Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State
Encyclopedia
Oneida Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State, 470 U.S. 226 (1985), is a landmark decision
concerning aboriginal title in the United States
. The case was "the first Indian land claim case won on the basis of the Nonintercourse Act."
The Supreme Court held that Indian tribes have a common law cause of action for possessory land claims based upon aboriginal title
, that the Nonintercourse Act did not preempt that cause of action, and that the cause of action was not barred by a statute of limitations
, abatement
, implicit federal ratification, or nonjusticiability. Four dissenting justices would have held for the counties on the defense of laches
, a question which the majority did not reach, but expressed doubts about.
Furthermore, the court held that, due to the Eleventh Amendment
, federal courts could not exercise ancillary jurisdiction
over cross-claims by counties against states. Although only two other justices agreed with the entirety of Justice Powell's majority opinion, Brennan and Marshall agreed with Parts I-IV and VI (the Oneida's claims against the counties) and Burger, White, and Rehnquist agreed with Part V (the counties claims against the state), thus forging separate majorities.
The case is often referred to as Oneida II because it is the second of three times the Oneida Indian Nation
reached the Supreme Court in litigating its land rights claims. It followed Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State v. Oneida Cnty. (1974) ["Oneida I"], holding that there was federal subject-matter jurisdiction, and was followed by City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. (2005) ["Sherrill"], rejecting the tribe's attempt in a later lawsuit to re-assert tribal sovereignty over parcels of land re-acquired by the tribe in fee simple
.
to the Oneida's land claim. Over a decade earlier, in Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State v. Oneida Cnty. (1974), the Supreme Court had allowed the same suit to proceed by unanimously holding that there was federal subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the claim. Since then, Justices William O. Douglas
and Potter Stewart
had departed, replaced by John Paul Stevens
and Sandra Day O'Connor
.
On remand, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
had found the counties liable to the Oneida for wrongful possession of their lands, awarded damages of $16,694, plus interest, representing the fair rental value of the land in question for the 2-year period specified in the complaint. Finally, the District Court required New York state to indemnify the counties. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to determine whether an Indian tribe may have a live cause of action for a violation of its possessory rights that occurred 175 years ago," ultimately agreeing with the District Court and Second Circuit that the tribe may. On appeal, the counties did not dispute the District Court's findings that the Oneida held aboriginal title to the lands in question, and that the 1795 conveyances of the lands to the state violated the Nonintercourse Act
. The counties instead argued that the Nonintercourse Act preempted the Oneida's cause of action, that any cause of action was time barred, nonjusticable, and abated, and that any conveyance was ratified by the federal government.
matter. The retainer agreement
between the firm and the tribe, approved (as required) by the Department of the Interior, provided that the firm would litigate the tribe's Nonintercourse Act claim only against the government and would not sue private land owners; another firm was handling the tribe's claim before the Indian Claims Commission
.
Shattuck argued Oneida I alone before the Supreme Court. The Native American Rights Fund
(NARF), which had assisted initially assisted the firm, served as co-counsel in the trial after the Oneida I decision and took over completely on the second appeal. The NARF also filed another suit behalf of the Oneidas, pressing the Oneida's possessory claims against landowners over additional lands.
As of 2011, BS&K has yet to receive any attorney's fees from the tribe.
Cause of action
The Second Circuit held that the Oneida's had both a federal common law cause of action
and an implied cause of action
under the Nonintercourse Act
of 1793 (the version that governed the 1795 transaction). The Supreme Court did not reach the statutory question because it held that "the Indians' common-law right to sue is firmly established." The court recognized that "[n]umerous decisions of this Court prior to Oneida I recognized at least implicitly that Indians have a federal common-law right to sue to enforce their aboriginal land rights," citing a string of examples back to Johnson v. M'Intosh
(1823). The court concluded:
As to the Nonintercourse Act, the Court held that it did not preempt the cause of action because "[t]he Nonintercourse Act of 1793 does not speak directly to the question of remedies for unlawful conveyances of Indian land." The court noted that the Act "did not establish a comprehensive remedial plan for dealing with violations of Indian property rights" and that there was "no indication in the legislative history that Congress intended to pre-empt common-law remedies." Because the Act contained no remedial provisions, and because subsequent Congressional enactments contemplated possessory land suits by Indians, the Court found that preemption was not indicated. The court reviewed its recent aboriginal title decisions, and reiterated its statement in Oneida I that the Act merely "put in statutory form what was or came to be the accepted rule."
