Ethical intuitionism
Encyclopedia
Ethical intuitionism is usually understood as a meta-ethical
theory that embraces the following theses:
However, ethical intuitionism is at a minimum a view in moral epistemology according to which some moral truths can be known without inference. That is, the view is at its core a foundationalism
about moral beliefs. Of course, such an epistemological view implies that there are moral beliefs with propositional contents; so it implies cognitivism
. However, both moral realism and ethical non-naturalism are not essential to the view; most ethical intuitionists simply happen to hold those views as well.
Likewise, sometimes the term "ethical intuitionism" is associated with a pluralistic, deontological
position in normative ethics
, a position defended by W.D. Ross. However, as is customary in contemporary philosophy, the term "ethical intuitionism" will be used in this article to refer to the general position that there are basic (non-inferential) moral beliefs. Thus, this usage encompasses both empiricist and rationalist accounts of non-inferential moral knowledge. While the empiricist version of ethical intuitionism is standardly called "moral sense theory
" (or sometimes "sentimentalism"), there is no standard name for the rationalist version. In this article, the rationalist version of ethical intuitionism will simply be called "rationalist ethical intuitionism".
Generally speaking, rationalist ethical intuitionism models the acquisition of such non-inferential moral knowledge on a priori, non-empirical knowledge, such as knowledge of mathematical truths; whereas moral sense theory models the acquisition of such non-inferential moral knowledge on empirical knowledge, such as knowledge of the colors of objects (see moral sense theory
).
, non-empirically-based intuitions of truths, such as basic truths of mathematics. Take for example the belief that two minus one is one. This piece of knowledge is often thought to be non-inferential in that it is not grounded in or justified by some other proposition or claim. Rather, one who understands the relevant concepts involved in the proposition that two minus one is one has what one might call an "intuition" of the truth of the proposition. One intuits the truth of the proposition, rather than inferring it. Likewise, the ethical intuitionist claims that basic moral truths—whether they are principles (such as don't kill people) or judgments (such as it is wrong to kill people)--are known without inference, and in particular they are known via one's rational intuition.
Some rationalist ethical intuitionists characterize moral "intuitions" as a species of belief (for example, Audi, 2005, pp. 33–6) that are self-evident
in that they are justified simply by virtue of one's understanding of the proposition believed. Others characterize "intuitions" as a distinct kind of mental state, in which something seems to one to be the case (whether one believes it or not) as a result of intellectual reflection. Michael Huemer (2005), for example, defines "intuition" as a sort of seeming:
Regardless of one's definition of rational intuition, intuitionists all agree that rational intuitions are not justified by inference from a separate belief.
version---of ethical intuitionism models non-inferential ethical knowledge on sense perception. This version involves what is often called a "moral sense". According to moral sense theorists, certain moral truths are known via this moral sense simply on the basis of experience, not inference.
One way to understand the moral sense is to draw an analogy between it and other kinds of senses. Beauty, for example, is something we see in some faces, artworks and landscapes. We can also hear it in some pieces of music. We clearly do not need an independent aesthetic sense faculty to perceive beauty in the world. Our ordinary five senses are quite enough to observe it, though merely observing something beautiful is not by itself enough to appreciate its beauty. Suppose we give a name to this ability to appreciate the beauty in things we see: one might call it the aesthetic sense. This aesthetic sense does not come automatically to all people with perfect vision and hearing, so it is fair to describe it as something extra, something not wholly reducible to vision and hearing. As the aesthetic sense informs us about what is beautiful, we can analogically
understand the moral sense as informing us of what is good. People with a functioning moral sense get a clear impression of wrongness when they see puppies being kicked, for example.
H.A. Prichard
gave an early defense of the view in his "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" (1912), wherein he contended that moral philosophy rested chiefly on the desire to provide arguments starting from non-normative premises for the principles of obligation that we pre-philosophically accept, such as the principle that one ought to keep one's promises or that one ought not to steal. This is a mistake, Prichard argued, both because it is impossible to derive any statement about what one ought to do from statements not concerning obligation (even statements about what is good), and because there is no need to do so since common sense principles of moral obligation are self-evident.
