Definist fallacy
Encyclopedia
The definist fallacy can refer to three logical fallacies related to how terms are defined in an argument. The first, coined by William Frankena
in 1939, involves the definition of one property in terms of another. The second fallacy refers to the insisted use of a persuasive definition
in an argument. Finally, it can also refer to the Socratic fallacy in which terms are required to be defined before use. This article focuses on the first of these fallacies.
The philosopher William Frankena first used the term definist fallacy in a paper published in the British analytic philosophy
journal Mind
in 1939. In this article he generalized and critiqued G. E. Moore's naturalistic fallacy
, which argued that good cannot be defined by natural properties, as a broader confusion caused by attempting to define a term using non-synonymous properties. Frankena argued that the naturalistic fallacy is a complete misnomer because it is neither limited to naturalistic properties nor necessarily a fallacy. On the first word (naturalistic), he noted that Moore rejected defining good in non-natural as well as natural terms.
On the second word (fallacy), Frankena rejected the idea that it represented an error in reasoning – a fallacy as it is usually recognized – rather than an error in semantics
. In Moore's Open Question Argument
, because questions such as "Is that which is pleasurable good?" have no definitive answer, then pleasurable is not synonymous with good. Frankena rejected this argument as the fact that there is always an open question merely reflects the fact that it makes sense to ask whether two things that may be identical in fact are. Thus, even if good is identical to pleasurable, it makes sense to ask whether it is; the answer may be "yes", but the question was legitimate. This seems to contradict Moore's view which accepts that sometimes alternative answers could be dismissed without argument, however Frankena objects that this would be committing the fallacy of begging the question
.
William Frankena
William K. Frankena was an American moral philosopher. Frankena was a member of the University of Michigan's Department of Philosophy for 41 years and chair of the Department for 14 years...
in 1939, involves the definition of one property in terms of another. The second fallacy refers to the insisted use of a persuasive definition
Persuasive definition
A persuasive definition is a form of definition which purports to describe the 'true' or 'commonly accepted' meaning of a term, while in reality stipulating an uncommon or altered use, usually to support an argument for some view, or to create or alter rights, duties or crimes.The terms thus...
in an argument. Finally, it can also refer to the Socratic fallacy in which terms are required to be defined before use. This article focuses on the first of these fallacies.
The philosopher William Frankena first used the term definist fallacy in a paper published in the British analytic philosophy
Analytic philosophy
Analytic philosophy is a generic term for a style of philosophy that came to dominate English-speaking countries in the 20th century...
journal Mind
Mind (journal)
Mind is a British journal, currently published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association, which deals with philosophy in the analytic tradition...
in 1939. In this article he generalized and critiqued G. E. Moore's naturalistic fallacy
Naturalistic fallacy
The naturalistic fallacy is often claimed to be a formal fallacy. It was described and named by British philosopher G. E. Moore in his 1903 book Principia Ethica...
, which argued that good cannot be defined by natural properties, as a broader confusion caused by attempting to define a term using non-synonymous properties. Frankena argued that the naturalistic fallacy is a complete misnomer because it is neither limited to naturalistic properties nor necessarily a fallacy. On the first word (naturalistic), he noted that Moore rejected defining good in non-natural as well as natural terms.
On the second word (fallacy), Frankena rejected the idea that it represented an error in reasoning – a fallacy as it is usually recognized – rather than an error in semantics
Semantics
Semantics is the study of meaning. It focuses on the relation between signifiers, such as words, phrases, signs and symbols, and what they stand for, their denotata....
. In Moore's Open Question Argument
Open Question Argument
The Open Question Argument is a philosophical argument put forward by British philosopher G. E. Moore in , to refute the equating of the property good with some non-moral property, whether naturalistic or meta-physical...
, because questions such as "Is that which is pleasurable good?" have no definitive answer, then pleasurable is not synonymous with good. Frankena rejected this argument as the fact that there is always an open question merely reflects the fact that it makes sense to ask whether two things that may be identical in fact are. Thus, even if good is identical to pleasurable, it makes sense to ask whether it is; the answer may be "yes", but the question was legitimate. This seems to contradict Moore's view which accepts that sometimes alternative answers could be dismissed without argument, however Frankena objects that this would be committing the fallacy of begging the question
Begging the question
Begging the question is a type of logical fallacy in which the proposition to be proven is assumed implicitly or explicitly in the premise....
.