Statute of limitations
Where there is no statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, the general rule is to borrow the analogous state statute of limitations unless such would be inconsistent with the underlying federal policies. However, here, the Court held that "borrowing of a state limitations period in these cases would be inconsistent with federal policy." Reviewing Congressional actions in the context of the Indian Claims Commission
, the Court concluded that "It would be a violation of Congress' will were we to hold that a state statute of limitations period should be borrowed in these circumstances."
Laches
The majority noted that the four dissenting justices would have barred the Oneida's claim under laches
. However, the majority noted that "we do not reach this issue today" because the District Court had ruled against the counties laches defense, and the counties had not raised the issue in the Second Circuit. In a footnote, the majority opined that "application of the equitable defense of laches in an action at law would be novel indeed." The same footnote cited Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129 (1922) for the proposition that laches "cannot properly have application to give vitality to a void deed and to bar the rights of Indian wards in lands subject to statutory restrictions." The majority called the application of laches "questionable" and noted that such "would appear to be inconsistent with established federal policy."
In its final footnote, the majority noted that, on "[t]he question whether equitable considerations should limit the relief available to the present day Oneida Indians . . ., we express no opinion as to . . . the final disposition of this case should Congress not exercise its authority to resolve these far-reaching Indian claims."
Abatement
The counties advanced the theory that the causes of action under Nonintercourse Acts of 1790, 1793, 1796, 1799, and 1802 (unlike the final 1833 version) abated
upon the expiration of the statutes. However, the Court held that because the different versions of the Act contained "substantially the same restraint on the alienation of Indian lands . . . , the precedents of this Court compel the conclusion that the Oneidas' cause of action has not abated."
Ratification
The counties advanced the theory that later treaties between the Oneidas and the United States, which ceded different lands to New York, constituted a ratification of the earlier conveyances (and thus those conveyances were in compliance with the Nonintercourse Act). The Court found this interpretation untenable under the canons of construction of federal Indian law, which provide that, inter alia, "treaties should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians."
Nonjusticiability
The counties final argument was that the Oneida's land claim was a nonjusticiable political question
. The Court found this argument to be non-meritorious in light of similar Indian law precedents.
Ancillary jurisdiction
The final question before the Court was whether the District Court rightly exercised ancillary jurisdiction
over the counties' cross-claim against the state for indemnification. The Court rejected, as having "no basis in law," the Second Circuit's theory that "by violating a federal statute, the State consented to suit in federal court by any party on any claim, state or federal, growing out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the statutory violation." Although the counties' cross-claim would meet the traditional criteria for ancillary jurisdiction, the Court found those criteria foreclosed by the Eleventh Amendment
.
Conclusion
The Court concluded by remarking upon the "potential consequences of affirmance," arguing that "this litigation makes abundantly clear the necessity for congressional action" to extinguish Indian title by statute. In the words of the Court:
and Thurgood Marshall
joined the entirety of the majority's opinion, except the ancillary jurisdiction portion. In a brief opinion, Brennan reiterated his view from Yeomans v. Kentucky (1975) that the Eleventh Amendment
"bars federal court suits against States only by citizens of other States."
Justice John Paul Stevens
, joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
and Justices Byron White
and William Rehnquist
joined the majority's opinion as to No. 83-1240 (the cross-claims against the state) but dissented as to No. 83-1065 (the Oneida's claims against the counties). The dissenters would have barred the Oneida's claim under the equitable doctrine of laches
, noting:
The dissenters noted various historical examples of the Court applying laches to Indian equitable claims, and argued that the doctrine should also be applied to the action of ejectment
(which they admitted was an action at law, not equity). Specifically, they cited "[t]hree decisions of this Court illustrate the application of the doctrine of laches to actions seeking to set aside conveyances made in violation of federal law." Moreover, the dissenters quoted Lewis v. Marshall, 30 U.S. 470 (1831), for the proposition that:
The dissent concluded:
The dissent did not address the other defenses raised by the counties.
Another Oneida claim, challenging the pre-constitutional conveyance of another 6 million acres (24,281.2 km²) tract, was rejected by the Second Circuit in 1988, on the grounds that the Confederation Congress Proclamation of 1783
had neither the authority nor the intent to limit the acquisition of Indian lands within the borders of U.S. state
s.