Prichard was influenced by G.E. Moore, whose Principia Ethica
(1903) argued famously that goodness was an indefinable, non-natural property of which we had intuitive awareness. Moore originated the term "the naturalistic fallacy
" to refer to the (alleged) error of confusing goodness with some natural property, and he deployed the Open Question Argument to show why this was an error. Unlike Moore, Prichard thought that one could derive principles of obligation from propositions about what is good.
Ethical intuitionism suffered a dramatic fall from favor by the middle of the century, probably due in part to the influence of logical positivism
, in part to the rising popularity of naturalism
in philosophy, and in part to philosophical objections based on the phenomenon of widespread moral disagreement.
Some recent work suggests the view may be enjoying a resurgence of interest in academic philosophy. Robert Audi
is one of the main supporters of ethical intuitionism in our days. His 2005 book, The Good in the Right, claims to update and strengthen Rossian intuitionism and to develop the epistemology of ethics. Michael Huemer's book Ethical Intuitionism (2005) also provides a recent defense of the view. Furthermore, authors writing on normative ethics
often accept methodological intuitionism as they present allegedly obvious or intuitive examples or thought experiment
s as support for their theories.
Ethical intuitionists could respond by arguing that the moral-aesthetic analogy is merely used to illustrate the fact that not all senses are limited to the five physical senses. However, this doesn't necessarily imply any further connection between the moral and aesthetic senses.
Ethical intuitionists could respond by pointing to numerous long-standing debates in philosophy and science. There are no long disputes about whether some object is green because that's simply a matter of observation, whereas metaphysics, epistemology, evolution, and quantum mechanics require reason, which is prone to human error. A similar analogy could be made about moral sense, which might give us a clear idea of what "rightness" is, but perhaps doesn't grant us direct knowledge of normative ethics.
to explain the meanings of our sentences about wrongness.
A counter-objection is that the very fact we do postulate the independent feature regarding morals is indicative, and the fact we do not feel the need to do this for queasiness is itself an argument for objective morality. Moral sense might inform us of the existence of objective morality, just as eyesight informs us of the existence of colors. Occam's Razor wouldn't dismiss the existence of eyesight or colors, but would require the simplest explanation of how they work.
Meta-ethics
In philosophy, meta-ethics is the branch of ethics that seeks to understand the nature of ethical properties, statements, attitudes, and judgments. Meta-ethics is one of the three branches of ethics generally recognized by philosophers, the others being normative ethics and applied ethics. Ethical...
theory that embraces the following theses:
- Moral realismMoral realismMoral realism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:# Ethical sentences express propositions.# Some such propositions are true.# Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion....
, the view that there are objectiveObjectivity (philosophy)Objectivity is a central philosophical concept which has been variously defined by sources. A proposition is generally considered to be objectively true when its truth conditions are met and are "mind-independent"—that is, not met by the judgment of a conscious entity or subject.- Objectivism...
facts of morality, - Ethical non-naturalismEthical non-naturalismEthical non-naturalism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:# Ethical sentences express propositions.# Some such propositions are true.# Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of human opinion....
, the view that these evaluative facts cannot be reduced to natural fact. - The thesis that we sometimes have intuitive awarenessIntuition (knowledge)Intuition is the ability to acquire knowledge without inference or the use of reason. "The word 'intuition' comes from the Latin word 'intueri', which is often roughly translated as meaning 'to look inside'’ or 'to contemplate'." Intuition provides us with beliefs that we cannot necessarily justify...
of value, or intuitive knowledge of evaluative facts, which forms the foundation of our ethical knowledge.
However, ethical intuitionism is at a minimum a view in moral epistemology according to which some moral truths can be known without inference. That is, the view is at its core a foundationalism
Foundationalism
Foundationalism is any theory in epistemology that holds that beliefs are justified based on what are called basic beliefs . This position is intended to resolve the infinite regress problem in epistemology...
about moral beliefs. Of course, such an epistemological view implies that there are moral beliefs with propositional contents; so it implies cognitivism
Cognitivism (ethics)
Cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences express propositions and can therefore be true or false , which noncognitivists deny...
