Philippa Foot
Encyclopedia
Philippa Ruth Foot was a British
philosopher
, most notable for her works in ethics
. She was one of the founders of contemporary virtue ethics
. Her work, especially in her later career, marked a significant change in view from her work in the 1950s and 1960s, and may be seen as an attempt to modernize Aristotelian
ethical theory, to show that it is adaptable to a contemporary world view, and thus, that it could compete with such popular theories as modern deontological and utilitarian
ethics. Some of her work was crucial in the re-emergence of normative ethics
within analytic philosophy
, especially her critique of consequentialism
. A familiar example is the continuing discussion of an example of hers referred to as the trolley problem
. Foot's approach was influenced by the later work of Wittgenstein, although she rarely dealt explicitly with materials treated by him.
in character: that is, they pertained to the status of moral judgment and speech. The essays Moral Arguments and Moral Beliefs, in particular, were crucial in overturning the rule of non-cognitivism
in analytic approaches to ethical theory in the preceding decades.
The non-cognitivist approach may already be found, e.g. in Hume
, but it was given its most influential analytic formulations in works of A. J. Ayer
, C. L. Stevenson, and R. M. Hare
. These writers focused on so-called 'thin ethical concepts' such as "good" and "bad" and "right" and "wrong", arguing that they are not employed to affirm something true of the thing in question, but rather, to express an emotion or (in Hare's case) an imperative.
This sort of analysis of 'thin" ethical concepts was tied to a special partitioning account of more concrete or "thick" concepts, such as "cowardly", 'cruel", or "gluttonous": these were supposed to combine a non-cognitive "evaluative" element with the obvious, "merely descriptive" element.
Foot's purpose was to criticize this distinction and the underlying account of thin concepts. Because of the particular way she approached the defense of the cognitive and truth-evaluable character of moral judgment, these essays were crucial in bringing the question of the rationality
of morality
to the fore.
Practical considerations involving "thick" ethical concepts – but it would be cruel, it would be cowardly, it's hers, or I promised her I wouldn't – move people to act one way rather than another, but they are as descriptive as any other judgment pertaining to human life. They differ from thought such as it would be done on a Tuesday or it would take about three gallons of paint, not by the admixture of any non-factual, attitude-expressing "moral" element, but by the fact that human beings have reasons not to do things that are cowardly or cruel.
Her lifelong devotion to this question appears in all periods of her work. It may be found in her continuing discussion of the Plato
nic immoralists, Callicles
and Thrasymachus
, and of Nietzsche.
the fact that we have nothing to say in proof of the irrationality of at least some unjust people should not alarm us in our own defense and cultivation of justice and benevolence: "it did not strike the citizens of Leningrad that their devotion to the city and its people during the terrible years of the siege was contingent".
Once this step is made, it becomes possible to argue for the rationality of moral considerations in a new way. Humans begin with the conviction that justice is a genuine virtue. Thus, the conviction that the well-constituted human practical reason operates with considerations of justice, means that taking account of other people in that sort of way is "how human beings live together." (The thought that this is how they live must be understood in a sense that is compatible with the fact that actual individuals often do not – just as dentists understand the thought that "human beings have n teeth" in a way that is compatible with many people having fewer). There is nothing incoherent in the thought that practical calculation that takes account of others and their good might characterize some kind of rational and social animal.
Similarly, of course, there is nothing incoherent in the idea of a form of rational life within which such considerations are alien; where they can only be imposed by damaging and disturbing the individual person. There is nothing analytic about the rationality of justice and benevolence. Rather, human conviction that justice is a virtue and that considerations of justice are genuine reasons for action, is the conviction that the kind of rational being that we are, namely, human beings, is of the first type. There is no reason to think such a kind of rational animality is impossible, so there is no reason to suspect that considerations of justice are frauds.
Of course, it might be suggested that this is precisely not the case, that human beings are of the second kind, and thus that the justice and benevolence we esteem are artificial and false. Foot would hold that considerations of machismo and lady-likeness are artificial and false; they are matters of "mere convention," which tend to put one off of the main things. That being how it is with justice, was the position of the Platonic "immoralists" Callicles and Thrasymachus, and that being how it is with benevolence, was the view of Nietzsche.
