Street v Mountford
Encyclopedia
Street v Mountford [1985] UKHL 4 is an important House of Lords judgment in English property law
. The case set out the principles the court would deploy to decide whether someone's occupation of a property amounted to a tenancy (i.e. a lease), or only a licence.
The former creates an estate or interest in land, enforceable against all the world, and enjoys significant protection at common law and by statute; but the latter is a purely personal contract, valid only between the two original parties to it, and attracts little in the way of legal protection.
Upon referring to this case, it is important to note that although a landlord is naming the document a licence, if the above terms are incorporated into the licence, i.e exclusive possession with a term certain at a full market rent, calling the document a licence is only a way for the landlord to steer clear of the laws that govern leases under the Landlord and Tenant act 1954.
In all these cases the Courts have repeatedly stressed the need to look at the reality of the arrangement, and to disregard the artificial labels which are typically employed in the documents (which, being invariably drafted by the landowner, represent only the landowner's view of the rights being created) - labels such as 'licensor' and 'licensee' - on the principle that it is necessary to call a spade a spade.
In AG Securities v Vaughan
(1988) the House of Lords decided that exclusive possession had not been granted, where up to four agreements existed simultaneously for the sharing of a single flat by unrelated occupiers, as there was an actual sharing of occupation.
In Antoniades v Villiers and Bridger , a case concerning a self-contained flat, the agreement expressly denied that the occupier had exclusive possession, and expressly provided for the owner to allow others to share the premises. The House of Lords decided that as the flat was in reality too small to accommodate others, so that it was incapable of actually being shared, the wording was merely a pretence intended to evade the Rent Act, and that in law the arrangement accordingly amounted to a grant of exclusive possession.
In Family Housing Association v Jones (1990), where a Housing Association housed homeless persons temporarily, the Court of Appeal decided that a tenancy was nevertheless created, because in reality it was intended that Mrs Jones and her child were to be the only occupiers, paying weekly, and in practice they did not actually share the accommodation; notwithstanding an express provision in the agreement that she did not have exclusive possession, and despite the Association holding a key.
By way of contrast, in Westminster CC v Clarke (1992) a resident of one room in a Hostel had an agreement permitting the Hostel's owner unrestricted access to the room, and containing a provision enabling the occupier to be compelled to share the room. There was no actual sharing; but the arrangement was nevertheless held to be a licence, not a tenancy, as the room did not amount to a separate dwelling.
English property law
English property law refers to the law of acquisition, sharing and protection of wealth in England and Wales. Property law can refer to many things, and covers many areas. Property in land is the domain of the law of real property. The law of personal property is particularly important for...
. The case set out the principles the court would deploy to decide whether someone's occupation of a property amounted to a tenancy (i.e. a lease), or only a licence.
The former creates an estate or interest in land, enforceable against all the world, and enjoys significant protection at common law and by statute; but the latter is a purely personal contract, valid only between the two original parties to it, and attracts little in the way of legal protection.
Facts
A Mr Roger Street granted a term of occupation to a Mrs Mountford for a rent. The written agreement included numerous references to the effect that it was a "licence". Several clauses also purported to retain for Mr Street rights of entry and termination. Mrs Mountford was also restricted in what she could do on the property, including bringing in animals and children. The agreement was so drafted to create a licence that would not come under the Rent Act, rather than a tenancy, which would entitle Mrs Mountford to the protection of the Rent Act. Mrs Mountford subsequently applied for rent protection, and the case progressed to the House of Lords.Judgment
The Lords unanimously held - with Lord Templeman delivering judgment - that an agreement for exclusive possession for a term at a rent creates a lease or tenancy, regardless of what the parties call it. Lord Templeman memorably stated that "a five pronged implement for manual digging is a fork", whatever the manufacturer chooses to call it. He also went on to explain the theoretical basis for tenancies, including periodic tenancies. The case is of much significance in the area of lease law throughout much of the common law world.Upon referring to this case, it is important to note that although a landlord is naming the document a licence, if the above terms are incorporated into the licence, i.e exclusive possession with a term certain at a full market rent, calling the document a licence is only a way for the landlord to steer clear of the laws that govern leases under the Landlord and Tenant act 1954.
Significance
In relation to residential properties, a line of cases have attempted to resolve the related issues of what amounts to exclusive possession (i.e. exclusive occupation) and what amounts to a 'dwelling', as the legal effect of Street v Mountford, taken together with the Rent Act 1977 (as amended by the Housing Act 1988), is that a tenancy or lease exists only if exclusive possession is granted of 'a dwelling'.In all these cases the Courts have repeatedly stressed the need to look at the reality of the arrangement, and to disregard the artificial labels which are typically employed in the documents (which, being invariably drafted by the landowner, represent only the landowner's view of the rights being created) - labels such as 'licensor' and 'licensee' - on the principle that it is necessary to call a spade a spade.
In AG Securities v Vaughan
AG Securities v Vaughan
AG Securities v Vaughan was a legal case in English property law concerning the concept of exclusive possession.-Facts:This case involved a joint appeal to the House of Lords regarding the elements of exclusive possession, and it was heard together with the case of Antonidas v Villiers...
(1988) the House of Lords decided that exclusive possession had not been granted, where up to four agreements existed simultaneously for the sharing of a single flat by unrelated occupiers, as there was an actual sharing of occupation.
In Antoniades v Villiers and Bridger , a case concerning a self-contained flat, the agreement expressly denied that the occupier had exclusive possession, and expressly provided for the owner to allow others to share the premises. The House of Lords decided that as the flat was in reality too small to accommodate others, so that it was incapable of actually being shared, the wording was merely a pretence intended to evade the Rent Act, and that in law the arrangement accordingly amounted to a grant of exclusive possession.
In Family Housing Association v Jones (1990), where a Housing Association housed homeless persons temporarily, the Court of Appeal decided that a tenancy was nevertheless created, because in reality it was intended that Mrs Jones and her child were to be the only occupiers, paying weekly, and in practice they did not actually share the accommodation; notwithstanding an express provision in the agreement that she did not have exclusive possession, and despite the Association holding a key.
By way of contrast, in Westminster CC v Clarke (1992) a resident of one room in a Hostel had an agreement permitting the Hostel's owner unrestricted access to the room, and containing a provision enabling the occupier to be compelled to share the room. There was no actual sharing; but the arrangement was nevertheless held to be a licence, not a tenancy, as the room did not amount to a separate dwelling.