Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
Encyclopedia
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal(MMA) (United Council of Action) is a coalition of Islamist parties that was formed in 2002 to electorally challenge the Pakistan
Parliament's incumbent parties. The MMA garnered the second-largest majority in the National Assembly Majlis-e-Shoora
with 58 out of 342 seats, as well as a provincial majority in NWFP and a provincial minority in Sindh and Balochistan.
However, in addition to the military prioritizing and providing several concessions to the MMA in its rise to legitimacy, ideological pragmatism as a campaign strategy lifted the party into Pakistan’s mainstream political institutions. Given the destabilized nature of the PPP and PML-N, the MMA benefited from the “ideological bankruptcy,” monopolizing on the public’s sentiment towards the U.S.’ involvement in Afghanistan. Also, in public, the MMA remained confrontational and opposed Musharraf for his partnership with the U.S. The MMA’s political program highlighted its nationalist, populist tendencies, while hindering its religious rhetoric. Leading up to the elections, the MMA composed a 15 point manifesto as follows.
The MMA’s manifesto relies on heavy promises towards social services, eradication of foreign imperialism, extinguish corruption and exercise justice, while highlighting local and international struggles towards autonomy. Although the implementations of Shari’a and gender segregation were cornerstones to the MMA’s ideology, such goals were vague and rarely highlighted during election campaigns. In addition, its relative passiveness against Musharraf’s incumbent regime helped the party’s cause, such as exemption from restrictions on public rallies and madrassa registration.
Such political strategies worked exemplary for the MMA in Baluchistan and the NWFP. Due to the Baluchi nationalists’ fragmentation following the withdrawal of the Soviets from the region and its failure to denounce the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the Baluchi incumbents were viewed as Musharraf sympathizers. In the NWFP, the MMA performed well due to the high volume of Pakhtuns, who received the MMA’s policies towards anti-imperialism well. The coalition consisted of large numbers of ethnic Pakhtuns, and thus was active in organizing demonstrations against the plight of Afghan Pakhtuns under siege. In Sindh, the MMA won popular support, and five out of twenty National Assembly seats, by attacking the incumbent party, the MQM. Highlighting their history of extortion and lack of progress towards addressing social concerns, the MMA rallied the masses through its madari networks to voice their position and conjure votes on Election Day.
Through utilizing the several concessions made by the military regime, exploiting ideological and public weaknesses of incumbent parties, and politicizing the Afghan invasion, the MMA was able to secure eleven percent of the popular vote and 58 seats in the National Assembly. Given the conditions of the election, which were limited and not free under the watchful eye of the military-government, the MMA’s ascension does not seem as surprising. However in the following years, leading up to the 2008 election, the MMA was exposed and held publicly accountable.
On December 29, the 17th Amendment was ratified by Parliament after an agreement between the MMA and the Musharraf regime was reached, thus enacting the LFO into law on January 1 and allowing for the General’s transition for COAS to President. With few alterations to the original LFO, most notably Musharraf’s agreement to remove his military uniform for civilian attire, the MMA, siding with the treasury benches, approved the Amendment by two-thirds majority. The vote was boycotted by the disconcerted ARD, who witnessed the MMA recite “No LFO no, go Musharraf go” throughout the year’s parliamentary session and organized rallies against the legislation in Rawalpindi and Islamabad. Instead, the ARD declared the MMA as dissidents in the cause against Musharraf’s authoritarian regime and the restoration of the civilian government.
The reasons as to why the MMA consented to the LFO remains unclear, given the initial agreement was reached between the two parties in separate meetings between the JI’s leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed and the JUI-F’s leader Fazlur Rahman. Regardless, the ratification of the LFO undermined the credibility of the MMA due to its capricious relationship with the incumbent authoritarian regime. In fact, the ARD and other secular parties felt corroboration of such a relationship came in the form of the military’s impassivity towards the JI after evidence of its association with al-Qaeda, recognition of the MMA as the main opposition in Parliament, and the MMA’s reticence in the wake of the storming of the Lal Masjid. The MMA attempted to compensate for the military-mullah rhetoric by violently protesting against the government and its response to the Danish cartoon controversy and the promulgation of the Hasba Bill, however such sentiment further proved the MMA’s flightiness to the public, while further provoking the secular parties and institutions of the civilian government.
The marginalization of the MMA by the ARD and the Supreme Court pitted the coalition against the most significant actors of the civilian government. The party’s reliability after the LFO debacle, an incident often related to Zia ul-Haq’s RCO measures, remained questionable, and thus was heavily discriminated against by the legal and political elements of the more established civilian actors. With such partisanship against the MMA, the secular elements banded together in universally opposing the MMA, which buckled, as would any party estranged in a democratic political process.
