a glass marble on a shelf; unbeknownst to him there was another, visually identical glass marble hidden right behind it. When he makes an assertion about 'the marble I saw yesterday' we take him to be referring to the one that he did in fact see, even if he could not supply enough descriptive information to identify it later. Had the marbles been arranged in the other order, therefore, we would take him to be referring to the other marble, yet his internal state would be identical.
The Swampman has no causal history. He is in the same state as the actual Davidson and the counter-factual Davidson considered above, whose utterances refer to different marbles. As a result his utterance could refer to either marble. In principle, Davidson tells us, the above indeterminacies can be extended to any degree we like: the fact that the Swampman happens to be identical to Davidson does not change the fact that he could have arrived at that state by any one of countless histories, each of which would demand we interpret him differently. Until the Swampman has begun interacting with and using language among the objects of the real world, we can have no grounds to attributing any meanings or thoughts to him at all.
Amongst those who accept the force of this argument, there are two distinct ways of viewing its consequences. On the one hand, many philosophers have taken it to affect merely how we should evaluate Swampman. The argument is believed to demonstrate that Swampman's utterances and thoughts do not mean anything, and do not refer to anything in particular. On this view, Swampman's subjectivity
Subjectivity
Subjectivity refers to the subject and his or her perspective, feelings, beliefs, and desires. In philosophy, the term is usually contrasted with objectivity.-Qualia:...
and consciousness
Consciousness
Consciousness is a term that refers to the relationship between the mind and the world with which it interacts. It has been defined as: subjectivity, awareness, the ability to experience or to feel, wakefulness, having a sense of selfhood, and the executive control system of the mind...
are considered to be unchanged. Others have argued that this lack of a causal history renders incoherent the notion that Swampman could have a mind
Mind
The concept of mind is understood in many different ways by many different traditions, ranging from panpsychism and animism to traditional and organized religious views, as well as secular and materialist philosophies. Most agree that minds are constituted by conscious experience and intelligent...
at all, which in turn raises the question of whether he is, in fact, a person
Person
A person is a human being, or an entity that has certain capacities or attributes strongly associated with being human , for example in a particular moral or legal context...
. (Note that Davidson calls Swampman 'it' rather than 'he'. This is obviously not a result of anatomical considerations.)
This argument depends upon the acceptance of semantic externalism
Semantic externalism
In the philosophy of language, semantic externalism is the view that the meaning of a term is determined, in whole or in part, by factors external to the speaker. According to an externalist position, one can claim without contradiction that two speakers could be in exactly the same brain state at...
- the claim that what one's words mean is determined not merely by some internal state, but also by the causal history of the speaker.
Objections
- Other philosophers have denied that any such conclusions can be derived from this thought experiment. Many adherents to the mind-brain identity theory have maintained that, as Swampman's brain is identical to Davidson's, so must his mind be identical to Davidson's. Therefore, any theory of language which leads one to conclude that Swampman's utterances and, particularly, thoughts, are any different from Davidson's is necessarily flawed.
- Others (such as Daniel Dennett in Consciousness Explained) have called into question the validity of this sort of thought experiment altogether, maintaining that when a thought experiment is too far moved from the actual state of affairsState of affairsThe state of affairs is that combination of circumstances applying within a society or group at a particular time. The current state of affairs may be considered acceptable by many observers, but not necessarily by all. The state of affairs may present a challenge, or be complicated, or contain a...
, our intuitions cease to be meaningful. - A third point of objection is that Davidson and the Swampman become individuals in their own rights immediately when they make choices of their own. Regardless of their physical make-up, neither can be defined in any way as individuals until their choices are considered. Thus, the two are only identical people insofar as they make their own choices—something which the thought experiment does not consider.
This concept has been said to have implications for mind uploading or mind transferance, as it indirectly addresses the question of whether an exact replica of one's brain patterns created within an alternate brain, an android brain, or a virtual universe is the same being as the person it was copied from, or another being entirely.
See also
- Twin Earth thought experimentTwin Earth thought experimentThe Twin Earth thought experiment was presented by philosopher Hilary Putnam in his 1973 paper "Meaning and Reference" and subsequent 1975 paper "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", as an early argument for what has subsequently come to be known as semantic externalism...
- Philosophical zombiePhilosophical zombieA philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience...
- Gareth EvansGareth Evans (philosopher)Gareth Evans was a British philosopher.-Life:Gareth Evans studied Philosophy, Politics and Economics at University College, Oxford . His philosophy tutor was Peter Strawson...
- Identity and changeIdentity and changeThe relationship between identity and change in the philosophical field of metaphysics seems, at first glance, deceptively simple, and belies the complexity of the issues involved. This article explores "the problem of change and identity".- Change :...
- Philip K. DickPhilip K. DickPhilip Kindred Dick was an American novelist, short story writer and essayist whose published work is almost entirely in the science fiction genre. Dick explored sociological, political and metaphysical themes in novels dominated by monopolistic corporations, authoritarian governments and altered...
- Ship of TheseusShip of TheseusThe Ship of Theseus, also known as Theseus' paradox, or various variants, notably grandfather's axe and Trigger's Broom is a paradox that raises the question of whether an object which has had all its component parts replaced remains fundamentally the same object.The paradox is most notably...