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. (U.S. 2005)
After decades, the Oneida became frustrated by the failure of the case to settle. Instead, they began to purchase land within the claim area in fee simple, asserting sovereignty over the re-acquired parcels and refusing to pay property tax. In City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. (2005), the Supreme Court held that laches
barred the re-assertion of sovereignty over ancestral land re-acquired in fee simple; the court did not consider whether the original aboriginal title over the disputed parcels was validly extinguished, and thus did not disturb its holding in Oneida II.
On remand, the district court held that, although the counties could tax the Oneida, due to tribal sovereign immunity
, they could not foreclose on land held by the tribe in satisfaction of these unpaid taxes. The Second Circuit affirmed, but two of the judges urged the Supreme Court to overrule some of its tribal sovereign immunity precedents. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the tribe passed an ordinance consenting to taxation, and the Court vacated and remanded.
Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of Oneida (2d Cir. 2010)
Oneida I and Oneida II were litigated as a test cases by both sides; the Oneidas suit against the counties for 200 years of damages was stayed pending its resolution. After settlement efforts, that suit resumed in 2000. In a similar suit by a different tribe, the Second Circuit adopted the view of the four dissenting Oneida II justices in Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki
(2005). The same laches defense defeated the larger Oneida claim. The Oneida and the United States petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari on May 16, 2011. The Court denied certiorari on October 17, with Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissenting from the denial.
Landmark decision
Landmark court decisions establish new precedents that establish a significant new legal principle or concept, or otherwise substantially change the interpretation of existing law...
concerning aboriginal title in the United States
Aboriginal title in the United States
The United States was the first jurisdiction to acknowledge the common law doctrine of aboriginal title...
. The case was "the first Indian land claim case won on the basis of the Nonintercourse Act."
The Supreme Court held that Indian tribes have a common law cause of action for possessory land claims based upon aboriginal title
Aboriginal title
Aboriginal title is a common law doctrine that the land rights of indigenous peoples to customary tenure persist after the assumption of sovereignty under settler colonialism...
, that the Nonintercourse Act did not preempt that cause of action, and that the cause of action was not barred by a statute of limitations
Statute of limitations
A statute of limitations is an enactment in a common law legal system that sets the maximum time after an event that legal proceedings based on that event may be initiated...
, abatement
Abatement in pleading
Historically, Abatement in pleading, or plea in abatement was, in English law, a plea by the defendant, defeating or quashing a legal action by some matter of fact, such as a defect in form or the personal incompetency of the parties suing....
, implicit federal ratification, or nonjusticiability. Four dissenting justices would have held for the counties on the defense of laches
Laches (equity)
Laches is an "unreasonable delay pursuing a right or claim...in a way that prejudices the [opposing] party" When asserted in litigation, it is an equitable defense, or doctrine...
, a question which the majority did not reach, but expressed doubts about.
Furthermore, the court held that, due to the Eleventh Amendment
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which was passed by the Congress on March 4, 1794, and was ratified on February 7, 1795, deals with each state's sovereign immunity. This amendment was adopted in order to overrule the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v...
, federal courts could not exercise ancillary jurisdiction
Ancillary jurisdiction
Ancillary jurisdiction allows a United States federal court to hear certain claims sufficiently related to the original claim that would otherwise defeat the court's jurisdiction...
over cross-claims by counties against states. Although only two other justices agreed with the entirety of Justice Powell's majority opinion, Brennan and Marshall agreed with Parts I-IV and VI (the Oneida's claims against the counties) and Burger, White, and Rehnquist agreed with Part V (the counties claims against the state), thus forging separate majorities.
The case is often referred to as Oneida II because it is the second of three times the Oneida Indian Nation
Oneida Indian Nation
The Oneida Indian Nation is the Oneida tribe that resides in New York and currently owns a number of businesses and tribal land in Verona, NY, Oneida, NY, and Canastota, NY.- Businesses :...
reached the Supreme Court in litigating its land rights claims. It followed Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State v. Oneida Cnty. (1974) ["Oneida I"], holding that there was federal subject-matter jurisdiction, and was followed by City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. (2005) ["Sherrill"], rejecting the tribe's attempt in a later lawsuit to re-assert tribal sovereignty over parcels of land re-acquired by the tribe in fee simple
Fee simple
In English law, a fee simple is an estate in land, a form of freehold ownership. It is the most common way that real estate is owned in common law countries, and is ordinarily the most complete ownership interest that can be had in real property short of allodial title, which is often reserved...
