Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki
Encyclopedia
Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005), is an important precedent in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
for the litigation of aboriginal title in the United States
. Applying the U.S. Supreme Court's recent ruling in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. (2005) ["Sherrill"], a divided panel held that the equitable doctrine of laches
bars all tribal land claims sounding in ejectment
or trespass
, for both tribal plaintiffs and the federal government as plaintiff-intervenor.
The ruling was the culmination of a two-decade-long litigation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
before Judge Neal Peters McCurn
. Pursuant to a jury verdict, the Cayuga Nation of New York
had been awarded $247.9 million, representing the current fair market value and 204 years of rental value damages for 64,015 acres conveyed by the tribe to the state in violation of the Nonintercourse Act (including pre-judgement interest).
This precedent has effectively ended the viability of all aboriginal title
litigation in the Second Circuit (Connecticut, New York, and Vermont), the site of nearly all of the unresolved Indian land claims in the United States. Since the ruling, no tribal plaintiff has overcome the laches defense in a land claim in the Second Circuit. Four dissenting Supreme Court justices had previously adopted the view of the Second Circuit in Oneida Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State (1985); there, the majority did not reach the issue.
In 1983, the Cayuga survived the defendant's motion to dismiss. Judge McCurn held that the Nonintercourse Act applied to the conveyances in question, held that the Cayuga had a valid cause of action, and rejected the affirmative defense
s of: sovereign immunity
pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
; statute of limitations
, nonjusticiability, and abatement
. McCurn's ruling preceded the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Oneida Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State (1985), which rejected several of the same affirmative defenses, among others.
In 1987, McCurn ruled on the motions for summary judgement. He held that: there was no evidence that the treaties had been ratified by the federal government; that the Indian Claims Commission
did not have the authority to ratify the conveyances; and that his court had jurisdiction over the defendants. In 1990, he ruled that both the 1795 and 1807 conveyances violated the Nonintercourse Act, and were thus invalid. In 1991, interpreted the "reservation" terminology in the relevant treaty to also implicate that Act. McCurn also rejected the laches
defense, on which the Second Circuit would eventually overturn his ruling. In response to the defendant's assertion of sovereign immunity as a defense, the federal government moved to intervene in the lawsuit, which was granted in November 1992.
Having established liability, the litigation turned to the remedy. In 1999, McCurn ruled on the appropriate method to calculate damages. The court rejected the state's arguments that damages should be limited to the fair market value of the land at the time of the transaction, without pre-judgement interest (the approximate method used by the Indian Claims Commission for statutory claims against the federal government). That same year, the court rejected ejectment
as a remedy, thus ensuring that the Cayuga would be unable to recover possession of the lands; their remedy would be limited to monetary damages. The court also determined that joint and several liability
would be inappropriate, and thus that the defendants would require separate trials. Finally, the court determined that the state would be able to offset
from the eventual damages any amount of consideration
paid in the original conveyances as well as the value of infrastructure
improvements; moreover, the plaintiff's anthropologist's testimony would not be admissible on the question of valuation, the jury would not be able to hear evidence on laches from either party, the Eleventh Amendment would not bar damages, and the plaintiffs would not be able to claim emotional, psychological, or cultural damages—only the economic value of the land.
Preparing for trial, the court threw out the plaintiff's real estate expert and approved the government's real estate expert, applying the Daubert standard
. He also clarified his prior ruling, to note that testimony on laches would be permitted inasmuch as it related to pre-judgement interest. In 2001, the jury returned a verdict for the Cayuga, calculating damages the current fair market value of the land and the fair rental value of the land over 204 years in excess of $36 million; with the addition of pre-judgement interest, the damages reached $247,911,999.42. The court also denied the defendant's post-trial motions, but stayed the collection of the judgement pending appeal.
authored the panel opinion, joined by Rosemary S. Pooler
. The court in large part relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's recent Sherrill (2005) decision, which, it stated, "dramatically altered the legal landscape against which we consider plaintiffs' claims." In summary, the court noted: "We understand Sherrill to hold that equitable doctrines, such as laches, acquiescence, and impossibility, can, in appropriate circumstances, be applied to Indian land claims, even when such a claim is legally viable and within the statute of limitations." While, Sherrill expressly did not disturb Oneida II
(1985): "Because the Supreme Court in Oneida II expressly declined to decide whether laches would apply to such claims, this statement in Sherrill is not dispositive of whether laches would apply here."
