Folk psychology
Encyclopedia
Folk psychology is the set of assumptions, constructs, and convictions that makes up the everyday language in which people discuss human psychology
. Folk psychology embraces everyday concepts like “beliefs”, "desires”, “fear”, and “hope".
, it is referred to as the theory theory. The theory of mind consisting of our ‘common sense’ understanding mental states can be interpreted two distinct ways, in an external sense and an internal sense.
. Likewise, all folk theory combine to serve as a code of wisdom, assorted from experiences of a limited but "adequate" level of confirmation. In principle, folk theorization is a complex, haphazard activity of the mind in a struggle to inform actions, opinions or a concept of the world, based on the joined account of known fact, hearsay and personal experience; or rather, correlating the outward aspects of human behaviors, mental states (sometimes linked to broader conditions), and a register of situations, to certain attitudes and developments.
An important hallmark of a folk theory, as such, is its not being subject to the rigorous experimentation characteristic of empirical science
. One could say, however, that folk psychology resembles heuristics, specifically a sort of people-heuristics, albeit with less inclination to revision. Folk theories will commonly exhibit a logically deductive
structure, suggesting a close relationship to schools of reason and rationality
. In this light, folk theory could be viewed as a "lazy mind's science," or a precursor to formal human examination.
Folk theory typically influences people's value judgment
s and ultimately their social action. Evolutionarily, acquiring a rudimentary catalog of "common sense" psychological knowledge that is serviceable when presented with limited time for social maneuvering is quite handy, but not without pitfalls. Reinforcement
of a cherished folk theory may be erroneously taken as proof of principle, and transit to the realm of "fact". Solidifying of folk theory may prevent adoption of a more informed truth realized only later. The overwhelming nature of the resulting dissonance
might then to lead to the rejection of broader fact.
, proverb
s and metaphors.
and Sellars
, have denied that the alleged theoretical entities posited by folk psychology ("beliefs", "desires", etc.) have any causal status. According to the theory-theory, a typical causal or counterfactual generalization (or law) of folk psychology would be characterized schematically as follows:
If, as Wittgenstein claims, propositional attitudes are not causes, then this would turn out to be meaningless. However, it is not clear on this analysis what properties such mental states do have, if not that of causality.
In the view of Daniel Dennett
, X wants that Y and believes that Z is necessary for Y just in case
it can be predictively attributed these beliefs and desires. He maintains this even if it is a simple animal, such as a frog, or a non-living object, such as a robot. In this, he declines to identify beliefs or desires with specific natural kinds. Thus, our folk-psychological talk about beliefs and desires is essential and frequently true, but does not concern entities in the brain.
Another perspective:
It has been argued (during past academic dialog) that individuals, beginning at some infantile stage, are responding in an adaptive manner to the world around us; more specifically the people in it. The stated anecdotal evidence is the seemingly uncanny (naive, functional) tendency of a child to try to manipulate those raising them to satisfy their needs/wants. And, often being incredibly successful at it. In the case of abuse and neglect, this development is contaminated and twisted, leaving the child with very dysfunctional relational and behavioral patterns—complete with often pathological explanations and justifications for their actions and emotive states.
If such explanation and analysis is valid, it would appear most likely to fit within development constructs, Therefore, the best definition(s) and understanding of it may well be found or inferred via developmental theories. As such, it is not then necessarily evolutionary (in a purely random or macro evolutionary sense), nor locked in stasis at a particular stage of development. Rather, it is likely subject to complex changes ranging from further life experiences in general, education both formal and informal, and, especially, the social norms and pressures, including interpretive explanations of those groups.
Another inference is that we all are practicing our own unique "brand" of naive psychology virtually all the time. Social animals that we are, we are both influenced and influencing each other in overt and subtle ways (conscious and unconscious). The worst possible personal condition then is that we compound our very likely and common interpretive errors with the errors of others and warp our perception of reality by being naive to this then "normal" naive state. Awareness of this naive state and any possibility of directed (micro evolutionary) adaptive growth is significantly enhanced by an admission of its personal and pervasive probability—and hindered by any and all denial that we are somehow magically not subject to it.