. However, both moral realism and ethical non-naturalism are not essential to the view; most ethical intuitionists simply happen to hold those views as well.
Likewise, sometimes the term "ethical intuitionism" is associated with a pluralistic, deontological
Deontological ethics
Deontological ethics or deontology is the normative ethical position that judges the morality of an action based on the action's adherence to a rule or rules. It is sometimes described as "duty" or "obligation" or "rule" -based ethics, because rules "bind you to your duty"...
position in normative ethics
Normative ethics
Normative ethics is the study of ethical action. It is the branch of philosophical ethics that investigates the set of questions that arise when considering how one ought to act, morally speaking...
, a position defended by W.D. Ross. However, as is customary in contemporary philosophy, the term "ethical intuitionism" will be used in this article to refer to the general position that there are basic (non-inferential) moral beliefs. Thus, this usage encompasses both empiricist and rationalist accounts of non-inferential moral knowledge. While the empiricist version of ethical intuitionism is standardly called "moral sense theory
Moral sense theory
Moral sense theory is a view in meta-ethics according to which morality is somehow grounded in moral sentiments or emotions...
" (or sometimes "sentimentalism"), there is no standard name for the rationalist version. In this article, the rationalist version of ethical intuitionism will simply be called "rationalist ethical intuitionism".
Rational intuition versus moral sense
Some use the term "ethical intuitionism" in moral philosophy to refer to the general position that we have some non-inferential moral knowledge (see Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006a & 2006b)--that is, basic moral knowledge that is not inferred from or based on any proposition. However, it is important to distinguish between empiricist versus rationalist models of this. Some, thus, reserve the term "ethical intuitionism" for the rationalist model and the term "moral sense theory" for the empiricist model (see Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006b, pp. 184–186, especially fn. 4). However, the terminology is not ultimately important, so long as one keeps in mind the relevant differences between these two views.Generally speaking, rationalist ethical intuitionism models the acquisition of such non-inferential moral knowledge on a priori, non-empirical knowledge, such as knowledge of mathematical truths; whereas moral sense theory models the acquisition of such non-inferential moral knowledge on empirical knowledge, such as knowledge of the colors of objects (see moral sense theory
Moral sense theory
Moral sense theory is a view in meta-ethics according to which morality is somehow grounded in moral sentiments or emotions...
).
Rational intuition
The rationalist version of ethical intuitionism models ethical intuitions on a prioriA priori and a posteriori (philosophy)
The terms a priori and a posteriori are used in philosophy to distinguish two types of knowledge, justifications or arguments...
, non-empirically-based intuitions of truths, such as basic truths of mathematics. Take for example the belief that two minus one is one. This piece of knowledge is often thought to be non-inferential in that it is not grounded in or justified by some other proposition or claim. Rather, one who understands the relevant concepts involved in the proposition that two minus one is one has what one might call an "intuition" of the truth of the proposition. One intuits the truth of the proposition, rather than inferring it. Likewise, the ethical intuitionist claims that basic moral truths—whether they are principles (such as don't kill people) or judgments (such as it is wrong to kill people)--are known without inference, and in particular they are known via one's rational intuition.
Some rationalist ethical intuitionists characterize moral "intuitions" as a species of belief (for example, Audi, 2005, pp. 33–6) that are self-evident
Self-evidence
In epistemology , a self-evident proposition is one that is known to be true by understanding its meaning without proof....
in that they are justified simply by virtue of one's understanding of the proposition believed. Others characterize "intuitions" as a distinct kind of mental state, in which something seems to one to be the case (whether one believes it or not) as a result of intellectual reflection. Michael Huemer (2005), for example, defines "intuition" as a sort of seeming:
Reasoning sometimes changes how things seem to us. But there is also a way things seem to us prior to reasoning; otherwise, reasoning could not get started. The way things seem prior to reasoning we may call an 'initial appearance'. An initial, intellectual appearance is an 'intuition'. That is, an intuition that p is a state of its seeming to one that p that is not dependent on inference from other beliefs and that results from thinking about p, as opposed to perceiving, remembering, or introspecting. An ethical intuition is an intuition whose content is an evaluative proposition. (§5.2)
Regardless of one's definition of rational intuition, intuitionists all agree that rational intuitions are not justified by inference from a separate belief.
