South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe
Encyclopedia
South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498 (1986), is an important U.S. Supreme Court precedent for aboriginal title in the United States
decided in the wake of Oneida Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State (1985) ["Oneida II"]. Distinguishing Oneida II, the Court held that federal policy did not preclude the application of a state statute of limitations
to the land claim of a tribe that had been terminated
, such as the Catawba tribe.
The Court remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
to determine whether South Carolina
's statute of limitations applied to the facts of the case. All together, the Fourth Circuit heard oral arguments in the case seven times, six of those times sitting en banc
, i.e. all the judges on the Circuit rather than a panel of three (although the Circuit wrote only five published opinions). The Fourth Circuit determined that the limitations statute only barred the claim against those defendants that could satisfy the standards of adverse possession
and upheld the trial court's denial of a defendant class certification.
These rulings would have required the Catawbas to file individual lawsuits against the estimated 60,000 landowners in the area. The complaints were prepared and printed, but the parties reached a settlement before the date on which the Catawbas would have been required to file the individual complaints. Congress ratified the settlement
, extinguishing all aboriginal title held by the Catawbas in exchange for $50,000,000—$32,000,000 paid by the federal government and $18,000,000 paid by the state.
, between the Catawba and the King of England guaranteed 144,000 acres of land to the Catawba in modern-day northern South Carolina. The "Tract of Land of Fifteen Miles square" was the Catawba's sole reservation, having ceded to the British the entirety of the rest of their claim to North and South Carolina in 1760 and 1763.
By 1840, nearly all of the Catawba reservation had been leased to non-Indians. After the Revolution, and decades after the passage of the federal Nonintercourse Act requiring Congressional consent for conveyances of Indian lands, South Carolina purchased 144,000 acre tract in 1840 with the Treaty of Nation Ford, without federal involvement. The Treaty provided that the tribe should receive $5,000 worth of land, $2,500, and nine annual payments of $1,500. In 1842, the state purchased a 630-acre reservation for the tribe, which was still held in trust by the state for the tribe at the time of litigation.
Between 1900 and 1942, the tribe lobbied the state to resolve the dispute. The tribe also lobbied the federal government; for example, in 1910 a federal Indian agent advised the tribe the federal government would not litigate the tribe's claim on their behalf. In 1943, the tribe, state, and Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
whereby the state purchased 3,434 acres for the tribe and conveyed the land to the Department of Interior in trust for the tribe; the agreement did not require the Catawba to renounce their claim against the state. Under the agreement, the tribe also adopted a BIA-approved constitution and received federal benefits.
In 1959, pursuant to federal Indian termination policy
, Congress authorized the division of the Catawba tribe's assets pursuant to the Catawba Division of Assets Act (the "termination act"). The BIA reassured the tribe that termination would not jeopardize the tribe's claim against the state. The termination act provided that all state laws would apply to the tribe as if they were non-Indians.
In 1975, the Catawbas incorporated under South Carolina law as a non-profit. By the time of the lawsuit, the town of Rock Hill, South Carolina
had developed within the former 144,000 acre tract.
(NARF).
All members of the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
recused
themselves from the case. Therefore, Judge Joseph Putnam Willson
of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
was designated to try the case by Chief Justice Burger. Wilson decided to resolve the merits before reaching the plaintiff's motion to certify the defendant class. Wilson granted summary judgement to the defendants.
reversed. The Circuit reheard the case en banc
with the same result. The Fourth Circuit interpreted the termination act to apply only to the tribal members, not the tribe itself.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and the United States Solicitor General
joined the defendants at oral argument.
, for a majority of six, held that the South Carolina statute of limitations applied to the Catawba's claim, but did not reach the issue of whether it barred the tribe's claim.
The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the termination act, stating: "The canon of construction regarding the resolution of ambiguities in favor of Indians, however, does not permit reliance on ambiguities that do not exist; nor does it permit disregard of the clearly expressed intent of Congress." Thus, having concluded that the tribe itself was terminated, the Court held that the statute of limitations should apply:
As for the BIA's assurance, the Court that only meant that the termination act did not terminate the claim, not that the statute of limitations would not begin to run. Because the Court of Appeals had only held that the statute of limitation did not apply, not that it would not bar the claim if it applied, and the District Court had held the claim barred, the Court remanded to the Court of Appeals to pass on that conclusion of the District Court.