.
Prior history
This was the second time the Supreme Court had granted certiorariCertiorari
Certiorari is a type of writ seeking judicial review, recognized in U.S., Roman, English, Philippine, and other law. Certiorari is the present passive infinitive of the Latin certiorare...
to the Oneida's land claim. Over a decade earlier, in Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State v. Oneida Cnty. (1974), the Supreme Court had allowed the same suit to proceed by unanimously holding that there was federal subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the claim. Since then, Justices William O. Douglas
William O. Douglas
William Orville Douglas was an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. With a term lasting 36 years and 209 days, he is the longest-serving justice in the history of the Supreme Court...
and Potter Stewart
Potter Stewart
Potter Stewart was an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. During his tenure, he made, among other areas, major contributions to criminal justice reform, civil rights, access to the courts, and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.-Education:Stewart was born in Jackson, Michigan,...
had departed, replaced by John Paul Stevens
John Paul Stevens
John Paul Stevens served as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from December 19, 1975 until his retirement on June 29, 2010. At the time of his retirement, he was the oldest member of the Court and the third-longest serving justice in the Court's history...
and Sandra Day O'Connor
Sandra Day O'Connor
Sandra Day O'Connor is an American jurist who was the first female member of the Supreme Court of the United States. She served as an Associate Justice from 1981 until her retirement from the Court in 2006. O'Connor was appointed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981...
.
On remand, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York serves one of the 94 judicial districts in the United States and one of four in the state of New York. The U.S. Attorney for the district is Richard S. Hartunian...
had found the counties liable to the Oneida for wrongful possession of their lands, awarded damages of $16,694, plus interest, representing the fair rental value of the land in question for the 2-year period specified in the complaint. Finally, the District Court required New York state to indemnify the counties. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is one of the thirteen United States Courts of Appeals...
affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to determine whether an Indian tribe may have a live cause of action for a violation of its possessory rights that occurred 175 years ago," ultimately agreeing with the District Court and Second Circuit that the tribe may. On appeal, the counties did not dispute the District Court's findings that the Oneida held aboriginal title to the lands in question, and that the 1795 conveyances of the lands to the state violated the Nonintercourse Act
Indian Intercourse Act
The Nonintercourse Act is the collective name given to six statutes passed by the United States Congress in 1790, 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802, and 1834. The Act regulates commerce between Native Americans and non-Indians...
. The counties instead argued that the Nonintercourse Act preempted the Oneida's cause of action, that any cause of action was time barred, nonjusticable, and abated, and that any conveyance was ratified by the federal government.
Change of counsel
The case was initiated by George Shattuck of Bond, Schoeneck & King (BS&K), on a contingency fee basis rather than as a pro bonoPro bono
Pro bono publico is a Latin phrase generally used to describe professional work undertaken voluntarily and without payment or at a reduced fee as a public service. It is common in the legal profession and is increasingly seen in marketing, technology, and strategy consulting firms...
matter. The retainer agreement
Retainer agreement
A retainer agreement is a work for hire contract. It falls between a one-time contract and full-time employment. Its distinguishing feature is that the employer pays in advance for work to be specified later...
between the firm and the tribe, approved (as required) by the Department of the Interior, provided that the firm would litigate the tribe's Nonintercourse Act claim only against the government and would not sue private land owners; another firm was handling the tribe's claim before the Indian Claims Commission
Indian claims commission
The Indian Claims Commission was a judicial panel for relations between the United States Federal Government and Native American tribes. It was established in 1946 by the United States Congress to hear claims of Indian tribes against the United States...
.
Shattuck argued Oneida I alone before the Supreme Court. The Native American Rights Fund
Native American Rights Fund
The Native American Rights Fund, also known as NARF, is a non-profit organization that uses existing laws and treaties to ensure that state governments and the national government live up to their legal obligations...
(NARF), which had assisted initially assisted the firm, served as co-counsel in the trial after the Oneida I decision and took over completely on the second appeal. The NARF also filed another suit behalf of the Oneidas, pressing the Oneida's possessory claims against landowners over additional lands.
