Aerial victory standards of World War I
Encyclopedia
During World War I, the national air services involved developed their own methods of assessing and assigning credit for aerial victories.
The victory scores of the pilots represented at List of World War I flying aces often cannot be definitive, but are based on itemized lists that are the best available sources of information. Loss of records (especially records of casualties and lost aircraft, which are at their best a very good guide to the degree of over-claiming) by mischance and the passage of time – and in fact the detail to which such records were kept in the first place – often complicates the reconstruction of the actual count for a given ace.
World War I began the historical experience that has shown that approximately five percent of combat pilots account for the majority of air to air victories in warfare.
Although the Belgian system of counting victories supposedly mirrored the French system more than the British one, victory lists for Belgian aces still contain confirmed claims for FTL (forced to land) and OOC (out of control) victories. Inspection of the Belgian pilots' victory lists also show victories being shared without being fractionally divided.
An enemy craft independently witnessed falling in flames;
An enemy craft independently witnessed crashing to earth;
An enemy craft independently witnessed disintegrating while in flight;
An enemy craft falling into captivity behind the battle lines of the French or their allies.
Probable victories would not count on a pilot's score, although they would be noted. Examples of probable victories could be enemy craft falling out of control but not seen to impact, or a claim lacking independent confirmation.
Observers as well as pilots could become aces. Victories could be shared, and counted as an addition of one to the score of each “victor” rather than being divided fractionally. In some cases, a single destroyed German or Austro-Hungarian aircraft could add to the scores of half a dozen or more French fliers.
Counting of “aerial victories” by the British was shaped the high command’s determination to sustain an ongoing aerial offensive, as well as the prevailing westerly winds on the Western Front. From the start, the British counted actions that foiled German intentions as victorious. Their count system was skewed toward recognizing the moral victory of thwarting enemy offensive actions as well as the physical one of destroying his aircraft.
1) A British pilot of the Royal Flying Corps
and Royal Naval Air Service
could be credited with a victory for destroying an enemy plane, for driving it down out of control, capturing it, or destroying an enemy observation balloon. In the earliest days of aerial combat, in 1915 and 1916, victories could also be awarded for forcing an enemy aircraft to land in either Allied or enemy territory.
2) By 1917, the number of "out of control", "driven down", and "forced to land" victories were overloading the scoring system. As aerial combat soared to the point where British pilots might submit 50 claims on a given day, the count system became overwhelmed. By May 1918, the new Royal Air Force supposedly quit reporting "out of control" victories as part of pilots' scores, but still credited them to pilots for purposes of awarding decorations. Victories were limited to enemy aircraft destroyed, enemy airplanes driven down out of control if they seemed so damaged they would crash, and airplanes captured. Squadron, Brigade, and Wing headquarters all kept track of individual and unit scores.
3) The approval system began with a Combat Report from the Squadron submitted to Wing HQ. They in turn passed the report on to Brigade HQ. Either Wing or Brigade could approve or disapprove it; sometimes one would confirm the victory while the other would not.
4) Victories were reported by RFC HQ via Communiqué. Deadline for the daily Communiqué (nicknamed “Comic Cuts” by RFC pilots) was 1600 hours (4 PM). Following a system that did not always report an event on the day it actually occurred added to the confusion caused by dual reporting.
5) In cases where more than one pilot (or observer) was involved in a British victory practice was especially inconsistent. Since after all only one enemy aircraft had been destroyed, the victory at unit level (to the squadron or wing for instance) was counted as one. On the other hand in some cases all pilots concerned might receive a full credit to his personal score, as victories at this time were not divided fractionally, in the way that became common practice later. As a striking example of this, no fewer than twelve Royal Flying Corps pilots each claimed a victory because they helped destroy an Albatros D.III
on 8 April 1917. However, some squadrons counted such victories only to the unit concerned without crediting them to an individual, or counted “shared” scores separately from a particular pilot’s “solo” victories. In the case of two-seater crews, both pilot and observer might each receive credit for a victory. The usual rule of thumb credited all victories to the pilot of a Sopwith 1½ Strutter
or Bristol F.2 Fighter
two-seater, but the observer/gunner was credited only for those instances where he fired his weaponry. Some squadrons kept separate lists of pilot and observer aces; some did not.
6) Unlike other air forces of the time, British authorities did not necessarily require independent ground verification of a victory to award credit, although many British air victories were in practice supported by such evidence.
2. Other Allied Powers pilots and/or ground observers could independently confirm an enemy's destruction.
3. Victories could be shared, with more than one pilot and/or gunner receiving full credit for a victory.
4. The system codified by Pier Piccio (an ace and by then the Inspector of Fighter Units) in Istruzione provvisoria di impiego delle Squadriglie da Caccia ("Provisional Instruction for the Use of the Fighter Squadrons") in June 1918 called for at least two confirmations from artillery, balloon, or frontline observers.