Justice Harry Blackmun
, joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor
and Thurgood Marshall
dissented.
Noting that the Catawba's claims arose from the federal Constitution, federal treaties, and a federal statute, the dissent argued: "These are federal claims and the statute of limitations is thus a matter of federal law. Where, as here, Congress has not specified a statute of limitations, federal courts generally borrow the most closely analogous limitations period under state law, but only if application of the state limitations period would not frustrate federal policy." In determining whether federal policy would bar the borrowing of the state statute of limitations—as it had in Oneida II—the dissent would have relied on the Indian law canon of construction. To this end, the dissent noted:
The dissent did not find the statute as clear as the majority did. Moreover, the dissent argued that the termination statute undid only the statutory restraint on alienation (the Nonintercourse Act), not the common law restraint on alienation:
In a footnote, the dissent further noted that:
The dissent also rejected the suggestion by the majority that the tribe's gradual assimilation weakened its claim:
Finally, the dissent repeated Justice Black's famous Tuscarora rule
: "[g]reat nations, like great men, should keep their word."
; in September 1987, a mere three weeks after receiving the request, the South Caroline Supreme Court returned the question unanswered.
Certification having been declined, the Fourth Circuit, again en banc
, held 4-2 that the statute of limitations did not bar the tribe's claim, finding that there was a presumption of possession within the 10 year limitations period. In other words, the court held that the Catawba's claim would only be time-barred as to defendants who were able to demonstrate adverse possession
, without tacking
except by inheritance. Thus, the court would look for a continuous ten-year period of possession for each defendant land-owner for the period between July 12, 1962 (the date of termination) and October 28, 1980 (the filing of the complaint). Further, the court rejected the defendant's other affirmative defense that the claim was not record in South Carolina's Registry of Mesne Conveyances and challenge to the jurisdiction of the court. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari
after this ruling.
On remand, the District Court (still Judge Wilson) decided to complete the resolution of the limitations issue before reaching the issue of whether to certify the defendant class. This caused the plaintiffs to apply to the Fourth Circuit for mandamus
(an order compelling the District Judge to certify the class), which the Fourth Circuit (still en banc) unanimously denied. Thereafter, the District Court—after soliciting dozens of affidavit
s to show adverse possession, as articulated by the Fourth Circuit—granted summary judgement to many of the landowner-defendants and the Fourth Circuit (still en banc) affirmed in part and reversed in part, and vacated and remanded. Again, the Circuit permitted tacking where the transfer was by operation of law or by will. The U.S. Supreme Court declined certiorari to review this decision.
Again on remand, the District Court denied certification, arguing that each land-owner's defense of adverse possession would require individual factual determinations. Because Judge Wilson again refused to certify the question for appeal, the Catawba again sought mandamus, which the Fourth Circuit (en banc) denied. On the mandamus appeal, the Fourth Circuit declined to resolve the issue of whether the statute of limitations was tolled
against the non-named defendant class members.
Thus, the Catawba prepared to file 60,000 separate complaints against individual landowners in the time remaining before October 1992 (the Catawba's interpretation of when the, even tolled, limitations period would run). The complaints were drafted and printed, and if filed, "would have been the largest single filing of separate complaints in the history of the federal court system."
on the theory that the BIA had misrepresented the effect that the termination act would have on tribe's land claim. The Claims Court dismissed this action on both the statute of limitations in the Indian Claims Commission
Act and the Claims Court's own statute of limitations in 1991. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirmed in 1993, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari that year.
to toll the Catawba's statute of limitation for one year, in order to increase the time to negotiate a settlement. A settlement was negotiated wherein the Catawba's aboriginal title would be extinguished in exchange for $50,000,000. Legislation approving the settlement (as is required for any settlement extinguishing aboriginal title) was passed in August 1993, soon after Congress passed President Bill Clinton
's omnibus budget legislation
. In addition, the settlement act repealed the Catawba termination act. The tribe voted to approve the settlement.