Parsing the Sherrill decision, the court concluded that the dispositive factor there was the "disruptive nature of the claim itself." Thus, the court opted for a broad reading of Sherrill:
Rejecting the Cayuga and federal government's argument that Sherrill did not bar monetary remedies, the court held that "this case involves comparably disruptive claims, and other, comparable remedies are in fact at issue." The court emphasized that "plaintiffs' claim is and has always been one sounding in ejectment; plaintiffs have asserted a continuing right to immediate possession as the basis of all of their claims, and have always sought ejectment of the current landowners as their preferred form of relief." The court concluded that the District Court had "'monetized' the ejectment remedy." The court's treatment would apply the defense recognized in Sherrill to nearly all aboriginal title claims:
Acknowledging that laches has traditionally been understood as an equitable doctrine, the court rejected any distinction between law and equity, holding that it barred "any remedy flowing from this possessory land claim." The court justified this holding with reference to the sui generis nature of aboriginal title. "To summarize," the court recapitulated:
The court held that laches equally barred both the plaintiff's cause of action for ejectment
and the plaintiff's cause of action for trespass
. Acknowledging that the federal government had "traditionally not been subject to the defense of laches," the court did not interpret this as a "per se rule." The decision concluded with praise for the McCurn:
of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
, sitting by designation, dissented. Hall argued: "While [Sherrill] has an impact on this case, it does not compel the conclusion that the plaintiffs are without any remedy . . . ." Hall would have barred the ejectment of the present landowners, but not the money damages. With respect to the ejectment cause of action, Hall would have held that: "[W]here a plaintiff seeks ejectment damages, rather than restoration of a possession interest, application of the doctrine of laches to such a money damage claim is rarely if ever justified." Hall also would not have applied laches to the trespass cause of action.
Nor would Hall have applied laches to the federal government. Distinguishing the cases cited by the panel majority, Hall noted that "[t]hese cases cannot support the proposition that this Court has the authority to craft a federal common law defense of laches against an Indian land claim sought by the United States." In concluding, Hall examined the language of Sherill in greater depth, arguing that Sherill "does not reach as far as the majority reads it."
.
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is one of the thirteen United States Courts of Appeals...
for the litigation of aboriginal title in the United States
Aboriginal title in the United States
The United States was the first jurisdiction to acknowledge the common law doctrine of aboriginal title...
. Applying the U.S. Supreme Court's recent ruling in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. (2005) ["Sherrill"], a divided panel held that the equitable doctrine of laches
Laches (equity)
Laches is an "unreasonable delay pursuing a right or claim...in a way that prejudices the [opposing] party" When asserted in litigation, it is an equitable defense, or doctrine...
bars all tribal land claims sounding in ejectment
Ejectment
Ejectment is the common law term for civil action to recover the possession of and title to land. It replaced the old real actions as well as the various possessory assizes...
or trespass
Trespass
Trespass is an area of tort law broadly divided into three groups: trespass to the person, trespass to chattels and trespass to land.Trespass to the person, historically involved six separate trespasses: threats, assault, battery, wounding, mayhem, and maiming...
, for both tribal plaintiffs and the federal government as plaintiff-intervenor.
The ruling was the culmination of a two-decade-long litigation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York serves one of the 94 judicial districts in the United States and one of four in the state of New York. The U.S. Attorney for the district is Richard S. Hartunian...
before Judge Neal Peters McCurn
Neal Peters McCurn
Neal Peters McCurn is a federal judge for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of New York. Judge McCurn graduated from Syracuse University with an A.B. in 1950 and Syracuse University College of Law with an LL.B. in 1952. He was nominated to the court by President Jimmy Carter on September...
. Pursuant to a jury verdict, the Cayuga Nation of New York
Cayuga Nation of New York
The Cayuga Nation of New York is a federally recognized tribe of Cayuga people, based in New York, United States. The other tribes with Cayuga members are Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma and the Six Nations of the Grand River First Nation.- History :...
had been awarded $247.9 million, representing the current fair market value and 204 years of rental value damages for 64,015 acres conveyed by the tribe to the state in violation of the Nonintercourse Act (including pre-judgement interest).