As of 2011, BS&K has yet to receive any attorney's fees from the tribe.
Majority
The majority opinion by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. recognized the Oneida's federal common law cause of action, and rejected all the counties' affirmative defenses.Cause of action
The Second Circuit held that the Oneida's had both a federal common law cause of action
Cause of action
In the law, a cause of action is a set of facts sufficient to justify a right to sue to obtain money, property, or the enforcement of a right against another party. The term also refers to the legal theory upon which a plaintiff brings suit...
and an implied cause of action
Implied cause of action
Implied cause of action is a term used in United States statutory and constitutional law for circumstances when a court will determine that a law that creates rights also allows private parties to bring a lawsuit, even though no such remedy is explicitly provided for in the law...
under the Nonintercourse Act
Indian Intercourse Act
The Nonintercourse Act is the collective name given to six statutes passed by the United States Congress in 1790, 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802, and 1834. The Act regulates commerce between Native Americans and non-Indians...
of 1793 (the version that governed the 1795 transaction). The Supreme Court did not reach the statutory question because it held that "the Indians' common-law right to sue is firmly established." The court recognized that "[n]umerous decisions of this Court prior to Oneida I recognized at least implicitly that Indians have a federal common-law right to sue to enforce their aboriginal land rights," citing a string of examples back to Johnson v. M'Intosh
Johnson v. M'Intosh
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 , is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that held that private citizens could not purchase lands from Native Americans...
(1823). The court concluded:
[W]e hold that the Oneidas can maintain this action for violation of their possessory rights based on federal common law.
As to the Nonintercourse Act, the Court held that it did not preempt the cause of action because "[t]he Nonintercourse Act of 1793 does not speak directly to the question of remedies for unlawful conveyances of Indian land." The court noted that the Act "did not establish a comprehensive remedial plan for dealing with violations of Indian property rights" and that there was "no indication in the legislative history that Congress intended to pre-empt common-law remedies." Because the Act contained no remedial provisions, and because subsequent Congressional enactments contemplated possessory land suits by Indians, the Court found that preemption was not indicated. The court reviewed its recent aboriginal title decisions, and reiterated its statement in Oneida I that the Act merely "put in statutory form what was or came to be the accepted rule."
Statute of limitations
Indian claims commission
The Indian Claims Commission was a judicial panel for relations between the United States Federal Government and Native American tribes. It was established in 1946 by the United States Congress to hear claims of Indian tribes against the United States...
, the Court concluded that "It would be a violation of Congress' will were we to hold that a state statute of limitations period should be borrowed in these circumstances."
Laches
The majority noted that the four dissenting justices would have barred the Oneida's claim under laches
Laches (equity)
Laches is an "unreasonable delay pursuing a right or claim...in a way that prejudices the [opposing] party" When asserted in litigation, it is an equitable defense, or doctrine...
. However, the majority noted that "we do not reach this issue today" because the District Court had ruled against the counties laches defense, and the counties had not raised the issue in the Second Circuit. In a footnote, the majority opined that "application of the equitable defense of laches in an action at law would be novel indeed." The same footnote cited Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129 (1922) for the proposition that laches "cannot properly have application to give vitality to a void deed and to bar the rights of Indian wards in lands subject to statutory restrictions." The majority called the application of laches "questionable" and noted that such "would appear to be inconsistent with established federal policy."
In its final footnote, the majority noted that, on "[t]he question whether equitable considerations should limit the relief available to the present day Oneida Indians . . ., we express no opinion as to . . . the final disposition of this case should Congress not exercise its authority to resolve these far-reaching Indian claims."
Abatement
The counties advanced the theory that the causes of action under Nonintercourse Acts of 1790, 1793, 1796, 1799, and 1802 (unlike the final 1833 version) abated
Abatement in pleading
Historically, Abatement in pleading, or plea in abatement was, in English law, a plea by the defendant, defeating or quashing a legal action by some matter of fact, such as a defect in form or the personal incompetency of the parties suing....
upon the expiration of the statutes. However, the Court held that because the different versions of the Act contained "substantially the same restraint on the alienation of Indian lands . . . , the precedents of this Court compel the conclusion that the Oneidas' cause of action has not abated."