According to Christie: "The inherently complex nature of a claim such as this as well as the hardships caused by all concerned during its protracted existence vividly demonstrate that litigation is an unfortunate vehicle by which to resolve essentially political Indian land-claim issues and that a legislative settlement by Congress such as the one ultimately reached is preferable."
Aboriginal title in the United States
The United States was the first jurisdiction to acknowledge the common law doctrine of aboriginal title...
decided in the wake of Oneida Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State (1985) ["Oneida II"]. Distinguishing Oneida II, the Court held that federal policy did not preclude the application of a state statute of limitations
Statute of limitations
A statute of limitations is an enactment in a common law legal system that sets the maximum time after an event that legal proceedings based on that event may be initiated...
to the land claim of a tribe that had been terminated
Indian termination policy
Indian termination was the policy of the United States from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s. The belief was that Native Americans would be better off if assimilated as individuals into mainstream American society. To that end, Congress proposed to end the special relationship between tribes and the...
, such as the Catawba tribe.
The Court remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is a federal court located in Richmond, Virginia, with appellate jurisdiction over the district courts in the following districts:*District of Maryland*Eastern District of North Carolina...
to determine whether South Carolina
South Carolina
South Carolina is a state in the Deep South of the United States that borders Georgia to the south, North Carolina to the north, and the Atlantic Ocean to the east. Originally part of the Province of Carolina, the Province of South Carolina was one of the 13 colonies that declared independence...
's statute of limitations applied to the facts of the case. All together, the Fourth Circuit heard oral arguments in the case seven times, six of those times sitting en banc
En banc
En banc, in banc, in banco or in bank is a French term used to refer to the hearing of a legal case where all judges of a court will hear the case , rather than a panel of them. It is often used for unusually complex cases or cases considered to be of greater importance...
, i.e. all the judges on the Circuit rather than a panel of three (although the Circuit wrote only five published opinions). The Fourth Circuit determined that the limitations statute only barred the claim against those defendants that could satisfy the standards of adverse possession
Adverse possession
Adverse possession is a process by which premises can change ownership. It is a common law concept concerning the title to real property . By adverse possession, title to another's real property can be acquired without compensation, by holding the property in a manner that conflicts with the true...
and upheld the trial court's denial of a defendant class certification.
These rulings would have required the Catawbas to file individual lawsuits against the estimated 60,000 landowners in the area. The complaints were prepared and printed, but the parties reached a settlement before the date on which the Catawbas would have been required to file the individual complaints. Congress ratified the settlement
Indian Land Claims Settlements
Indian Land Claims Settlements are settlements of Native American land claims by the United States Congress, codified in 25 U.S.C. ch. 19.In several instances, these settlements ended live claims of aboriginal title in the United States...
, extinguishing all aboriginal title held by the Catawbas in exchange for $50,000,000—$32,000,000 paid by the federal government and $18,000,000 paid by the state.
Background
The Treaty of Fort Augusta (1763), which immediately followed the Royal Proclamation of 1763Royal Proclamation of 1763
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was issued October 7, 1763, by King George III following Great Britain's acquisition of French territory in North America after the end of the French and Indian War/Seven Years' War...
, between the Catawba and the King of England guaranteed 144,000 acres of land to the Catawba in modern-day northern South Carolina. The "Tract of Land of Fifteen Miles square" was the Catawba's sole reservation, having ceded to the British the entirety of the rest of their claim to North and South Carolina in 1760 and 1763.
By 1840, nearly all of the Catawba reservation had been leased to non-Indians. After the Revolution, and decades after the passage of the federal Nonintercourse Act requiring Congressional consent for conveyances of Indian lands, South Carolina purchased 144,000 acre tract in 1840 with the Treaty of Nation Ford, without federal involvement. The Treaty provided that the tribe should receive $5,000 worth of land, $2,500, and nine annual payments of $1,500. In 1842, the state purchased a 630-acre reservation for the tribe, which was still held in trust by the state for the tribe at the time of litigation.
Between 1900 and 1942, the tribe lobbied the state to resolve the dispute. The tribe also lobbied the federal government; for example, in 1910 a federal Indian agent advised the tribe the federal government would not litigate the tribe's claim on their behalf. In 1943, the tribe, state, and Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Indian Affairs
The Bureau of Indian Affairs is an agency of the federal government of the United States within the US Department of the Interior. It is responsible for the administration and management of of land held in trust by the United States for Native Americans in the United States, Native American...