Moral sense
Another version---what one might call the empiricistEmpiricism
Empiricism is a theory of knowledge that asserts that knowledge comes only or primarily via sensory experience. One of several views of epistemology, the study of human knowledge, along with rationalism, idealism and historicism, empiricism emphasizes the role of experience and evidence,...
version---of ethical intuitionism models non-inferential ethical knowledge on sense perception. This version involves what is often called a "moral sense". According to moral sense theorists, certain moral truths are known via this moral sense simply on the basis of experience, not inference.
One way to understand the moral sense is to draw an analogy between it and other kinds of senses. Beauty, for example, is something we see in some faces, artworks and landscapes. We can also hear it in some pieces of music. We clearly do not need an independent aesthetic sense faculty to perceive beauty in the world. Our ordinary five senses are quite enough to observe it, though merely observing something beautiful is not by itself enough to appreciate its beauty. Suppose we give a name to this ability to appreciate the beauty in things we see: one might call it the aesthetic sense. This aesthetic sense does not come automatically to all people with perfect vision and hearing, so it is fair to describe it as something extra, something not wholly reducible to vision and hearing. As the aesthetic sense informs us about what is beautiful, we can analogically
Analogy
Analogy is a cognitive process of transferring information or meaning from a particular subject to another particular subject , and a linguistic expression corresponding to such a process...
understand the moral sense as informing us of what is good. People with a functioning moral sense get a clear impression of wrongness when they see puppies being kicked, for example.
History
Ethical Intuitionism was popular in the early twentieth century, particularly among British analytic philosophers.H.A. Prichard
Harold Arthur Prichard
Harold Arthur Prichard, , often H. A. Pritchard, was an English philosopher. He was born in London in 1871, the eldest child of Walter Stennett Prichard and his wife Lucy. Harold Prichard was a scholar of Clifton College from where he won a scholarship to New College, Oxford to study mathematics...
gave an early defense of the view in his "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" (1912), wherein he contended that moral philosophy rested chiefly on the desire to provide arguments starting from non-normative premises for the principles of obligation that we pre-philosophically accept, such as the principle that one ought to keep one's promises or that one ought not to steal. This is a mistake, Prichard argued, both because it is impossible to derive any statement about what one ought to do from statements not concerning obligation (even statements about what is good), and because there is no need to do so since common sense principles of moral obligation are self-evident.
Prichard was influenced by G.E. Moore, whose Principia Ethica
Principia Ethica
Principia Ethica is a monograph by philosopher G. E. Moore, first published in 1903. It is one of the standard texts of modern ethics, and introduced the term naturalistic fallacy.-External links:* of Principia Ethica....
(1903) argued famously that goodness was an indefinable, non-natural property of which we had intuitive awareness. Moore originated the term "the naturalistic fallacy
Naturalistic fallacy
The naturalistic fallacy is often claimed to be a formal fallacy. It was described and named by British philosopher G. E. Moore in his 1903 book Principia Ethica...
" to refer to the (alleged) error of confusing goodness with some natural property, and he deployed the Open Question Argument to show why this was an error. Unlike Moore, Prichard thought that one could derive principles of obligation from propositions about what is good.
Ethical intuitionism suffered a dramatic fall from favor by the middle of the century, probably due in part to the influence of logical positivism
Logical positivism
Logical positivism is a philosophy that combines empiricism—the idea that observational evidence is indispensable for knowledge—with a version of rationalism incorporating mathematical and logico-linguistic constructs and deductions of epistemology.It may be considered as a type of analytic...
, in part to the rising popularity of naturalism
Naturalism (philosophy)
Naturalism commonly refers to the philosophical viewpoint that the natural universe and its natural laws and forces operate in the universe, and that nothing exists beyond the natural universe or, if it does, it does not affect the natural universe that we know...
in philosophy, and in part to philosophical objections based on the phenomenon of widespread moral disagreement.
