Ethical naturalism
Encyclopedia
Ethical naturalism is the meta-ethical
view which claims that:
This makes ethical naturalism a definist form of moral realism
, which is in turn a form of cognitivism
. Ethical naturalism stands in opposition to ethical non-naturalism
, which denies that moral terms refer to anything other than irreducible moral properties, as well as to all forms of moral anti-realism
, including ethical subjectivism
(which denies that moral propositions refer to objective facts), error theory (which denies that any moral propositions are true), and non-cognitivism
(which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all).
It is important to distinguish the versions of ethical naturalism which have received the most sustained philosophical interest, for example, Cornell Realism
, from the position that "the way things are is always the way they ought to be"; few ethical naturalists believe such a slogan. Ethical naturalism does, however, reject the fact-value distinction
: it suggests that inquiry into the natural world can increase our moral knowledge in just the same way it increases our scientific knowledge. Indeed, proponents of ethical naturalism have argued that humanity needs to invest in their science of morality
– although the existence of such a science is debated.
Ethical naturalism encompasses any reduction of ethical properties, such as 'goodness', to non-ethical properties; there are many different examples of such reductions, and thus many different varieties of ethical naturalism. Hedonism
, for example, is the view that goodness is ultimately just pleasure
.
. Garner and Rosen say that a common definition of "natural property" is one "which can be discovered by sense observation or experience, experiment, or through any of the available means of science." They also say that a good definition of "natural property" is problematic but that "it is only in criticism of naturalism, or in an attempt to distinguish between naturalistic and nonnaturalistic definist theories, that such a concept is needed." R. M. Hare
also criticised ethical naturalism because of its fallacious definition of the terms 'good' or 'right' explaining how value-terms being part of our prescriptive moral language are not reducible to descriptive terms: "Value-terms have a special function in language, that of commending; and so they plainly cannot be defined in terms of other words which themselves do not perform this function"
– and failure to address this matter is criticized as ethnocentrism
.
As a broad example of relativism, we would no doubt see very different moral systems in an alien race that can only survive by occasionally ingesting one another. As a narrow example, there would be further specific moral opinions for each individual of that species.
Some forms of moral realism
are compatible with some degree of meta-ethical relativism. This argument rests on the assumption that one can have a "moral" discussion on various scales; that is, what is "good" for: a certain part of your being (leaving open the possibility of conflicting motives), you as a single individual, your family, your society, your species, your type of species. For example, a moral universalist
(and certainly an absolutist
) might argue that, just as one can discuss what is 'good and evil' at an individual's level, so too can one make certain "moral" propositions with truth values relative at the level of the species. In other words, the moral relativist need not deem all moral propositions as necessarily subjective. The answer to "is free speech normally good for human societies?" is relative in a sense, but the moral realist would argue that an individual can be incorrect in this matter. This may be the philosophical equivalent of the more pragmatic arguments made by some scientists.
maintain that any talk of an objective morality is incoherent and better off using other terms. Proponents of moral science
like Ronald A. Lindsay have counter-argued that their way of understanding "morality" as a practical enterprise is the way we ought to have understood it in the first place. He holds the position that the alternative seems to be the elaborate philosophical reduction of the word "moral" into a vacuous, useless term. Lindsay adds that it is important to reclaim the specific word "Morality" because of the connotations it holds with many individuals.
has argued that we over-estimate the relevance of many arguments against the science of morality, arguments he believes scientists happily and rightly disregard in other domains of science like physics. For example, a scientist may find herself attempting to counter-argue philosophical skeptics
, when Harris says she should be practically asking – as scientists would in any other domain – "why would we listen to a [ solipsist
] in the first place?" This, Harris contends, is part of what it means to practice a science of morality.
Physicist Sean Carroll
believes that conceiving of morality as a science could be a case of Scientific imperialism
and insists that what is "good for conscious creatures" is not an adequate working definition of "moral".
In opposition, Vice President at the Center for Inquiry
, John Shook, claims that this working definition is more than adequate for science at present, and that disagreement should not immobilize the scientific study of ethics.
In modern times, many thinkers discussing the fact-value distinction
and the Is-ought problem
have settled on the idea that one cannot derive ought from is. Conversely, Harris maintains that the fact-value distinction is a confusion, proposing that values are really a certain kind of fact. Specifically, Harris suggests that values amount to empirical statements about "the flourishing of conscious creatures in a society". He argues that there are objective answers to moral questions, even if some are difficult or impossible to possess in practice. In this way, he says, science can tell us what to value. Harris adds that we do not demand absolute certainty from predictions in physics so we should not demand that of a science studying morality.
