Charles E. Allen
Encyclopedia
Charles E. Allen is an American public servant, notable for his roles at the United States Department of Homeland Security
's Office of Intelligence and Analysis
and, before that, the Central Intelligence Agency
.
Anwar al-Awlaki
In October 2008, Allen warned that Anwar al-Awlaki
"targets US Muslims with radical online lectures encouraging terrorist attacks from his new home in Yemen." Quoting Allen, Al-Awlaki responded in December 2008: "I would challenge him to come up with just one such lecture where I encourage 'terrorist attacks'". The FBI later investigated (but dismissed) al-Awlaki's connections to both the November 5, 2009 Fort Hood shooting
sole suspect, Nidal Malik Hasan
, as well as to the Northwest Flight 253 bombing attempt in which he is believed to have played a part in the al-Qaeda operation, and trained and blessed the suspect.
were critical of the CIA Inspector General's report on the intelligences failures ahead of the September 11 terrorist attacks for having failed to interview Allen, who was assistant director of central intelligence for collection.
In 1998, after the bombing of two American embassies in East Africa, Mr. Allen was assigned by George Tenet to organize the agency's efforts against the terrorist network, according to testimony Mr. Tenet gave last year. He said that at the advice of Mr. Allen, he created a special unit with officers from the C.I.A., the National Security Agency and the NGA to meet daily and focus on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
From an August 2004 U.S. News & World Report article:
"...more of a legend than a man around the CIA. 'If you don't think you're getting your money's worth out of the federal government,' says an admirer, 'you should meet Charlie Allen.' A workaholic, Allen had served as an intelligence officer for 40 years and earned a reputation as a plain-spoken professional who regularly bucked the bureaucracy..."
Duane Clarridge remarked in his memoir:
"He (Allen) was a bit of a maverick; bright absolutely dedicated, on occasion short on diplomacy, and a workaholic."
planning project. A colleague quoted Allen as saying during a COG meeting, "our job is to throw the Constitution out the window." His assignment to the COG project brought him into contact with Oliver North
, who was delegated to monitor COG's findings by National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane
.
formally reprimanded Allen for failing to fully comply with the DCI's request for full cooperation in the agency's internal Iran-Contra scandal investigation. After failing to have the reprimand lifted through the regular appeal process, Allen retained future DCI James Woolsey as an attorney and was successful in applying pressure to have the reprimand lifted.
Mark Perry observes "Ironically, Allen's attack on Webster was as unjustified as Webster's reprimand." The reprimand stemmed from a set of missing papers found in Allen's office containing information on the arms-for-hostages deal. Allen claimed they had been inadvertently overlooked in a messy office. Supporters of Allen pointed out that Webster reprimanded the one person in the CIA who had brought his suspicions of a funds diversion to Robert Gates. Others asserted that Allen simply did not respect Webster.
Satellite photos and electronic intercepts indicating this alternative use were regarded as circumstantial and unconvincing to Brigadier General Buster Glosson
, who had primary responsibility for targeting. Glosson's comment was that the assessment wasn't "worth a shit." A human source in Iraq, who had previously proven accurate warned the CIA that Iraqi intelligence had begun operating from the shelter. On February 11, the Amiriyah shelter
was added to the Air Force's attack plan. At 4:30 am the morning of February 13, two F-117 stealth bombers each dropped a 2,000 pound, laser-guided, GBU-27 munition on the shelter. The first cut through ten feet of reinforced concrete before a time-delayed fuze exploded. Minutes later the second bomb followed the path cut by the first bomb.
In the shelter at the time of the bombing were hundreds of Iraqi civilians. More than 400 people, mostly women and children were killed. Men and boys over the age of 15 had left the shelter to give the women and children some privacy. Jeremy Bowen
, a BBC correspondent, was one of the first television reporters on the scene. Bowen was given access to the site and did not find evidence of military use.