(BIA) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
Memorandum of understanding
A memorandum of understanding is a document describing a bilateral or multilateral agreement between parties. It expresses a convergence of will between the parties, indicating an intended common line of action. It is often used in cases where parties either do not imply a legal commitment or in...
whereby the state purchased 3,434 acres for the tribe and conveyed the land to the Department of Interior in trust for the tribe; the agreement did not require the Catawba to renounce their claim against the state. Under the agreement, the tribe also adopted a BIA-approved constitution and received federal benefits.
In 1959, pursuant to federal Indian termination policy
Indian termination policy
Indian termination was the policy of the United States from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s. The belief was that Native Americans would be better off if assimilated as individuals into mainstream American society. To that end, Congress proposed to end the special relationship between tribes and the...
, Congress authorized the division of the Catawba tribe's assets pursuant to the Catawba Division of Assets Act (the "termination act"). The BIA reassured the tribe that termination would not jeopardize the tribe's claim against the state. The termination act provided that all state laws would apply to the tribe as if they were non-Indians.
In 1975, the Catawbas incorporated under South Carolina law as a non-profit. By the time of the lawsuit, the town of Rock Hill, South Carolina
Rock Hill, South Carolina
Rock Hill is the largest city in York County, South Carolina and the fourth-largest city in the state. It is also the third-largest city of the Charlotte metropolitan area, behind Charlotte and Concord, North Carolina. The population was 71,459 as of . Rock Hill has undergone rapid growth between...
had developed within the former 144,000 acre tract.
District Court
In 1980, the Catawba sued the state of South Carolina and 76 public and private land-owning entities, as named representatives of a defendant class estimated at 27,000 persons. The tribe contended that the Treaty of Nation Ford was void because of the federal Nonintercourse Act and because the state had not lived up to its obligations (by delaying the purchase for 2.5 years, by spending only $2,000 on the new reservation, and buying land for the new reservation from within the old reservation). The tribe sought both possession of the lands and 140 years of trespass damages. The Catawba were represented by the Native American Rights FundNative American Rights Fund
The Native American Rights Fund, also known as NARF, is a non-profit organization that uses existing laws and treaties to ensure that state governments and the national government live up to their legal obligations...
(NARF).
All members of the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina is the federal district court whose jurisdiction is the state of South Carolina...
recused
Recusal
Judicial disqualification, also referred to as recusal, refers to the act of abstaining from participation in an official action such as a legal proceeding due to a conflict of interest of the presiding court official or administrative officer. Applicable statutes or canons of ethics may provide...
themselves from the case. Therefore, Judge Joseph Putnam Willson
Joseph Putnam Willson
Joseph Putnam Willson was a United States federal judge.Born in Bath, New York, Willson received a B.S. from the University of Pennsylvania in 1926 and an LL.B. from Temple University School of Law in 1931. He was in private practice in Smethport, Pennsylvania from 1931 to 1953. He served in the U.S...
of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania sits in Pittsburgh, Erie, and Johnstown, Pennsylvania. It is composed of ten judges as authorized by federal law. The Honorable Judge Gary L. Lancaster is currently Chief Judge of the Western Pennsylvania District...
was designated to try the case by Chief Justice Burger. Wilson decided to resolve the merits before reaching the plaintiff's motion to certify the defendant class. Wilson granted summary judgement to the defendants.
Fourth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth CircuitUnited States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is a federal court located in Richmond, Virginia, with appellate jurisdiction over the district courts in the following districts:*District of Maryland*Eastern District of North Carolina...
reversed. The Circuit reheard the case en banc
En banc
En banc, in banc, in banco or in bank is a French term used to refer to the hearing of a legal case where all judges of a court will hear the case , rather than a panel of them. It is often used for unusually complex cases or cases considered to be of greater importance...
with the same result. The Fourth Circuit interpreted the termination act to apply only to the tribal members, not the tribe itself.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari
Certiorari
Certiorari is a type of writ seeking judicial review, recognized in U.S., Roman, English, Philippine, and other law. Certiorari is the present passive infinitive of the Latin certiorare...
and the United States Solicitor General
United States Solicitor General
The United States Solicitor General is the person appointed to represent the federal government of the United States before the Supreme Court of the United States. The current Solicitor General, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. was confirmed by the United States Senate on June 6, 2011 and sworn in on June...
joined the defendants at oral argument.