, i.e. “all else being equal”. For example, if John was hungry, and John had a bowl of mashed potatoes, and John thought eating those mashed potatoes would satisfy his hunger, then John would eat the mashed potatoes, ceteris paribus. Many philosophers (e.g. Nancy Cartwright
) say that using ceteris paribus makes a statement vacuous because it makes a statement incapable of being disconfirmed. For example, they would take the sentence “If Pooh were hungry and had some honey, Pooh would eat the honey, ceteris paribus” as “If Pooh were hungry and had some honey, Pooh would eat the honey, unless he didn’t”. Jerry Fodor would argue that those philosophers would be defining ceteris paribus in the wrong way. Fodor says that a claim in commonsense psychology relies on ceteris paribus in the same way that any hard science would. Fodor states, “For surely ‘Ceteris paribus, a meandering river erodes its outside bank’ means something like ‘A meandering river erodes its outside bank in any nomologically possible world where the operative idealizations of geology are satisfied.’ That this is, in general, stronger than ‘P in any world where not not-P’ is certain. So if, as it would appear, commonsense psychology relies upon its ceteris paribus clauses, so too does geology.”
Many philosophers believe that if Folk Psychology is to be a theory, there should be generalizations to be taken from the theory and used. If these generalizations really are as common-sense as folk psychology would lead one to believe, then people should be aware of them, but in actuality, there are few of these generalizations that can be held to be true.
There are philosophers who believe that the ontology of folk psychology, meaning the idea of beliefs, desires, intentions and so on, are so incorrect that in time, modern science will overwrite and eliminate what we know as folk psychology. These philosophers are known as eliminative materialists, one of their leading defenders being Paul Churchland
. Eliminative materialism states that the mental states that folk psychologists believe to be part of the mind, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions don’t actually exist. There are three main arguments which Churchland uses against folk psychology:
Tim Crane refutes each of these claims in his book The Mechanical Mind. In Churchland’s first claim against folk psychology, he states that folk psychology cannot explain things such as “[T]he nature and dynamics of mental illness, the faculty of creative imagination… [and] the nature and psychological function of sleep.” Crane asks why a theory pertaining to beliefs and desires should try to explain things such as mental illness and sleep. He also suggests that a reason for the theory being so stagnant throughout the ages is that it is well established, rather than lacking the ability to evolve. Finally, in response to Churchland’s third argument, Crane says that even if folk psychology’s categories are not explainable by physics, there should be no reason why it should be necessary for it to be explained by physics in the first place to be true. As many philosophers believe, there may be many things explainable beyond the realm of physics.
, the untrained human perception of basic physical phenomena, has been, to a large extent, shown to be inadequate in providing robust explanations of various physical phenomena. Similarly, folk psychology's validity is a subject of lively debate in the philosophy of mind
.
Philosophers take various attitudes toward the possibility of vindicating / extending folk psychology by allowing its theoretical terms (e.g. 'belief' 'desire' etc.) to play a role in serious scientific theorizing.
Among the advocates of such a possibility, Jerry Fodor
is surely the most famous (for a defense of this view see his 1987 book "Psychosemantics"). The other extreme is exemplified by eliminative materialists
, such as Paul
and Patricia Churchland
and Stephen Stich
. Although Stich no longer considers himself an eliminativist, his book, "From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief" generated much attention for eliminative materialism.
Philosopher Daniel Dennett
's intentional stance theory
can be viewed as a third apex of the triangle formed by the representation theory of mind (like Fodor) and the eliminative materialists (like Churchland). He concedes some aspects of eliminativism (arguing that folk psychological entities will not/cannot match discoveries of science) whilst still seeing the value of folk psychological concepts as both essential to our understandings of and dealings with other people, and as grounded in real regularities in human behavior
.
Psychology
Psychology is the study of the mind and behavior. Its immediate goal is to understand individuals and groups by both establishing general principles and researching specific cases. For many, the ultimate goal of psychology is to benefit society...
. Folk psychology embraces everyday concepts like “beliefs”, "desires”, “fear”, and “hope".