This precedent has effectively ended the viability of all aboriginal title
Aboriginal title
Aboriginal title is a common law doctrine that the land rights of indigenous peoples to customary tenure persist after the assumption of sovereignty under settler colonialism...
litigation in the Second Circuit (Connecticut, New York, and Vermont), the site of nearly all of the unresolved Indian land claims in the United States. Since the ruling, no tribal plaintiff has overcome the laches defense in a land claim in the Second Circuit. Four dissenting Supreme Court justices had previously adopted the view of the Second Circuit in Oneida Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State (1985); there, the majority did not reach the issue.
Prior history
The Second Circuit ruling came twenty-five years after the Cayuga filed their complaint in the Northern District of New York in 1980 challenging two conveyances of land to the state in 1795 and 1807, totaling 64,015 acres. The following year, a class of defendant land owners was certified.In 1983, the Cayuga survived the defendant's motion to dismiss. Judge McCurn held that the Nonintercourse Act applied to the conveyances in question, held that the Cayuga had a valid cause of action, and rejected the affirmative defense
Affirmative defense
A defendant offers an affirmative defense when responding to a plaintiff's claim in common law jurisdictions, or, more familiarly, in criminal law. Essentially, the defendant affirms that the condition is occurring or has occurred but offers a defense that bars, or prevents, the plaintiff's claim. ...
s of: sovereign immunity
Sovereign immunity
Sovereign immunity, or crown immunity, is a legal doctrine by which the sovereign or state cannot commit a legal wrong and is immune from civil suit or criminal prosecution....
pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which was passed by the Congress on March 4, 1794, and was ratified on February 7, 1795, deals with each state's sovereign immunity. This amendment was adopted in order to overrule the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v...
; statute of limitations
Statute of limitations
A statute of limitations is an enactment in a common law legal system that sets the maximum time after an event that legal proceedings based on that event may be initiated...
, nonjusticiability, and abatement
Abatement
Abatement may refer to:*Abatement of debts and legacies, a common law doctrine of wills*Abatement in pleading, a legal defense to civil and criminal actions based purely on procedural and technical issues involving the death of parties...
. McCurn's ruling preceded the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Oneida Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State (1985), which rejected several of the same affirmative defenses, among others.
In 1987, McCurn ruled on the motions for summary judgement. He held that: there was no evidence that the treaties had been ratified by the federal government; that the Indian Claims Commission
Indian claims commission
The Indian Claims Commission was a judicial panel for relations between the United States Federal Government and Native American tribes. It was established in 1946 by the United States Congress to hear claims of Indian tribes against the United States...
did not have the authority to ratify the conveyances; and that his court had jurisdiction over the defendants. In 1990, he ruled that both the 1795 and 1807 conveyances violated the Nonintercourse Act, and were thus invalid. In 1991, interpreted the "reservation" terminology in the relevant treaty to also implicate that Act. McCurn also rejected the laches
Laches (equity)
Laches is an "unreasonable delay pursuing a right or claim...in a way that prejudices the [opposing] party" When asserted in litigation, it is an equitable defense, or doctrine...
defense, on which the Second Circuit would eventually overturn his ruling. In response to the defendant's assertion of sovereign immunity as a defense, the federal government moved to intervene in the lawsuit, which was granted in November 1992.
Having established liability, the litigation turned to the remedy. In 1999, McCurn ruled on the appropriate method to calculate damages. The court rejected the state's arguments that damages should be limited to the fair market value of the land at the time of the transaction, without pre-judgement interest (the approximate method used by the Indian Claims Commission for statutory claims against the federal government). That same year, the court rejected ejectment
Ejectment
Ejectment is the common law term for civil action to recover the possession of and title to land. It replaced the old real actions as well as the various possessory assizes...
as a remedy, thus ensuring that the Cayuga would be unable to recover possession of the lands; their remedy would be limited to monetary damages. The court also determined that joint and several liability
Joint and several liability
Where two or more persons are liable in respect of the same liability, in most common law legal systems they may either be:* jointly liable, or* severally liable, or* jointly and severally liable.-Joint liability:...