However, after 2002, as such parties became entrenched in the political process, they adapted accordingly, engaging in realpolitik while adhering to party ideology. The PPP, a secular party committed to democracy, has historically clashed with the military and authoritarian regimes, and is insistent on the preservation of the 1973 constitution. The PML-N, the first established ruling party of Pakistan after partition under Jinnah, was split in 2002 when the incumbent government formed the PML-Q Thus, although the party was fractured, the dissent, which consisted of conservative, military loyalists, yielded a more ideologically cohesive PML-N. In addition, the coup orchestrated in 1999 ousted the PML-N, whom offered concessions to religious groups, and thus appeared antagonistic to the Musharraf-regime.
The MMA’s fresh inception into Pakistani politics as a party most used to garnering support on the street, the political processes of Parliament quickly tested its ideological strength. However, due to the competing factions within the party, each of which were self-proclaimed defendants of a Islam, MMA ideology was shirked for individual or group allegiances. Due to such ideological differences, intra-party fissures and divisions arose early in the MMA’s existence. For instance, following the 2002 elections the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Samiul Haq (JUI-S) claimed the party’s politics and policy had been usurped by the JI and JIU-F, disadvantaging the smaller constituents of the MMA. In 2004, Samiul Haq informally seceded, citing the MMA had failed in its implementation of Shari’a, had fell silent regarding military presence in tribal areas, raids on mosques, and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.
In 2005, a veteran of the JI was expelled from the MMA for dissenting from the party, and registering to contest an election against the coalition. Due to the MMA’s undemocratic nature and monopolization by the JI and JIUF, Pir Muhammad defected, forming a “forward bloc of ten MMA’s in the assembly.” To highlight unraveling of the party, although Qazi Hussain Ahmed, leader of the JI officially revoked Pir Muhammad’s affiliation with the MMA, Fazlur Rahman of the JUIF declared the JI dissident as an honorary member of the MMA, given he withdrew his name right before the electoral process. Issues such as these have pitted the JI and JIUF against one another in series of contentions.
The most publicized of such fissures occurred as the NWFP Chief Minister Akram Khan Durrani defied Qazi Hussain Ahmed and the JI in attending the National Security Council meeting. Following rows of accusations of the MMA’s close relationship with the government, the coalition attempted to distance itself from the Musharraf regime, including absence from the NSC. After the 2005 earthquake in the NWFP, Durrani attended the NSC in an attempt to gain federal relief funds. The issue exacerbated the once already prevalent fissure between the JI and JIUF, for the JUIF’s constituents found it necessary for Durrani to attend, whereas the JI leader vehemently opposed.
As the two most established organizations of the MMA diverted, the party began to unravel during the 2005 general elections. The JI and JIU-F fielded separate candidates in its strongholds, and aligned with the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), respectively. Due to such a split, the two parties performed poorly, for the JI garnered 91 of the Frontier’s 986 seats for Union Council nazims, whereas the JUI-F secured 161 seats.
However, the formation of the MMA, on the basis of anti-American, anti-Musharraf, and pro-Islam platforms, coalesced solely in the context of a perceived moment of crisis. As the pressures which brought them in tandem eased, and domestic issues such as unemployment and social issues arose, the binding conditions of the coalition unraveled. As the Parliament began to functionally operate for the first time after the 1999 coup, a domestic agenda was established, thus forcing the MMA, centrally lacking organization, to engage in the democratic nature of party politics. Such processes highlighted the fissures and competing ideologies within the MMA, where interests and partisanship resulted in different responses to situations. The fact remains that the MMA’s political experience derived from establishing street power, however translating such into a coherent, effective ideology was precarious, and thus was exposed by the accountable, rigorous forces of the democratic process. The fact that the MMA lacked the resources and institutions to succeed in the democratic process can be ascribed to its competing Islamisms, where differences in the successful elections of 2002 were not buried, yet instead, evaded.
In 2003, as part of the Annual Development Report published by the World Bank, the MMA had breached several agreements with the organization, and most notably its constituents. The report delineated the widespread corruption in the NWFP government, where under-the-table favors and irregularities in the postings of officials in accordance with familiarity as opposed to merit were pervasive. In addition, The Herald reported privatization of certain sectors of the NWFP as encouraged by the World Bank allowed government officials to pawn industries off to business associates and cronies. In fact, it is stated that a high-ranking official in Peshawar’s city government was replaced when inhibiting such transactions.
In 2005, scandal occurred in the NWFP after the police inaction regarding a violent incident where a young woman was paraded at gunpoint in Qazi Hussain Ahmed’s native district of Nowshera. Eventually, the girl was rescued by relatives, and an immediate case was filed, yet the reaction, or lack thereof, is what sparked controversy. The MMA refused to address the issue, defending the police and its impassivity in the case. A few months later, MMA officials were accused of distributing the medical-school examinations to prominent families in Abbottabad and Peshawar. Although swift arrests were made following the incident, the image of the MMA as a supporter of the lower-middle class was tarnished, given such a leak came from within the party. Capping off the MMA’s year came the purchase of two French Alloute-II helicopters to serve as official transportation for the province’s officials. Serious claims were made against the government, for a price tag of 105 million rupees, with an additional 40-million-rupee annual maintenance fee, did not fair well for a province where about half of its resident living at or below the poverty line. With such frequent rows of corruption, the party’s legitimacy was quickly lost.