Folk psychology as a theory
A theory is a group of principles or rules which are used to explain how a certain phenomenon works. Folk psychology is interpreted as a theory when the ‘common sense’ perceptions of one’s daily life (such as those of pain, pleasure, excitement, anxiety, etc.) are interpreted as principles that are used to explain mental states. When our ordinary view of mental states is interpreted as a ‘common sense’ or folk theory of mindTheory of mind
Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states—beliefs, intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc.—to oneself and others and to understand that others have beliefs, desires and intentions that are different from one's own...
, it is referred to as the theory theory. The theory of mind consisting of our ‘common sense’ understanding mental states can be interpreted two distinct ways, in an external sense and an internal sense.
Principles
As a set of folk theories, folk psychology is a passively (sometimes actively) gathered and occasionally invoked compendium of day-to-day non-critical postulationCritical thinking
Critical thinking is the process or method of thinking that questions assumptions. It is a way of deciding whether a claim is true, false, or sometimes true and sometimes false, or partly true and partly false. The origins of critical thinking can be traced in Western thought to the Socratic...
. Likewise, all folk theory combine to serve as a code of wisdom, assorted from experiences of a limited but "adequate" level of confirmation. In principle, folk theorization is a complex, haphazard activity of the mind in a struggle to inform actions, opinions or a concept of the world, based on the joined account of known fact, hearsay and personal experience; or rather, correlating the outward aspects of human behaviors, mental states (sometimes linked to broader conditions), and a register of situations, to certain attitudes and developments.
An important hallmark of a folk theory, as such, is its not being subject to the rigorous experimentation characteristic of empirical science
Empiricism
Empiricism is a theory of knowledge that asserts that knowledge comes only or primarily via sensory experience. One of several views of epistemology, the study of human knowledge, along with rationalism, idealism and historicism, empiricism emphasizes the role of experience and evidence,...
. One could say, however, that folk psychology resembles heuristics, specifically a sort of people-heuristics, albeit with less inclination to revision. Folk theories will commonly exhibit a logically deductive
Deductive reasoning
Deductive reasoning, also called deductive logic, is reasoning which constructs or evaluates deductive arguments. Deductive arguments are attempts to show that a conclusion necessarily follows from a set of premises or hypothesis...
structure, suggesting a close relationship to schools of reason and rationality
Rationality
In philosophy, rationality is the exercise of reason. It is the manner in which people derive conclusions when considering things deliberately. It also refers to the conformity of one's beliefs with one's reasons for belief, or with one's actions with one's reasons for action...
. In this light, folk theory could be viewed as a "lazy mind's science," or a precursor to formal human examination.
Folk theory typically influences people's value judgment
Value judgment
A value judgment is a judgment of the rightness or wrongness of something, or of the usefulness of something, based on a comparison or other relativity. As a generalization, a value judgment can refer to a judgment based upon a particular set of values or on a particular value system...
s and ultimately their social action. Evolutionarily, acquiring a rudimentary catalog of "common sense" psychological knowledge that is serviceable when presented with limited time for social maneuvering is quite handy, but not without pitfalls. Reinforcement
Reinforcement
Reinforcement is a term in operant conditioning and behavior analysis for the process of increasing the rate or probability of a behavior in the form of a "response" by the delivery or emergence of a stimulus Reinforcement is a term in operant conditioning and behavior analysis for the process of...
of a cherished folk theory may be erroneously taken as proof of principle, and transit to the realm of "fact". Solidifying of folk theory may prevent adoption of a more informed truth realized only later. The overwhelming nature of the resulting dissonance
Cognitive dissonance
Cognitive dissonance is a discomfort caused by holding conflicting ideas simultaneously. The theory of cognitive dissonance proposes that people have a motivational drive to reduce dissonance. They do this by changing their attitudes, beliefs, and actions. Dissonance is also reduced by justifying,...
might then to lead to the rejection of broader fact.
Manifestations
Folk psychology is seen as manifested in common senseCommon sense
Common sense is defined by Merriam-Webster as, "sound and prudent judgment based on a simple perception of the situation or facts." Thus, "common sense" equates to the knowledge and experience which most people already have, or which the person using the term believes that they do or should have...
