emansfield
Regarding the weather it is true that Scott experienced unusually low temperatures and severe blizzards during March 1912, as Susan Saloman demonstrates in her superb book "The Coldest March". However, the point to be made here is that Scott and his men should not have been out on the Barrier in late March, a lesson that they should have learned from their experiences the previous March during the depot laying trips. Of course, they didn't really have any other option, given the choice of transportation, which necessitated both a later start because of the ponies, and a slower rate of travel due to the subsequent man-hauling, but this just underscores the folly of choosing ponies and man-hauling for transportation.
Dehydration is a crucial factor in the success and failure of the respective teams, a factor which is often either overlooked or given only cursory attention, and the differences here are directly attributable to the planning and preparation of the respective teams. Amundsen designed sledge cases which were permanently lashed to the sledges and which had lids that could easily be pried off without removing outer mitts. This enabled easy access to the food and cooking gear, without risk of frostbite, and enabled them to melt drinking water quickly and efficiently at each meal stop. Amundsen makes several references to the copious amounts of fresh water he and his men were drinking on a daily basis. By contrast, Scott's rations and cooking gear were stowed in standard issue Navy equipment boxes, which were lashed to the sledges with ropes and knots in true Navy fashion, and which needed to be undone in order to access the contents. This often meant removing their outer mitts, and sometimes even using bare hands, in order to undo the knots that often became iced-up during travel. This contributed greatly to frostbitten hands, which in turn made it more and more difficult to accomplish. As a result, and coupled with the drastic shortage of fuel due to evaporation, the British were only drinking two or three cups of tea per day each, which was woefully inadequate given the effort expended and the climate, which is one of the driest on earth, especially on the Polar Plateau. This progressive dehydration compounded the exhaustion and undernourishment.
Dehydration is a crucial factor in the success and failure of the respective teams, a factor which is often either overlooked or given only cursory attention, and the differences here are directly attributable to the planning and preparation of the respective teams. Amundsen designed sledge cases which were permanently lashed to the sledges and which had lids that could easily be pried off without removing outer mitts. This enabled easy access to the food and cooking gear, without risk of frostbite, and enabled them to melt drinking water quickly and efficiently at each meal stop. Amundsen makes several references to the copious amounts of fresh water he and his men were drinking on a daily basis. By contrast, Scott's rations and cooking gear were stowed in standard issue Navy equipment boxes, which were lashed to the sledges with ropes and knots in true Navy fashion, and which needed to be undone in order to access the contents. This often meant removing their outer mitts, and sometimes even using bare hands, in order to undo the knots that often became iced-up during travel. This contributed greatly to frostbitten hands, which in turn made it more and more difficult to accomplish. As a result, and coupled with the drastic shortage of fuel due to evaporation, the British were only drinking two or three cups of tea per day each, which was woefully inadequate given the effort expended and the climate, which is one of the driest on earth, especially on the Polar Plateau. This progressive dehydration compounded the exhaustion and undernourishment.