Meta-ethics
In philosophy, meta-ethics is the branch of ethics that seeks to understand the nature of ethical properties, statements, attitudes, and judgments. Meta-ethics is one of the three branches of ethics generally recognized by philosophers, the others being normative ethics and applied ethics. Ethical...
view which claims that:
- Ethical sentenceSentence (linguistics)In the field of linguistics, a sentence is an expression in natural language, and often defined to indicate a grammatical unit consisting of one or more words that generally bear minimal syntactic relation to the words that precede or follow it...
s express propositionPropositionIn logic and philosophy, the term proposition refers to either the "content" or "meaning" of a meaningful declarative sentence or the pattern of symbols, marks, or sounds that make up a meaningful declarative sentence...
s. - Some such propositions are true.
- Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of human opinion.
- These moral features of the world can be reducedReductionismReductionism can mean either an approach to understanding the nature of complex things by reducing them to the interactions of their parts, or to simpler or more fundamental things or a philosophical position that a complex system is nothing but the sum of its parts, and that an account of it can...
to some set of non-moral features.
This makes ethical naturalism a definist form of moral realism
Moral realism
Moral realism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:# Ethical sentences express propositions.# Some such propositions are true.# Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion....
, which is in turn a form of cognitivism
Cognitivism (ethics)
Cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences express propositions and can therefore be true or false , which noncognitivists deny...
. Ethical naturalism stands in opposition to ethical non-naturalism
Ethical non-naturalism
Ethical non-naturalism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:# Ethical sentences express propositions.# Some such propositions are true.# Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of human opinion....
, which denies that moral terms refer to anything other than irreducible moral properties, as well as to all forms of moral anti-realism
Anti-realism
In analytic philosophy, the term anti-realism is used to describe any position involving either the denial of an objective reality of entities of a certain type or the denial that verification-transcendent statements about a type of entity are either true or false...
, including ethical subjectivism
Ethical subjectivism
Ethical subjectivism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:# Ethical sentences express propositions.# Some such propositions are true.# Those propositions are about the attitudes of people.This makes ethical subjectivism a form of cognitivism...
(which denies that moral propositions refer to objective facts), error theory (which denies that any moral propositions are true), and non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions and thus cannot be true or false...
(which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all).
It is important to distinguish the versions of ethical naturalism which have received the most sustained philosophical interest, for example, Cornell Realism
Cornell realism
Cornell realism is a view in meta-ethics, associated with the work of Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon, and David Brink, who took his Ph.D. at Cornell University but never taught there...
, from the position that "the way things are is always the way they ought to be"; few ethical naturalists believe such a slogan. Ethical naturalism does, however, reject the fact-value distinction
Fact-value distinction
The fact-value distinction is a concept used to distinguish between arguments which can be claimed through reason alone, and those where rationality is limited to describing a collective opinion. In another formulation, it is the distinction between what is and what ought to be...
: it suggests that inquiry into the natural world can increase our moral knowledge in just the same way it increases our scientific knowledge. Indeed, proponents of ethical naturalism have argued that humanity needs to invest in their science of morality
Science of morality
Science of morality can refer to a number of ethically naturalistic views. Historically, the term was introduced by Jeremy Bentham . In meta-ethics, ethical naturalism bases morality on rational and empirical consideration of the natural world...
– although the existence of such a science is debated.
Ethical naturalism encompasses any reduction of ethical properties, such as 'goodness', to non-ethical properties; there are many different examples of such reductions, and thus many different varieties of ethical naturalism. Hedonism
Hedonism
Hedonism is a school of thought which argues that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. In very simple terms, a hedonist strives to maximize net pleasure .-Etymology:The name derives from the Greek word for "delight" ....
, for example, is the view that goodness is ultimately just pleasure
Pleasure
Pleasure describes the broad class of mental states that humans and other animals experience as positive, enjoyable, or worth seeking. It includes more specific mental states such as happiness, entertainment, enjoyment, ecstasy, and euphoria...
.
Criticisms
Ethical naturalism has been criticized most prominently by ethical non-naturalist G. E. Moore, who formulated the Open Question ArgumentOpen Question Argument
The Open Question Argument is a philosophical argument put forward by British philosopher G. E. Moore in , to refute the equating of the property good with some non-moral property, whether naturalistic or meta-physical...