In the case of Callicles and Nietzsche, this apparently is to be shown by claiming that justice and benevolence, respectively, can be inculcated only by warping the emotional apparatus of the individual. Foot's book ends by attempting to defuse the evidence Nietzsche brings against what might be called, the common sense position. She proceeds by accepting his basic premise that a way of life that can only be inculcated by damaging the individual's passions, filling one with remorse, resentment, and so forth, is not true. She employs exactly the Nietzschean form of argument against certain forms of femininity, for example, or exaggerated forms of acceptance of etiquette. Justice and benevolence, she claims, however, "suit" human beings, and there is no reason to accept the critique of Callicles or Nietzsche in this case.
(who was born in the White House
), and a granddaughter of U.S. President Grover Cleveland
.
Foot began her career in philosophy as a student and tutor at Somerville College
, Oxford. She spent many hours there in debate with G.E.M. Anscombe, who persuaded her that non-cognitivism was misguided.
For many years Foot held the position of Griffin Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles
.
She was one of the founders of Oxfam
and an atheist.http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~hrp/issues/2003/Foot.pdf
She was at one time married to the historian M. R. D. Foot.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern IrelandIn the United Kingdom and Dependencies, other languages have been officially recognised as legitimate autochthonous languages under the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages...
philosopher
Philosophy
Philosophy is the study of general and fundamental problems, such as those connected with existence, knowledge, values, reason, mind, and language. Philosophy is distinguished from other ways of addressing such problems by its critical, generally systematic approach and its reliance on rational...
, most notable for her works in ethics
Ethics
Ethics, also known as moral philosophy, is a branch of philosophy that addresses questions about morality—that is, concepts such as good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice, justice and crime, etc.Major branches of ethics include:...
. She was one of the founders of contemporary virtue ethics
Virtue ethics
Virtue ethics describes the character of a moral agent as a driving force for ethical behavior, rather than rules , consequentialism , or social context .The difference between these four approaches to morality tends to lie more in the way moral dilemmas are...
. Her work, especially in her later career, marked a significant change in view from her work in the 1950s and 1960s, and may be seen as an attempt to modernize Aristotelian
Aristotelianism
Aristotelianism is a tradition of philosophy that takes its defining inspiration from the work of Aristotle. The works of Aristotle were initially defended by the members of the Peripatetic school, and, later on, by the Neoplatonists, who produced many commentaries on Aristotle's writings...
ethical theory, to show that it is adaptable to a contemporary world view, and thus, that it could compete with such popular theories as modern deontological and utilitarian
Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is an ethical theory holding that the proper course of action is the one that maximizes the overall "happiness", by whatever means necessary. It is thus a form of consequentialism, meaning that the moral worth of an action is determined only by its resulting outcome, and that one can...
ethics. Some of her work was crucial in the re-emergence of normative ethics
Normative ethics
Normative ethics is the study of ethical action. It is the branch of philosophical ethics that investigates the set of questions that arise when considering how one ought to act, morally speaking...
within analytic philosophy
Analytic philosophy
Analytic philosophy is a generic term for a style of philosophy that came to dominate English-speaking countries in the 20th century...
, especially her critique of consequentialism
Consequentialism
Consequentialism is the class of normative ethical theories holding that the consequences of one's conduct are the ultimate basis for any judgment about the rightness of that conduct...
. A familiar example is the continuing discussion of an example of hers referred to as the trolley problem
Trolley problem
The trolley problem is a thought experiment in ethics, first introduced by Philippa Foot, but also extensively analysed by Judith Jarvis Thomson, Peter Unger, and Frances Kamm...
. Foot's approach was influenced by the later work of Wittgenstein, although she rarely dealt explicitly with materials treated by him.