5. In January 1919, the intelligence branch of Commando Generale di Aeronautica ("General Command of Aeronautics") hastily drew up a list of pilots credited with any aerial victories during the war; evaluative criteria is unknown, thus casting doubt on the final totals.
The U.S. Army Air Service would adopt French standards for evaluating American victories scored for the USAAS, with one exception–during the summer of 1918, while flying under operational control of the British, the 17th Aero Squadron and the 148th Aero Squadron naturally used British standards.
American observers could become aces. Victories could be shared between aviators. USAAS records, which tracked only those victories scored by Americans in the USAAS, showed 1,513 victories were credited to individual pilots or observers for the destruction of 756 German airplanes and 76 observation balloons; 341 of the victories were shared to some extent, proving that the sharing of victories was common enough to be the norm. However, the USAAS did not track victories won by Americans in other countries' air forces.
Austria-Hungary
Every aircrew member significantly contributing to the defeat of an enemy aircraft was credited with a full victory. All victories counted equally, whether the aviator scored them as a fighter pilot, a reconnaissance pilot, or an aerial observer/gunner.
The victory scores of the pilots represented at List of World War I flying aces often cannot be definitive, but are based on itemized lists that are the best available sources of information. Loss of records (especially records of casualties and lost aircraft, which are at their best a very good guide to the degree of over-claiming) by mischance and the passage of time – and in fact the detail to which such records were kept in the first place – often complicates the reconstruction of the actual count for a given ace.
World War I began the historical experience that has shown that approximately five percent of combat pilots account for the majority of air to air victories in warfare.
Belgium
Enemy aircraft had to fall within friendly lines in a nation partially occupied by the enemy, or be seen by friendly ground troops falling within German lines, to be counted. Confirmation by fellow friendly pilots was not allowed. Thus, unconfirmed claims outnumbered official victories.Although the Belgian system of counting victories supposedly mirrored the French system more than the British one, victory lists for Belgian aces still contain confirmed claims for FTL (forced to land) and OOC (out of control) victories. Inspection of the Belgian pilots' victory lists also show victories being shared without being fractionally divided.
France
French victory confirmation standards were strict. Credit was given only for the destruction of an enemy aircraft, and the destruction had to be witnessed an independent witness, such as an artillery observer, infantryman, or another pilot. The victories certified generally fell into one of four categories of destruction:An enemy craft independently witnessed falling in flames;
An enemy craft independently witnessed crashing to earth;
An enemy craft independently witnessed disintegrating while in flight;
An enemy craft falling into captivity behind the battle lines of the French or their allies.
Probable victories would not count on a pilot's score, although they would be noted. Examples of probable victories could be enemy craft falling out of control but not seen to impact, or a claim lacking independent confirmation.
Observers as well as pilots could become aces. Victories could be shared, and counted as an addition of one to the score of each “victor” rather than being divided fractionally. In some cases, a single destroyed German or Austro-Hungarian aircraft could add to the scores of half a dozen or more French fliers.
Great Britain and the British Commonwealth
The British “system” was essentially more casual and inconsistent than that of their enemies, and to a large degree their allies. The British high command in fact never officially recognised an “ace system” – preferring that the efforts of their air services be recognised as “team effort”, and recognising the importance of the achievements of reconnaissance and bomber pilots, who had far less opportunity to build up big scores of enemy aircraft destroyed. Talk of British “standards” can only be based on analysis of actual practice, which was very far from consistent.Counting of “aerial victories” by the British was shaped the high command’s determination to sustain an ongoing aerial offensive, as well as the prevailing westerly winds on the Western Front. From the start, the British counted actions that foiled German intentions as victorious. Their count system was skewed toward recognizing the moral victory of thwarting enemy offensive actions as well as the physical one of destroying his aircraft.
1) A British pilot of the Royal Flying Corps
Royal Flying Corps
The Royal Flying Corps was the over-land air arm of the British military during most of the First World War. During the early part of the war, the RFC's responsibilities were centred on support of the British Army, via artillery co-operation and photographic reconnaissance...
and Royal Naval Air Service
Royal Naval Air Service
The Royal Naval Air Service or RNAS was the air arm of the Royal Navy until near the end of the First World War, when it merged with the British Army's Royal Flying Corps to form a new service , the Royal Air Force...
could be credited with a victory for destroying an enemy plane, for driving it down out of control, capturing it, or destroying an enemy observation balloon. In the earliest days of aerial combat, in 1915 and 1916, victories could also be awarded for forcing an enemy aircraft to land in either Allied or enemy territory.