In addition, one of the driving forces to its election in 2002 was its guarantee in providing jobs and ameliorating the fragile economy of the NWFP. However, the MMA’s policies further deteriorated the economic and development progress of the province. Due to its attempted eradication of music in public spaces, local cinemas and hotels, and most notably its vehement rejection of the advertisement industry and its use of women on its billboards, tourism and federal funding for the province was severely cut. In addition, due to its lack of proper management of World Bank development funds, a large chunk of the year’s allotted funds were withheld. The MMA failed to follow the realpolitik nature of Pakistani politics, quickly pitting all other civilian parties against the coalition, and failed to provide the goods promised to its constituents in the NWFP.
and Pakistan's dedication to counter-terrorism and regional stability. Nor has the MMA been able to influence Pakistan's monetary and banking policies, whereas the MMA has demanded in Parliament that the interest
banking system be banned (the MMA's opposition has pointed out that the government itself would be unable to continue to operate without borrowing money from foreign banks). Some Pakistanis are suspicious of the MMA, as the MMA, by virtue of its nature as a professedly religious Islamic party, openly states it desires the establishment of a theocracy
, and does not believe in the Western notion of a democracy
. The MMA's definition of democracy which is identical to theocracy is unacceptable to the MMA's opponents.
The MMA have sought to implement controversial legislation in NWFP, such as the proposed Shariat and Hisbah bills. The bills are disputed - some Pakistanis regard this as a serious abuse of government power and violation of human rights, while Islamic parties regard it as the implementation of legitimate Islamic laws, in line with the constitution of Pakistan, which makes it avowedly clear the fact that Pakistan is an Islamic republic with the law of Shari'a supreme. The Governor of NWFP has vowed that it will not be implemented and President Pervez Musharraf
filed a reference against it in Pakistan's Supreme Court. The 9 member bench of the court declared certain clauses unconstitutional and directed the Governor not to sign it into law until it is revised. In a detailed verdict released on September 1, 2005, the Supreme Court stated that other clauses of the bill can be challenged as well. However, the elected senate approved over 90% of the bill.
, ambiguous attitude towards terrorism, and opposition to President Musharraf, the MMA have not interfered in anti-terrorism operations, whether it is law enforcement or military or paramilitary action.
The MMA has not supported the operations either.
Sharia courts in Pakistan, which claim to be based on Islamic law, try rape cases under "Hudood
" Ordinances instituted in 1979. According to critics of the ordinance, a rape victim could face adultery (or fornication if unmarried) charges unless she can produce four male Muslim witnesses of good character to her rape. Failing to do so entails a maximum sentence for adultery is death by stoning. However, Mufti Taqi Usmani, an instrumental figuring in making the Hudud Laws, has stated "If anyone says that she was punished because of Qazaf (false accusation of rape) then Qazaf Ordinance, Clause no. 3, Exemption no. 2 clearly states that if someone approaches the legal authorities with a rape complaint, she cannot be punished in case she is unable to present 4 witnesses. No court of law can be in its right mind to award such a punishment."
The Hudood Ordinances are widely condemned by women's rights groups in Pakistan, by some Islamists globally, and by international human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch
.
Pakistan
Pakistan , officially the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a sovereign state in South Asia. It has a coastline along the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman in the south and is bordered by Afghanistan and Iran in the west, India in the east and China in the far northeast. In the north, Tajikistan...
Parliament's incumbent parties. The MMA garnered the second-largest majority in the National Assembly Majlis-e-Shoora
Majlis-e-Shoora
The Parliament of Pakistan, officially termed the Majlis-e-Shoora ; is the federal and supreme legislative body of Pakistan. It is a bicameral federal legislature that consists of the Senate and the National Assembly, the upper and lower houses, respectively...
with 58 out of 342 seats, as well as a provincial majority in NWFP and a provincial minority in Sindh and Balochistan.