Critique of non-cognitivism
Foot's works of the late 1950s were meta-ethicalMeta-ethics
In philosophy, meta-ethics is the branch of ethics that seeks to understand the nature of ethical properties, statements, attitudes, and judgments. Meta-ethics is one of the three branches of ethics generally recognized by philosophers, the others being normative ethics and applied ethics. Ethical...
in character: that is, they pertained to the status of moral judgment and speech. The essays Moral Arguments and Moral Beliefs, in particular, were crucial in overturning the rule of non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions and thus cannot be true or false...
in analytic approaches to ethical theory in the preceding decades.
The non-cognitivist approach may already be found, e.g. in Hume
David Hume
David Hume was a Scottish philosopher, historian, economist, and essayist, known especially for his philosophical empiricism and skepticism. He was one of the most important figures in the history of Western philosophy and the Scottish Enlightenment...
, but it was given its most influential analytic formulations in works of A. J. Ayer
Alfred Ayer
Sir Alfred Jules "Freddie" Ayer was a British philosopher known for his promotion of logical positivism, particularly in his books Language, Truth, and Logic and The Problem of Knowledge ....
, C. L. Stevenson, and R. M. Hare
R. M. Hare
Richard Mervyn Hare was an English moral philosopher who held the post of White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford from 1966 until 1983. He subsequently taught for a number of years at the University of Florida...
. These writers focused on so-called 'thin ethical concepts' such as "good" and "bad" and "right" and "wrong", arguing that they are not employed to affirm something true of the thing in question, but rather, to express an emotion or (in Hare's case) an imperative.
This sort of analysis of 'thin" ethical concepts was tied to a special partitioning account of more concrete or "thick" concepts, such as "cowardly", 'cruel", or "gluttonous": these were supposed to combine a non-cognitive "evaluative" element with the obvious, "merely descriptive" element.
Foot's purpose was to criticize this distinction and the underlying account of thin concepts. Because of the particular way she approached the defense of the cognitive and truth-evaluable character of moral judgment, these essays were crucial in bringing the question of the rationality
Rationality
In philosophy, rationality is the exercise of reason. It is the manner in which people derive conclusions when considering things deliberately. It also refers to the conformity of one's beliefs with one's reasons for belief, or with one's actions with one's reasons for action...
of morality
Morality
Morality is the differentiation among intentions, decisions, and actions between those that are good and bad . A moral code is a system of morality and a moral is any one practice or teaching within a moral code...
to the fore.
Practical considerations involving "thick" ethical concepts – but it would be cruel, it would be cowardly, it's hers, or I promised her I wouldn't – move people to act one way rather than another, but they are as descriptive as any other judgment pertaining to human life. They differ from thought such as it would be done on a Tuesday or it would take about three gallons of paint, not by the admixture of any non-factual, attitude-expressing "moral" element, but by the fact that human beings have reasons not to do things that are cowardly or cruel.
Her lifelong devotion to this question appears in all periods of her work. It may be found in her continuing discussion of the Plato
Plato
Plato , was a Classical Greek philosopher, mathematician, student of Socrates, writer of philosophical dialogues, and founder of the Academy in Athens, the first institution of higher learning in the Western world. Along with his mentor, Socrates, and his student, Aristotle, Plato helped to lay the...
nic immoralists, Callicles
Callicles
Callicles is a character in Plato’s dialogue Gorgias. He is an Athenian citizen, who is a student of the sophist Gorgias. In the dialogue, he argues the position of an oligarchic, proto-"Nietzschean" amoralism: it is natural and just for the strong to dominate the weak and that it is unfair for...
and Thrasymachus
Thrasymachus
Thrasymachus was a sophist of Ancient Greece best known as a character in Plato's Republic.-Life, date, and career:...
, and of Nietzsche.
