Freedom of action
Encyclopedia
Freedom of action in philosophy has been distinguished from freedom of the will
at least since the work of Thomas Hobbes
and David Hume
, who claimed that human freedom was the lack of external coercion (sometimes called negative freedom) and not the supposed "free will," which they took to be a will that could act (impossibly at random) independently of the circumstances just prior to a decision.
Free will
was the positive freedom to do otherwise in the same circumstances
. This requires alternative possibilities
for thought and action that Hobbes and Hume denied could exist. It implies the existence of absolute chance
in the universe, which they thought impossible since all events have necessary causes. And it implies more than one possible future, which may conflict with religious views of God's foreknowledge
.
Hobbes called free actions "voluntary" and the actor a "free agent."
He said:
Hobbes was the modern inventor of compatibilism
, the idea that necessary causes and voluntary actions are compatible. (In antiquity, compatibilism was first proposed by the Stoic Chrysippus
)
David Hume agreed:
Rogers Albritton was a philosopher of independent mind who was once chair of the philosophy department at Harvard, and later the chair at UCLA.
Out in California, he became the president of the American Philosophical Association
's western division. His 1985 presidential address, "Freedom of Will and Freedom of Action," to the APA clearly distinguished freedom of action (the freedom to do what we will) from freedom of the will itself.
"Where there's a will, there just isn't always a way," as he put it.
Albritton was particularly critical of Elizabeth Anscombe and her essay "Soft Determinism." William James
had called the Hobbes-Hume freedom "soft" determinism, and a "quagmire of evasion."
Free will
"To make my own decisions whether I am successful or not due to uncontrollable forces" -Troy MorrisonA pragmatic definition of free willFree will is the ability of agents to make choices free from certain kinds of constraints. The existence of free will and its exact nature and definition have long...
at least since the work of Thomas Hobbes
Thomas Hobbes
Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury , in some older texts Thomas Hobbs of Malmsbury, was an English philosopher, best known today for his work on political philosophy...
and David Hume
David Hume
David Hume was a Scottish philosopher, historian, economist, and essayist, known especially for his philosophical empiricism and skepticism. He was one of the most important figures in the history of Western philosophy and the Scottish Enlightenment...
, who claimed that human freedom was the lack of external coercion (sometimes called negative freedom) and not the supposed "free will," which they took to be a will that could act (impossibly at random) independently of the circumstances just prior to a decision.
Free will
Free will
"To make my own decisions whether I am successful or not due to uncontrollable forces" -Troy MorrisonA pragmatic definition of free willFree will is the ability of agents to make choices free from certain kinds of constraints. The existence of free will and its exact nature and definition have long...
was the positive freedom to do otherwise in the same circumstances
Do otherwise in the same circumstances
The ability to choose and do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances is one of two criteria considered essential for libertarian free will and for moral responsibility...
. This requires alternative possibilities
Alternative possibilities
Alternative possibilities for action are one of two criteria considered essential for libertarian free will and for moral responsibility. The other is to the ability to choose and do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances....
for thought and action that Hobbes and Hume denied could exist. It implies the existence of absolute chance
Chance
- Philosophy, logic and theology :* Chance * Contingency * Indeterminism* Luck* Probability* Randomness- Places :* Chancé, a commune in Brittany, France* Chance, Kentucky, U.S.* Chance, Maryland, U.S.* Chance, Virginia, U.S....
in the universe, which they thought impossible since all events have necessary causes. And it implies more than one possible future, which may conflict with religious views of God's foreknowledge
Foreknowledge
Foreknowledge may refer to* Various concepts of knowledge regarding future events:** Predestination** Prediction - Informed or uninformed guesses regarding future events...
.
Hobbes called free actions "voluntary" and the actor a "free agent."
He said:
"I hold that ordinary definition of a free agent, namely that a free agent is that which, when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it, implies a contradiction and is nonsense; being as much as to say the cause may be sufficient, that is necessary, and yet the effect shall not follow."
Hobbes was the modern inventor of compatibilism
Compatibilism
Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent. It may, however, be more accurate to say that compatibilists define 'free will' in a way that allows it to co-exist with determinism...
, the idea that necessary causes and voluntary actions are compatible. (In antiquity, compatibilism was first proposed by the Stoic Chrysippus
Chrysippus
Chrysippus of Soli was a Greek Stoic philosopher. He was a native of Soli, Cilicia, but moved to Athens as a young man, where he became a pupil of Cleanthes in the Stoic school. When Cleanthes died, around 230 BC, Chrysippus became the third head of the school...
)
"when first a man has an appetite or will to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will is not the will itself, but something else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controversy that of voluntary actions the will is the necessary cause, and by this which is said the will is also caused by other things whereof it disposes not, it follows that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes and therefore are necessitated."
David Hume agreed:
"By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; this is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then, is no subject of dispute."
Rogers Albritton was a philosopher of independent mind who was once chair of the philosophy department at Harvard, and later the chair at UCLA.
Out in California, he became the president of the American Philosophical Association
American Philosophical Association
The American Philosophical Association is the main professional organization for philosophers in the United States. Founded in 1900, its mission is to promote the exchange of ideas among philosophers, to encourage creative and scholarly activity in philosophy, to facilitate the professional work...
's western division. His 1985 presidential address, "Freedom of Will and Freedom of Action," to the APA clearly distinguished freedom of action (the freedom to do what we will) from freedom of the will itself.
"Where there's a will, there just isn't always a way," as he put it.
Albritton was particularly critical of Elizabeth Anscombe and her essay "Soft Determinism." William James
William James
William James was a pioneering American psychologist and philosopher who was trained as a physician. He wrote influential books on the young science of psychology, educational psychology, psychology of religious experience and mysticism, and on the philosophy of pragmatism...
had called the Hobbes-Hume freedom "soft" determinism, and a "quagmire of evasion."
"Most philosophers seem to think it quite easy to rob the will of some freedom. Thus Elizabeth Anscombe, in an essay called "Soft Determinism," appears to suppose that a man who can't walk because he is chained up has lost some freedom of will. He "has no 'freedom of will' to walk," she says, or, again; no "freedom of the will in respect of walking." "Everyone will allow," she says, "that 'A can walk, i.e. has freedom of the will in respect of walking' would be gainsaid by A's being chained up." And again, "External constraint is generally agreed to be incompatible with freedom", by which she seems to mean: incompatible with perfect freedom of will, because incompatible with freedom of will to do, or freedom of the will in respect of doing, whatever the constraint prevents.