Instrumentalism
Encyclopedia
In the philosophy of science
, instrumentalism is the view that a scientific theory is a useful instrument in understanding the world. A concept or theory should be evaluated by how effectively it explains and predicts phenomena, as opposed to how accurately it describes objective reality.
Instrumentalism avoids the realism
/ anti-realism
debate, and may be better characterised as non-realism. Instrumentalism shifts the basis of evaluation away from whether or not phenomena observed actually exist, and towards an analysis of whether the results and evaluation fit with observed phenomena.
Theories about unobservable phenomena are regarded as having no scientific meaning. Scientists may make claims about unobservable objects, but these claims should not be regarded as meaningful. Evidence is necessarily limited in any scientific enquiry, and this means underdetermination
is a common result, where competing theories are posited on the same set of evidence.
The usefulness of an instrumentalist position becomes particularly apparent in sciences where core concepts are likely to be fundamentally illusive or disputed, such as quantum physics, and astronomy.
An instrumentalist position was put forward by Ernst Mach
. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
posits problem-solving as a key component of scientific practice, with the emphasis on truth or reality reduced, as he provides extensive examples of how our conceptions of reality have changed over time.
was criticized by Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of pragmatism
(and later pragmaticism
). Peirce emphasized that a supposition of reality and truth seems to be the only way to explain scientific progress and to justify the scientific practice of seeking explanations of regularities in better theories. In particular, Peirce explained that unobservable objects had an important role in science, as long as their existence yields in principle empirical consequences that could be tested (in principle).
The philosopher of science Karl Popper
repeatedly rejects and criticizes instrumentalism in Conjectures and Refutations
, perhaps regarding it as too mechanical:
Instrumentalism denies that theories are truth-evaluable; instead, they should be treated like a black box
into which you feed observed data, and through which you produce observable predictions. This requires a distinction between theory and observation, and within each type a distinction between terms and statements. Observation statements (O-statements) have their meaning fixed by observable truth conditions, e.g. "the litmus paper is red", whereas observation terms (O-terms) have their meaning fixed by their referring to observable things or properties, e.g. "red". Theoretical statements (T-statements) have their meaning fixed by their function within a theory and aren't truth evaluable, e.g. "the solution is acidic", whereas theoretical terms (T-terms) have their meaning fixed by their systematic function within a theory and don't refer to any observable thing or property, e.g. "acidic". Though you may think that "acidic" refers to a real property in an object, the meaning of the term can only be explained by reference to a theory about acidity, in contrast to "red", which is a property you can observe. Statements that mix both T-terms and O-terms are therefore T-statements, since their totality cannot be directly observed.
There is some criticism of this distinction, however, as it confuses "non-theoretical" with "observable", and likewise "theoretical" with "non-observable". For example, the term "gene" is theoretical (so a T-term) but it can also be observed (so an O-term) . Whether a term is theoretical or not is a semantic matter, because it involves the different ways in which the term gets its meaning (from a theory or from an observation). Whether a term is observable or not is an epistemic matter, because it involves how we can come to know about it. Instrumentalists contend that the distinctions are the same, that we can only come to know about something if we can understand its meaning according to truth-evaluable observations. So in the above example, "gene" is a T-term because, although it is observable, we cannot understand its meaning from observation alone.
Philosophy of science
The philosophy of science is concerned with the assumptions, foundations, methods and implications of science. It is also concerned with the use and merit of science and sometimes overlaps metaphysics and epistemology by exploring whether scientific results are actually a study of truth...
, instrumentalism is the view that a scientific theory is a useful instrument in understanding the world. A concept or theory should be evaluated by how effectively it explains and predicts phenomena, as opposed to how accurately it describes objective reality.
Instrumentalism avoids the realism
Philosophical realism
Contemporary philosophical realism is the belief that our reality, or some aspect of it, is ontologically independent of our conceptual schemes, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc....
/ anti-realism
Anti-realism
In analytic philosophy, the term anti-realism is used to describe any position involving either the denial of an objective reality of entities of a certain type or the denial that verification-transcendent statements about a type of entity are either true or false...
debate, and may be better characterised as non-realism. Instrumentalism shifts the basis of evaluation away from whether or not phenomena observed actually exist, and towards an analysis of whether the results and evaluation fit with observed phenomena.
Explanation
Historically, science and scientific theories have advanced as more detailed observations and results about the world have been made. Instrumentalism provides a framework for the practice of science and scientific method. Instrumentalism is not specifically anti-realist, however it maintains that the role of the scientist is constrained by empirical results, and the theories that can be developed can offer explanations of how the world works, but that these explanations should be seen as best approximations of the world, rather than an ultimate reality.Theories about unobservable phenomena are regarded as having no scientific meaning. Scientists may make claims about unobservable objects, but these claims should not be regarded as meaningful. Evidence is necessarily limited in any scientific enquiry, and this means underdetermination
Underdetermination
In scientific theory, underdetermination refers to situations where the evidence available is insufficient to identify which belief we should hold about that evidence...
is a common result, where competing theories are posited on the same set of evidence.