United States Department of Homeland Security
The United States Department of Homeland Security is a cabinet department of the United States federal government, created in response to the September 11 attacks, and with the primary responsibilities of protecting the territory of the United States and protectorates from and responding to...
's Office of Intelligence and Analysis
Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis
The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis is a position within the United States Department of Homeland Security. The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for fusing law enforcement and intelligence information relating to terrorist threats...
and, before that, the Central Intelligence Agency
Central Intelligence Agency
The Central Intelligence Agency is a civilian intelligence agency of the United States government. It is an executive agency and reports directly to the Director of National Intelligence, responsible for providing national security intelligence assessment to senior United States policymakers...
.
Department of Homeland Security
In August 2005, President George W. Bush appointed Charles E. Allen, to the dual role of Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security as well as the DHS Chief of Intelligence. Effective November 2007, Charles Allen's position was elevated to Under Secretary for the renamed Office of Intelligence and Analysis at DHS, an office he held until January 20, 2009. Prior to his appointment to DHS, Allen served as Special Assistant to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.Anwar al-Awlaki
In October 2008, Allen warned that Anwar al-Awlaki
Anwar al-Awlaki
Anwar al-Awlaki was an American and Yemeni imam who was an engineer and educator by training. According to U.S. government officials, he was a senior talent recruiter and motivator who was involved with planning operations for the Islamist militant group al-Qaeda...
"targets US Muslims with radical online lectures encouraging terrorist attacks from his new home in Yemen." Quoting Allen, Al-Awlaki responded in December 2008: "I would challenge him to come up with just one such lecture where I encourage 'terrorist attacks'". The FBI later investigated (but dismissed) al-Awlaki's connections to both the November 5, 2009 Fort Hood shooting
Fort Hood shooting
The Fort Hood shooting was a mass shooting that took place on November 5, 2009, at Fort Hood, the most populous U.S. military installation in the world, located just outside Killeen, Texas. In the course of the shooting, a single gunman killed 13 people and wounded 29 others...
sole suspect, Nidal Malik Hasan
Nidal Malik Hasan
Nidal Malik Hasan, USA is a United States Army officer and sole suspect in the November 5, 2009, Fort Hood shooting, which occurred less than a month before he would have deployed to Afghanistan....
, as well as to the Northwest Flight 253 bombing attempt in which he is believed to have played a part in the al-Qaeda operation, and trained and blessed the suspect.
Career highlights Central Intelligence Agency
- Served with the CIA since 1958, holding a variety of positions of increasing responsibility, both analytic and managerial.
- CIA's national intelligence officer for counterterrorism (1985)
- Chairman of the National Security CouncilUnited States National Security CouncilThe White House National Security Council in the United States is the principal forum used by the President of the United States for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and Cabinet officials and is part of the Executive Office of the...
's Hostage Location Task Force (1985)
- National Intelligence Officer for Warning (1986)
- Served as Assistant Director of Central Intelligence [ADCI] for Collection, June 1998 until June 2005. In that capacity, he was in charge of coordinating all the community spy systems and chaired the National Intelligence Collection Board, which ensures that collection is integrated and coordinated across the intelligence community.
- "Appointed as Assistant Director of Central Intelligence (ADCI) for Collection, coordinating the entire intelligence community intelligence collection system, was Charles Allen, a thirty year veteran operations officer. He will oversee the decisions of the various committees deciding the targets of national systems. He allegedly was chosen on the basis of his reputation for holding contrariness views and willingness to challenge the system."
C.I.A. Inspector General's report on 9/11 intelligence failures
In August 2005 the New York Times reported that supporters of former C.I.A. Director George TenetGeorge Tenet
George John Tenet was the Director of Central Intelligence for the United States Central Intelligence Agency, and is Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at Georgetown University....
were critical of the CIA Inspector General's report on the intelligences failures ahead of the September 11 terrorist attacks for having failed to interview Allen, who was assistant director of central intelligence for collection.