Ratification
The counties advanced the theory that later treaties between the Oneidas and the United States, which ceded different lands to New York, constituted a ratification of the earlier conveyances (and thus those conveyances were in compliance with the Nonintercourse Act). The Court found this interpretation untenable under the canons of construction of federal Indian law, which provide that, inter alia, "treaties should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians."
Nonjusticiability
The counties final argument was that the Oneida's land claim was a nonjusticiable political question
Political question
In American Constitutional law, the political question doctrine is closely linked to the concept of justiciability, as it comes down to a question of whether or not the court system is an appropriate forum in which to hear the case. This is because the court system only has authority to hear and...
. The Court found this argument to be non-meritorious in light of similar Indian law precedents.
Ancillary jurisdiction
The final question before the Court was whether the District Court rightly exercised ancillary jurisdiction
Ancillary jurisdiction
Ancillary jurisdiction allows a United States federal court to hear certain claims sufficiently related to the original claim that would otherwise defeat the court's jurisdiction...
over the counties' cross-claim against the state for indemnification. The Court rejected, as having "no basis in law," the Second Circuit's theory that "by violating a federal statute, the State consented to suit in federal court by any party on any claim, state or federal, growing out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the statutory violation." Although the counties' cross-claim would meet the traditional criteria for ancillary jurisdiction, the Court found those criteria foreclosed by the Eleventh Amendment
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which was passed by the Congress on March 4, 1794, and was ratified on February 7, 1795, deals with each state's sovereign immunity. This amendment was adopted in order to overrule the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v...
.
Conclusion
The Court concluded by remarking upon the "potential consequences of affirmance," arguing that "this litigation makes abundantly clear the necessity for congressional action" to extinguish Indian title by statute. In the words of the Court:
One would have thought that claims dating back for more than a century and a half would have been barred long ago. As our opinion indicates, however, neither petitioners nor we have found any applicable statute of limitations or other relevant legal basis for holding that the Oneidas' claims are barred or otherwise have been satisfied.
Brennan and Marshall
Justices William J. Brennan, Jr.William J. Brennan, Jr.
William Joseph Brennan, Jr. was an American jurist who served as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court from 1956 to 1990...
and Thurgood Marshall
Thurgood Marshall
Thurgood Marshall was an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, serving from October 1967 until October 1991...
joined the entirety of the majority's opinion, except the ancillary jurisdiction portion. In a brief opinion, Brennan reiterated his view from Yeomans v. Kentucky (1975) that the Eleventh Amendment
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which was passed by the Congress on March 4, 1794, and was ratified on February 7, 1795, deals with each state's sovereign immunity. This amendment was adopted in order to overrule the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v...
"bars federal court suits against States only by citizens of other States."
Stevens, Burger, White, and Rehnquist
John Paul Stevens
John Paul Stevens served as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from December 19, 1975 until his retirement on June 29, 2010. At the time of his retirement, he was the oldest member of the Court and the third-longest serving justice in the Court's history...
, joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
Warren E. Burger
Warren Earl Burger was the 15th Chief Justice of the United States from 1969 to 1986. Although Burger had conservative leanings, the U.S...
and Justices Byron White
Byron White
Byron Raymond "Whizzer" White won fame both as a football halfback and as an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Appointed to the court by President John F. Kennedy in 1962, he served until his retirement in 1993...
and William Rehnquist
William Rehnquist
William Hubbs Rehnquist was an American lawyer, jurist, and political figure who served as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court of the United States and later as the 16th Chief Justice of the United States...
joined the majority's opinion as to No. 83-1240 (the cross-claims against the state) but dissented as to No. 83-1065 (the Oneida's claims against the counties). The dissenters would have barred the Oneida's claim under the equitable doctrine of laches
Laches (equity)
Laches is an "unreasonable delay pursuing a right or claim...in a way that prejudices the [opposing] party" When asserted in litigation, it is an equitable defense, or doctrine...
, noting:
[In 1795, the Oneidas] made no attempt to assert the claim, and their successors in interest waited 175 years before bringing suit to avoid a 1795 conveyance that the Tribe freely made, for a valuable consideration. The absence of any evidence of deception, concealment, or interference with the Tribe's right to assert a claim, together with the societal interests that always underlie statutes of repose-particularly when title to real property is at stake-convince me that this claim is barred by the extraordinary passage of time. It is worthy of emphasis that this claim arose when George Washington was the President of the United States.
