Shapiro v. Thompson
Encyclopedia
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969), was a Supreme Court
decision that helped to establish a fundamental "right to travel" in U.S. law
. Although the Constitution does not mention the right to travel, it is implied by the other rights given in the Constitution. (Although the right was recognized under the Equal Protection clause in this case, pre-Fourteenth Amendment, the right to travel was understood as protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause (Article IV), as a privilege of citizenship, and therefore might have been applied to the states under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Amendment XIV, as J. Stewart wanted.)
law denying an application for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
assistance to appellee Vivian Marie Thompson, a 19-year-old unwed mother
of one child and pregnant with her second child, because she had changed her residence in June 1966 from Dorchester, Massachusetts
to Hartford, Connecticut
, to live with her mother. When her mother was no longer able to support her, she and her infant son moved to her own apartment in Hartford in August 1966. Thompson could not work or enter a work training program. Her application for assistance, filed in August 1966, was denied in November solely on the ground that she had not lived in the State for a year before her application was filed, a requirement under Connecticut law.
in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
where a three-judge panel, one judge dissenting, declared the provision of Connecticut law unconstitutional, holding that the waiting-period requirement is unconstitutional because it "has a chilling effect on the right to travel" and also holding that the provision violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment
, "because the denial of relief to those resident in the State for less than a year is not based on any permissible purpose but is solely designed, as 'Connecticut states quite frankly,' 'to protect its fisc by discouraging entry of those who come needing relief'" (decision of the Court).
This case examined laws that required a period of residence in a jurisdiction before welfare benefits would become available to a new resident. The state asserted that its interest in requiring this waiting period was to deter needy citizens from other states from coming to the state for the sole purpose of receiving superior welfare benefits. The Court held that the purpose of inhibiting the migration of needy people was a constitutionally impermissible objective. The state also argued that this requirement was an attempt to apportion services based on how much residence have contributed (i.e. longer residence means more taxes paid) but such apportionment is not allowed under the Equal protection clause.
The state asserted that the requirement served the states interest in efficient administration of welfare by providing an objective test of residence, allowing for planning a budget, minimize fraud, and encourage entry into the workforce before seeking welfare. Because the constitutional right to free movement between states was implicated, the Court applied a standard of strict scrutiny and held none of these interests were sufficient to sustain the waiting requirement. The Court held that there was no evidence that the requirement would make planning a budget more predictable, and that if a waiting period encouraged new residents to enter the workforce it should also be applied to current residents, and that the interest in deterring fraud and having an objective verification of residence could be better served by less restrictive means (e.g. calling welfare recipients periodically).
Finally the Court rejected the argument that Congress had authorized the waiting period because Congress does not have to power to authorize violations of the equal protection clause.
Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justice Black, dissented. Congress has the power to authorize these restrictions under the commerce clause. Under the commerce clause, Congress needs only a rational basis to a legitimate state interest, not a necessary relation to a compelling interest.
Justice Harlan also dissented, arguing that the requirement of a compelling interest and necessary relationship between the law and that interest serve as an example of intermediate scrutiny.
Case citation
Case citation is the system used in many countries to identify the decisions in past court cases, either in special series of books called reporters or law reports, or in a 'neutral' form which will identify a decision wherever it was reported...
(1969), was a Supreme Court
Supreme Court of the United States
The Supreme Court of the United States is the highest court in the United States. It has ultimate appellate jurisdiction over all state and federal courts, and original jurisdiction over a small range of cases...
decision that helped to establish a fundamental "right to travel" in U.S. law
Law of the United States
The law of the United States consists of many levels of codified and uncodified forms of law, of which the most important is the United States Constitution, the foundation of the federal government of the United States...
. Although the Constitution does not mention the right to travel, it is implied by the other rights given in the Constitution. (Although the right was recognized under the Equal Protection clause in this case, pre-Fourteenth Amendment, the right to travel was understood as protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause (Article IV), as a privilege of citizenship, and therefore might have been applied to the states under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Amendment XIV, as J. Stewart wanted.)