Background
The MMA is a conglomeration of distinct Islamist parties that ran under a single banner during Pakistan’s 2002 provincial elections. Islamist movements are defined as those which derive inspiration from the Islamic scriptures, the Qur'an and Hadith, and vie to capture the state. Historically, literature concerning Islamism and Muslim political institutions has been propagated via the Orientalist discourse, where the rejection of certain post-Enlightenment, national, and secular values has been translated into such movements’ retrogressive nature. In fact, much of Islamism and its ideology are critiqued as a launching pad for fundamentalism and radicalism, as political movements such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the ‘Islamic’ revolution of Iran are highlighted. However, social science and ethnographic work has proven that Islamism emerges out of middle-class lay intellectuals concentrated in urban centers. In the case of Pakistan and the MMA, Islamists united in 1993 under the Islamic Front and in 2000 under the Pakistan-Afghanistan Defense Council, yet the formation of the MMA in 2001 was the first time such a coalition entered the electoral process. It currently comprises the following groups:- Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman's faction of Jamiat Ulema-e-IslamJamiat Ulema-e-IslamThe Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam is a political party in Pakistan. It formed a combined government in national elections in 2002 and 2008...
or simply JUI-F. The Largest more hardline and traditional stream of thinking - with popular appeal amongst clerics and the Pashtuns and Baluch of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. - Jamiat Ulema-e-PakistanJamiat Ulema-e-PakistanThe Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan is a political party in Pakistan. It is part of the Islamic Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, that won at the last legislative elections, 20 October 2002, 11.3 of the popular vote and 53 out of 272 elected members.This party belongs to the Sunni current, which in...
or JUP. A traditional BarelviBarelviBarelvi is a term used for the movement of Sufi , Sunni Islam originating in the Indian subcontinent.The Movement is known as Ahle Sunnat movement to its followers....
political party which is popular with traditional and folk Muslims in Pakistani villages in SindhSindhSindh historically referred to as Ba'ab-ul-Islam , is one of the four provinces of Pakistan and historically is home to the Sindhi people. It is also locally known as the "Mehran". Though Muslims form the largest religious group in Sindh, a good number of Christians, Zoroastrians and Hindus can...
and PunjabPunjab (Pakistan)Punjab is the most populous province of Pakistan, with approximately 45% of the country's total population. Forming most of the Punjab region, the province is bordered by Kashmir to the north-east, the Indian states of Punjab and Rajasthan to the east, the Pakistani province of Sindh to the...
. - Jamaat-e-IslamiJamaat-e-IslamiThis article is about Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan. For other organizations of similar name see Jamaat-e-Islami The Jamaat-e-Islami , is a Pro-Muslim political party in Pakistan...
. A pan-Islamist religious political party. - Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan or TJP. The Shia group also known as the Tehrik-e-Islami.
- Jamiat Ahle HadithJamiat Ahle HadithJamiat Ahle Hadith is a religio-political party in Pakistan promoting the Ahle Hadees religious movement. It is part of the Islamic fundamentalist Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, that won at the last legislative elections, 20 October 2002 with 11.3 percent of the popular vote...
. religious political party of Pakistan deriving from the Ahl-al-Hadees movement.
Rise to power
The success of the MMA can be attributed to the context-specific, political environment of the 2002 elections, due to the region’s geopolitical significance following the Afghanistan invasion, military-civilian relations, and the threat of religion under secular authoritarian rule. Leading up to the 2002 elections, the PPP and the PML-N were severely handicapped as elite members of their respective parties were charged with corruption under the military regime, and thus, under the Legal Framework Ordinances (LFO), were rendered incapable of running for office. In addition, the government exempted the MMA from standard campaign conduct, for their use of loudspeakers, street rallies, and anti-government inflammatory rhetoric was not interfered with. Another form of assistance from the government came in the revision of article 8a of the constitution, where a graduation clause required degrees from accredited universities, which included JI and JIU-F affiliated madaris, for participation in the electoral process. Such a clause restricted the ANP in its strongholds in NWFP and Balochistan, and thus favored the MMA.However, in addition to the military prioritizing and providing several concessions to the MMA in its rise to legitimacy, ideological pragmatism as a campaign strategy lifted the party into Pakistan’s mainstream political institutions. Given the destabilized nature of the PPP and PML-N, the MMA benefited from the “ideological bankruptcy,” monopolizing on the public’s sentiment towards the U.S.’ involvement in Afghanistan. Also, in public, the MMA remained confrontational and opposed Musharraf for his partnership with the U.S. The MMA’s political program highlighted its nationalist, populist tendencies, while hindering its religious rhetoric. Leading up to the elections, the MMA composed a 15 point manifesto as follows.
- To revive fear of God, affection to the Islamic Prophet Mohammed and service to people with particular emphasis on government officials and cabinet members.
- To make Pakistan a true Islamic welfare state to ensure justice to people and eradicate corruption whatsoever.
- To ensure provision of bread, clothes, shelter, education, jobs and marriage expenses to all citizens.
- To protect basic human rights (life, property and honour) of citizens
- To create an independent, just and humane economic system where citizens will be provided opportunities for halal jobs, business, and investments.
- To ensure uniform and quick justice to every citizen, from the president to a layman.
- The develop God fearing, helping, brave and protecting police system.
- To get the entire society literate within ten years to enable everyone to know one’s rights and responsibilities.
- To ensure compulsory and free of charge education till matriculation and provide opportunities to meritorious students and scholars for advanced research.
- To protect rights of women guaranteed by Islam and restoration of their honour and prestige.
- To abolish all chronic and new feudal systems with forfeiture of illegal wealth and its distribution among the poor.