In 1998, after the bombing of two American embassies in East Africa, Mr. Allen was assigned by George Tenet to organize the agency's efforts against the terrorist network, according to testimony Mr. Tenet gave last year. He said that at the advice of Mr. Allen, he created a special unit with officers from the C.I.A., the National Security Agency and the NGA to meet daily and focus on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Comments about Charles Allen
Mark Perry offers this commentary about Allen based on information from colleagues:- "An eccentric workaholic who often picked fights with superiors"
- "A tall graying man given to sober suits and precise grammar."
- "More than just a little weird; it was hard to know just where he was coming from."
- "At times during his career Allen seemed almost out of control as he often spent all night at his office and made unreasonable demands on his secretarial staff."
- "Allen was known for his offbeat views, and his detractors said he had a huge ego."
- "A 'brilliant man' with 'a yen for controversy'"
From an August 2004 U.S. News & World Report article:
"...more of a legend than a man around the CIA. 'If you don't think you're getting your money's worth out of the federal government,' says an admirer, 'you should meet Charlie Allen.' A workaholic, Allen had served as an intelligence officer for 40 years and earned a reputation as a plain-spoken professional who regularly bucked the bureaucracy..."
Duane Clarridge remarked in his memoir:
"He (Allen) was a bit of a maverick; bright absolutely dedicated, on occasion short on diplomacy, and a workaholic."
Continuity of government
From 1980 to November 1982, Allen was detailed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he was deputy director of a continuity of governmentContinuity of government
Continuity of government is the principle of establishing defined procedures that allow a government to continue its essential operations in case of nuclear war or other catastrophic event....
planning project. A colleague quoted Allen as saying during a COG meeting, "our job is to throw the Constitution out the window." His assignment to the COG project brought him into contact with Oliver North
Oliver North
Oliver Laurence North is a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer, political commentator, host of War Stories with Oliver North on Fox News Channel, a military historian, and a New York Times best-selling author....
, who was delegated to monitor COG's findings by National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane
Robert McFarlane
Robert Carl "Bud" McFarlane was a National Security Advisor to President Ronald Reagan, serving from 1983 through 1985.After a career in the Marines, he became part of the Reagan administration, and was a leading architect of the Strategic Defense Initiative for defending the United States...
.
Iran contra
- From the nomination of Robert M. Gates of Virginia, to be Director of Central Intelligence (Senate: November 5, 1991), Congressional Record: Extract:
- "On September 9, 1986, a senior CIA analyst, Charles Allen, wrote a memo on the arms sales to Iran, a copy of which went to Mr. Gates. He also claims to have talked to Mr. Gates regarding shipments of arms to Iran. Mr. Gates cannot recall the conversation or receiving the Nomination memo." Re Iran-Contra scandal.
- "A number of outspoken analysts bitterly criticized him [Allen] for bending his views to political expediency during the Iran initiative. Allen, they said, took advantage of his access to Casey to promote a political line – that an opening could be made to Iranian moderates-that could not be supported by the information they had gathered on Iran's internal politics. Allen played the White House game, these critics claimed, by using contrived information provided by CIA consultant George Cave to support the Iran program. 'Charlie Allen briefed the NSC on the basis of Cave's disinformation,' a senior CIA analyst explains."
Reprimand by William Webster
Director of Central Intelligence William WebsterWilliam Hedgcock Webster
William Hedgcock Webster is an American attorney, jurist, and current Chairman of the Homeland Security Advisory Council. Previously Webster was the 3rd Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1978 to 1987 and Director of Central Intelligence from 1987 to 1991...
formally reprimanded Allen for failing to fully comply with the DCI's request for full cooperation in the agency's internal Iran-Contra scandal investigation. After failing to have the reprimand lifted through the regular appeal process, Allen retained future DCI James Woolsey as an attorney and was successful in applying pressure to have the reprimand lifted.