would be inappropriate, and thus that the defendants would require separate trials. Finally, the court determined that the state would be able to offset
Offset
The term offset may refer to:* Carbon offset, a financial instrument aimed at a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions* Offset agreement, trade practice in Aerospace and Defense Industry...
from the eventual damages any amount of consideration
Consideration
Consideration is the central concept in the common law of contracts and is required, in most cases, for a contract to be enforceable. Consideration is the price one pays for another's promise. It can take a number of forms: money, property, a promise, the doing of an act, or even refraining from...
paid in the original conveyances as well as the value of infrastructure
Infrastructure
Infrastructure is basic physical and organizational structures needed for the operation of a society or enterprise, or the services and facilities necessary for an economy to function...
improvements; moreover, the plaintiff's anthropologist's testimony would not be admissible on the question of valuation, the jury would not be able to hear evidence on laches from either party, the Eleventh Amendment would not bar damages, and the plaintiffs would not be able to claim emotional, psychological, or cultural damages—only the economic value of the land.
Preparing for trial, the court threw out the plaintiff's real estate expert and approved the government's real estate expert, applying the Daubert standard
Daubert Standard
The Daubert standard is a rule of evidence regarding the admissibility of expert witnesses' testimony during United States federal legal proceedings. Pursuant to this standard, a party may raise a Daubert motion, which is a special case of motion in limine raised before or during trial to exclude...
. He also clarified his prior ruling, to note that testimony on laches would be permitted inasmuch as it related to pre-judgement interest. In 2001, the jury returned a verdict for the Cayuga, calculating damages the current fair market value of the land and the fair rental value of the land over 204 years in excess of $36 million; with the addition of pre-judgement interest, the damages reached $247,911,999.42. The court also denied the defendant's post-trial motions, but stayed the collection of the judgement pending appeal.
Majority
Judge José A. CabranesJosé A. Cabranes
José Alberto Cabranes , is a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Formerly a practicing lawyer, government official, and law teacher, he was the first Puerto Rican appointed to a federal judgeship in the continental United States .-Background:Cabranes was born in...
authored the panel opinion, joined by Rosemary S. Pooler
Rosemary S. Pooler
Rosemary S. Pooler , is a U.S. federal judge in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.-Early life:Rosemary Pooler was born in New York City. She earned a B.A. from Brooklyn College in 1959, an M.A...
. The court in large part relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's recent Sherrill (2005) decision, which, it stated, "dramatically altered the legal landscape against which we consider plaintiffs' claims." In summary, the court noted: "We understand Sherrill to hold that equitable doctrines, such as laches, acquiescence, and impossibility, can, in appropriate circumstances, be applied to Indian land claims, even when such a claim is legally viable and within the statute of limitations." While, Sherrill expressly did not disturb Oneida II
Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State
Oneida Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State, 470 U.S. 226 , is a landmark decision concerning aboriginal title in the United States...
(1985): "Because the Supreme Court in Oneida II expressly declined to decide whether laches would apply to such claims, this statement in Sherrill is not dispositive of whether laches would apply here."
Parsing the Sherrill decision, the court concluded that the dispositive factor there was the "disruptive nature of the claim itself." Thus, the court opted for a broad reading of Sherrill:
Although we recognize that the Supreme Court did not identify a formal standard for assessing when these equitable defenses apply, the broadness of the Supreme Court's statements indicates to us that Sherrills holding is not narrowly limited to claims identical to that brought by the Oneidas, seeking a revival of sovereignty, but rather, that these equitable defenses apply to “disruptive” Indian land claims more generally.
Rejecting the Cayuga and federal government's argument that Sherrill did not bar monetary remedies, the court held that "this case involves comparably disruptive claims, and other, comparable remedies are in fact at issue." The court emphasized that "plaintiffs' claim is and has always been one sounding in ejectment; plaintiffs have asserted a continuing right to immediate possession as the basis of all of their claims, and have always sought ejectment of the current landowners as their preferred form of relief." The court concluded that the District Court had "'monetized' the ejectment remedy." The court's treatment would apply the defense recognized in Sherrill to nearly all aboriginal title claims:
[T]his type of possessory land claim-seeking possession of a large swath of central New York State and the ejectment of tens of thousands of landowners . . . is indisputably disruptive. Indeed, this disruptiveness is inherent in the claim itself-which asks this Court to overturn years of settled land ownership-rather than an element of any particular remedy which would flow from the possessory land claim. Accordingly, we conclude that possessory land claims of this type are subject to the equitable considerations discussed in Sherrill.