, proverb
Proverb
A proverb is a simple and concrete saying popularly known and repeated, which expresses a truth, based on common sense or the practical experience of humanity. They are often metaphorical. A proverb that describes a basic rule of conduct may also be known as a maxim...
s and metaphors.
Examples
Many philosophers, under the influence of WittgensteinLudwig Wittgenstein
Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein was an Austrian philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language. He was professor in philosophy at the University of Cambridge from 1939 until 1947...
and Sellars
Wilfrid Sellars
Wilfrid Stalker Sellars was an American philosopher. His father was the Canadian-American philosopher Roy Wood Sellars, a leading American philosophical naturalist in the first half of the twentieth-century...
, have denied that the alleged theoretical entities posited by folk psychology ("beliefs", "desires", etc.) have any causal status. According to the theory-theory, a typical causal or counterfactual generalization (or law) of folk psychology would be characterized schematically as follows:
- If X wants that Y, and believes that Z is necessary for Y, then X will do Z.
If, as Wittgenstein claims, propositional attitudes are not causes, then this would turn out to be meaningless. However, it is not clear on this analysis what properties such mental states do have, if not that of causality.
In the view of Daniel Dennett
Daniel Dennett
Daniel Clement Dennett is an American philosopher, writer and cognitive scientist whose research centers on the philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and philosophy of biology, particularly as those fields relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science. He is currently the Co-director of...
, X wants that Y and believes that Z is necessary for Y just in case
If and only if
In logic and related fields such as mathematics and philosophy, if and only if is a biconditional logical connective between statements....
it can be predictively attributed these beliefs and desires. He maintains this even if it is a simple animal, such as a frog, or a non-living object, such as a robot. In this, he declines to identify beliefs or desires with specific natural kinds. Thus, our folk-psychological talk about beliefs and desires is essential and frequently true, but does not concern entities in the brain.
Another perspective:
It has been argued (during past academic dialog) that individuals, beginning at some infantile stage, are responding in an adaptive manner to the world around us; more specifically the people in it. The stated anecdotal evidence is the seemingly uncanny (naive, functional) tendency of a child to try to manipulate those raising them to satisfy their needs/wants. And, often being incredibly successful at it. In the case of abuse and neglect, this development is contaminated and twisted, leaving the child with very dysfunctional relational and behavioral patterns—complete with often pathological explanations and justifications for their actions and emotive states.
If such explanation and analysis is valid, it would appear most likely to fit within development constructs, Therefore, the best definition(s) and understanding of it may well be found or inferred via developmental theories. As such, it is not then necessarily evolutionary (in a purely random or macro evolutionary sense), nor locked in stasis at a particular stage of development. Rather, it is likely subject to complex changes ranging from further life experiences in general, education both formal and informal, and, especially, the social norms and pressures, including interpretive explanations of those groups.
Another inference is that we all are practicing our own unique "brand" of naive psychology virtually all the time. Social animals that we are, we are both influenced and influencing each other in overt and subtle ways (conscious and unconscious). The worst possible personal condition then is that we compound our very likely and common interpretive errors with the errors of others and warp our perception of reality by being naive to this then "normal" naive state. Awareness of this naive state and any possibility of directed (micro evolutionary) adaptive growth is significantly enhanced by an admission of its personal and pervasive probability—and hindered by any and all denial that we are somehow magically not subject to it.
Rejections and responses to folk psychology
Folk psychology relies largely on the clause of ceteris paribusCeteris paribus
or is a Latin phrase, literally translated as "with other things the same," or "all other things being equal or held constant." It is an example of an ablative absolute and is commonly rendered in English as "all other things being equal." A prediction, or a statement about causal or logical...
, i.e. “all else being equal”. For example, if John was hungry, and John had a bowl of mashed potatoes, and John thought eating those mashed potatoes would satisfy his hunger, then John would eat the mashed potatoes, ceteris paribus. Many philosophers (e.g. Nancy Cartwright
Nancy Cartwright
Nancy Campbell Cartwright is an American film and television actress, comedian and voice artist. She is best known for her long-running role as Bart Simpson on the animated television series The Simpsons...