Opinion
Majority
Justice John Paul StevensJohn Paul Stevens
John Paul Stevens served as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from December 19, 1975 until his retirement on June 29, 2010. At the time of his retirement, he was the oldest member of the Court and the third-longest serving justice in the Court's history...
, for a majority of six, held that the South Carolina statute of limitations applied to the Catawba's claim, but did not reach the issue of whether it barred the tribe's claim.
The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the termination act, stating: "The canon of construction regarding the resolution of ambiguities in favor of Indians, however, does not permit reliance on ambiguities that do not exist; nor does it permit disregard of the clearly expressed intent of Congress." Thus, having concluded that the tribe itself was terminated, the Court held that the statute of limitations should apply:
Without special federal protection for the Tribe, the state statute of limitations should apply to its claim in this case. For it is well established that federal claims are subject to state statutes of limitations unless there is a federal statute of limitations or a conflict with federal policy. Although federal policy may preclude the ordinary applicability of a state statute of limitations for this type of action in the absence of a specific congressional enactment to the contrary, the Catawba Act clearly suffices to reestablish the usual principle regarding the applicability of the state statute of limitations. In striking contrast to the situation in [Oneida II], the Catawba Act represents an explicit redefinition of the relationship between the Federal Government and the Catawbas; an intentional termination of the special federal protection for the Tribe and its members; and a plain statement that state law applies to the Catawbas as to all “other persons or citizens.”
As for the BIA's assurance, the Court that only meant that the termination act did not terminate the claim, not that the statute of limitations would not begin to run. Because the Court of Appeals had only held that the statute of limitation did not apply, not that it would not bar the claim if it applied, and the District Court had held the claim barred, the Court remanded to the Court of Appeals to pass on that conclusion of the District Court.
Dissent
Harry Blackmun
Harold Andrew Blackmun was an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1970 until 1994. He is best known as the author of Roe v. Wade.- Early years and professional career :...
, joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor
Sandra Day O'Connor
Sandra Day O'Connor is an American jurist who was the first female member of the Supreme Court of the United States. She served as an Associate Justice from 1981 until her retirement from the Court in 2006. O'Connor was appointed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981...
and Thurgood Marshall
Thurgood Marshall
Thurgood Marshall was an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, serving from October 1967 until October 1991...
dissented.
Noting that the Catawba's claims arose from the federal Constitution, federal treaties, and a federal statute, the dissent argued: "These are federal claims and the statute of limitations is thus a matter of federal law. Where, as here, Congress has not specified a statute of limitations, federal courts generally borrow the most closely analogous limitations period under state law, but only if application of the state limitations period would not frustrate federal policy." In determining whether federal policy would bar the borrowing of the state statute of limitations—as it had in Oneida II—the dissent would have relied on the Indian law canon of construction. To this end, the dissent noted:
This rule is not simply a method of breaking ties; it reflects an altogether proper reluctance by the judiciary to assume that Congress has chosen further to disadvantage a people whom our Nation long ago reduced to a state of dependency. The rule is particularly appropriate when the statute in question was passed primarily for the benefit of the Indians, as was the 1959 Division of Assets Act. Absent “clear and plain” language to the contrary, it must be assumed that Congress did not intend to belie its “avowed solicitude” for the Indians with a “backhanded” abrogation or limitation of their rights.
The dissent did not find the statute as clear as the majority did. Moreover, the dissent argued that the termination statute undid only the statutory restraint on alienation (the Nonintercourse Act), not the common law restraint on alienation:
[E]ven if I agreed with the majority that the removal of restraints on alienation should trigger the application of state limitations periods, the 1959 Act lifted only statutory restrictions on the alienation of Catawba land, and the requirement that the Federal Government approve any transfer of the property at issue in this case did not, and does not, stem solely from any federal statute. The land set aside for the Catawbas in 1760 and 1763 was within the Tribe's aboriginal territory, and their claim to the land thus derives from original title as well as from the 18th-century treaties. With respect to original title, at least, the Nonintercourse Act merely “put in statutory form what was or came to be the accepted rule-that the extinguishment of Indian title required the consent of the United States.”