. Garner and Rosen say that a common definition of "natural property" is one "which can be discovered by sense observation or experience, experiment, or through any of the available means of science." They also say that a good definition of "natural property" is problematic but that "it is only in criticism of naturalism, or in an attempt to distinguish between naturalistic and nonnaturalistic definist theories, that such a concept is needed." R. M. Hare
R. M. Hare
Richard Mervyn Hare was an English moral philosopher who held the post of White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford from 1966 until 1983. He subsequently taught for a number of years at the University of Florida...
also criticised ethical naturalism because of its fallacious definition of the terms 'good' or 'right' explaining how value-terms being part of our prescriptive moral language are not reducible to descriptive terms: "Value-terms have a special function in language, that of commending; and so they plainly cannot be defined in terms of other words which themselves do not perform this function"
Moral relativism
When it comes to the moral questions that we might ask, it can be difficult to argue that there is not necessarily some level of meta-ethical relativismMoral relativism
Moral relativism may be any of several descriptive, meta-ethical, or normative positions. Each of them is concerned with the differences in moral judgments across different people and cultures:...
– and failure to address this matter is criticized as ethnocentrism
Ethnocentrism
Ethnocentrism is the tendency to believe that one's ethnic or cultural group is centrally important, and that all other groups are measured in relation to one's own. The ethnocentric individual will judge other groups relative to his or her own particular ethnic group or culture, especially with...
.
As a broad example of relativism, we would no doubt see very different moral systems in an alien race that can only survive by occasionally ingesting one another. As a narrow example, there would be further specific moral opinions for each individual of that species.
Some forms of moral realism
Moral realism
Moral realism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:# Ethical sentences express propositions.# Some such propositions are true.# Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion....
are compatible with some degree of meta-ethical relativism. This argument rests on the assumption that one can have a "moral" discussion on various scales; that is, what is "good" for: a certain part of your being (leaving open the possibility of conflicting motives), you as a single individual, your family, your society, your species, your type of species. For example, a moral universalist
Moral universalism
Moral universalism is the meta-ethical position that some system of ethics, or a universal ethic, applies universally, that is, for "all similarly situated individuals", regardless of culture, race, sex, religion, nationality, sexuality, or any other distinguishing feature...
(and certainly an absolutist
Moral absolutism
Moral absolutism is an ethical view that certain actions are absolutely right or wrong, regardless of other contexts such as their consequences or the intentions behind them. Thus stealing, for instance, might be considered to be always immoral, even if done to promote some other good , and even if...
) might argue that, just as one can discuss what is 'good and evil' at an individual's level, so too can one make certain "moral" propositions with truth values relative at the level of the species. In other words, the moral relativist need not deem all moral propositions as necessarily subjective. The answer to "is free speech normally good for human societies?" is relative in a sense, but the moral realist would argue that an individual can be incorrect in this matter. This may be the philosophical equivalent of the more pragmatic arguments made by some scientists.
Moral nihilism
Moral nihilistsMoral nihilism
Moral nihilism is the meta-ethical view that nothing is moral or immoral. For example, a moral nihilist would say that killing someone, for whatever reason, is neither inherently right nor inherently wrong...
maintain that any talk of an objective morality is incoherent and better off using other terms. Proponents of moral science
Science of morality
Science of morality can refer to a number of ethically naturalistic views. Historically, the term was introduced by Jeremy Bentham . In meta-ethics, ethical naturalism bases morality on rational and empirical consideration of the natural world...
like Ronald A. Lindsay have counter-argued that their way of understanding "morality" as a practical enterprise is the way we ought to have understood it in the first place. He holds the position that the alternative seems to be the elaborate philosophical reduction of the word "moral" into a vacuous, useless term. Lindsay adds that it is important to reclaim the specific word "Morality" because of the connotations it holds with many individuals.
Morality as a science
Author Sam HarrisSam Harris (author)
Sam Harris is an American author, and neuroscientist, as well as the co-founder and current CEO of Project Reason. He received a Bachelor of Arts in philosophy from Stanford University, before receiving a Ph.D. in neuroscience from UCLA...
has argued that we over-estimate the relevance of many arguments against the science of morality, arguments he believes scientists happily and rightly disregard in other domains of science like physics. For example, a scientist may find herself attempting to counter-argue philosophical skeptics
Skepticism
Skepticism has many definitions, but generally refers to any questioning attitude towards knowledge, facts, or opinions/beliefs stated as facts, or doubt regarding claims that are taken for granted elsewhere...