) say that using ceteris paribus makes a statement vacuous because it makes a statement incapable of being disconfirmed. For example, they would take the sentence “If Pooh were hungry and had some honey, Pooh would eat the honey, ceteris paribus” as “If Pooh were hungry and had some honey, Pooh would eat the honey, unless he didn’t”. Jerry Fodor would argue that those philosophers would be defining ceteris paribus in the wrong way. Fodor says that a claim in commonsense psychology relies on ceteris paribus in the same way that any hard science would. Fodor states, “For surely ‘Ceteris paribus, a meandering river erodes its outside bank’ means something like ‘A meandering river erodes its outside bank in any nomologically possible world where the operative idealizations of geology are satisfied.’ That this is, in general, stronger than ‘P in any world where not not-P’ is certain. So if, as it would appear, commonsense psychology relies upon its ceteris paribus clauses, so too does geology.”
Many philosophers believe that if Folk Psychology is to be a theory, there should be generalizations to be taken from the theory and used. If these generalizations really are as common-sense as folk psychology would lead one to believe, then people should be aware of them, but in actuality, there are few of these generalizations that can be held to be true.
There are philosophers who believe that the ontology of folk psychology, meaning the idea of beliefs, desires, intentions and so on, are so incorrect that in time, modern science will overwrite and eliminate what we know as folk psychology. These philosophers are known as eliminative materialists, one of their leading defenders being Paul Churchland
Paul Churchland
Paul Churchland is a philosopher noted for his studies in neurophilosophy and the philosophy of mind. He is currently a Professor at the University of California, San Diego, where he holds the Valtz Chair of Philosophy. Churchland holds a joint appointment with the Cognitive Science Faculty and...
. Eliminative materialism states that the mental states that folk psychologists believe to be part of the mind, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions don’t actually exist. There are three main arguments which Churchland uses against folk psychology:
- Folk psychology, as a whole, does not explain very much
- The theory is stagnant and has not developed much throughout its history
- It seems unlikely that the categories of which folk psychology speaks (beliefs, desire intentions, etc.) will “reduce” to physical categories, meaning scientists will not be able to scientifically explain those categories, hence, they will not be scientifically proven
Tim Crane refutes each of these claims in his book The Mechanical Mind. In Churchland’s first claim against folk psychology, he states that folk psychology cannot explain things such as “[T]he nature and dynamics of mental illness, the faculty of creative imagination… [and] the nature and psychological function of sleep.” Crane asks why a theory pertaining to beliefs and desires should try to explain things such as mental illness and sleep. He also suggests that a reason for the theory being so stagnant throughout the ages is that it is well established, rather than lacking the ability to evolve. Finally, in response to Churchland’s third argument, Crane says that even if folk psychology’s categories are not explainable by physics, there should be no reason why it should be necessary for it to be explained by physics in the first place to be true. As many philosophers believe, there may be many things explainable beyond the realm of physics.
Reception
Folk physicsNaïve physics
Naïve physics or folk physics is the untrained human perception of basic physical phenomena. In the field of artificial intelligence the study of naïve physics is a part of the effort to formalize the common knowledge of human beings....
, the untrained human perception of basic physical phenomena, has been, to a large extent, shown to be inadequate in providing robust explanations of various physical phenomena. Similarly, folk psychology's validity is a subject of lively debate in the philosophy of mind
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness and their relationship to the physical body, particularly the brain. The mind-body problem, i.e...
.
Philosophers take various attitudes toward the possibility of vindicating / extending folk psychology by allowing its theoretical terms (e.g. 'belief' 'desire' etc.) to play a role in serious scientific theorizing.
Among the advocates of such a possibility, Jerry Fodor
Jerry Fodor
Jerry Alan Fodor is an American philosopher and cognitive scientist. He holds the position of State of New Jersey Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and is the author of many works in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, in which he has laid the groundwork for the...
is surely the most famous (for a defense of this view see his 1987 book "Psychosemantics"). The other extreme is exemplified by eliminative materialists
Eliminative materialism
Eliminative materialism is a materialist position in the philosophy of mind. Its primary claim is that people's common-sense understanding of the mind is false and that certain classes of mental states that most people believe in do not exist...