The usefulness of an instrumentalist position becomes particularly apparent in sciences where core concepts are likely to be fundamentally illusive or disputed, such as quantum physics, and astronomy.
An instrumentalist position was put forward by Ernst Mach
Ernst Mach
Ernst Mach was an Austrian physicist and philosopher, noted for his contributions to physics such as the Mach number and the study of shock waves...
. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , by Thomas Kuhn, is an analysis of the history of science. Its publication was a landmark event in the history, philosophy, and sociology of scientific knowledge and it triggered an ongoing worldwide assessment and reaction in — and beyond — those scholarly...
posits problem-solving as a key component of scientific practice, with the emphasis on truth or reality reduced, as he provides extensive examples of how our conceptions of reality have changed over time.
Critics & discussion
The instrumentalism of Ernst MachErnst Mach
Ernst Mach was an Austrian physicist and philosopher, noted for his contributions to physics such as the Mach number and the study of shock waves...
was criticized by Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of pragmatism
Pragmatism
Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition centered on the linking of practice and theory. It describes a process where theory is extracted from practice, and applied back to practice to form what is called intelligent practice...
(and later pragmaticism
Pragmaticism
Pragmaticism is a term used by Charles Sanders Peirce for his pragmatic philosophy starting in 1905, in order to distance himself and it from pragmatism, the original name, which had been used in a manner he did not approve of in the "literary journals"...
). Peirce emphasized that a supposition of reality and truth seems to be the only way to explain scientific progress and to justify the scientific practice of seeking explanations of regularities in better theories. In particular, Peirce explained that unobservable objects had an important role in science, as long as their existence yields in principle empirical consequences that could be tested (in principle).
The philosopher of science Karl Popper
Karl Popper
Sir Karl Raimund Popper, CH FRS FBA was an Austro-British philosopher and a professor at the London School of Economics...
repeatedly rejects and criticizes instrumentalism in Conjectures and Refutations
Conjectures and Refutations
Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge is a book written by philosopher Karl Popper.Published in 1963 by Routledge, this book is a collection of his lectures and papers that summarised his thoughts on the philosophy of science...
, perhaps regarding it as too mechanical:
Instrumentalism can be formulated as the thesis that scientific theories - the theories of the so-called "pure" sciences - are nothing but computational rules (or inference rules); of the same character, fundamentally, as the computation rules of the so-called "applied" sciences. (One might even formulate it as the thesis that "pure" science is a misnomer, and that all science is "applied".)
Now my reply to instrumentalism consists in showing that there are profound differences between "pure" theories and technological computation rules, and that instrumentalism can give a perfect description of these rules but is quite unable to account for the difference between them and the theories.
Instrumentalism denies that theories are truth-evaluable; instead, they should be treated like a black box
Black box theory
Black box theories are things defined only in terms of their function. The term black box theory is applied to any field, philosophy and science or otherwise where some inquiry or definition is made into the relations between the appearance of something , i.e...
into which you feed observed data, and through which you produce observable predictions. This requires a distinction between theory and observation, and within each type a distinction between terms and statements. Observation statements (O-statements) have their meaning fixed by observable truth conditions, e.g. "the litmus paper is red", whereas observation terms (O-terms) have their meaning fixed by their referring to observable things or properties, e.g. "red". Theoretical statements (T-statements) have their meaning fixed by their function within a theory and aren't truth evaluable, e.g. "the solution is acidic", whereas theoretical terms (T-terms) have their meaning fixed by their systematic function within a theory and don't refer to any observable thing or property, e.g. "acidic". Though you may think that "acidic" refers to a real property in an object, the meaning of the term can only be explained by reference to a theory about acidity, in contrast to "red", which is a property you can observe. Statements that mix both T-terms and O-terms are therefore T-statements, since their totality cannot be directly observed.
There is some criticism of this distinction, however, as it confuses "non-theoretical" with "observable", and likewise "theoretical" with "non-observable". For example, the term "gene" is theoretical (so a T-term) but it can also be observed (so an O-term) . Whether a term is theoretical or not is a semantic matter, because it involves the different ways in which the term gets its meaning (from a theory or from an observation). Whether a term is observable or not is an epistemic matter, because it involves how we can come to know about it. Instrumentalists contend that the distinctions are the same, that we can only come to know about something if we can understand its meaning according to truth-evaluable observations. So in the above example, "gene" is a T-term because, although it is observable, we cannot understand its meaning from observation alone.
External links
- Can politics be reduced to science by David HumeDavid HumeDavid Hume was a Scottish philosopher, historian, economist, and essayist, known especially for his philosophical empiricism and skepticism. He was one of the most important figures in the history of Western philosophy and the Scottish Enlightenment...