"Why be moral?" – early works
It is on this question – the "why be moral?" question (which for her may be said to divide into the questions "why be just?", "why be temperate?", etc.) – that her doctrine underwent a surprising series of reversals. In Moral Beliefs, she had argued that the received virtues – courage, temperance, justice, and so on – are cultivated rationally, and that it was thus rational to act in accordance with them. The "thick" ethical concepts that she emphasized (without using this expression) in her defense of the cognitive character of moral judgment were associated with such rationally cultivated traits, i.e. virtues; this is how they differ from randomly chosen descriptions of action. The crucial point was that the difference between "just action" and "action performed on Tuesday" (for example) was not a matter of "emotive" meaning, as in Ayer and Stevenson, or a secret imperatival feature, as in Hare."Why be moral?" – middle works
Fifteen years later, in the essay Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, she reversed this when it came to justice and benevolence, that is, the virtues that especially regard other people. Although everyone has reason to cultivate courage, temperance and prudence, whatever the person desires or values, still, the rationality of just and benevolent acts must, she thought, turn on contingent motivations. Although many found the thesis shocking, on her (then) account, it is meant to be, in a certain respect, inspiring: in a famous reinterpretation of a remark of Kant, she says that "we are not conscripts in the army of virtue, but volunteers";the fact that we have nothing to say in proof of the irrationality of at least some unjust people should not alarm us in our own defense and cultivation of justice and benevolence: "it did not strike the citizens of Leningrad that their devotion to the city and its people during the terrible years of the siege was contingent".
"Why be moral?" – later work
Her book, Natural Goodness, attempts a different line. The question, what we have most reason to do, is tied to the idea of the good working of practical reason. This, in turn, is tied to the idea of the species of an animal as providing a measure of good and bad in the operations of its parts and faculties. Just as one has to know what kind of animal one is dealing with in order, for instance, to decide whether its eyesight is good or bad, the question of whether a subject's practical reason is well developed, depends on the kind of animal it is. (This idea is developed in the light of a conception of animal kinds or species as implicitly containing "evaluative" content, which may be criticized on contemporary biological grounds; although it is arguable, even on that basis, that it is very deeply entrenched in human cognition.) In our case, what makes for a well-constituted practical reason, depends on the fact that we are human beings characterized by certain possibilities of emotion and desire, a certain anatomy, neurological organization, and so forth.Once this step is made, it becomes possible to argue for the rationality of moral considerations in a new way. Humans begin with the conviction that justice is a genuine virtue. Thus, the conviction that the well-constituted human practical reason operates with considerations of justice, means that taking account of other people in that sort of way is "how human beings live together." (The thought that this is how they live must be understood in a sense that is compatible with the fact that actual individuals often do not – just as dentists understand the thought that "human beings have n teeth" in a way that is compatible with many people having fewer). There is nothing incoherent in the thought that practical calculation that takes account of others and their good might characterize some kind of rational and social animal.
Similarly, of course, there is nothing incoherent in the idea of a form of rational life within which such considerations are alien; where they can only be imposed by damaging and disturbing the individual person. There is nothing analytic about the rationality of justice and benevolence. Rather, human conviction that justice is a virtue and that considerations of justice are genuine reasons for action, is the conviction that the kind of rational being that we are, namely, human beings, is of the first type. There is no reason to think such a kind of rational animality is impossible, so there is no reason to suspect that considerations of justice are frauds.
Of course, it might be suggested that this is precisely not the case, that human beings are of the second kind, and thus that the justice and benevolence we esteem are artificial and false. Foot would hold that considerations of machismo and lady-likeness are artificial and false; they are matters of "mere convention," which tend to put one off of the main things. That being how it is with justice, was the position of the Platonic "immoralists" Callicles and Thrasymachus, and that being how it is with benevolence, was the view of Nietzsche.
In the case of Callicles and Nietzsche, this apparently is to be shown by claiming that justice and benevolence, respectively, can be inculcated only by warping the emotional apparatus of the individual. Foot's book ends by attempting to defuse the evidence Nietzsche brings against what might be called, the common sense position. She proceeds by accepting his basic premise that a way of life that can only be inculcated by damaging the individual's passions, filling one with remorse, resentment, and so forth, is not true. She employs exactly the Nietzschean form of argument against certain forms of femininity, for example, or exaggerated forms of acceptance of etiquette. Justice and benevolence, she claims, however, "suit" human beings, and there is no reason to accept the critique of Callicles or Nietzsche in this case.