2) By 1917, the number of "out of control", "driven down", and "forced to land" victories were overloading the scoring system. As aerial combat soared to the point where British pilots might submit 50 claims on a given day, the count system became overwhelmed. By May 1918, the new Royal Air Force supposedly quit reporting "out of control" victories as part of pilots' scores, but still credited them to pilots for purposes of awarding decorations. Victories were limited to enemy aircraft destroyed, enemy airplanes driven down out of control if they seemed so damaged they would crash, and airplanes captured. Squadron, Brigade, and Wing headquarters all kept track of individual and unit scores.
3) The approval system began with a Combat Report from the Squadron submitted to Wing HQ. They in turn passed the report on to Brigade HQ. Either Wing or Brigade could approve or disapprove it; sometimes one would confirm the victory while the other would not.
4) Victories were reported by RFC HQ via Communiqué. Deadline for the daily Communiqué (nicknamed “Comic Cuts” by RFC pilots) was 1600 hours (4 PM). Following a system that did not always report an event on the day it actually occurred added to the confusion caused by dual reporting.
5) In cases where more than one pilot (or observer) was involved in a British victory practice was especially inconsistent. Since after all only one enemy aircraft had been destroyed, the victory at unit level (to the squadron or wing for instance) was counted as one. On the other hand in some cases all pilots concerned might receive a full credit to his personal score, as victories at this time were not divided fractionally, in the way that became common practice later. As a striking example of this, no fewer than twelve Royal Flying Corps pilots each claimed a victory because they helped destroy an Albatros D.III
Albatros D.III
The Albatros D.III was a biplane fighter aircraft used by the Imperial German Army Air Service and the Austro-Hungarian Air Service during World War I. The D.III was flown by many top German aces, including Manfred von Richthofen, Ernst Udet, Erich Löwenhardt, Kurt Wolff, and Karl Emil Schäfer...
on 8 April 1917. However, some squadrons counted such victories only to the unit concerned without crediting them to an individual, or counted “shared” scores separately from a particular pilot’s “solo” victories. In the case of two-seater crews, both pilot and observer might each receive credit for a victory. The usual rule of thumb credited all victories to the pilot of a Sopwith 1½ Strutter
Sopwith 1½ Strutter
The Sopwith 1½ Strutter was a British one or two-seat biplane multi-role aircraft of the First World War. It is significant as the first British-designed two seater tractor fighter, and the first British aircraft to enter service with a synchronised machine gun...
or Bristol F.2 Fighter
Bristol F.2 Fighter
The Bristol F.2 Fighter was a British two-seat biplane fighter and reconnaissance aircraft of the First World War flown by the Royal Flying Corps. It is often simply called the Bristol Fighter or popularly the "Brisfit" or "Biff". Despite being a two-seater, the F.2B proved to be an agile aircraft...
two-seater, but the observer/gunner was credited only for those instances where he fired his weaponry. Some squadrons kept separate lists of pilot and observer aces; some did not.
6) Unlike other air forces of the time, British authorities did not necessarily require independent ground verification of a victory to award credit, although many British air victories were in practice supported by such evidence.
Italy
1. The enemy aircraft fell in Italian-held territory and could be confirmed, or2. Other Allied Powers pilots and/or ground observers could independently confirm an enemy's destruction.
3. Victories could be shared, with more than one pilot and/or gunner receiving full credit for a victory.
4. The system codified by Pier Piccio (an ace and by then the Inspector of Fighter Units) in Istruzione provvisoria di impiego delle Squadriglie da Caccia ("Provisional Instruction for the Use of the Fighter Squadrons") in June 1918 called for at least two confirmations from artillery, balloon, or frontline observers.
5. In January 1919, the intelligence branch of Commando Generale di Aeronautica ("General Command of Aeronautics") hastily drew up a list of pilots credited with any aerial victories during the war; evaluative criteria is unknown, thus casting doubt on the final totals.
USA
Pilots from the USA had their victory totals defined several different ways. If and when they served with British aviation, their victories were determined via British methods; indeed, no fewer than 40 American aces served solely in British units. It was equally true that Americans serving in French units were evaluated via French standards; there were just four American aces who served solely in French units.The U.S. Army Air Service would adopt French standards for evaluating American victories scored for the USAAS, with one exception–during the summer of 1918, while flying under operational control of the British, the 17th Aero Squadron and the 148th Aero Squadron naturally used British standards.
American observers could become aces. Victories could be shared between aviators. USAAS records, which tracked only those victories scored by Americans in the USAAS, showed 1,513 victories were credited to individual pilots or observers for the destruction of 756 German airplanes and 76 observation balloons; 341 of the victories were shared to some extent, proving that the sharing of victories was common enough to be the norm. However, the USAAS did not track victories won by Americans in other countries' air forces.