, when Harris says she should be practically asking – as scientists would in any other domain – "why would we listen to a [ solipsist
Solipsism
Solipsism is the philosophical idea that only one's own mind is sure to exist. The term comes from Latin solus and ipse . Solipsism as an epistemological position holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure. The external world and other minds cannot be known, and might not...
] in the first place?" This, Harris contends, is part of what it means to practice a science of morality.
Physicist Sean Carroll
Sean M. Carroll
Sean Michael Carroll is a senior research associate in the Department of Physics at the California Institute of Technology. He is a theoretical cosmologist specializing in dark energy and general relativity...
believes that conceiving of morality as a science could be a case of Scientific imperialism
Scientific imperialism
Scientific imperialism is a term that appears to have been coined by Dr. Ellis T. Powell when addressing the Commonwealth Club of Canada on 8 September 1920...
and insists that what is "good for conscious creatures" is not an adequate working definition of "moral".
In opposition, Vice President at the Center for Inquiry
Center for Inquiry
The Center for Inquiry is a non-profit educational organization with headquarters in the United States whose primary mission is to encourage evidence-based inquiry into paranormal and fringe science claims, alternative medicine and mental health practices, religion, secular ethics, and society...
, John Shook, claims that this working definition is more than adequate for science at present, and that disagreement should not immobilize the scientific study of ethics.
In modern times, many thinkers discussing the fact-value distinction
Fact-value distinction
The fact-value distinction is a concept used to distinguish between arguments which can be claimed through reason alone, and those where rationality is limited to describing a collective opinion. In another formulation, it is the distinction between what is and what ought to be...
and the Is-ought problem
Is-ought problem
The is–ought problem in meta-ethics as articulated by Scottish philosopher and historian, David Hume , is that many writers make claims about what ought to be on the basis of statements about what is...
have settled on the idea that one cannot derive ought from is. Conversely, Harris maintains that the fact-value distinction is a confusion, proposing that values are really a certain kind of fact. Specifically, Harris suggests that values amount to empirical statements about "the flourishing of conscious creatures in a society". He argues that there are objective answers to moral questions, even if some are difficult or impossible to possess in practice. In this way, he says, science can tell us what to value. Harris adds that we do not demand absolute certainty from predictions in physics so we should not demand that of a science studying morality.
Ethical theories that can be naturalistic
- AltruismAltruism (ethics)Altruism is an ethical doctrine that holds that individuals have a moral obligation to help, serve, or benefit others, if necessary at the sacrifice of self interest. Auguste Comte's version of altruism calls for living for the sake of others...
- Cornell realismCornell realismCornell realism is a view in meta-ethics, associated with the work of Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon, and David Brink, who took his Ph.D. at Cornell University but never taught there...
- Ethical egoismEthical egoismEthical egoism is the normative ethical position that moral agents ought to do what is in their own self-interest. It differs from psychological egoism, which claims that people can only act in their self-interest. Ethical egoism also differs from rational egoism, which holds merely that it is...
- Natural law libertarianismLibertarianismLibertarianism, in the strictest sense, is the political philosophy that holds individual liberty as the basic moral principle of society. In the broadest sense, it is any political philosophy which approximates this view...
- ObjectivismObjectivism (Ayn Rand)Objectivism is a philosophy created by the Russian-American philosopher and novelist Ayn Rand . Objectivism holds that reality exists independent of consciousness, that human beings have direct contact with reality through sense perception, that one can attain objective knowledge from perception...
- Humanistic ethics
- UtilitarianismUtilitarianismUtilitarianism is an ethical theory holding that the proper course of action is the one that maximizes the overall "happiness", by whatever means necessary. It is thus a form of consequentialism, meaning that the moral worth of an action is determined only by its resulting outcome, and that one can...
- Evolutionary ethicsEvolutionary ethicsEvolutionary ethics could be either a form of descriptive ethics or normative ethics.Descriptive evolutionary ethics consists of biological approaches to ethics based on the role of evolution in shaping human psychology and behavior...
External links
- Stanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyStanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a freely-accessible online encyclopedia of philosophy maintained by Stanford University. Each entry is written and maintained by an expert in the field, including professors from over 65 academic institutions worldwide...
, "Moral Naturalism", by James Lenman, first published Thu June 1, 2006; substantive revision Mon August 7, 2006 - Philosophy 302: Naturalistic Ethics