In a footnote, the dissent further noted that:
The federal common-law ruleFederal common lawFederal common law is a term of United States law used to describe common law that is developed by the federal courts, instead of by the courts of the various states...
against alienation of aboriginal title without the consent of the sovereign was recognized as early as [Johnson v. M'IntoshJohnson v. M'IntoshJohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 , is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that held that private citizens could not purchase lands from Native Americans...
(1823)], and it is reflected in the Constitution's Indian Commerce Clause . . . . In Oneida II, the Court rejected a suggestion that Indian common-law rights to tribal lands were somehow swallowed up or pre-empted by the Nonintercourse Act; it made clear that the common law still furnishes an independent basis for legal relief.
The dissent also rejected the suggestion by the majority that the tribe's gradual assimilation weakened its claim:
When an Indian Tribe has been assimilated and dispersed to this extent-and when, as the majority points out, thousands of people now claim interests in the Tribe's ancestral homeland, the Tribe's claim to that land may seem ethereal, and the manner of the Tribe's dispossession may seem of no more than historical interest. But the demands of justice do not cease simply because a wronged people grow less distinctive, or because the rights of innocent third parties must be taken into account in fashioning a remedy. Today's decision seriously handicaps the Catawbas' effort to obtain even partial redress for the illegal expropriation of lands twice pledged to them, and it does so by attributing to Congress, in effect, an unarticulated intent to trick the Indians a century after the property changed hands. From any perspective, there is little to be proud of here.
Finally, the dissent repeated Justice Black's famous Tuscarora rule
Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation
Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, , was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court which determined that the Federal Power Commission was authorized to take lands owned by the Tuscarora Indian tribe by eminent domain under the Federal Power Act for a hydroelectric power...
: "[g]reat nations, like great men, should keep their word."
Subsequent history
On remand, the defendants attempted to certify the question of whether the state statute of limitations barred the claim to the South Carolina Supreme CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
The South Carolina Supreme Court is the highest court in the U.S. state of South Carolina. The court is composed of a Chief Justice and four Associate Justices.-Selection of Justices:...
; in September 1987, a mere three weeks after receiving the request, the South Caroline Supreme Court returned the question unanswered.
Certification having been declined, the Fourth Circuit, again en banc
En banc
En banc, in banc, in banco or in bank is a French term used to refer to the hearing of a legal case where all judges of a court will hear the case , rather than a panel of them. It is often used for unusually complex cases or cases considered to be of greater importance...
, held 4-2 that the statute of limitations did not bar the tribe's claim, finding that there was a presumption of possession within the 10 year limitations period. In other words, the court held that the Catawba's claim would only be time-barred as to defendants who were able to demonstrate adverse possession
Adverse possession
Adverse possession is a process by which premises can change ownership. It is a common law concept concerning the title to real property . By adverse possession, title to another's real property can be acquired without compensation, by holding the property in a manner that conflicts with the true...
, without tacking
Tacking (law)
Tacking is a legal concept arising under the common law relating to competing priorities between two or more security interests arising over the same asset. The concept is best illustrated by way of example....
except by inheritance. Thus, the court would look for a continuous ten-year period of possession for each defendant land-owner for the period between July 12, 1962 (the date of termination) and October 28, 1980 (the filing of the complaint). Further, the court rejected the defendant's other affirmative defense that the claim was not record in South Carolina's Registry of Mesne Conveyances and challenge to the jurisdiction of the court. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari
Certiorari
Certiorari is a type of writ seeking judicial review, recognized in U.S., Roman, English, Philippine, and other law. Certiorari is the present passive infinitive of the Latin certiorare...
after this ruling.