Personal details
Foot was the daughter of Esther ClevelandEsther Cleveland
Esther Cleveland was the daughter of the President of the United States Grover Cleveland.Esther Cleveland is the first — and as of 2011 the only — presidential child born in the White House. She contracted measles when it spread through the White House, leading to a quarantine. Five years later,...
(who was born in the White House
White House
The White House is the official residence and principal workplace of the president of the United States. Located at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW in Washington, D.C., the house was designed by Irish-born James Hoban, and built between 1792 and 1800 of white-painted Aquia sandstone in the Neoclassical...
), and a granddaughter of U.S. President Grover Cleveland
Grover Cleveland
Stephen Grover Cleveland was the 22nd and 24th president of the United States. Cleveland is the only president to serve two non-consecutive terms and therefore is the only individual to be counted twice in the numbering of the presidents...
.
Foot began her career in philosophy as a student and tutor at Somerville College
Somerville College, Oxford
Somerville College is one of the constituent colleges of the University of Oxford in England, and was one of the first women's colleges to be founded there...
, Oxford. She spent many hours there in debate with G.E.M. Anscombe, who persuaded her that non-cognitivism was misguided.
For many years Foot held the position of Griffin Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles
University of California, Los Angeles
The University of California, Los Angeles is a public research university located in the Westwood neighborhood of Los Angeles, California, USA. It was founded in 1919 as the "Southern Branch" of the University of California and is the second oldest of the ten campuses...
.
She was one of the founders of Oxfam
Oxfam
Oxfam is an international confederation of 15 organizations working in 98 countries worldwide to find lasting solutions to poverty and related injustice around the world. In all Oxfam’s actions, the ultimate goal is to enable people to exercise their rights and manage their own lives...
and an atheist.http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~hrp/issues/2003/Foot.pdf
She was at one time married to the historian M. R. D. Foot.
See also
- Judith Jarvis ThomsonJudith Jarvis ThomsonJudith Jarvis Thomson is an American moral philosopher and metaphysician, best known for her use of thought experiments to make philosophical points.- Career :...
- G.E.M. Anscombe
- Rosalind HursthouseRosalind Hursthouse-Biography:Hursthouse spent her childhood in New Zealand and taught for many years at the Open University in England. She was head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Auckland from 2002 to 2005...
- Thought experimentThought experimentA thought experiment or Gedankenexperiment considers some hypothesis, theory, or principle for the purpose of thinking through its consequences...
- Trolley problemTrolley problemThe trolley problem is a thought experiment in ethics, first introduced by Philippa Foot, but also extensively analysed by Judith Jarvis Thomson, Peter Unger, and Frances Kamm...
- Violinist (thought experiment)Violinist (Thought Experiment)The Violinist is a famous thought experiment first posed by Judith Jarvis Thomson in 1971.-The "famous violinist" thought experiment:The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes her thought experiment as follows:...
Selected works
- Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Berkeley: University of California Press; Oxford: Blackwell, 1978 (there are more recent editions).
- Natural Goodness. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001.
- Moral Dilemmas: And Other Topics in Moral Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.
External links
- Iris MurdochIris MurdochDame Iris Murdoch DBE was an Irish-born British author and philosopher, best known for her novels about political and social questions of good and evil, sexual relationships, morality, and the power of the unconscious...
: Memoir of Philippa Foot - Interview with Philippa Foot in Philosophy NowPhilosophy NowPhilosophy Now is a philosophy magazine, published every two months and sold from news-stands and bookstores in the USA, UK, Australia and Canada. It aims to appeal to the general educated public, as well as to students and philosophy teachers. It was founded in 1991...
magazine, 2001. - Interview with Foot by Alex Voorhoeve A revised and slightly expanded version of this interview appears in Alex Voorhoeve, Conversations on Ethics. Oxford University Press, 2009.
- A bibliography of Foot's works through 1996
- "Philippa Foot, Renowned Philosopher, Dies at 90," by WILLIAM GRIMES, The New York Times, October 9, 2010