The dissenters noted various historical examples of the Court applying laches to Indian equitable claims, and argued that the doctrine should also be applied to the action of ejectment
Ejectment
Ejectment is the common law term for civil action to recover the possession of and title to land. It replaced the old real actions as well as the various possessory assizes...
(which they admitted was an action at law, not equity). Specifically, they cited "[t]hree decisions of this Court illustrate the application of the doctrine of laches to actions seeking to set aside conveyances made in violation of federal law." Moreover, the dissenters quoted Lewis v. Marshall, 30 U.S. 470 (1831), for the proposition that:
The best interests of society require that causes of action should not be deferred an unreasonable time. This remark is peculiarly applicable to land titles. Nothing so much retards the growth and prosperity of a country as insecurity of titles to real estate. Labor is paralysed where the enjoyment of its fruits is uncertain; and litigation without limit produces ruinous consequences to individuals.
The dissent concluded:
The Court, no doubt, believes that it is undoing a grave historical injustice, but in doing so it has caused another, which only Congress may now rectify.
The dissent did not address the other defenses raised by the counties.
Remand
On remand, after decades of settlement efforts, Judge McCurn entered judgments of $15,994 against Oneida County and $18,970 against Madison County, representing the full fair market rental value, minus set-offs for improvements, plus pre-judgment interest. The following year, McCurn denied cross-motions for relief from the judgment–seeking to correct various mathematical errors previously made by Judge Port—due to a pending appeal before the Second Circuit. After a stipulated remand, McCurn granted both motions.Companion cases
Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. New York (2d Cir. 1988)Another Oneida claim, challenging the pre-constitutional conveyance of another 6 million acres (24,281.2 km²) tract, was rejected by the Second Circuit in 1988, on the grounds that the Confederation Congress Proclamation of 1783
Confederation Congress Proclamation of 1783
Confederation Congress Proclamation of 1783 was a proclamation by the Congress of the Confederation dated September 22, 1783 prohibiting the extinguishment of aboriginal title in the United States without the consent of the federal government...
had neither the authority nor the intent to limit the acquisition of Indian lands within the borders of U.S. state
U.S. state
A U.S. state is any one of the 50 federated states of the United States of America that share sovereignty with the federal government. Because of this shared sovereignty, an American is a citizen both of the federal entity and of his or her state of domicile. Four states use the official title of...
s.
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. (U.S. 2005)
After decades, the Oneida became frustrated by the failure of the case to settle. Instead, they began to purchase land within the claim area in fee simple, asserting sovereignty over the re-acquired parcels and refusing to pay property tax. In City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. (2005), the Supreme Court held that laches
Laches
* Laches : an equitable principle in Anglo-American law* Laches : an Athenian aristocrat * Laches : a Socratic dialogue of Plato-See also:* Lache...
barred the re-assertion of sovereignty over ancestral land re-acquired in fee simple; the court did not consider whether the original aboriginal title over the disputed parcels was validly extinguished, and thus did not disturb its holding in Oneida II.
On remand, the district court held that, although the counties could tax the Oneida, due to tribal sovereign immunity
Sovereign immunity in the United States
Sovereign immunity in the United States is the legal privilege by which the American federal, state, and tribal governments cannot be sued. Local governments in most jurisdictions enjoy immunity from some forms of suit, particularly in tort...
, they could not foreclose on land held by the tribe in satisfaction of these unpaid taxes. The Second Circuit affirmed, but two of the judges urged the Supreme Court to overrule some of its tribal sovereign immunity precedents. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the tribe passed an ordinance consenting to taxation, and the Court vacated and remanded.
Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of Oneida (2d Cir. 2010)
Oneida I and Oneida II were litigated as a test cases by both sides; the Oneidas suit against the counties for 200 years of damages was stayed pending its resolution. After settlement efforts, that suit resumed in 2000. In a similar suit by a different tribe, the Second Circuit adopted the view of the four dissenting Oneida II justices in Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki
Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki
Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 , is an important precedent in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for the litigation of aboriginal title in the United States. Applying the U.S. Supreme Court's recent ruling in City of Sherrill v...
(2005). The same laches defense defeated the larger Oneida claim. The Oneida and the United States petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari on May 16, 2011. The Court denied certiorari on October 17, with Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissenting from the denial.
External links
- Text of the opinion at: Justia
- Oral arguments at Oyez Project