Acknowledging that laches has traditionally been understood as an equitable doctrine, the court rejected any distinction between law and equity, holding that it barred "any remedy flowing from this possessory land claim." The court justified this holding with reference to the sui generis nature of aboriginal title. "To summarize," the court recapitulated:
[T]he import of Sherrill is that “disruptive,” forward-looking claims, a category exemplified by possessory land claims, are subject to equitable defenses, including laches. Insofar as the Cayugas' claim in the instant case is unquestionably a possessory land claim, it is subject to laches. . . . The fact that, nineteen years into the case, at the damages stage, the District Court substituted a monetary remedy for plaintiffs' preferred remedy of ejectment cannot salvage the claim, which was subject to dismissal ab initioAb initioab initio is a Latin term used in English, meaning from the beginning.ab initio may also refer to:* Ab Initio , a leading ETL Tool Software Company in the field of Data Warehousing.* ab initio quantum chemistry methods...
. To frame this point a different way: if the Cayugas filed this complaint today, exactly as worded, a District Court would be required to find the claim subject to the defense of laches under Sherrill and could dismiss on that basis.
The court held that laches equally barred both the plaintiff's cause of action for ejectment
Ejectment
Ejectment is the common law term for civil action to recover the possession of and title to land. It replaced the old real actions as well as the various possessory assizes...
and the plaintiff's cause of action for trespass
Trespass
Trespass is an area of tort law broadly divided into three groups: trespass to the person, trespass to chattels and trespass to land.Trespass to the person, historically involved six separate trespasses: threats, assault, battery, wounding, mayhem, and maiming...
. Acknowledging that the federal government had "traditionally not been subject to the defense of laches," the court did not interpret this as a "per se rule." The decision concluded with praise for the McCurn:
Our decision to reverse the judgment of the District Court and enter judgment for defendants should in no way be interpreted as a reflection on the District Court's efforts and rulings in this case. We recognize and applaud the thoughtful and painstaking efforts, over many years, of Judge Neil P. McCurn, who presided over this and related land claims in upstate New York with fairness and due regard to the rights and interests of all parties as well as with a keen appreciation of the complexities of the subject matter and of the relevant law. Our decision is based on a subsequent ruling by the Supreme Court, which could not be anticipated by Judge McCurn in his handling of this case over more than twenty years.
Dissent
Judge Janet C. HallJanet C. Hall
Janet C. Hall is a United States federal judge on the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. She sits in Bridgeport. Hall was nominated by President Bill Clinton on June 5, 1997, to a seat vacated by T. F. Gilroy Daly...
of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut is the Federal district court whose jurisdiction is the state of Connecticut. The court has offices in Bridgeport, Hartford and New Haven. Appeals from the court are heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit...
, sitting by designation, dissented. Hall argued: "While [Sherrill] has an impact on this case, it does not compel the conclusion that the plaintiffs are without any remedy . . . ." Hall would have barred the ejectment of the present landowners, but not the money damages. With respect to the ejectment cause of action, Hall would have held that: "[W]here a plaintiff seeks ejectment damages, rather than restoration of a possession interest, application of the doctrine of laches to such a money damage claim is rarely if ever justified." Hall also would not have applied laches to the trespass cause of action.
Nor would Hall have applied laches to the federal government. Distinguishing the cases cited by the panel majority, Hall noted that "[t]hese cases cannot support the proposition that this Court has the authority to craft a federal common law defense of laches against an Indian land claim sought by the United States." In concluding, Hall examined the language of Sherill in greater depth, arguing that Sherill "does not reach as far as the majority reads it."
Subsequent history
Although both the Solicitor General of the United States and the Cayuga asked the Supreme Court to review the Second Circuit's holding, the Court declined to grant certiorariCertiorari
Certiorari is a type of writ seeking judicial review, recognized in U.S., Roman, English, Philippine, and other law. Certiorari is the present passive infinitive of the Latin certiorare...
.