Mark Perry observes "Ironically, Allen's attack on Webster was as unjustified as Webster's reprimand." The reprimand stemmed from a set of missing papers found in Allen's office containing information on the arms-for-hostages deal. Allen claimed they had been inadvertently overlooked in a messy office. Supporters of Allen pointed out that Webster reprimanded the one person in the CIA who had brought his suspicions of a funds diversion to Robert Gates. Others asserted that Allen simply did not respect Webster.
Gulf War: warning of war
- Richard L. Russell, Political Science Quarterly, Summer 2002:
- "One high-level intelligence official on the National Intelligence CouncilNational Intelligence CouncilThe National Intelligence Council is the center for midterm and long-term strategic thinking within the United States Intelligence Community . It was formed in 1979...
(NIC), charged with advising the DCI, was more forward leaning than the analytic judgments published in the NID. The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Warning Charles Allen on July 25 [1998] issued a 'warning of war' memorandum in which he stressed that Iraq had nearly achieved the capability to launch a corps-sized operation of sufficient mass to occupy much of Kuwait. The memo judged that the chances of a military operation of some sort at better than 60 percent."
Gulf War: bombing of Amiriyah shelter
Allen supported the selection of bomb targets during the first Gulf War. He coordinated intelligence with Colonel John Warden, who headed the Air Force's planning cell known as "Checkmate." On February 10, 1991 Allen presented his estimate to Col. Warden that Public Shelter Number 25 in the Southwestern Baghdad suburb of Amiriyah had become an alternative command post and showed no sign of being used as a civilian bomb shelter.Satellite photos and electronic intercepts indicating this alternative use were regarded as circumstantial and unconvincing to Brigadier General Buster Glosson
Buster Glosson
Lieutenant General Buster Cleveland Glosson was the deputy chief of staff for plans and operations at the headquarters for the U.S. Air Force in Washington D.C. He was responsible to the secretary of the Air Force and chief of staff for the planning, operations, requirements and force structure...
, who had primary responsibility for targeting. Glosson's comment was that the assessment wasn't "worth a shit." A human source in Iraq, who had previously proven accurate warned the CIA that Iraqi intelligence had begun operating from the shelter. On February 11, the Amiriyah shelter
Amiriyah shelter
The Amiriyah shelter bombing was an aerial attack that killed more than 408 civilians on February 13, 1991 during the Gulf War, when an air-raid shelter , also referred to as the Al Firdos C3 bunker by the U.S. military, in the Amiriyah neighborhood of Baghdad, Iraq was destroyed by the USAF with...
was added to the Air Force's attack plan. At 4:30 am the morning of February 13, two F-117 stealth bombers each dropped a 2,000 pound, laser-guided, GBU-27 munition on the shelter. The first cut through ten feet of reinforced concrete before a time-delayed fuze exploded. Minutes later the second bomb followed the path cut by the first bomb.
In the shelter at the time of the bombing were hundreds of Iraqi civilians. More than 400 people, mostly women and children were killed. Men and boys over the age of 15 had left the shelter to give the women and children some privacy. Jeremy Bowen
Jeremy Bowen
Jeremy Francis John Bowen is a Welsh journalist and television presenter. He was the BBC's Middle East correspondent based in Jerusalem between 1995 and 2000, and has been its Middle East Editor since 2005.-Background:...
, a BBC correspondent, was one of the first television reporters on the scene. Bowen was given access to the site and did not find evidence of military use.
Australia
From 1974 to 1977, he was stationed in Canberra, Australia, in an intelligence liaison capacity. Served under CIA Station Chiefs M. Corely Wonus (1934–1992) and John Walker (1921–2002).External links
- David E. Kaplan, "Mission Impossible: The inside story of how a band of reformers tried—and failed—to change America's spy agencies", U.S. News & World Report, August 2, 2004.
- Scott Shane, "With Only Reputations at Stake, Talk on C.I.A. Report Turns to How Much to Publish", New York Times, August 27, 2005.