, such as Paul
Paul Churchland
Paul Churchland is a philosopher noted for his studies in neurophilosophy and the philosophy of mind. He is currently a Professor at the University of California, San Diego, where he holds the Valtz Chair of Philosophy. Churchland holds a joint appointment with the Cognitive Science Faculty and...
and Patricia Churchland
Patricia Churchland
Patricia Smith Churchland is a Canadian-American philosopher noted for her contributions to neurophilosophy and the philosophy of mind. She has been a Professor at the University of California, San Diego since 1984...
and Stephen Stich
Stephen Stich
Stephen Stich is a professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He is also currently an Honorary Professor of the department of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield. Stich's main philosophical interests are in the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, epistemology, and moral psychology. He...
. Although Stich no longer considers himself an eliminativist, his book, "From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief" generated much attention for eliminative materialism.
Philosopher Daniel Dennett
Daniel Dennett
Daniel Clement Dennett is an American philosopher, writer and cognitive scientist whose research centers on the philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and philosophy of biology, particularly as those fields relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science. He is currently the Co-director of...
's intentional stance theory
Intentional stance
The intentional stance is a term coined by philosopher Daniel Dennett for the level of abstraction in which we view the behavior of a thing in terms of mental properties...
can be viewed as a third apex of the triangle formed by the representation theory of mind (like Fodor) and the eliminative materialists (like Churchland). He concedes some aspects of eliminativism (arguing that folk psychological entities will not/cannot match discoveries of science) whilst still seeing the value of folk psychological concepts as both essential to our understandings of and dealings with other people, and as grounded in real regularities in human behavior
Human behavior
Human behavior refers to the range of behaviors exhibited by humans and which are influenced by culture, attitudes, emotions, values, ethics, authority, rapport, hypnosis, persuasion, coercion and/or genetics....
.
See also
- BehaviorismBehaviorismBehaviorism , also called the learning perspective , is a philosophy of psychology based on the proposition that all things that organisms do—including acting, thinking, and feeling—can and should be regarded as behaviors, and that psychological disorders are best treated by altering behavior...
- BeliefBeliefBelief is the psychological state in which an individual holds a proposition or premise to be true.-Belief, knowledge and epistemology:The terms belief and knowledge are used differently in philosophy....
- Eliminative materialismEliminative materialismEliminative materialism is a materialist position in the philosophy of mind. Its primary claim is that people's common-sense understanding of the mind is false and that certain classes of mental states that most people believe in do not exist...
- InstrumentalismInstrumentalismIn the philosophy of science, instrumentalism is the view that a scientific theory is a useful instrument in understanding the world. A concept or theory should be evaluated by how effectively it explains and predicts phenomena, as opposed to how accurately it describes objective...
- Philosophy of mindPhilosophy of mindPhilosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness and their relationship to the physical body, particularly the brain. The mind-body problem, i.e...
- Propositional attitudePropositional attitudeA propositional attitude is a relational mental state connecting a person to a proposition. They are often assumed to be the simplest components of thought and can express meanings or content that can be true or false...
Further reading
- Geary, D. C.David C. GearyDavid C. Geary is a notable United States cognitive developmental and evolutionary psychologist with interests in mathematical learning and sex differences...
(2005). Folk knowledge and academic learning. In B. J. Ellis & D. F. BjorklundDavid F. BjorklundDavid F. Bjorklund is a professor of psychology at Florida Atlantic University. His areas of research interest include cognitive development and evolutionary developmental psychology. His works include authoring several books and over 130 scientific papers...
(Eds.), Origins of the social mind (pp. 493–519). New York: Guilford Publications. Full text - Horgan, T. and Woodward, J. (1999). Folk Psychology is Here to Stay. In Lycan, W.G., (Ed.), Mind and Cognition: An Anthology, 2nd Edition. Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, Inc.
- Hutto, Daniel D. (2008). "Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons", Cambridge: MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-08367-6
- Leslie, Alan M.(2000). The New Cognitive Neurosciences,Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press/A Bradford Book
- Ratcliffe, M. (2007). Rethinking commonsense psychology a critique of folk psychology, theory of mind and simulation. Hampshire, England: Palgrave MacMillan.