- To provide lands to peasants and formers for their livelihood and guarantee reasonable prices to their produce.
- To protect provincial autonomy and district governments, taking care of backward areas and classes and taking special steps to get them at par with developed areas.
- To get the country and people rid of imperialistic forces and their local agents.
- To extend moral, political and diplomatic help and support to all suppressed with particular emphasis on Kashmiris, Palestinians, Afghans, and Chechens.
The MMA’s manifesto relies on heavy promises towards social services, eradication of foreign imperialism, extinguish corruption and exercise justice, while highlighting local and international struggles towards autonomy. Although the implementations of Shari’a and gender segregation were cornerstones to the MMA’s ideology, such goals were vague and rarely highlighted during election campaigns. In addition, its relative passiveness against Musharraf’s incumbent regime helped the party’s cause, such as exemption from restrictions on public rallies and madrassa registration.
Such political strategies worked exemplary for the MMA in Baluchistan and the NWFP. Due to the Baluchi nationalists’ fragmentation following the withdrawal of the Soviets from the region and its failure to denounce the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the Baluchi incumbents were viewed as Musharraf sympathizers. In the NWFP, the MMA performed well due to the high volume of Pakhtuns, who received the MMA’s policies towards anti-imperialism well. The coalition consisted of large numbers of ethnic Pakhtuns, and thus was active in organizing demonstrations against the plight of Afghan Pakhtuns under siege. In Sindh, the MMA won popular support, and five out of twenty National Assembly seats, by attacking the incumbent party, the MQM. Highlighting their history of extortion and lack of progress towards addressing social concerns, the MMA rallied the masses through its madari networks to voice their position and conjure votes on Election Day.
Through utilizing the several concessions made by the military regime, exploiting ideological and public weaknesses of incumbent parties, and politicizing the Afghan invasion, the MMA was able to secure eleven percent of the popular vote and 58 seats in the National Assembly. Given the conditions of the election, which were limited and not free under the watchful eye of the military-government, the MMA’s ascension does not seem as surprising. However in the following years, leading up to the 2008 election, the MMA was exposed and held publicly accountable.
Collapse
The Islamist coalition's successes in the NWFP, Baluchistan, and the municipal government of Karachi were transient events, as seen in the party’s split in the 2005 elections and official collapse in the 2008 elections. Although the Military-MMA relationship is pertinent to the party’s demise, the MMA’s fate can be more accurately ascribed to its relationship to other secular institutions, individual and organizational corruption, and competing Islamisms. The MMA’s actions while serving in the government portray the party’s ideological fissures, its inadequacy in serving the public and delivering campaign promises, and its illiteracy in realpolitik. With such exposed shortcomings while serving as constituents in Pakistan’s democratic institutions, the MMA was evaluated on the basis of its performance, and was duly rejected in the subsequent provincial and national elections.The Legal Framework Ordinance, MMA-Military relationship, and fallout with the ARD
In April 2002, General Musharraf promulgated the controversial Legal Framework Ordinance (LFO), providing 29 amendments to Pakistan’s 1973 constitution. In rejection to the executive measure, the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD), uniting the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), staunchly opposed the measure, as did the MMA. The 2nd Amendment, addressing Articles 41 and 58 of the constitution, authorized Musharraf to legally transfer from his post as Chief Executive to President, and provided the President the authority to dissolve Parliament at will. The 7th Amendment agitated members of the PPP, PML-N, and the MMA, whose politicians were disqualified on the basis of corruption, evading repayment of government loans, and other misconduct, rendering them unable to participate in elections. The most vehemently protested legislation was of Amendment 17, which established the National Security Council (NSC) and granted its executive seat to General Musharraf, therefore solidifying the transfer of power from the Parliament and Prime Minister to the President. In 2003, an 11-person arbitration council was set up to negotiate measures necessary to pass the Amendments in Parliament, however private settlements were offered to each party in exchange for its support of the legislation as well. Due to the PPP and PML-N’s allegiance to the ARD and the established intra-party institutions and ideology, the parties resolutely rejected the most striking aspects of the proposed legislation, which vindicated the military regime of its unconstitutional coup. However, with its various Islamist groups and thus assorted ideologies, the MMA served as the most likely party for the Musharraf regime to conciliate. In fact, the second largest group of the MMA, the JUI-F, advocated the existing government, unlike the other party pioneer, the JI.On December 29, the 17th Amendment was ratified by Parliament after an agreement between the MMA and the Musharraf regime was reached, thus enacting the LFO into law on January 1 and allowing for the General’s transition for COAS to President. With few alterations to the original LFO, most notably Musharraf’s agreement to remove his military uniform for civilian attire, the MMA, siding with the treasury benches, approved the Amendment by two-thirds majority. The vote was boycotted by the disconcerted ARD, who witnessed the MMA recite “No LFO no, go Musharraf go” throughout the year’s parliamentary session and organized rallies against the legislation in Rawalpindi and Islamabad. Instead, the ARD declared the MMA as dissidents in the cause against Musharraf’s authoritarian regime and the restoration of the civilian government.