Facts of the case
The Connecticut Welfare Department invoked ConnecticutConnecticut
Connecticut is a state in the New England region of the northeastern United States. It is bordered by Rhode Island to the east, Massachusetts to the north, and the state of New York to the west and the south .Connecticut is named for the Connecticut River, the major U.S. river that approximately...
law denying an application for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Aid to Families with Dependent Children was a federal assistance program in effect from 1935 to 1996, which was administered by the United States Department of Health and Human Services...
assistance to appellee Vivian Marie Thompson, a 19-year-old unwed mother
Unwed Mother
Unwed Mother is a novel by Gloria D. Miklowitz. First published in 1977, it was reprinted in 1985. The story deals with a fourteen-year-old girl's pregnancy and her relationship with her baby's father.-Story:...
of one child and pregnant with her second child, because she had changed her residence in June 1966 from Dorchester, Massachusetts
Dorchester, Massachusetts
Dorchester is a dissolved municipality and current neighborhood of Boston, Massachusetts, United States. It is named after the town of Dorchester in the English county of Dorset, from which Puritans emigrated and is today endearingly nicknamed "Dot" by its residents. Dorchester, including a large...
to Hartford, Connecticut
Hartford, Connecticut
Hartford is the capital of the U.S. state of Connecticut. The seat of Hartford County until Connecticut disbanded county government in 1960, it is the second most populous city on New England's largest river, the Connecticut River. As of the 2010 Census, Hartford's population was 124,775, making...
, to live with her mother. When her mother was no longer able to support her, she and her infant son moved to her own apartment in Hartford in August 1966. Thompson could not work or enter a work training program. Her application for assistance, filed in August 1966, was denied in November solely on the ground that she had not lived in the State for a year before her application was filed, a requirement under Connecticut law.
Case history
Thompson brought suitLawsuit
A lawsuit or "suit in law" is a civil action brought in a court of law in which a plaintiff, a party who claims to have incurred loss as a result of a defendant's actions, demands a legal or equitable remedy. The defendant is required to respond to the plaintiff's complaint...
in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut is the Federal district court whose jurisdiction is the state of Connecticut. The court has offices in Bridgeport, Hartford and New Haven. Appeals from the court are heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit...
where a three-judge panel, one judge dissenting, declared the provision of Connecticut law unconstitutional, holding that the waiting-period requirement is unconstitutional because it "has a chilling effect on the right to travel" and also holding that the provision violated the Equal Protection Clause
Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause, part of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, provides that "no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"...
of the Fourteenth Amendment
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was adopted on July 9, 1868, as one of the Reconstruction Amendments.Its Citizenship Clause provides a broad definition of citizenship that overruled the Dred Scott v...
, "because the denial of relief to those resident in the State for less than a year is not based on any permissible purpose but is solely designed, as 'Connecticut states quite frankly,' 'to protect its fisc by discouraging entry of those who come needing relief'" (decision of the Court).
This case examined laws that required a period of residence in a jurisdiction before welfare benefits would become available to a new resident. The state asserted that its interest in requiring this waiting period was to deter needy citizens from other states from coming to the state for the sole purpose of receiving superior welfare benefits. The Court held that the purpose of inhibiting the migration of needy people was a constitutionally impermissible objective. The state also argued that this requirement was an attempt to apportion services based on how much residence have contributed (i.e. longer residence means more taxes paid) but such apportionment is not allowed under the Equal protection clause.
The state asserted that the requirement served the states interest in efficient administration of welfare by providing an objective test of residence, allowing for planning a budget, minimize fraud, and encourage entry into the workforce before seeking welfare. Because the constitutional right to free movement between states was implicated, the Court applied a standard of strict scrutiny and held none of these interests were sufficient to sustain the waiting requirement. The Court held that there was no evidence that the requirement would make planning a budget more predictable, and that if a waiting period encouraged new residents to enter the workforce it should also be applied to current residents, and that the interest in deterring fraud and having an objective verification of residence could be better served by less restrictive means (e.g. calling welfare recipients periodically).
Finally the Court rejected the argument that Congress had authorized the waiting period because Congress does not have to power to authorize violations of the equal protection clause.
Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justice Black, dissented. Congress has the power to authorize these restrictions under the commerce clause. Under the commerce clause, Congress needs only a rational basis to a legitimate state interest, not a necessary relation to a compelling interest.
Justice Harlan also dissented, arguing that the requirement of a compelling interest and necessary relationship between the law and that interest serve as an example of intermediate scrutiny.