On remand, the District Court (still Judge Wilson) decided to complete the resolution of the limitations issue before reaching the issue of whether to certify the defendant class. This caused the plaintiffs to apply to the Fourth Circuit for mandamus
Mandamus
A writ of mandamus or mandamus , or sometimes mandate, is the name of one of the prerogative writs in the common law, and is "issued by a superior court to compel a lower court or a government officer to perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties correctly".Mandamus is a judicial remedy which...
(an order compelling the District Judge to certify the class), which the Fourth Circuit (still en banc) unanimously denied. Thereafter, the District Court—after soliciting dozens of affidavit
Affidavit
An affidavit is a written sworn statement of fact voluntarily made by an affiant or deponent under an oath or affirmation administered by a person authorized to do so by law. Such statement is witnessed as to the authenticity of the affiant's signature by a taker of oaths, such as a notary public...
s to show adverse possession, as articulated by the Fourth Circuit—granted summary judgement to many of the landowner-defendants and the Fourth Circuit (still en banc) affirmed in part and reversed in part, and vacated and remanded. Again, the Circuit permitted tacking where the transfer was by operation of law or by will. The U.S. Supreme Court declined certiorari to review this decision.
Again on remand, the District Court denied certification, arguing that each land-owner's defense of adverse possession would require individual factual determinations. Because Judge Wilson again refused to certify the question for appeal, the Catawba again sought mandamus, which the Fourth Circuit (en banc) denied. On the mandamus appeal, the Fourth Circuit declined to resolve the issue of whether the statute of limitations was tolled
Tolling (law)
Tolling is a legal doctrine which allows for the pausing or delaying of the running of the period of time set forth by a statute of limitations. Certain traditional conditions will toll a statute of limitations:* Plaintiff is a minor....
against the non-named defendant class members.
Thus, the Catawba prepared to file 60,000 separate complaints against individual landowners in the time remaining before October 1992 (the Catawba's interpretation of when the, even tolled, limitations period would run). The complaints were drafted and printed, and if filed, "would have been the largest single filing of separate complaints in the history of the federal court system."
Parallel Claims Court case
The Catawba also sued the federal government in the United States Claims CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
The United States Court of Federal Claims is a United States federal court that hears monetary claims against the U.S. government. The court is established pursuant to Congress's authority under Article One of the United States Constitution...
on the theory that the BIA had misrepresented the effect that the termination act would have on tribe's land claim. The Claims Court dismissed this action on both the statute of limitations in the Indian Claims Commission
Indian claims commission
The Indian Claims Commission was a judicial panel for relations between the United States Federal Government and Native American tribes. It was established in 1946 by the United States Congress to hear claims of Indian tribes against the United States...
Act and the Claims Court's own statute of limitations in 1991. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
-Vacancies and pending nominations:-List of former judges:-Chief judges:Notwithstanding the foregoing, when the court was initially created, Congress had to resolve which chief judge of the predecessor courts would become the first chief judge...
affirmed in 1993, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari that year.
Settlement
In August 1992, Congress enacted legislation by voice voteVoice vote
A voice vote is a voting method used by deliberative assemblies in which a vote is taken on a topic or motion by responding verbally....
to toll the Catawba's statute of limitation for one year, in order to increase the time to negotiate a settlement. A settlement was negotiated wherein the Catawba's aboriginal title would be extinguished in exchange for $50,000,000. Legislation approving the settlement (as is required for any settlement extinguishing aboriginal title) was passed in August 1993, soon after Congress passed President Bill Clinton
Bill Clinton
William Jefferson "Bill" Clinton is an American politician who served as the 42nd President of the United States from 1993 to 2001. Inaugurated at age 46, he was the third-youngest president. He took office at the end of the Cold War, and was the first president of the baby boomer generation...
's omnibus budget legislation
Omnibus spending bill
An omnibus spending bill is a bill that sets the budget of many departments of the United States government at once. It is one possible outcome of the budget process in the U.S....
. In addition, the settlement act repealed the Catawba termination act. The tribe voted to approve the settlement.
According to Christie: "The inherently complex nature of a claim such as this as well as the hardships caused by all concerned during its protracted existence vividly demonstrate that litigation is an unfortunate vehicle by which to resolve essentially political Indian land-claim issues and that a legislative settlement by Congress such as the one ultimately reached is preferable."