The reasons as to why the MMA consented to the LFO remains unclear, given the initial agreement was reached between the two parties in separate meetings between the JI’s leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed and the JUI-F’s leader Fazlur Rahman. Regardless, the ratification of the LFO undermined the credibility of the MMA due to its capricious relationship with the incumbent authoritarian regime. In fact, the ARD and other secular parties felt corroboration of such a relationship came in the form of the military’s impassivity towards the JI after evidence of its association with al-Qaeda, recognition of the MMA as the main opposition in Parliament, and the MMA’s reticence in the wake of the storming of the Lal Masjid. The MMA attempted to compensate for the military-mullah rhetoric by violently protesting against the government and its response to the Danish cartoon controversy and the promulgation of the Hasba Bill, however such sentiment further proved the MMA’s flightiness to the public, while further provoking the secular parties and institutions of the civilian government.
The marginalization of the MMA by the ARD and the Supreme Court pitted the coalition against the most significant actors of the civilian government. The party’s reliability after the LFO debacle, an incident often related to Zia ul-Haq’s RCO measures, remained questionable, and thus was heavily discriminated against by the legal and political elements of the more established civilian actors. With such partisanship against the MMA, the secular elements banded together in universally opposing the MMA, which buckled, as would any party estranged in a democratic political process.
Competing Islamisms
The constituents of the ARD performed poorly in the 2002 elections due to restrictions imposed by the Musharraf-regime, leading to arrests of several leaders of the PPP and PML-N for corruption charges and violation of campaign methods. In addition, the ANP suffered substantially due to the graduation clause as made part of article 8a of the constitution, making graduate degrees from accredited universities, madrasahs included, a prerequisite for positions in the provincial and national assemblies. With such conditions, established political parties were handicapped, and thus were left ideologically bankrupt, jostling for self-preservation. As the issue most prevalent to the 2002 elections became foreign policy and economic reforms, the PPP, PML-N, and ANP did not adjust their rhetoric accordingly.However, after 2002, as such parties became entrenched in the political process, they adapted accordingly, engaging in realpolitik while adhering to party ideology. The PPP, a secular party committed to democracy, has historically clashed with the military and authoritarian regimes, and is insistent on the preservation of the 1973 constitution. The PML-N, the first established ruling party of Pakistan after partition under Jinnah, was split in 2002 when the incumbent government formed the PML-Q Thus, although the party was fractured, the dissent, which consisted of conservative, military loyalists, yielded a more ideologically cohesive PML-N. In addition, the coup orchestrated in 1999 ousted the PML-N, whom offered concessions to religious groups, and thus appeared antagonistic to the Musharraf-regime.
The MMA’s fresh inception into Pakistani politics as a party most used to garnering support on the street, the political processes of Parliament quickly tested its ideological strength. However, due to the competing factions within the party, each of which were self-proclaimed defendants of a Islam, MMA ideology was shirked for individual or group allegiances. Due to such ideological differences, intra-party fissures and divisions arose early in the MMA’s existence. For instance, following the 2002 elections the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Samiul Haq (JUI-S) claimed the party’s politics and policy had been usurped by the JI and JIU-F, disadvantaging the smaller constituents of the MMA. In 2004, Samiul Haq informally seceded, citing the MMA had failed in its implementation of Shari’a, had fell silent regarding military presence in tribal areas, raids on mosques, and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.
In 2005, a veteran of the JI was expelled from the MMA for dissenting from the party, and registering to contest an election against the coalition. Due to the MMA’s undemocratic nature and monopolization by the JI and JIUF, Pir Muhammad defected, forming a “forward bloc of ten MMA’s in the assembly.” To highlight unraveling of the party, although Qazi Hussain Ahmed, leader of the JI officially revoked Pir Muhammad’s affiliation with the MMA, Fazlur Rahman of the JUIF declared the JI dissident as an honorary member of the MMA, given he withdrew his name right before the electoral process. Issues such as these have pitted the JI and JIUF against one another in series of contentions.
The most publicized of such fissures occurred as the NWFP Chief Minister Akram Khan Durrani defied Qazi Hussain Ahmed and the JI in attending the National Security Council meeting. Following rows of accusations of the MMA’s close relationship with the government, the coalition attempted to distance itself from the Musharraf regime, including absence from the NSC. After the 2005 earthquake in the NWFP, Durrani attended the NSC in an attempt to gain federal relief funds. The issue exacerbated the once already prevalent fissure between the JI and JIUF, for the JUIF’s constituents found it necessary for Durrani to attend, whereas the JI leader vehemently opposed.