Some recent work suggests the view may be enjoying a resurgence of interest in academic philosophy. Robert Audi
Robert Audi
Robert Audi is an American philosopher whose major work has focused on epistemology, ethics—especially on ethical intuitionism-and the theory of action. He is O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, and previously held a Chair in the Business School there...
is one of the main supporters of ethical intuitionism in our days. His 2005 book, The Good in the Right, claims to update and strengthen Rossian intuitionism and to develop the epistemology of ethics. Michael Huemer's book Ethical Intuitionism (2005) also provides a recent defense of the view. Furthermore, authors writing on normative ethics
Normative ethics
Normative ethics is the study of ethical action. It is the branch of philosophical ethics that investigates the set of questions that arise when considering how one ought to act, morally speaking...
often accept methodological intuitionism as they present allegedly obvious or intuitive examples or thought experiment
Thought experiment
A thought experiment or Gedankenexperiment considers some hypothesis, theory, or principle for the purpose of thinking through its consequences...
s as support for their theories.
Are there really objective moral values?
Many people think that beauty is subjective, that it is "in the eye of the beholder." They would claim there are really no objective facts about what is and is not beautiful, only facts about what people prefer. Because of the close analogies between the moral and the aesthetic sense, parity of reasoning suggests that we should see the difference between right and wrong as also being merely in the eye of the beholder. Though ethical intuitionists insist on the analogy, they equally insist that the facts about right and wrong are perfectly objective. How can they have it both ways?Ethical intuitionists could respond by arguing that the moral-aesthetic analogy is merely used to illustrate the fact that not all senses are limited to the five physical senses. However, this doesn't necessarily imply any further connection between the moral and aesthetic senses.
Disagreement
The problem is made worse by the fact that there is so much widespread and apparently irresolveable disagreement about moral values. Why do these not get settled through the careful use of the moral sense? There are no long disputes about whether some object is green – these would be quickly settled if we just invited the disputing parties to look. Why does the moral sense not settle moral disagreements in a similarly simple way?Ethical intuitionists could respond by pointing to numerous long-standing debates in philosophy and science. There are no long disputes about whether some object is green because that's simply a matter of observation, whereas metaphysics, epistemology, evolution, and quantum mechanics require reason, which is prone to human error. A similar analogy could be made about moral sense, which might give us a clear idea of what "rightness" is, but perhaps doesn't grant us direct knowledge of normative ethics.
Occam’s Razor
It is undeniable that humans experience a feeling of right and wrong, but are these feelings evidence of an independent feature of the world? The principle of Occam’s Razor suggests us to postulate only those entities which are necessary to best explain our observations. The existence of an objective wrongness is not necessary to explain our queasy and resentful feelings. Thus, according to the principle, we should say there is no such thing as wrongness, and perhaps looks toward an explanation such as EmotivismNon-cognitivism
Non-cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions and thus cannot be true or false...
to explain the meanings of our sentences about wrongness.
A counter-objection is that the very fact we do postulate the independent feature regarding morals is indicative, and the fact we do not feel the need to do this for queasiness is itself an argument for objective morality. Moral sense might inform us of the existence of objective morality, just as eyesight informs us of the existence of colors. Occam's Razor wouldn't dismiss the existence of eyesight or colors, but would require the simplest explanation of how they work.
Another Definition
Intuitionism is a doctrine which states that the source of morality is found within the human personality; its basis is the person's motive, intent or will. The rightness and wrongness of an act is not determined by the act nor its consequences which are observable and are subjected to prejudices. Man's motive or intention in doing such an act should be the lone basis in judging its morality, nothing else. "The action is essentially good if the motive of the agent is good, let the consequences be what they may."External links
- http://mhosken.webs.com A multi-chapter exploration leading (inevitably?) to intuitionism in ethics.
- Ethical Intuitionism, a contemporary defense of the theory by Michael Huemer.
- Papers defending intuitionism - by Michael Huemer.