As the two most established organizations of the MMA diverted, the party began to unravel during the 2005 general elections. The JI and JIU-F fielded separate candidates in its strongholds, and aligned with the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), respectively. Due to such a split, the two parties performed poorly, for the JI garnered 91 of the Frontier’s 986 seats for Union Council nazims, whereas the JUI-F secured 161 seats.
However, the formation of the MMA, on the basis of anti-American, anti-Musharraf, and pro-Islam platforms, coalesced solely in the context of a perceived moment of crisis. As the pressures which brought them in tandem eased, and domestic issues such as unemployment and social issues arose, the binding conditions of the coalition unraveled. As the Parliament began to functionally operate for the first time after the 1999 coup, a domestic agenda was established, thus forcing the MMA, centrally lacking organization, to engage in the democratic nature of party politics. Such processes highlighted the fissures and competing ideologies within the MMA, where interests and partisanship resulted in different responses to situations. The fact remains that the MMA’s political experience derived from establishing street power, however translating such into a coherent, effective ideology was precarious, and thus was exposed by the accountable, rigorous forces of the democratic process. The fact that the MMA lacked the resources and institutions to succeed in the democratic process can be ascribed to its competing Islamisms, where differences in the successful elections of 2002 were not buried, yet instead, evaded.
Corruption and Failure to Deliver
Without the ability to engage in realpolitik, the MMA’s limited tenure within the party became apparent, resulting in widespread organizational and individual corruption. Due to such, the MMA functioned independent of the public, and thus lost its street credibility. Withdrawal from the populist platform, the strongest cadre of MMA support, resulted in opposition by most facets of the civilian government and the public. Without legitimacy, the MMA’s preservation was implausible, for the political culture and democratic institutions did not allow for such a party to persist.In 2003, as part of the Annual Development Report published by the World Bank, the MMA had breached several agreements with the organization, and most notably its constituents. The report delineated the widespread corruption in the NWFP government, where under-the-table favors and irregularities in the postings of officials in accordance with familiarity as opposed to merit were pervasive. In addition, The Herald reported privatization of certain sectors of the NWFP as encouraged by the World Bank allowed government officials to pawn industries off to business associates and cronies. In fact, it is stated that a high-ranking official in Peshawar’s city government was replaced when inhibiting such transactions.
In 2005, scandal occurred in the NWFP after the police inaction regarding a violent incident where a young woman was paraded at gunpoint in Qazi Hussain Ahmed’s native district of Nowshera. Eventually, the girl was rescued by relatives, and an immediate case was filed, yet the reaction, or lack thereof, is what sparked controversy. The MMA refused to address the issue, defending the police and its impassivity in the case. A few months later, MMA officials were accused of distributing the medical-school examinations to prominent families in Abbottabad and Peshawar. Although swift arrests were made following the incident, the image of the MMA as a supporter of the lower-middle class was tarnished, given such a leak came from within the party. Capping off the MMA’s year came the purchase of two French Alloute-II helicopters to serve as official transportation for the province’s officials. Serious claims were made against the government, for a price tag of 105 million rupees, with an additional 40-million-rupee annual maintenance fee, did not fair well for a province where about half of its resident living at or below the poverty line. With such frequent rows of corruption, the party’s legitimacy was quickly lost.
In addition, one of the driving forces to its election in 2002 was its guarantee in providing jobs and ameliorating the fragile economy of the NWFP. However, the MMA’s policies further deteriorated the economic and development progress of the province. Due to its attempted eradication of music in public spaces, local cinemas and hotels, and most notably its vehement rejection of the advertisement industry and its use of women on its billboards, tourism and federal funding for the province was severely cut. In addition, due to its lack of proper management of World Bank development funds, a large chunk of the year’s allotted funds were withheld. The MMA failed to follow the realpolitik nature of Pakistani politics, quickly pitting all other civilian parties against the coalition, and failed to provide the goods promised to its constituents in the NWFP.
Criticism
The MMA is the major Islamic political party of Pakistan. It is opposed by a number of secular political parties which reject the MMA's aspirations to establish a complete theocracy in Pakistan. Though Pakistan is a Muslim country and its constitution declares Shar'iah as the law, there is not a unified consensus on what is shariah and what is not. Although the MMA has been able to exert a great deal of power over the poorest and least educated provinces of Pakistan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan), it has been completely prevented from influencing Pakistan's foreign policy. The MMA is highly opposed to Pakistan's friendship with the United StatesUnited States
The United States of America is a federal constitutional republic comprising fifty states and a federal district...
and Pakistan's dedication to counter-terrorism and regional stability. Nor has the MMA been able to influence Pakistan's monetary and banking policies, whereas the MMA has demanded in Parliament that the interest
Interest
Interest is a fee paid by a borrower of assets to the owner as a form of compensation for the use of the assets. It is most commonly the price paid for the use of borrowed money, or money earned by deposited funds....
banking system be banned (the MMA's opposition has pointed out that the government itself would be unable to continue to operate without borrowing money from foreign banks). Some Pakistanis are suspicious of the MMA, as the MMA, by virtue of its nature as a professedly religious Islamic party, openly states it desires the establishment of a theocracy
Theocracy
Theocracy is a form of organization in which the official policy is to be governed by immediate divine guidance or by officials who are regarded as divinely guided, or simply pursuant to the doctrine of a particular religious sect or religion....
, and does not believe in the Western notion of a democracy
Democracy
Democracy is generally defined as a form of government in which all adult citizens have an equal say in the decisions that affect their lives. Ideally, this includes equal participation in the proposal, development and passage of legislation into law...
. The MMA's definition of democracy which is identical to theocracy is unacceptable to the MMA's opponents.
The MMA have sought to implement controversial legislation in NWFP, such as the proposed Shariat and Hisbah bills. The bills are disputed - some Pakistanis regard this as a serious abuse of government power and violation of human rights, while Islamic parties regard it as the implementation of legitimate Islamic laws, in line with the constitution of Pakistan, which makes it avowedly clear the fact that Pakistan is an Islamic republic with the law of Shari'a supreme. The Governor of NWFP has vowed that it will not be implemented and President Pervez Musharraf
Pervez Musharraf
Pervez Musharraf , is a retired four-star general who served as the 13th Chief of Army Staff and tenth President of Pakistan as well as tenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Musharraf headed and led an administrative military government from October 1999 till August 2007. He ruled...
filed a reference against it in Pakistan's Supreme Court. The 9 member bench of the court declared certain clauses unconstitutional and directed the Governor not to sign it into law until it is revised. In a detailed verdict released on September 1, 2005, the Supreme Court stated that other clauses of the bill can be challenged as well. However, the elected senate approved over 90% of the bill.
War on Terror
Besides of their severe criticism of the War on TerrorismWar on Terrorism
The War on Terror is a term commonly applied to an international military campaign led by the United States and the United Kingdom with the support of other North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as well as non-NATO countries...
, ambiguous attitude towards terrorism, and opposition to President Musharraf, the MMA have not interfered in anti-terrorism operations, whether it is law enforcement or military or paramilitary action.
The MMA has not supported the operations either.
"Hudood" Law controversy
The MMA threatened to resign from national and provincial assemblies in protest after Pakistan's parliament amended laws to transfer rape cases from its 'Sharia' courts to civil courts.Sharia courts in Pakistan, which claim to be based on Islamic law, try rape cases under "Hudood
Hudood Ordinance
The Hudood Ordinance was a law in Pakistan that was enacted in 1979 as part of then-military ruler Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization and replaced or revised in 2006 by the Women's Protection Bill....
" Ordinances instituted in 1979. According to critics of the ordinance, a rape victim could face adultery (or fornication if unmarried) charges unless she can produce four male Muslim witnesses of good character to her rape. Failing to do so entails a maximum sentence for adultery is death by stoning. However, Mufti Taqi Usmani, an instrumental figuring in making the Hudud Laws, has stated "If anyone says that she was punished because of Qazaf (false accusation of rape) then Qazaf Ordinance, Clause no. 3, Exemption no. 2 clearly states that if someone approaches the legal authorities with a rape complaint, she cannot be punished in case she is unable to present 4 witnesses. No court of law can be in its right mind to award such a punishment."
The Hudood Ordinances are widely condemned by women's rights groups in Pakistan, by some Islamists globally, and by international human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Watch is an international non-governmental organization that conducts research and advocacy on human rights. Its headquarters are in New York City and it has offices in Berlin, Beirut, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Paris, San Francisco, Tokyo,...
.
See also
- Qazi Hussain AhmadQazi Hussain AhmadQazi Hussain Ahmad was the third president of the Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami, a major political party in Pakistan...
- Khurshid Ahmad
- Majlis-e-Ahrar-ul-IslamMajlis-e-Ahrar-ul-IslamMajlis-e-Ahrar-ul-Islam or Majlis-e-Ah'rãr-e-Islam , also known in short as Ahrar, was a conservative Sunni Muslim political party in Pakistan prior to the Partition of India...
- Abdul Latif Khalid CheemaAbdul Latif Khalid CheemaAbdul Latif Khalid Cheema is Secretary General of Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam and Central convener of Muttahida Tehreek-e-Khatme Nabuwwat Rabitta Committee. He is also the head of Darul Uloom Khatm-e-Nubuwwat in Chichawatni...
- Liaqat BalochLiaqat BalochLiaqat Baloch Bawala is a political leader in Pakistan. He is originally from Muzaffargarh, a remote area of southern Punjab....
- Women's Protection BillWomen's Protection BillThe Women's Protection Bill which was passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan on 15 November 2006 is an attempt to amend the heavily criticized Hudood Ordinance laws which govern the punishment for rape and adultery in Pakistan.-Impact of the Bill:...
External links
- mma.org.pk - Official web site
- Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (A key member of MMA)
- Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)